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ABSTRACT
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An Assessment of Alternative Theories
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,
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Ph.D.
,
University of Massachussets
Directed by: Professor William E. Connolly
Three paradigms for the explanation of non-participa-
tion are identified, compared, and evaluated.
"Pluralist" explanations emphasize the apathy of
citizens who freely choose not to participate. Bernard
Berelson suggests present levels of apathy are functional
for American democracy, insulating it from the shock of
intense interest. Robert Dahl sees participation as a
cost, devoid of intrinsic value. However, he argues that
severe political inequality exists, unfairly limiting citi-
zen opportunity to participate.
"Reform" explanations suggest that many citizens are
depoliticized: systematically denied entry points into the
political process. E. E. Schattschneider argues that poli-
tical withdrawal is really rational abstention from a
system that does not meet non-participants' needs. Peter
Bachrach adds that people also withdraw because they are
• • •
ILL
denied participatory structures to help them fashion poli-
tical interests out of subpolitical grievances.
"Radical" explanations emphasize inculcation of apa-
thetic consciousness, and structural pressures against
widespread participation. Herbert Marcuse argues that
people are becoming fully adapted to advanced industrial
society: apathy is an extreme condition of consciousness,
a mortification of political life.
C. Wright Mills provides the best explanation, arguing
that the political realm is subordinated to an apolitical
mass society, preventing people from articulating political
issues out of inchoate troubles.
To explain non-participation, we need to study how
ideology and structural pressures are interpreted by
non-participants. We must go beyond theories that focus on
individual apathy or false consciousness, crudely conceived.
How will the depoliticization required by advanced
capitalism be legitimated? Samuel Huntington suggests we
moderate our activism to prevent overloading the system.
His plea helps legitimate depoliticization by tempering
democratic aspirations, allowing social scientists to
explain future non-participation as individual apathy.
American democracy can be revitalized. A coalition
can be forged for "jobs and peace" to counter corporate
power, thereby stimulating further democratic participation.
iv
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INTRODUCTION
The first two years of the presidency of Ronald Pveagan
are bringing about some of the most dramatic changes in
public policy since the New Deal. Not only has military
spending been radically increased but the role of govern-
ment as a moderating influence on the extremes of
capitalist development is being seriously questioned for
the first time in forty years.
Moreover, the Reagan program to revitalize American
capitalism is based on an economic theory that is largely
untested in national affairs: "supply-side" economics,
high defense spending, lowered taxes, particularly for
businesses and the wealthy, huge Federal budget deficits,
and slashed social programs. All are part of a policy to
shift capital resources to accumulation, augment business
incentive, accelerate corporate growth, further limit the
power of unions, and completely marginalize minorities,
women and the underclass.
Even more remarkable than the scope of the "Reagan
revolution," however, is the narrow political base upon
which it is built. Certainly the Republican right
benefits from a weak Democratic Party, whose own retreat
from welfare state policies is tacit acknowledgement that
1
2these policies no longer work adequately. In 1980, a tired
program saddled to a "weak" and incompetent President
provided the Republicans with an ideal opportunity to reset
the American political agenda. Thus we can explain the
fact that the electoral shift to Reagan did not need, and
was not accompanied by, an ideological shift to the right
among the electorate. Given the increasing decomposition
of the political party structure, neither was it likely to
be the beginning of a realignment into the future of a new
conservative majority based in the Republican Party.
1
Instead the Reagan victory reflects a fundamental
continuity that goes back to the defeat of populism around
the turn of the century: the secular decline, with some
variation, of the percentage of Americans who vote in
Presidential elect ions. 2 The Reagan revolution was ushered
in by a "landslide" in which one out of four eligible
voters chose the conservative candidate, as nearly half the
electorate did not meet what surely is a most minimal
standard for political participation—voting once every
four years.
Political scientists often have asked, why do so many
Americans not participate in political activity, and what
impact does low participation have on the democratic
character of the polity as a whole? As we shall see, the
3answers they give can differ quite radically, even though
they all begin their analysis with a common perception of
low participation and a common commitment to democracy as
the best way to organize political life.
In this thesis, I shall assess the relative merits of
three frameworks for explaining non-participation: the
pluralist, reform and radical. My purpose will be, first,
to articulate the explanation of non-participation within
each school, with special reference to the particular role
it assigns the concept "apathy." Political apathy
historically has played an important role in academic
explanations of non-participation, and remains central in
popular journalistic explanations. Moreover, as a key
explanatory term it helps set the parameters within which
the analysis of non-participation ranges: between choosing
not to participate out of indifference or contentment, to
being programmed into an apathetic posture. Morever, as
we'll see in the last chapter, if the work of Samuel
Huntington provides a guide, apathy may be resurrected as
an important intellectual explanation (and justification)
for widespread non-participation in the future.
Secondly, I shall elaborate the distinctive features
of each explanation, suggesting why it is classified where
it is. Thirdly, the relative strength and weakness of each
4will be discussed. Fourthly, I shall draw out the implica-
tions of each, not only for a broader theory of democracy
but also for immediate political practice. Finally, the
analysis will be drawn together in a concluding chapter
that will argue both for a mode of inquiry that seems
well-suited to the analysis of participation, and for a
specific explanation of non-participation: the conceptuali-
zation of political subordination extracted from the work
of C. Wright Mills in Chapter III and further developed in
Chapter VI. Although the approach to inquiry and the
specific explanation complement each other, as we shall
see, the mode I am suggesting could be used to reach
conclusions other than those I arrive at.
In organizing the three paradigms, the typology will
be based on the analysis of power developed by Steven
Lukes. 3 The explanation of non-participation is, at the
same time, an investigation of what type of relationship
obtains between the non-participant and the act of not
participating. Does the agent do so voluntarily, freely
consenting not to participate, for example, because he or
she is simply not interested in politics? Have unfair
voter eligibility requirements been established, disenfran-
chising a particular race? Does either of the two main
parties represent concerns that speak to the needs of
non-participants? If not, are there other political
avenues open to them? Do non-participants experience
inchoate grievances they are unable to articulate into
political issues because of an absence of available poli-
tical ideas that speak to their deepest troubles? Do the
present political system and its personnel manipulate
non-participants into a posture of apathy? Taken together,
the answers to these questions help us determine whether an
agent freely decides not to participate or whether there
may be constraints operating on the agent, some of which he
or she may be unaware of.
In Chapter I, we shall explore, then, the consensus or
pluralist explanation of non-participation through the work
of Bernard Berelson and Robert Dahl . This account, tied
closely to behavioral methodology, is based on what Lukes
calls the "one-dimensional" view of power: It
involves a focus on behaviour in the making of
decisions on issues over which there is an
observable conf1 ict of (subjective) interests
,
seen as express policy preference, revealed 5~y
political participation.^"
The pluralist account will prove deficient primarily
because, insisting on the need to find overt conflict
before it will determine that a consensus does not exist,
it overexplains non-participation in terms of apathy or
indifference, failing to consider the way a political
6agenda may itself prevent submerged political conflicts
from surfacing. It overlooks the possibility, therefore,
that non-participants may withdraw from politics because
the scope of politics - -the breadth of issues that set the
terms of the present political agenda--do not speak to
their needs. Conflict remains latent with no serious
avenue available for political discontent to be expressed.
The reform or conflict explanation of non-partici-
pation, to be explored in Chapter II, will correct this
deficiency. Through the work of E. E. Schattschneider and
Peter Bachrach, we will examine the foundation argument for
a thesis of depoliticization: the political arena is
organized so as to exclude, in terms of the political
agenda and viable political organizing, important segments
of the American public. In the reform view, typically,
people have grievances with the going order but can find no
channel through which to press them. The methodology of
the study of power generally employed within this
explanation, therefore, corresponds to Lukes' "two-
dimensional" view, incorporating
a qualified critique of the behavioural focus of
the first view. . . and it allows for consider-
ation of the ways in which decisions are
prevented from being taken on potential issues
over which there is an observable confLict of
(subjective) interests , seen as embodied in
express policy preferences and sub-politicalgrievances. 5 v
Although the reform concept of depoliticization is an
important advance over the pluralist explanation, it will
prove lacking in two respects. First, it does not explore
the way in which structural imperatives of a social system
(e.g., accumulation under capitalism), and not just elites
or interest groups, set the parameters within which various
political agendas may be set. Secondly, it does not
consider that conflict may not exist, even in the form of
sub-political grievances, not because it is submerged but
because political consciousness has been channeled to
accord with dominant ideology, while harming the real
interest of the non-participants. With the work of C.
Wright Mills (Chapter III), and Herbert Marcuse (Chapters
IV and V), then, we will extend the concept of depolitici-
zation to include these two elements. A thorough analysis
of non-participation, therefore, will need to incorporate
Lukes' "three-dimensional" view of power, which involves:
a thoroughgoing critique of the behavioural focus
of the first two views as too individualistic and
allows for consideration of the many ways in
which potential issues are kept out of politics,
whether through the operation of social forces
and institutional practices or through
ind ividuals' decisions. This, moreover, can
occur in the absence of actual, observable
conflict, which may have been successfully
averted- -though there remains here an implicit
3reference to potential conflict. This potential,
however may never in fact be actualised. What
one may have here is a latent conflict
, which
consists in a contradiction between the interests
of those exercising power and the real interests
of those they exclude. These latter may not
express or even be conscious of their interests,
but, as 1 shall argue, the identification of
those interests ultimately always rests on
empirically supportable and refutable hypotheses.
6
While these paradigms are our organizing vehicle, we
will find that theorists do not alway oblige by fitting
neatly within their contour. Robert Dahl ' s tacit under-
standing often transcends the pluralist view, and sometimes
his later writings on political inequality are in serious
tension with the broader argument he has advanced over his
career. Peter Bachrach's early writing sometimes edges
near the radical paradigm, and in his later writing, 1
believe, he enters that framework. The purpose of the
categories, after all, is not to pigeon-hole authors but to
describe what features constitute a particular mode of
inquiry- -and to determine which concepts and approaches are
useful and which need to be modified or abandoned.
In the last chapter, we shall also see that a subtle
shift has occurred over time as to which concepts are
emphasized in understanding the role of non-participation
in the political order. For example, where Berelson and
9the early Bachrach focus on participation and its relation
to democratic theory, Bachrach 's later work and the work of
Samuel Huntington emphasize, although in radically differ-
ent ways, the central role of system imperatives for
understanding the present political order. For Bachrach,
this concern issues in a call to temper or remove the
imperatives themselves, where for Huntington, it involves
arguing that we now must moderate the disruptive effects of
excessive participation.
The transition from Berelson to Huntington is particu-
larly important, for they are two authors whose work has a
common concern for the stability of the social system as it
now exists . Where Berelson recognized that substantial
non-participation was functional for what he considered to
be the smooth running of modern democracy, Huntington now
argues it is a functional necessity for the continuation of
the social system. The critical point is that, writing in
the 1980' s, both Huntington and Bachrach place at the
center what remained a germ in Berelson' s analysis: the
present systemic necessity of depoliticization for advanced
capitalism. Similarly, in the 1960 's and early 1970' s,
abstract issues of political participation occupied the
high ground in much democratic theory. Today these are
more likely to be the backdrop of arguments over whether we
should fashion our political order in harmony with such
imperatives or whether we can and should alter the system
and thereby the imperatives themselves, allowing the
development of increased participation.
The argument throughout will be that there are many
concepts pertinent to the explanation of non-participation,
ranging from the "apathy" of Berelson, to the "displacement
of conflict" of Schattschneider
, and the "one-dimensional
man" of Marcuse. While the theorists will profoundly
disagree on the appropriate explanation of non-participa-
tion, it is important to note that their disagreement is
based on a prior consensus on the importance of organizing
our political life democratically. Without such a
consensus, they would have difficulty engaging one
another. The "debate" will include a host of ideas and
concepts essential to democratic theory, on whose meaning
they share imperfect agreement, ranging from the value of
participation, the concepts of interests, freedom and
power, and the proper roles of apathy and depoliticization
in explaining non-participation.
Let us take the example of political apathy. Apathy
is in many ways "essentially contestable" because it is a
part of a political language that helps constitute a
democratic way of life. In a democracy, it is an important
11
appraisive concept, yet in accepting a particular set of
criteria for proper application of the concept, one goes
some way toward accepting a complementary democratic theory
as well. Prior to the debate over particular constructions
of the concept, however, there is shared meaning which
makes the debate possible. Because America prides itself
in being democratic, and political democracy is generally
thought incompatible with widespread non-participation
based on indifference, Americans generally agree that
apathy, all other things being equal, should be discouraged.
Theorists as diverse as Berelson and Marcuse
acknowledge these presumptions and agree that apathy in a
democracy needs further explanation and justification. In
fact, Berelson, who ends up justifying the role he sees
apathy playing in American political life, feels compelled
to begin by explaining why present conditions in America
differ sufficiently from past conditions to justify
revising the normative import of the term. Berelson claims
that in modern democracy a fair amount of apathy may help
the political system by promoting stability. The crucial
point is, however, that he could not simply accept high
levels of non-participation: he had first to explain them
with the concept of apathy (here equated with lack of
interest or with contentment) and second to justify them as
12
aiding stability before he could make his claim. Marcuse,
on the other hand, views apathy as symptomatic of a society
of manipulated consensus. For him, apathy indicates severe
and profound depoliticization rather than freely chosen
non-participation
.
Both tacitly agree, however, that in a democracy,
apathy is in need of serious consideration and explana-
tion. Of course, they ultimately disagree on much more:
the criteria for applying the term; the meaning of the
term; the function the term should serve within a political
language of democracy; and especially the meaning of what
would constitute a truly democratic society. But it is
essential to remember that the debate proceeds from common,
though imperfectly shared, assumptions concerning how we
are to explain non-participation and apathy from a
democratic point of view.
To fully grasp these assertions, we must understand
what is at stake in a conceptual dispute. If important
political concepts stand in a reflexive relationship with
the political and social structures we sustain or develop,
and the consciousness with which we understand these
arrangements, then debates over the way to use concepts
carry political import. Consider what is involved in the
type of "conceptual reform" Berelson attempts by altering
13
the normative import of the term "apathy." William E.
Connolly writes:
To reform successfully a notion embedded in
our political life that bears close conceptual
ties to our basic ideas of responsibility is toinfuse the norms of responsibility themselves
more deeply into the political practices of
modern society. Debates over the grammar
appropriate to such concepts are at root debates
over the extent to which such infusions arejustified.
'
As we shall see in the last chapter, the particular
way we use concepts in reference to the explanation of
non-participation is of great political moment. We now
live in a time when problems both in our economy and in the
legitimacy of our political institutions have become
increasingly significant. The solution now being offered
to the economic mini-crisis is to require that even more
disciplines be imposed on those least able to afford them.
Even a Democratic administration is not likely to reverse
completely the radical austerity inaugurated under Reagan.
This program requires the continued depoliticization of
massive numbers of Americans, whose self-interest (and
indeed survival) is transparently harmed by current
policy. Yet, if Americans today are less likely to believe
that current policy is for the common good , how is such
depoliticization to be made plausible to both the most
obviously depoliticized and the rest of the citizenry?
14
Here is where the role of responsible social science
may face an important challenge in the near future. For,
in explaining why people don't participate in politics,
theorists will also be casting a vision of what the present
political landscape looks like and what role American
citizens should have in determining its future contours.
To the extent that they successfully articulate their
views, these will become part of the file of political
ideas that set our agenda for good or ill, for fuller
democracy of further depoliticization
. In this way, as
political scientists, we are unavoidably politically
engaged.
The danger, therefore, is great—particularly the
danger of developing an apology for future depolitici-
zation, under the guide of sanctioning very low political
participation for the sake of "realism." There is also the
opposite danger of developing over-simplified ideas about
elites conspiring to keep the "masses" disenfranchised.
This paper does not pretend not to have a point of
view. The view here is that there does exist widespread
depoliticization in our country. Its contours, however, do
not accord neatly with a simple depoliticization thesis nor
need all non-participation be explained through this
framework.
There is a methodological point as well: the best
theory is that which is "tested" against competing theo-
ries, adapted where weak, defended where strong. The
thesis of political subordination, which I shall conclude
has the greatest power in the explanation of non-partici-
pation, will first be articulated in the chapter on C.
Wright Mills and then developed in the concluding chapter.
The conclusion, however, will have been developing through-
out, by exposition, critique and comparison of the plural-
ist, reform and radical explanations of non-participation.
CHAPTER I
THE PLURALIST OR CONSENSUS EXPLANATION OF NON-PARTICIPATION
Introduction
In this chapter, I shall explore the pluralist or con-
sensus explanation of non-participation by studying the
work of Bernard Berelson and Robert Dahl
. Their work will
provide the launching point for the critique of the expla-
nations of non-participation to be developed throughout.
Berelson 1 s argument is quite straightforward. People
do not participate in politics because they are apathetic
or indifferent, and their non-participation serves to
cushion the political system from the instability wide-
spread participation would generate. Contrary to "classi-
cal" democratic theory, Berelson argues that non-participa-
tion and apathy are functional (and good) for "democratic"
political systems.
Robert Dahl provides a more complex argument, sug-
gesting that non-participation results when the opportunity
costs of participating exceed the benefits. Because he
sees participation as neither intrinsically rewarding nor
necessary to help one come to know one's interests, he
expects widespread non-participation--all things being
equal. Like Berelson, he usually explains non-partici-
16
pation in terms of apathy.
Dahl, however, moves far beyond Berelson in arguing
that political inequality can also foster non-participation
by placing unfair burdens on some, denying them the right
to have an equal opportunity to influence decision-
makers. In his recent work, he even suggests, at times,
that capitalist ideology and concentration of power
undermine attempts to combat political inequality, particu-
larly attempts at public control over corporations.
Taken as a whole, however, his work does not consider
sufficiently how the present scope of political issues may
help foster non-participation by not speaking to the
perceived needs of many American citizens. Nor does he
fully consider how the present bias in the way politics is
organized only allows certain types of issues to surface.
To explore these concerns, we will turn to the work of E.
E. Schatt Schneider and Peter Bachrach in Chapter II.
Revising Democratic Theory I: The Role of Apathy
in Bernard Berelson' s Explanation of Non-Participation
In Voting (1954) , Bernard Berelson offered an explana-
tion of non-participation that helped set the terms of
debate for much theory that was to follow. 1 Berelson wanted
to explain an anomaly he saw in American society between
18
widespread non-participation in politics and the smooth
functioning of what he considered a democratic polity:
Individual voters today seem unable to satisfy
the requirements of a democratic system ofgovernment outlined by political theorists. Butthe system of democracy does meet certain
requirements for a going political organization.
The individual members may not meet all the
standards, but the whole nevertheless survives
and grows .
^
For Berelson, "classical" democratic theory was unable
to account for several essential "facts" of contemporary
"democratic practice," revealed by survey research. Indi-
vidual citizens often "fail" to meet the requirements of
the "classical conception of meaningful participation,"
showing little interest, discrimination, or knowledge.
Even many voters vote neither out of principle nor with
full rationality.
At the same time, we can have in operation a success-
ful democratic system of governance because, fortunately,
democratic political systems require "incompatible proper-
ties"--which, "although they cannot all reside in each
individual voter, can (and do) reside in a heterogeneous
electorate . "3 These are involvement and indifference; sta-
bility and flexibility; progress and conservation; consen-
sus and cleavage; individualism and collectivism. Because
the shortcomings of some of the citizenry help balance
these qualities in the system as a whole, they support the
existence of a healthy democratic polity.
The classical ideal, he concluded, should now be re-
vised to accord with contemporary facts. Upon completing
his revision, Berelson ironically found that high levels of
non-participation help sustain the superior quality of our
democratic polity. Berelson, therefore, responded to the
disharmony between the ideal of democracy and widespread
non-participation, by privileging the claim that America
is, in fact, a democratic polity over the claim that
widespread non-participation is subversive of democracy.
Standing behind Berelson 's argument is a transparent
fear that, given the potentially totalitarian nature of a
"mass," complex, industrialized society, it is functional
and good for our society to deviate from "classical demo-
cratic theory. "4- He asks, how could:
a mass democracy work if all the people were
deeply involved in politics? Lack of interest by
some people is not without its benefits too.
5
In Berelson' s view, mass democracy couldn't work if
"all the people were deeply involved," and we are fortun-
ately saved from this dire consequence because of our
political and social pluralism and political division of
labor. In Elmira, the town he studied, political lines
are meaningful "but not identical with the lines of social
groupings. And the political division of labor, "as
repugnant as it may be in some respects to our individu-
20
alist tradition, ... is serving us well today in mass
politics. "7 "Happily for the system," Berelson reports,
"voters distribute themselves along a continuum":
Sociable Political Man ^ideological Man
(indifferent to public (absorbed in
affairs, non-partisan, public affairs,
flexible.
. .) highly parti-
san, rigid.
.
.)
And it turns out that this distribution itself,
with its internal checks and balances, can
perform the functions and incorporate the same
values ascribed by some theorists to each indivi-
dual in the system as well as to the constitutive
political institutions !°
Having established, first, that "modern" democratic
society could not stand the shock of widespread partici-
pation, and secondly, that it is now in the system as a
whole we are to look for the balance of democratic attri-
butes formerly sought in the individual, Berelson draws the
following conclusion. From a democratic point of view, he
now believes himself free to suggest an apathetic stratum
of society is essential to the functioning of the modern
democratic polity:
The apathetic segment of America probably has
helped to hold the system together and cushioned
the shock of disagreements, adjustments and
change. But that is not to say that we can stand
apathy without limit.
9
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While Berelson is not explicit on this latter point,
presumably apathy without limit would create too much
complacency, undermining democracy.
The essential point remains. Classical democratic
theory is incapable of explaining the anomaly consisting of
the existence of both widespread non-participation and
apathy, and effective modern democratic governance. Eigh-
teenth- and nineteenth-century theory must be revised to
accord with these twentieth-century facts. With Berelson,
non-participation motivated by apathy now becomes an
ingredient essential to the viability of modern democracies
in mass, industrialized societies.
Based on the above discussion, I take the following to
be Berelson 's paradigm of political apathy:
X (a person) is apathetic with respect to Y
(politics) if he or she is content with and/or
uninterested in present political arrangements
and therefore freely chooses not to vote or
participate in electoral activity.
Note: Although Berelson does not explicitly
mention contentment, this concept is necessary to
help sustain his view of "harmonious community
interest. "10 Otherwise, he would have to main-
tain the more difficult claim that all apathetics
are indifferent both to politics and to their own
possible satisfactions resulting from public
policy. He would then have to show how high
levels of apathy (now based on indifference even
to one's own contentment) are compatible with the
"harmonious community interest" and the consensus
he believes to exist and to be critical for the
functioning of a modern democratic polity.
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Evaluation of Berelson's Revision of Democratic Theory
and Explanation of Non-Participation
Berelson's general explanation of non-participation
and his peculiar use of apathy are gravely flawed.
However, his interpretation does have one virtue. Given
his favorable evaluation of American democracy, it is
crucial to Berelson to maintain that apathetics, in some
meaningful sense, freely choose not to participate in
politics. 11 The element of choice is extremely important
in our everyday use of the term "apathy" because it helps
us to locate responsibility for non-participation.
If in a democracy there is a prima facie case in favor
of participation, then widespread non-participation, once
found to exist, must be explained and justified. Otherwise
the question arises, "how democratic is the society, after
all?" To say that non-participation is due to "apathy" is
one form of explanation, allowing us to ascertain both the
reason and the responsibility, precisely because it helps
us to pinpoint the motivating factors that stand behind the
non-part icipat ion
.
For example, it makes sense to say, "John did not vote
in the referendum on the nuclear freeze because he is
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apathetic about nuclear war. John is capable of caring,"
the argument might go, "but other concerns have made that
issue seem irrelevant to him now." Part of the meaning of
these statements is that the non-participation is explained
and justified by locating responsibility with John and,
indeed, placing the blame on him for "not caring" enough
about something that should be important to him. Other
possible explanations, such as insufficient publicity about
election times, unnecessarily difficult registration
procedures, etc., are therefore rejected. The import of
this example is to support Berelson's tacit claim that, in
explanations of non-participation focusing on the concept
"political apathy," an important element of non-participant
choice and responsibility is implied. As we shall see,
however, the responsibility for non-participation need not
always lie with the non-participant.
Unfortunately, Berelson's explanation of non-partici-
pation falls prey to the weakness of his analysis of
American politics more generally: it is inherently uncri-
tical. Berelson simply assumes that America is a modern
industrialized democracy par excellence
,
however its prac-
tices might deviate from the norms required by "classical"
democratic theory.
Anything that supports the prosperity and growth of
24
the present "democratic" system, it follows, should now be
written into democratic theory. The implicit claim is that
these practices, now viewed from the lens of a "realistic"
theory, should be positively appraised. Carole Pateman
writes of Berelson's argument:
Berelson's theory provides us with a clear
statment of some of the main arguments of recentdemocratic theory.
. . . From this standpoint we
can see that high levels of participation andinterest are required from a minority of citizens
only, and moreover, the apathy and disinterest of
the majority play a valuable role in maintaining
the stability of the system as a whole. Thus we
arrive at the argument that the amount of
participation that actually obtains is just about
the amount that is required for a stable system"
of democracy
.
1Z
"
~~—
Berelson's alteration of the role of participation and
apathy within "modern" democracy, then, reflects his
revised democratic theory. Both are subject to the general
critique of social science and the language it employs
advanced by Herbert Marcuse, in One Dimensional Man : when
political language is functionalized , it is robbed of its
capacity to aid critical analysis. If the norms with which
we are to judge comtemporary affairs are drawn uncritically
only from what appear to be dominant practices, how are we
to know if anything is amiss within or beneath these
practices? Let us ask two questions. First, under what
circumstances is it legitimate to revise the critical
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grammar of any political language? Secondly, has Berelson
adequate justification to do so in this case?
There is little doubt that political theory and philo-
sophy is, and should be, revised with historical change.
It follows then, that there are times when changing the
function of dimensions of our political language is also
justified. For example, the judgment embodied in the
concept "democracy" has undergone substantial alteration
over the last three centuries, running the gamut from
negative to positive appraisal. It is Berelson 's parti-
cular revision, and not his desire to revise, that is
obj ectionable.
In Berelson ! s work there is no serious effort to
justify the revision he proposes, nor is the revision
implicitly justified. Instead, his facile equation of
American politics with "modern" democracy leads him to miss
the importance of in-depth argument favoring what amount to
very controversial revisions. His argument is tautological
in the worst way; he develops criteria for modern demo-
cracy from a society he presumes to be democratic, without
a serious effort to give a reasoned defense of the criteria
he "discovers." In fact, the criteria he discusses amount
to little more than the balancing of opposing tendencies
(e.g., involvement and indifference, progress and conser-
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vat ion) and, without further elaboration, might also be
construed as qualities necessary for successful political
systems that are not necessarily democratic. Nevertheless,
Berelson obtusely uses the functional argument that because
American democracy meets the criteria for an ongoing
political system, the characteristics of American society
now become the realistic criteria for modern democracy.
Apart from lack of analytical rigor, Berelson 1 s work
also suffers from important conceptual and substantive
weaknesses. Perhaps the most important of these is the
unjustified change he insinuated into the moral point of
the term "political apathy." Ironically, according to
Berelson, in today's political world, apathy should aid us
in assigning praise rather than blame for non-participation:
.
.
^
.
the voters least admirable when measured
against individual requirements contribute most
when measured against the aggregate requirement
for flexibility.
. . . They may be the least
partisan and interested voters, but they perform
a valuable function for the entire system. *3
Apathy, then, up to certain unspecified limits, is func-
tional for American democracy.
Many criticisms can be leveled against this position.
The so-called "pluralist--anti-pluralist" literature has
explored these, and I will only mention two directly
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pertinent to our study.H First, Berelson assumes that
participation has no intrinsic importance or developmental
value, and he therefore misunderstands the value attached
to participation by radical theorists of democracy. A
rigorous development of his position would have to show
these views to be problematic. Secondly, Berelson merely
assumes that non-participation is motivated by indifference
or contentment. This assumption would have the prima facie
force Berelson attaches to it only if we could be confident
that there were no other constraining factors on
participation--as we shall see, a problematic issue at best.
Trapped by his functional equation of modern democracy
with the American polity he observed in the 1950' s, Berel-
son asks us to use the concept "apathy" in the following
peculiar way when explaining non-participation: if we were
to begin with a person, "John," who did not vote in a
referendum, Berelson would ask us to comment in somewhat
this fashion: "John is apathetic about politics and
therefore didn't vote in the referendum. Thank God for
people like John, for without them our democracy couldn't
stand the disruption of referenda. Perhaps if there were
more people like John, our democracy would run more
smoothly," In this case, we are asked to presume that John
is indifferent about politics, that he has good reason to
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be indifferent, since political decisions are at least not
likely to adversely affect his wants, and that he should be
commended for his lack of interest. 15 Berelson begs all of
the questions implicit in these assumptions.
Yet, these assumptions and others implicit in his
work, once unearthed and evaluated, provide a weak under-
pinning for Berelson' s use of apathy as an uncritical
functional concept. First, there is implicit in his work
too close a conceptual connection between political apathy
and contentment, allowing him to justify non-participation
by implying that it does not adversely affect the wants or
interests of the non-participants. How would Berelson'
s
use of the concept help us comprehend apathy resulting from
intense interest which is frustrated and then translated
into discontent and withdrawal from politics? Studying
only surface behavior, Berelson would categorize such
non-participation simply as apathy. Utilizing his odd
definition of apathy, Berelson would first, misdescribe
rej ection of political activity as apathy, and secondly,
insinuate that the apathetics are content to boot, entirely
missing the deeper significance of the political act .
Rejection of the present scope of politics, through Berel-
son' s eyes, turns into a silent vote of approval.
There is also a conceptual distance between
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contentment and apathy that is important in enabling us to
be certain our contentment will be assured into the
future. Consider that a content person can be lulled into
apathy only after deciding, in some sense, that withdrawing
from political activity will not threaten his or her
contentment with the existing state of affairs. To the
extent that this person remains apathetic, he or she
suspends these judgments, making it more likely that the
contentment will be jeopardized in the future. While
contentment, then, could be a motivation for apathy, there
are good reasons why it is not fully integrated into the
concept. Moreover, from a "democratic point of view," it
is plausible to argue that a person who is apathetic should
not be content with that state. Again, this draws
attention to Berelson's unjustified attempt to fit the
reality of widespread non-participation, explained as
apathy, into democratic theory.
Secondly, Berelson restricts the use of the term to
individuals. The effect is to devise as the grouping "non-
participants," simply a collection of disparate apathetic
individuals, presumably of no particular socioeconomic or
racial grouping. Used exclusively in this way, a poten-
tially critical component is removed from the term, because
in ordinary usage apathy has a somewhat ambivalent meaning.
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While one sense of apathy relates to individual
responsibility, another begins to shift responsibility to
structural sources. For example, we clearly know what we
mean when we say, "John is apathetic about the nuclear
freeze referendum." But what is meant by the phrase
"apathetic masses" or, more pointedly, by "poor people are
apathetic about the nuclear freeze"? When we say that the
"masses are apathetic," we are suggesting that they "don't
care" in some sense, but we are also acknowledging that
there is something about being in a particular position
which promotes this posture. Similarly, we recognize the
apparent irrelevance of the nuclear freeze to the lives of
people shackled to the immediate concerns fostered by
destitution
.
As these examples indicate, our political language
pushes us to begin to look beyond individual choices or
attitudes when the concept of apathy is applied to social
groupings
. We may still decide, of course, that
responsibility lies with the group in question. However,
the possibility is now tacitly acknowledged within the use
of the term that some other factors may induce apathy- -an
implication not as apparent when we think of apathy
exclusively in terms of individuals.^
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Thirdly, Berelson's use of apathy in reference only to
politics in general, without specifying particular issues,
can have the effect of weakening the precision of the
'
analysis and restricting its critical potential. To the
extent we see the non-participation of a group or indivi-
dual based on apathy toward a specific issue, we are likely
to wonder why this issue helps motivate withdrawal. We are
also more likely to ask if there may exist a range of
issues which produce a similar reaction, at the same time
holding open the possibility that there also may exist a
range of issues which would motivate active participation.
When we focus on only the apathy of individuals with
respect to politics generally, therefore, we are likely to
lose critical vantage points which a more flexible use of
language would allow. For example, if we claim "poor
people are apathetic with respect to the nuclear freeze,"
this statement is suggestive because we have specified a
group and an issue. If we believe that the statement is
true, it prods us to ask, what is it about this class of
people in relation to this issue that motivates lack of
interest?
Fourthly, Berelson's use of apathy, at times, confuses
the grammar of motivation (apathy), with the grammar of
action (non-participation)
. Although he does suggest that
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participants are often indifferent, he virtually equates
apathy with non-participation. Yet, it makes perfect sense
to say that "Mary has not voted in the last twelve years
out of principle alone because she doesn't think any real
alternatives have been present." Clearly, Berelson's
behaviorism here obfuscates the explanation of
non-participation
.
Someone might agree to the validity of some of these
conceptual criticisms and still object to the basic claim
that Berelson is an apologist for widespread non-partici-
pation in American politics. It might be argued, for
example, that Berelson states he is not in favor of "apathy
without limit." Yet, he never specifies those limits, a
problem symptomatic of his general discussion of demo-
cracy: for there is no way Berelson can establish criteria
of this sort without engaging in the kind of theoretical
enterprise that his work excludes--the rational defense of
one democratic theory in relation to opposing theories. He
merely asserts that the present stability of our political
order indicates that the amount of apathy we now have is
just about right. Untroubled by the need to demonstrate
the validity of this basic proposition, Berelson's analysis
of non-participation and his use of apathy may truly be
called ideological.
And not just harmless ideology, because his analysis
is likely to lead to perverse political consequences. To
the extent that apathy is the only important explanation of
non-participation we have access to, we lose a critical
range of other important explanations, particularly those
that suggest that the political system has depoliticized
massive numbers of citizens. The result may be to blame
the most politically and economically disenfranchised
classes within America for their depoliticization
.
Berelson's 1954 work is, in fact, based on his
presumption that democratic theory has been remiss in not
looking for empirical evidence as to what precisely
constitutes "democracy," often resting content with 18th
century ideas. Let us look at some recent empirical work.
Evidence has existed for quite some time revealing a
close connection between non-participation in political and
organizational activity and low socioeconomic status
(SES). Indeed, in an earlier work with Paul F. Lazarsfeld
and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice (1944), Berelson and
his co-authors themselves report:
People on the lower SES levels are less likely to
belong to any organizations than people on high
SES (Social and Economic Status) levels. (On an
A and B level, we find 72 per cent of these
respondents who belong to one or more organiza-
tions. The proportion of respondents who are
members of formal organizations decreases
34
levef oni
a%fS l6Vel descends until, on the Dvel ly 35 per cent of the respondents belongto any associations.) 17
In a recent work, Participation and Political Equality
(1978), Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie and Jae-on Kim find
that, in the United States, social class is not an impor-
tant ingredient of political competition, with neither
strong working-class consciousness nor parties organized
specifically along class lines. "At the same time," they
report
:
the class basis of political activity is very
strong--the participant population is heavilybiased in the direction of those who are more
affluent and better educated—more so than in
other nations. (See Verba and Nie, 1972, chapter
15.) Our explanation of this seeming
contradiction was that the very absence of class
as a basis of politics in an ideational or
organizational sense meant that class would play
a key role in relation to individual political
activity. In the absence of explicit
contestation on the basis of social class the
haves in society come to play an inordinate role
in political life. 18
If we take voting, as Berelson does, to be a prime
example of political participation, we find in the United
States a severe decline in participation along with the
decline of the most important mass mobilizing vehicle, the
political party, and the rise of corporate capitalism, all
dating to the turn of the century (in particular, the
election of 1896) . The class bias of American participa-
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tion seems to have arisen out of an inability of the
earlier parties and movements, in particular populism, as
Walter Dean Burnham puts it, "to adapt their structures,
mass coalitions, and political goals in a way which
corresponded with the rise of functional collectivism in
society and economy":
And this, in turn, was merely the behavioral
certification of the failure of any broadly based
collectivist political consciousness to emergethen or later, among Americans. It was not
'
possible in the last analysis for democratic
consciousness and democratic mass organizational
structures to transcend the postulates or thelimitations of the middle-class individualist
democracy. Thus, when the conflict betweenindustrial capitalism and the pre-existing
democratic structure came into the open, it was
in the first place not very widely perceived as a
conflict at all, except among certain marginal
intellectual and labor groups; and it eventuated
in the displacement of democracy, not of
industrial capitalism."^
There is, then, a class bias in American political
participation that has its roots in the corporate
ascendancy in this country and which continues into the
present. The high degree of non-participation in voting,
which Berelson attempts to explain, is at the same time
non-participation with a pronounced class skewing: those
who do not participate lack the economic, organizational
and ideological resources with which to challenge the
present scope of politics. Berelson 's focus on apathy,
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indifference, contentment, etc., can only obscure these
most fundamental facts about political participation. For
unless he argues that our more disadvantaged citizens are
pressured into these postures, he must make the implausible
assumption that they are content to withdraw from a poli-
tical system that patently harms their interests. It seems
to me that it is fundamentally on the latter assumption
that Berelson's explanation of non-participation, rooted in
apathy related to free choice, attempts and fails to
sustain itself.
Moreover, Berelson's explanation itself becomes an
ideological resource against stimulating broader partici-
pation. To the extent the disenfranchised internalize
explanations focusing on individual apathy, they will also
tend to blame themselves for their non-participation. And
as a consequence of explanations such as Berelson's, we are
all more likely to misunderstand those contemporary power
relationships which may inhibit participation . 20 Tile
effects are important: at the same time, they confuse our
ability to locate political responsibility, hinder poli-
tical organizing and misconstrue the real needs of impor-
tant segments of the public, as well as the needs of
democratic public policy making.
Berelson may not intend his use of the term "apathy"
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to have these consequences. Nevertheless, by exaggerating
the degree of apathy prevalent and restricting its charac-
ter to focus on individuals, his analysis also produces
these important effects. Although he suggests that now
apathy is to be praised (within certain unspecified lim-
its)
,
fulfilling important functional requirements, our
ordinary usage is not so easily displaced. His peculiar
use of the concept, therefore, also trades upon our sense
of the term in ordinary usage, particularly our negative
appraisal of "apathetics . " Only now having stated his odd
case, he believes himself free to offer apathy as an
explanation that demonstrates the legitimacy of widespread
non-participation existing in a democracy.
Berelson's analysis, then, must bear scrutiny on two
levels. First, are the widespread non-participation and
apathy he reports compatible with democracy? Secondly,
what are the consequences for our determination of poli-
tical responsibility of his overuse of apathy, and his
narrow construal of its meaning, his "revision" of the
moral inport of the term notwithstanding?
It is this second question we have focused on, and
found Berelson's analysis conceptually shallow, strong in
assertion while weak in argument. In the end, his work
tacitly serves to legitimate without adequate foundation
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the need for a depoliticized public within advanced capi-
talism, a project to be replicated, as we shall see in the
last chapter, in a more sophisticated version by Samuel
Huntington almost 30 years later.
Revising Democrat ir. Theory II: Robert Dahl , Polypmh,
and the Explanation of Non-Participation
Robert Dahl's work incorporates a modified version of
the explanation of non-participation and the the role of
political apathy in such explanation, suggested by Bernard
Berelson. Essentially, Dahl's work is also an attempt to
develop a contemporary democratic theory that corresponds
with and can account for empirical observations of "demo-
cratic" countries—generally, Western, liberal, capitalist,
parliamentary polities. Dahl develops what he calls a
theory of "polyarchy" to account for the practice of
modern, complex, "democratic" societies.
In modern democracies, minorities rule. 21 This is not
a surprising development, in his view, because in political
systems as in "all human organizations there are signifi-
cant variations in participation." Although widespread
non-participation is undesirable, some non-participation
may prove salubrious to the functioning of a democratic
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polity. For it turns out that, although non-participation
correlates with low SES
, it also correlates with authori-
tarian personalities, potentially subversive of democratic
institutions
.
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Elections play a critical role in polyarchies.
Although they don't really fully indicate majority prefer-
ences, they do provide for elite competition, and also
serve as a mechanism of democratic control. 23 Beneath
elite contention, however, consensus on basic democratic
values by the politically active is necessary to absorb the
stress of democratic competition . 24 Consensus is also
important, from a democratic point of view, because it is
the majority that sets the terms of the consensus under
wich minorities rule through elite competition . 25
Perhaps the most critical norm of the consensus is
political equality, defined as the equal opportunity to
influence decisionmakers through some form of political
participation. 26 while political inequality is an impor-
tant problem, demonstrating the degree to which we fall
short of a critical democratic goal, Dahl concluded in
1970: American polyarchy "looks very much better when it
is compared with other political systems that have actually
existed. . . ."27
Dahl 1 s explanation of non-participation and his use of
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apathy will prove to be an improvement of Berelson's
primarily because they begin to uncover a relationship
between what he calls "political inequality" with ineffec-
tive participation, and the generation of despair at
participating. Dahl's explanation of non-participation,
however, also symbolizes deficiencies in his general
methodological and theoretical orientation, often more
suggestive of problem areas than successful resolutions of
problems. While some of these difficulties may be caused
by occasional lack of rigor, others indicate that Dahl is
somewhat a transitional figure whose tacit understanding
sometimes goes beyond his systematic treatment. This
becomes clearest as we observe his increasing focus on the
problem of political inequality in his later work. It is
therefore more difficult to develop a fair representation
of Dahl's explanation of non-participation and his specific
use of apathy than it was for Berelson. In order to under-
take this task, it will be necessary first to discuss the
meaning and relationship, for Dahl, of the concepts,
consensus, "political man," political inequality and non-
participation.
As we have seen, consensus is an important element of
polyarchy: it is necessary for it to flourish and proof of
its ability to govern fairly and democratically. While
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Dahl suggests that social training in shared values is
important in developing consensus, continuing consent
requires, in turn, that the citizen has:
unimpaired opportunities.
. . to figure outdiscover, and formulate his goals or prefer-
ences: to find out what he really wants
. . tohave his preferences weighted equally in the
conduct of the government
--that is weighted with
no discrimination because of what he wants or whohe happens to be. z °
Herein lies the peculiarity in Dahl 1 s notion of
consent. Neither value formation nor the development of
shared values as part of a growing sense of collective
responsibility plays a significant role in most of Dahl '
s
work. In an extremely favorable 1977 review essay on
Dahl's scholarship, George Von Der Muhll writes:
When not altogether ignored, the binding force of
a commitment to publicly defined values is either
discounted without argument or reduced to a for-
mula for realizing private preferences. Dahl's
political actors pursue fixed goals derived from
their personal utility curves.
. . . the rela-
tive stability of the various democracies is
accounted for through configurations of interests
and resources, and authority itself is discussed
in terms of personal needs and individual
calculations of opportunity costs. 29
Given this individualistic, indeed, atomistic
conception of human interests, it is not surprising that
Dahl believes, with Madison, that conflict "is sown in the
nature of humankind." While one way to achieve consent
might be to press for agreement on policies, this is both
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unrealistic and potentially tyrannical should an individual
(or numerous individuals) disagree with an adopted solu-
tion. This leaves the possibility that consent can be
established realistically, and democratically, through
agreement on process. 30
Dahl favors the process of "procedural democracy." In
a recent essay, "On Removing Certain Impediments to Demo-
cracy in the United States " (1978), he lists five criteria
for the full execution of this process: 31
1. Political equality: "The decision rule for
determining outcomes must equally take into
account the preferences of each member of the
demos as to the outcome."
2. Effective participation: For //l to be effective,
"every member must have equal opportunities for
expressing preferences and the grounds for them,
throughout the process of collective decision-
making .
"
3. Enlightened understanding: "In order to express
preferences accurately, each member of the demos
ought to have adequate and equal opportunities
for discovering and validating, in the time
available, what his or her preferences are on the
matter to be decided."
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4. Inclusiveness: The "demos ought to include all
adults who are obliged to obey the rules of the
association .
"
5. Popular sovereignty: The demos
,
through
procedural democracy, can oversee (and change)
the scope, domain and procedures of decision-
making that occurs "outside" the domain of
procedural democracy (i.e., technical, admini-
strative or judicial decisions).
These are, in Dahl 1 s view, standards by which to judge
aspiring democratic polities. It is also consent to this
process, based on democratic values, that would fulfill an
ideal-type consensus, allowing clashing preferences to run
their course, giving everyone an equal opportunity to have
his or her choices adopted. In the real world, practice
falls short of ideal on both counts, however. In Who
Governs? (1961), Dahl wonders whether substantial segments
of the public either comprehend or share democratic
values. 32 jn various works, including his most recent, The
Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy (1982), he raises the
question of political inequality as a critical problem for
present American polyarchy. However, political
inequalities notwithstanding, he never retracts his earlier
position that the American system of government operates,
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by and large, with the consent of the governed: we pre-
sume, then, that they continue to be in a position to
determine relatively freely their interests and press for
them in the polyarchy within constraints of the existing
political inequality.
In coming to this conclusion, as we shall see, Dahl
simplifies the nature of political inequality, underplaying
the ways in which present institutions, constraints of
social structure, and consciousness may undermine freedom.
If we are not as free as Dahl imagines, then either our
consent is mistakenly given, or what appears as consent may
really be disguised political confusion or even aliena-
tion. And what appears to be non-participation based on
apathy or indifference may be severe depoliticization
.
These issues will be central to our discussion of the
reform and radical explanations of non-participation in the
following chapters.
To augment our understanding of Dahl ' s conception of
consent in a polyarchy and the proper role of
participation, we need to consider his view of "political
man": Why isn't political activity more rewarding for more
people?
The explanation, no doubt, turns on the fact that
man is not by instinct a reasonable, reasoning,
civic-minded being. Many of his most imperious
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desires and the source of many of his mostpowerful gratifications can be traced to ancientand persistent biological and physiologicaldrives, needs and wants. Organized politicallife arrived late in man's evolution; today manlearns how to behave as a political man with the
aid and often with the hindrance of instinctive
equipment that is the product of a long priordevelopment. To avoid pain, discomfort, andhunger, to satisfy drives for sexual gratifi-
cation, love, security, and respect--these needs
are
.
insistent and primordial. The means of
satisfying them quickly and concretely generallylie outside political life. 33 y 3
While people are capable of calculating the rewards to
be gained from politics, Dahl seems to argue politics is
not likely to contain the most important rewards, nor is
political participation per se one of them. In this sense,
people have individual political "rationality" but not the
potential for civic virtue, classically conceived, as a
basic characteristic. The public interest, such as it is,
will be the result of the unavoidable political interac-
tions some individuals and groups will decide to engage in,
so as to meet their needs. These are fairly consistent
themes in Dahl. While there is some tension here between
Dahl's use of the language of "social training" and his in-
dividualist conception of the formation of wants, the lat-
ter theme is more central to his writing. The former is
not sufficiently developed to suppose that Dahl means more
than the simple learning of roles--necessary even in the
individualist conception of human nature he advances.
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The problem of political inequality
For Dahl, the problem of political inequality arises
when unfair impediments exist, preventing members of the
"demos" from enjoying the equal opportunity to have their
choices become effective. When a person is denied equal
access to the resources necessary to effectively press for
satisfaction of his or her wants, an imbalance in political
influence results, creating political inequality. In
Dahl's view, the dominant sources of political inequality
include: racial discrimination; differences in education,
income, wealth; unequal access to communications; unequal
political skills and incentives. The following example
illustrates his view:
In every polyarchy, consequently, and more
emphatically in the U.S. than in some, electoral
officials are rarely recruited from the ranks of
blue collar workers: full time politics is dis-
tinctly a monopoly of the white-collar strata. 34
In this case, higher levels of education, for example,
might give advantages to the white-collar strata, creating
a form of political inequality: a maldistribution of
electoral officials by occupational position.
While Dahl argues, in his recent work, that such
inequalities are widespread , 35 American polyarchy survives
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in spite of them. 36 Taken ag & whole> Dahl , g
indicates a basic commitment to our present system of
governance as basically a neutral instrument of public
policy formation, although deformed by the imposition of
political inequalities upon it. These most often take the
form of discrimination against certain minorities, histori-
cally most severe in the case of Blacks and Native
Americans, and disadvantages of skills and access, accruing
from one's social and economic position. Nevertheless, if
only we could develop greater equality of political
resources, as defined by Dahl, then the criterion of equal
opportunity to make one's choices effective would become
fully operative. Such opportunity is the hallmark of
democracy in the modern world.
To his credit, Dahl ' s concern with political
inequality develops and toughens in his later writings. In
his text Democracy in the United States: Promise and
Performance , 37 for example, he is quite outspoken about the
pervasiveness of racial discrimination in American
history. In his 1970 After the Revolution? Dahl suggests
that political inequalities may result from of our present
mode of economic organization. In criticizing the
"Corporate Leviathan," Dahl argues that private corpora-
tions really are public services and should be accountable
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to those they affect. Dahl arrives at his conclusion after
weighing three criteria necessary for authority: personal
choice; competence and the potential of delegating author-
ity to those presumed competent (e.g., business managers);
and economy, weighing the opportunity costs of participa-
tion against other uses of the same time, energy and
resources. Dahl concludes that we need more democracy in
the workplace and more public accountability of the
corporation. However, while he comes close to viewing the
corporation as a proto-political organization, he does not
claim that the stratified relationships, either in owner-
ship or in job organization constitute, in themselves,
political inequalities.
In his essay, "On Removing Certain Impediments to
Democracy in the United States," Dahl presses further,
arguing that American democracy is limited by certain
commitments the nation has made over its 200-year history.
The five most important commitments are: (1) to a liberal
political and constitutional order, giving primacy to
certain political and civil rights (1776-1836); (2) to the
belief in a democratic political system (1800-1836); (3) to
the socioeconomic order of corporate capitalism (1900) ; (4)
to the ideas and institutions of the welfare state (with
the New Deal)
; (5) to play an international role as a world
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power (with World War II). Except, perhaps, for the
commitment of democracy itself, Dahl argues, all the others
have created problems for democracy. For example, while
the fourth commitment certainly provided benefits and
protection of the rights of workers, like the fifth commit-
ment, it dangerously expanded the scope of presidential
power. Indeed, given the constitutional system and the
desire for democratic rule, majority coalitions seeking to
displace established privilege are likely to succeed only
by concentrating political resources in the presidency
"great enough to make the office a standing danger to
majority rule and procedural democracy itself."
The constitutional system itself is now, and has
always been, hostile to the principle of majority rule.
Originally, it excluded the maj ority- -women
,
nonwhites, and
propertyless white males--from democratic governance, deny-
ing them the right of consent and political equality. And
the elaborate system of checks and balances, constitutional
federalism, separation of powers, etc., designed to protect
fundamental rights, "are both adverse to the majority prin-
ciple, and in that sense to democracy, and yet arbitrary
and unfair in the protection they give to rights. . . .
However laudable their ends," Dahl concludes, "in their
means the framers were guilty of overkill. "38
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The commitment to corporate capitalism changed the
fundamental distribution of resources so favorable to
democratic development in the relatively egalitarian,
agrarian society that preceded it. There were two major
consequences of this change. First, corporate capitalism
generated much greater differentials in political
resources, skills and incentives, largely as a result of
the great differences in wealth, income, social esteem,
education, occupational skills and ethnic status. Poli-
tical inequality thereby augmented the difficulty of a
majority coalition forming to change the allocation of
rewards. Secondly, the expanding corporate form meant that
increasing numbers of people were to live out their working
lives within a "hierarchical structure of subordination."
The system of democracy, then, became marginal "to the
actual political system in which the members of the demos
lived their daily lives":
Thus, the transfer of the Lockean view [defense
of private property] to the corporation was a
double triumph. By making ownership the only, or
at least primary, source of legitimate control
over corporate decisions, the new order not only
excluded democratic controls in the internal
government of the enterprise but placed powerful
ideological barriers against the imposition of
external controls by a government that, for all
its deficiencies, was much more democratic than
were the governments of business firms. 39
What can be done to make our polyarchy more demo-
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cratic? Dahl suggests we assume that the first two commit-
ments can be interpreted as commitment to procedural
democracy, once the "inconsistencies" are ironed out. In
terms of the expansion of the power of the President as a
result of commitments //4 and //5, he suggests organizational
and constitutional changes to make it easier for an opposi-
tional majority to oppose an entrenched minority. These
include abolishing the presidential veto; creating a
unicameral Congress; inaugurating proportional represen-
tation and a multiparty system in Congressional elections;
etc. 40 His hope is that such changes will make the system
more responsive to majority desires and reduce the pressure
toward the "pseudodemocratization" of the presidency--the
need to develop a majority coalition through the chief
executive, thereby dangerously increasing presidential
power and subverting democracy.
Now questioning important aspects of American ideology
itself, Dahl argues that if "we abandon the absurdities in
extending Locke on private property to ownership or control
of the modern business corporation," then we can properly
see that the rights of owners are secondary "to the primary
rights that are necessary to self-government." Our
commitment to corporate capitalism, therefore, needs to be
"reconsidered": because large economic units are, in
52
principle, public enterprises, they exist not by right but
by demonstration of social utility. The proper question,
then, becomes: is a privately owned corporation "more
effective in achieving our social purposes, including
procedural democracy, than all possible alternatives to it"?
Dahl warns us against prejudging the answer as to how
such enterprises should be organized, controlled or owned:
"To arrive at a correct answer depends," in his judgment,
"as much on technical as on philosophical or ideological
judgments, and perhaps a good deal more"41 (my emphasis).
In fact, the question of ownership should be viewed, in
part, as subordinate to the question of what is the most
desirable form of social control: government ownership, he
argues, "is as consistent as private ownership with
despotic control of enterprises."
Dahl makes two substantive suggestions. First, the
time has come to move from the attempt to limit (and fail
at limiting) the translation of economic to political
resources and move to a more equitable distribution of
economic resources, particularly wealth and income.
Secondly, procedural democracy should now be applied "to
the government of firms." In 1978, it is with these
proposals Dahl seeks to redress the problem of political
inequality within the corporation and the polity at large
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that is the inheritance of our commitment to corporate
capitalism.
In his latest book, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy
.
Dahl refines his position further stating the main problem
quite starkly:
.
. .
while necessary, desirable, and inevitablein a democratic order, organizational pluralism
may also play a part in stabilizing inequalitiesdeforming civic consciousness, distorting the
'
public agenda, and alienating the final control
over the public agenda by the citizen body.^2
Rejecting both the "myths" of "bureaucratic socialism"
and the "unworldly realm of neo-classical" market theory,
Dahl argues both against the presumption that either
nationalization or the "fair exchange" in a "free market"
can provide viable solutions to the political dilemma he
sees. Where the former creates problems of inefficient,
undemocratic, bureaucratic control, the latter is unable to
really provide the regulation necessary to ensure the fair
exchange that is the hallmark of its ideology.
A solution would involve two components. First,
income distribution would have to be "fair." This change
would lessen the objective condition of inequality that
now prevents greater civic virtue based on a complementar-
ity of interests from emerging. While conflict remains for
Dahl the stuff of politics--in his view, perfect harmony
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would render politics obsolete-imperfect complementarity
of interests is an attainable goal:
. . .
interests are often imperfectly complemen-tary, in the sense that for each actor the *a insfrom cooperating with others outweighs the costson balance.
Secondly, "decisions that would remain discretionary
because of the inevitable looseness of regulation by the
market would be subject to democratic control. "44
would allow the type of regulation necessary to reduce
inequality while encouraging efficiency. Regulation,
however, need not all be of one piece. Where certain
organizations such as trade unions and some "economic
associations," political parties, etc. would be entitled to
a healthy "boundary" which regulation should avoid crossing
(because of just claims to "fundamental rights" to such
independence)
,
"privately owned and controlled economic
enterprises, particularly in the form of very large corpo-
rations, are a different story." Large corporations, he
argues once again, are essentially "private" governments
with public power.
Yet the government of a large corporation differs
radically from the government of the state in a
democratic country, because neither in theory nor
in practice are corporate governments democratic .^5
Democratic control, however, requires the creation of
an appropriate demos
,
that is public body, charged with
making important public decisions. Considering both claims
to "fundamental rights" and to "social utility," Dahl
suggests that "different matters should often be subject to
control by different bodies of citizens"--including the
employees of "economic enterprises," who, as "citizens of a
firm" should possess "equal votes." Citizen and employee
control through public bodies that are decentralized, while
not chaotic, is the best solution to the problem of private
control over matters that should be on the public political
agenda. These should include exploring possibilities of
worker participation or control and employee ownership:
plans that might increase incentives and funds for invest-
ment while also redistributing ownership and control. An
appropriate balance, then, needs to be struck between
markets and competition and democratic regulation over
those areas where corporate capitalism violates
"fundamental rights" and subverts the democratic process.
The ultimate success of this project will require the
completion of three stages of change: (1) a change in
civic consciousness to modify individual and group egoism;
(2) a reduction of inequalities, which would run its
course, encountering problems of electoral resistance and
increasingly disadvantageous tradeoffs with economic effi-
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ciency, growth and incentive-
-thereby necessitating; (3)
structural change in the economic order that "would
simultaneously foster economic incentives, efficiency, and
political equality. "46 While the Scandanavian countries,
which Dahl now seems to view as the most advanced, are
struggling with the problems inherent in the second stage,
"the United States still stands before the threshold of the
first stage." Yet, the tension between economic institu-
tions that are perceived as private and their public and
social character "creates a discordance that probably
cannot be indefinitely sustained." It is one that could
particularly manifest itself in periods of low economic
growth, in which issues of inequality might come to the
fore of the public agenda. Dahl concludes:
I cannot say, of course, whether the changes
in structure and in civic orientations necessary
to remedy the defects of organizational pluralism
will come about. To the extent they do not,
however, the United States will surely fail to
achieve the best potentialities of pluralist
democracy .47
Yet how are we to understand Dahl 1 s interpretation of
the obstacles of power that prevent us from changing the
circumstance of political inequality? In After the
Revolution?
,
where he develops his precursor arguments on
political inequality, he makes both of the following
comments
:
.
.
-until we reach much greater parity in thedistribution of political resources, other stenstoward democratization are like treating tubercu-losis with aspirins.
. .
.48 5
D
And
.
. .
the greatest obstacle to democratization
and reducing inequalities is not that
. . . eliteof wealthy men themselves
, or even that militaryindustrial complex
. . . but rather the
.
.American people. 49
Note the tension within the following comment in the
1976 edition of Democracy in the United States ; also note
the tension between the comment as a whole and the above
discussion of political inequality:
Another set of differences that contributed heav-
to political inequality among Americans weredifference in political skills and incentive s.
These are among the elemental causes of inequali-
ty.
. .
.In every political system, some citizens
are much less interested and active in politics
than others. Apathetic citizens disfranchise
themselves; active citizens gain influence. 50
These incongruities, I believe, reveal both Dahl '
s
commitment to pluralism and his belief that a functioning
democratic polyarchy exists, and his attempt to draw out
the serious inequalities that have manifested themselves,
partly undermining these beliefs. While Dahl argues,
therefore, that we need much greater equality of condition
to ensure political equality and freedom, 51 he also glibly
places the blame for inequality on the "military-indus-
trial-financial-labor-farming-educational-professional-
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consumer-over and under thirty-lower/middle/upper class
complex": 52 that is, the American people.
While it is to Dahl's credit that he now gives the
highest priority to the problem of political inequality for
democratic theory, he has not yet forthrightly rejected his
prior analysis of where primary responsibility lies for
this problem. For he cannot hold both that political
inequality results from our present socio-economic system,
buttressed by ideology and that the "greatest obstacle to
democratization" is the average American. While the former
theme predominates in his later work, it remains in serious
tension with much of his political theory. 53 It now re _
mains for him to clearly state how free he believes politi-
cal thought and action to be within contemporary America--
and to reconsider his earlier work on political participa-
tion in this light. Otherwise we are left to conclude that
the freely arrived at choice of the American people not to
participate remains itself a central obstacle to greater
participation.
Explaining non-participation
People refrain from participating in politics, Dahl
argues, when the opportunity costs of participating are
greater than the gains. • If it is in a person's perceived
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rational self-interest to participate, he or she will-
unless obstacles are placed in the way, thereby increasing
the opportunity costs. For Dahl
,
participation is often
not perceived to be in the rational self-interest of the
agent, as many factors mitigate participatory zeal: (1)
people are, after all, not civic-minded by nature and
participation is not intrinsically rewarding; (2) citizens
might not perceive important differences between the
competing political parties; (3) they might have a low
sense of political efficacy; (4) they might be content with
the likely outcome of a political contest; (5) their
knowledge is often limited; 54 (6) sheer size discourages
participation; (7) government is likely to be remote; (8)
inequalities of political resources place formidable
obstacles in the way of participation . 55
It is important to note that, in Modern Political
Analysis
,
Dahl emphasizes the first five items, while, in
the more recent After the Revolution?
,
he emphasizes the
latter three. There is an important shift in emphasis as
to what constitutes opportunity costs, but little or no
shift in the basic formula of how one calculates such
costs, or what the value of political participation is. 56
Rational self-interest remains the critical variable and,
as Dahl becomes more aware of systematic inequalities, he
seems to press for more participation primarily for
more effective self-protection. Consequently, Dahl
concludes that non-participation is a problem in a polyar-
chy primarily because participation tends to protect one's
self-interest and helps fortify the basic consensus (except
for authoritarian participants). He adds almost as an
afterthought: it is a "good norm. "57
Dahl's work on political apathy reflects the tensions
we have pointed to in his various statements on non-parti-
cipation and political inequality. Sometimes, apathy is
equated with non-part icipation-"the apolitical spectrum."
Here he is very close to Berelson:
.
. .
in all polyarchies, it seems, a sizable
number of citizens are apathetic about politics
and relatively inactive: in short apolitical . 58
However, he also notes that people "who care a great
deal about the outcome" of a "one-sided election" may not
participate because their vote won't matter. 59 0ne would
presume from this comment that such people would not be
apathetic, although they didn't, in fact, participate. In
other works, Dahl does seem to indicate that apathy is the
prime explanation of non-participation. Recall his comment
that "apathetic citizens disfranchise themselves."
Why is there so little interest? Politics is so
remote from the lives of the substantial apolitical spec-
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trum "as to lack much meaning." However, what are we to
presume the sources of the remoteness to be-size, human
nature, political inequality? Are we to presume that
remoteness induces apathy? If it does, will this later
undermine the ability of an individual to assess oppor-
tunity costs to determine whether participation is in his
or her self-interest? Is Dahl here beginning to suggest
that some form of depoliticization is rearing its head, or
is he suggesting tacitly, as his former student Nelson
Polsby has stated forthright ly , that we should not impose
middle-class participatory values on lower class
apathetics?60
In After the Revolution?
,
Dahl offers a more careful
statement on non-participation and apathy:
The most important causes for non-participation
are now pretty well specified. Many of these,
and certainly the most unjust ones—registration
and voting laws and practices that make partici-
pation unnecessarily difficult, discriminatory
laws and practices, severe lack of education,
inadequate organization and mobilization, apathy
produced by poverty or a group history of subjec-
tion and defeat --can be eliminated or at the very
least greatly reduced [by reducing unequal poli-
tical resources]. ... Of course even in a
highly egalitarian society one could still choose
whether or not or how much to participate.
. . .
Yet in comparison with the present, these differ-
ences would result more from the exercise of per-
sonal choice over an array of opportunities and
less from objective differences in the opportun-
ities available . °t
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In general, Dahl's views suggest the following
relationship between apathy and the explanation of non-
participation. In some of his writings, non-participants
are considered ipso facto apathetic. In others, once
apathy is developed, it becomes a source of non-partici-
pation. Both apathy and non-participation can be induced
by political inequalities, such as low political skills,
"cycles of political defeat," low education, etc., as well
as by contentment or indifference. Ideally, for Dahl
,
non-participation would be a consequence of personal
choices one makes, based on an assessment of opportunity
costs and benefits, within a system in which equal oppor-
tunity to make one's choices effective prevails. Political
apathy that resulted from such calculations would seem in
no way to undermine the authority of the political system-
-
even if it issued in quite widespread non-participation.
As we can see, there is ambiguity in Dahl's work,
perhaps resulting from his desire to adjust his theory to
respond to intellectual criticism and political upheaval.
Nevertheless, there is a core to Dahl's concept of
political apathy as he uses it in the explanation of
non-participation. It can be reproduced as follows:
X (an individual, group, or race) 62 i s apathetic
with respect to Y (politics, an election, an
issue) . If X is indifferent to or content with
Y, or suffers political inequality with respect toY, causing opportunity costs to become greaterthan the likely benefits-as a result, hi or sherefrains from participating in the politicalprocess. K
Evaluation of Dahl ' s Explanation of Non-Participation
Dahl's explanation of non-participation and his use of
apathy are an improvement over Berelson's in several
respects. Dahl does not functionalize the language of
apathy to the same extent Berelson does. In Dahl's view, a
democratic society should actively seek to remove the
impediments to participation, allowing the notion of apathy
to retain some of its critical function as an explanation
of non-participation. Given Dahl's acknowledgement that
political inequality is a serious problem, particularly in
his later work, apathy and non-participation become sources
of some concern.
Nor does Dahl restrict the explanation of non-partici-
pation to apathy based on indifference or contentment.
Instead, he attempts to draw out some of the relationships
between political inequality and non-participation,
incorporating concerns about socioeconomic structure into
his explanation. Unfortunately, he uses apathy in so many
different ways throughout his work, confusion can arise
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when trying t0 comprehend how he is using it in . specific
situation.
Dahl aiso does not restrict the range of X to indivi-
duals. The critical function this performs is evident in
his treatment of racial discrimination in his middle and
later works.
Moreover, he shows greater sensitivity to the range Y
can have. For example, it makes a great deal of difference
whether a person is seen as apathetic about a specific
issue or just vaguely about politics. Taking a broader
view of both X and Y together helps us locate the reasons
that stand behind the apathy we have observed: when we see
members of a race apathetic about a certain issue, for
example, we begin to ask, what is it about being a member
of that race in relation to that issue that seems to
promote apathy?
Finally, Dahl makes an effort to include public
control over corporations and procedural democracy in the
workplace within what should be now counted as "legitimate"
political issues. Ironically, if ever adopted or pressed
seriously by powerful political organizations, such
proposals could serve to better test Dahl • s thesis that we
should expect significant apathy in all types of human
organization-
-and, in particular, political organization . 63
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In general, Dahl
' s later views have improved as
critics have displayed weaknesses in his earlier work.
Dahl's explanation of non-participation and understanding
of apathy in the 1950 's and early 1960's were similar to
Berelson's. For example, in Who Governs?
. Dahl argues that
citizens in New Haven use the political resources available
to them~"hardly at all . "64 Dahl . s more contemporary WQrk
shows greater sensitivity to the injustices of inequality
and racism, brought to public prominence during the protest
movements of the 1960's. The evidence of political
inequality was, of course, always available, 65 and, as we
shall see, Schattschneider and Mills made use of it in
their explanations of non-participation. Dahl's belated
and somewhat tentative response indicates prior commitment
to his core thesis concerning the role of political
participation in human affairs, and the presumption of the
existence of a successful pluralist democracy.
In fact, Dahl's work does not fundamentally differ
from Berelson's on the meaning of participation. For Dahl,
participation primarily remains an instrument in the
pursuit of a person's self-interest. All other things
being equal, Dahl expects apathy; it is active political
participation that needs to be explained. This view comes
out clearly in Who Governs? and is a consistent theme in
Dahl's work:
At the focus of most men's lives are „rin,»r„
activities involving food sex W Prt*V
work, play, shelter f comfort friendship socialesteem, and the like. Activities like these--notpolitics-are the primary concerns of most menand women.
... It would clear the air of agood deal of cant if instead of assuming that"
hi]™*" 13 3 n°rmal and natural con"rn of humanbeings, one were to make the contrary assumptiontnat
.
politics is a remote, alien andunrewarding activity. Instead of seeking toexplain why citizens are not interested, con-
few"^ • aCtlv& the task is t0 exP la^ »hy atew citizens are."" y
In Dahl's view, as long as the competition between
elites serves the purpose of meeting the rational
self-interest of non-participants, there would seem to b
little incentive for them to participate. Assuming that
people might develop new needs or conceptions of self-
interest through the vehicle of participation is an idea
that is largely foreign to Dahl's work. Although he
discusses the role of "social training" and even develops
notion of ideological control in his essay, "On Removing
Some Impediments.
.
.," he does not fully consider that
human needs are themselves, in part, socially developed:
the private acquisitiveness he assumes to be basic to
calculations of "rational self-interest" itself is, in
fact, a social construction. Participation in the
political life of a community might have the effect of
displacing those very needs that Dahl takes to be basic to
human nature and remain for him the foundation argument
against expecting people to participate in politics.
As Peter Bachrach points out, Dahl » s conception of
interests leads him, in the end, to misconstrue the
essential nature of political participation: discussion
and involvement can help a person develop the concept of
what is in his or her interest and thereby a fuller
understanding of the real situation he or she is in. 67
Presuming "that man is incapable of holding a social
interest which conflicts with his self interest, "68 Dahl
ignores the idea that participation as a process may yield
unanticipated benefits, rather than only the immediate
rewards it brings in getting one's way:
Dahl fails, in other words, to conceive ofpolitical participation two-dimensionally; asinstrumentality to obtain end results and as aprocess that affords him the opportunity^ gain
a greater sense of purpose and pride in himself
and a greater awareness of community. 69
Understating the potential of participation, Dahl is free
to exaggerate the levels of non-participation and degree of
apathy to be expected in the normal course of affairs.
Conversely, even where Dahl suggests that we need
greater citizen involvement, such as at the workplace, his
argument remains instrumentalist. As George Von Der Muhll
points out, the criteria for authority developed in Aft er
the Revolution? of personal choice, competence and economy
are not the test of "rightness " of a particular organiza-
tion of politics. Although using these criteria enables
Dahl to conclude that greater workplace democracy and
public control over corporations are desireable, in and of
themselves they only test whether the process to be adopted
will advance or retard our self-interest. The criteria,
then, suggest:
questions any instrumentally oriented consumer
would rationally wish to ask of a public service
agency. They do not differentiate decisional
processes we support because they are effectivein meeting our needs from those we regard aslegitimately binding without prior assessment oftheir outcomes. /u
And even in Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy where he
discusses the need to increase civic virtue, the cost-
benefit calculus dominates. In systems comprised of large
aggregates of individuals, he argues, civic virture is
constrained by the inevitability of conflict: the imposs-
ible idea of civic virtue as pursuit of the "general good"
should, therefore, yield to the possible solution of
"enlightened egoism." The ideal of "perfect complementary"
interests becomes the realistic standard for civic virtue,
where "the actions of each to achieve his or her ends would
create benefits at no cost to the others. "71 Against this
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ideal, which Dahl believes can only be imperfectly achieved
in practice, we can still maintain that civic virtue
involves commitments beyond the advancement of self-
interest-even that self-interest attempting to minimize
social conflicts. While self-interest understood in this
way is surely a good in itself, real civic virtue also
includes common commitments, as Von Der Muhll puts it, "we
regard as legitimately binding without prior assessment of
their outcomes."
Surely Dahl 1 s own commitment to democracy is itself
more an example of this type of civic virtue than of
"enlightened egoism." And is this not the real social glue
that undergirds the commitment of most Americans to the
democratic ideal? Democracy is, then, more than a process
to fairly allocate benefits— it is part of the contemporary
conception of what constitutes the "general good." We can
agree with Dahl that conflict is inherent in modern politi-
cal life and still maintain that civic virtue remains more
than the sum of individual calculations of "enlightened
egoism.
"
Further, we can even argue that political participa-
tion can itself help develop one's conception both of one's
interest and the "general good," in terms that may include
but are certainly not restricted to a cost-benefit calculus
of self-interest. Discussing Dahl
' s concern with
democratizing the corporation in After the Revolution?
Peter Bachrach rightly concludes:
Pragmatically Dahl has transcended the structuralconfinement of pluralist theory. Theoreticallvhowever, it is clear that Dahl's contention has'not departed in any major respect from thenarrowly drawn pluralist concept of interest^!
This instrumentalist horizon is reinforced by a
reliance on behavioral methodology. Thus we have the
conclusions that non-participation is not intrinsically
rewarding because in the arenas studied there appears to be
apathy. Behavioral evidence of the sort Dahl relies on,
however, is only one level of evidence, ignoring reasons
inhibiting participation and attitudes toward it that may
not be suitable for behavioral "operational" definitions.
Reliance on participation rates to predict the potential of
future participation or to gauge how basic political parti-
cipation is to our nature does no more than beg a series of
questions: Why are participation rates what they are?
What is the relationship between the rates and the quality
of participation? Can effective participation, once exper-
ienced, lead to an increased appreciation for political
participation as a component of community life?
Dahl's analysis of power is also rooted in the same
basic assumptions as Berelson's and much behavioral
methodology. According to Dahl : "A has power over B to
the extent that he can get B to do something that B would
not otherwise do. "73 We see if ^ potential . g
ized, as Polsby describes the pluralist approach, by
studying "specific outcomes in order to determine who
actually prevails in community decision-making . "74 The
emphasis is on behavior that is easily observed.
We see this definition manifested in Dahl's explana-
tion of non-participation. When free of constraining
factors, people often allow themselves to become
apathetic--an important source of non-participation.
Policies or decisions prevent legitimate groups from
participating, generally by denying them the political
resources necessary for effective participation. This
situation constitutes political inequality. Participation
can be enhanced to the fullest degree possible and
desirable, given human nature and the instrumental nature
of participation, by removing these obstacles. In
analyzing whether power is exercised, the emphasis is on
behavior, policies and articulated preferences that have
surfaced politically and are frustrated, rather than the
scope of the issues drawn, covert grievances and troubles
unable to find political expression, manipulation of
consciousness, and imperatives of social structure setting
72
constraints on beliefs and action.
in
e
To take a complex example, it might be argued that,
a hypothetical working-class community, Blacks participat
less than Whites in politics because they suffer the
inequality of an inferior education. If attempts to
rectify this imbalance through busing Black children to
better schools in White neighborhoods is frustrated, we
might conclude that this is primarily an example of White
local residents exercising power over Blacks, contributing
eventually to abetting their non-participation by increas-
ing their political inequality due to inferior education.
The hostility to busing itself is likely to be seen simply
as a reflection of racist attitudes on the part of the
White working class.
One is less likely to analyze the grievances of Whites
denied political outlets and their vague troubles a means
of articulation and displaced by them onto Black school
children. The result is to reinforce racist attitudes and
to divide potential working-class allies. These pressures,
unable to be conceptualized as political inequalities
within Dahl's paradigm, are nevertheless evidence of an
exercise of power that has impact upon both the extent and
quality of participation. Unable to forge effective
coalitions to control essential decisions affecting the
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community, such as investment practices, Whites are likely
to retreat into non-participation born of despair of
controlling one's community, after the narrow attempt
through the racist vehicle of opposition to busing has run
its course. The most effective exercise of power, with the
implications for political participation, may lie outside
the immediate sight of either of the contestants in the
dispute.
The depth with which these assumptions are built into
Dalil's analysis can be revealed by recalling, once again,
certain propositions he argues in "On Removing Some Imped-
iments.
. .
." Here Dahl argues both that corporate
capitalism has established resilient "ideological barriers"
against the idea of government control of business and that
corporate capitalism is an important source of political
inequalities. His solution is to call for a redistribution
of wealth and, I believe, for the principle of "enlightened
understanding"--"each member of the demos ought to have
adequate and equal opportunities for discovering and
validating, in the time available, what his or her
preferences are on the matter to be decided."
As to the latter point, the standard of "enlightened
understanding" focuses on augmenting the individual '
s
ability to rationally comprehend his or her self-interest.
Yet, this obscures a more basic understanding necessary to
promote genuine democracy-the class basis of capitalism-
and relates to Dahl's ultimately unsatisfactory understand-
ing of how capitalism inhibits democracy. It is not just
economic and social inequality of resources that impinge
upon the political system, producing political inequality.
It is that capitalism operates under a system of impera-
tives, one of which is that capitalists must maximize
profit in order to accumulate wealth. This imperative
thereby governs how the production process is controlled,
whether through capitalists or their managers. As Philip
Green argues, the "maldistribution of political as well as
economic power are therefore secondary to the existence of
social classes that set boundaries to one's political
existence" : 75
Th<
op<r o 1- UJ- ,- u j-^j- muj.ai.cu j.iiut;pfc;Li-dently of the people who work in it, live around
it, or otherwise rely on it in any decisive way
is incompatible with political equality. 76
Yet, when Dahl suggests that the form of control over
such enterprises "should be treated as a problem that is
prior to the form of ownership," he assumes that effective
control can be exercised over private accumulation,
investment, organization of production, products, worker's
rights, health and safety, etc. The question, he suggests,
is "which is more effective in achieving our social pur-
P° SeS
>
Eluding procedural democrat ?" The answer, it
will be recalled, depends "as much on technical as on
philosophical or ideological judgments, and perhaps a good
deal more."
The real question is, however, how can people decide
primarily on technical grounds whether the class impera-
tives endemic to corporate capitalism are incompatible with
democratic control over work, production and investment?
This question must, in turn, be translated into the expli-
citly political question: what is the relationship of
capitalism to democracy?
Moreover, the ideology of corporate capitalism cannot
be effectively countered by providing individuals primarily
with ideal of equal opportunity to achieve enlightenment of
self-interest. An effective counterideology would be one
which would recognize the similarities of structural
position of persons within each class: it would take as
its starting point the need for forging a collective
interest. Instead, Dahl urges each citizen to seek
self-interested enlightenment. Thus, in an important
advance, Dahl recognizes the importance of ideology in
sustaining corporate capitalism but provides a remedy that,
itself, is built on the same abstract individualism as the
ideology of capitalism-individualism that has helped
££event the forging of a common interest to oppose the
abuses of capitalist power.
Certainly a counterideology incorporating class
considerations could also include technical questions, such
as efficiency, that would influence how we organize our
political and economic institutions. Sometimes there will
be a need for a trade-off between technical considerations
and ideals to achieve what we consider to be the best
balance
.
But the primary considerations will remain political
and perhaps, in Dahl's use of the term, "ideological."
Does a class society exist and, if it does, can anything
more than "pseudodemocracy" coexist within it? The
question is not abstractly between control and ownership:
the question is, can we achieve effective control under the
legal and social relations of advanced corporate capital-
ism? If we can, what kind of control can we achieve? Will
the control be real or illusory, devolving into coopta-
tion? The solutions Dahl proposes of redistributing
resources, public control over corporations, and greater
workplace democracy, while desirable in themselves, do not
grapple with these problems. For them to be effective they
need: first, presume neither a neutral government doino
the will of millions of disparate individuals, nor even
thousands of pressure groups but a strong, vital government
or other focused centers of political power that stand in
opposition to the immense concentrated power of the
corporations; and secondly, public awareness and resolve to
press class interests through government at all levels, as
well as through other modes of political organization.
Whether or not one likes this scenario, it would seem
necessary for Dahl ' s reforms, particularly his structural
reforms, to stand any chance at all. Otherwise, how
effective would the decisions of a faction-ridden
government be, for example, to hold down corporate prices
when threatened with the countermeasure of an investment
strike? Dahl himself asks: "Is it imaginable that a more
equitable distribution of wealth and income could ever be
achieved in the United States without intense political
conflict?" 7 ? In short, Dahl ' s reforms would require a
broadly defined class-based opposition to present corporate
power--that would unify majority interests in a powerful
coalition, whatever the differences within the majority.
Dahl's work, then, remains better at stating the most
obvious manifestation and abuses of power than uncovering
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its multifaceted character. Inequality in general, and
political inequality in particular, result in good measure
from system imperatives that help shape both what ideas
will appear reasonable to press as issues, and what
interests will likely control the fundamental levers of
economic and political power. Dahl is right in suggesting
that non-participation is abetted by political inequality.
Yet, the success of the reforms he proposes, in fact, would
require a fuller awareness of how the scope of politics is
defined and structural constraints formed within corporate
capitalism.
At times, then, Dahl brushes with the reform and
radical paradigms of power articulated in the Introduction
to this thesis. In suggesting that political inequality,
illicit corporate control over public decisions, etc. limit
the ability of citizens to effectively participate in the
control of public policy, he comes close to articulating
the type of depoliticization thesis we will explore in the
next chapter. This is particularly true when he suggests
that corporate control over "economic" life is not yet an
issue on the political agenda-
-although it needs to be. He
stops short, however, of suggesting that the primary factor
creating widespread non-participation is that the scope of
the present political arena systematically excludes
critical basic needs of broad segments of the citizenry.
And while he discusses ideology and corporate
concentration of power, aspects of the radical paradigm
(our subject in Chapters III-V)
, he fails to explicitly
discuss false consciousness as a mode of social control.
Nor does he fully articulate the various ways in which
system imperatives of modern corporate capitalism may
rec
luire a hiSh degree of non-participation; and the complex
obstacles they deploy against developing the widespread
politically conscious opposition that may be necessary to
ensure the success of even the structural reform he argues
for. While some of these concerns are pregnant with his
recent work, they await his more explicit articulation.
The above analysis suggests the following weaknesses
in Dahl's explanation of non-participation and his use of
the concept "apathy." First, he draws too close a connec-
tion between apathy and non-participation motivated by
rational self-interest calculated through opportunity
costs, thereby misconstruing apathy induced by constrained
political and social arrangements. For example, Dahl
writes of a "cycle of defeat" in which inadequate political
skills, low resources, and weak incentives reinforce one
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another. Now while this interaction may describe certain
situations, it does not quite capture the meaning of Dahl
s
own phrase "apathy producing subjection and defeat."
Indeed, this phrase begins to suggest that the
"apathetics" are in some ways unable to, or disabled in
their capacity to, care about politics. The paradigm case
of this condition might be what Bruno Bettelheim has
described as apathy in concentration camps. 78 By encour-
aging us to see induced apathy as somehow related to
calculations of self-interest--from however weak and
defensive a position--Dahl masks an insidious situation.
Calculations of opportunity costs, lack of alternative
ideologies, absence of supportive institutions may all help
create a situation in which people devolve into a condition
of apathy about their own fate. But the condition does not
indicate an assessment of costs—quite the opposite, it
indicates the inability to make accurate assessments. Thus
while there is a relationship between apathy and opportun-
ity costs, a healthy conceptual distance must be maintained
between them.
Dahl often seems content with apathy as a fairly
complete explanation--once the relationship between apathy
and opportunity costs, and especially those incurred
through political inequality, is understood. However, by
allowing apathy such wide range in the explanation of
non-participation, the effect is often to create confusion
and, in the end, limit the explanatory power of the term.
Secondly, by over stress ing apathy in explaining
non-participation, Dahl, like Berelson, focuses too much
attention on the non-participants as the responsible
agents. While Dahl is much more careful than Berelson in
stipulating what stands behind the apathy, he often uses
the term in such a way as to leave us often with the
impression that it is the motivation of the apathetics he
is pointing to.
Thirdly, Dahl does not fully integrate class in the
range of X. While inequalities may be severe, the primary
obstacles to effective participation are not seen as
flowing from the imperatives of American social structure
as an advanced capitalist system. Nor does Dahl generally
include grievances in the range of Y- -particularly covert
grievances and troubles. To do so would be to admit that
our political system blocks legitimate issues from surfac-
ing more than Dahl allows. The effect in both cases is to
exaggerate the amount of apathy related to individual
motivation present by limiting our understanding of the
structural forces pressuring withdrawal from politics. 79
Fourthly, Dahl ' s tendency to rate low the value of
as
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participation overlooks the potential "impact of widespread
democratic participation upon societal values-especially
toward authority, equality, and community . "80 Specifically
he helps undermine the possibility of equality of power
emerging as a dominant value, not the least because he
restricts the notion of political equality to mean the
equal opportunity to influence decision-makers. Taken as
whole, his views tend to legitimate the power relation
involved in present political and economic divisions of
labor and hierarchical organization more generally. For to
the extent participation helps us evaluate the legitimacy
of power relations based on apparent authority, uncriti-
cally accepting high levels of non-participation as
inevitable hinders such scrutiny. 81 Moreover, because it
is participation in existing hierarchical organizations
that serves as the test, for Dahl, of people's desire to
participate, an apathy based in human nature again may be
overstated as a reason for non-participation; and the
toleration of hierarchical, non-participatory, political
and economic organization may be unwarranted.
Lastly, Dahl underrates the importance of the element
of responsibility implicated in the concept of apathy
because he misunderstands the relationship between
political participation, discovering one's interests and
freedom. To the extent participation should be valued for
reasons other than protection of self-interest and the
generation of consensus necessary for polyarchy, apathy
should be more emphatically discouraged than Dahl
discourages it. As Peter Bachrach argues:
The real interest of man is freedom: the freedomto discover himself and beyond that, the freedom
bliA *l ft? " SOC±ally consci^ humaneing For this reason, democratic participationmust be recognized as an integral moral valSe ofcontemporary democratic theory. 82 t
CHAPTER II
THE REFORM OR CONFLICT EXPLANATION OF NON-PARTICIPATION
Introduction
In this chapter, I shall explore the reform or con-
flict explanation of non-participation by studying the work
of E. E. Schattschneider and Peter Bachrach. Their work
provides an essential critique and counterpoint to the
pluralist explanation we have just reviewed.
Schattschneider really provides the base, arguing
quite straightforwardly that many people do not participate
in politics because the present scope of political organiz-
ing and debate does not speak to their needs. As we shall
see, with his thesis of the "mobilization of bias," he
rejects the pluralist assumptions that non-participation
reflects consent for the present order and that apathy is
an adequate explanation.
Bachrach extends Schattschneider 1 s arguments by elab-
orating the relationship between non-participation and the
problem inherent in articulating political interests from
covert grievances and troubles. He warns us that we can't
always be sure that people have a clear perception of their
needs and suggests that meaningful political and workplace
participation can help people better articulate
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what is really in their interests.
In terms of the explanation of non-participation,
Bachrach suggests we must hold open the possibility that
people suffering under the burdens of a difficult daily
existence may become apathetic about their political
interests. With this idea, he begins to articulate the
concept of apathy as a condition.
His analysis will fall short, however, by not fully
incorporating the possibility of "false consciousness" and
by inadequately considering the structural and ideological
constraints that help foster depoliticized roles. I will
turn to Mills and Marcuse in the subsequent chapters to
fully explore these themes in relation to the explanation
of non-participation.
E. E. Schattschneider and the Bias of Conflict
E. E. Schattschneider ! s major work, The Semi-Sovereign
People, is an excellent early (I960) attempt to explain the
existence of widespread non-participation in American poli-
tics. Where Dahl focuses on political inequalities as pro-
blems for the viability of the American consensus, Schatt-
schneider claimed that pluralists incorrectly perceive
consensus to exist because they ignore fundamental, though
submerged, political cleavages. The existing "consensus-
was itself a particular distribution of power because,
Schattschneider argued, "the definition of the alternative
is the supreme instrument of power": 1
All forms of political organization have a biasm favor of the exploitation of some kinds ofconflict and the suppression of others because
organizat ion is the mobilization of bias. Somelssues are organized into politics while others
are organized out. z
In the American political scene of his time, this
"bias" had resulted in forty million Americans rejecting
electoral politics, with most Americans (ninety per cent)
having no place in the pressure system. These facts were
of fundamental significance for the future of American
democracy
:
It is a great deficiency of the group theory
that it has found no place in the political
system for the majority.
3
In fact, he argued, the participation of the "non-
participants" could profoundly alter the scope of poli-
tics: the "struggle for democracy" was now over the
organization of politics and not the right to vote.
Present political organization should be significantly
altered to include policy proposals that are outside the
present consensus. In Schattschneider ' s view, to the
extent writers view non-participation in terms only of
ignorance and lack of interest, they are offering a
rationalization for the present system, deflecting
attention from the need to change it:
reflect^ *L V"" e^lanation - Abstentionects the suppression of the options andalternatives that reflect the needs of the
?WPa£ 1ClpanV" Tt is n0t ^cessarily truethat the people with the greatest needsparticipate in politics most actively.
4
It may be just the opposite, in fact, as it turns out
that the most socioeconomically disenfranchised groups are
also those who do not vote:
An examination of the social structure of thedisenfranchised lends support to the foregoingproposition.
. . . Every study of the subject
supports the conclusion that nonvoting is a
characteristic of the poorest, least well-
established, least educated stratum of the
community. Unquestionably, an expansion of the
scope of the system would bring a new kind of
voter into the community and would change thebalance of forces.
The question is: Has the quarrel that
underlies American politics been so defined that
it excludes a major segment of the nation from
the political system?^
The relationship between nonvoting and the scope of
politics, he suggested, was "the most important dictum
about the political system, much more important than the
distinction between Republicans and Democrats." 6 The
democratic challenge was to develop a "public policy about
politics" to use "political means" to overcome the extra-
legal, social, procedural, structural and organizational
biases of the political system. The democratic goal must
be to bring the disenfranchised into the political arena.
7
How could this be accomplished? Schattschneider
'
s
argument was that the present bias of the political system
had to be rearranged through a political program that spoke
to the needs of the nonvoters
. The present bias of the
political system included within it conflicts in which none
of the antagonistic positions really addressed the inter-
ests of the non-participants. Yet these conflicts, he
maintained with simple brilliance, displaced other con-
flicts and potential issues that would motivate the disen-
franchised to become involved. Moreover, the problem was
deepened because the bias of the system extended beyond the
voter-nonvoter cleavage. There was also a "class bias" to
the present organization of significant interest groups:
The vice of the groupist theory is that it
conceals the most significant aspects of the
system. The flaw in the pluralist heaven is
that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong
upperclass accent. Probably 90 per cent of the
people can't get into the pressure system. 8
Not only nonvoters, but many voters as well, were
denied important levers of power. It was the historic
function of government in a democracy to help redress the
imbalance. Presently, this process was stalemated as
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crucial issues and conflicts were restricted in scope. The
present bias could be overcome, Schattschneider concluded,
if responsible political leaders and organizations would
undertake the task of increasing the level of "socializa-
tion of conflict"-moving it away from narrow private
interests to encompass broader interests. In this way, the
powerless voters, and the disenfranchised voters especi-
ally, would develop a greater stake in the system, breaking
the present hegemony of business. Democratic government
could then serve its historic function of providing an
effective vehicle to counterbalance the power of private
wealth, and democracy would be preserved alongside
capitalism.
The following paradigm of apathy is consistent with
Schattschneider' s pithy examination of American politics.
Note the limited role it allows apathy in the explanation
of non-participation, in sharp contrast to Berelson, and
even Dahl
:
Apathy may explain non-participation when there
are no significant Ys (political issues, overt
grievances) which meet X's (individual, group,
race, "subjective" class ) needs but are kept out
of the political arena.
Mote: This model extrapolates how I presume
Schattschneider would use the concept of apathy,
based on his discussion of non-participation.
He does not use it to any important extent.
9
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Evaluation of Schattschnei der ' s Explanation
of Non-Participation
Schattschneider does not use the language of apathy to
describe what he takes to be the systematic exclusion from
the political system of identifiable groups. Instead, he
develops concepts with more precise critical meaning, such
as, "mobilization of bias," "abstention," "rejection,"
"suppression," etc. In contrast to Dahl
, who often over-
uses apathy, salvaging his usage by varying its content,
Schattschneider 's explanation of non-participation implies
a restricted usage. What appears as consensus to Berelson
and, at times, Dahl is here interpreted as a mobilization
of bias accomplished by suppressing conflict. Non-partici-
pation is characterized by the abstention of Xs , with
grievances not addressed in the political system under the
present "consensus" of two-party politics. And while Dahl
does discuss political inequalities, it is quite another
thing to claim, as Schattschneider does, that non-partici-
pation reflects the needs of the majority that systematic-
ally go unmet. Moreover, to reject by conscious abstention
is not to be apathetic, no matter how much the concept is
modified. Indeed, it implies taking most seriously those
needs that are going unmet.
Because Schattschneider thinks non-participation may
be explained by the operation of a class system (loosely
defined) he admits "class- to the range of X. Believing
such a system prevents some issues from surfacing, he also
adds overt grievances to the range of Y. With Dahl
, such
additions would have increased the likelihood of stipulat-
ing more precisely what he means by "apathy," or, indeed,
curtailed his use of the term. Dahl
' s overuse of apathy
is, of course, related to his exclusion of grievances and
class from serious consideration in his explanation of
non-participation
.
To maintain, for example, that the "working class" is
apathetic has different implications from maintaining that
apathy characterizes disparate individuals, or even
groups. Schattschneider 's explanation serves to restrict
the application of apathy, therefore, forcing one to expli-
citly use other concepts, such as those I've noted, to
explain non-participation. For, to the extent a "class"
has "overt grievances" which speak to their "needs" but
have not been allowed to surface as "issues" in "legiti-
mate" political channels, that class is not likely to be
considered "apathetic." In the explanation of non-partici-
pation, therefore, we must at least search for evidence of
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classes with grievances. Apathy becomes a plausible expla-
nation only after we have determined that such class-based
grievances do not exist.
Schattschneider 's explanation of non-participation
does have several important limitations. For one thing,
his view of the political arena still focuses primarily on
party politics and government. As a result, we are not
likely to question whether what we, at first glance,
consider to be '•private" economic relations really should
be considered instead as directly political relations. Now
Schattschneider is aware of the enormous influence of
business on politics and believes that government in a
democratic society is the primary forum within which to
redress the imbalance of power between classes. Neverthe-
less, this presumption concerning the nature of the
political arena first, deflects attention from potential
legitimate political issues, 10 and secondly, overlooks more
subtle power relations that may inhibit participation.
Should corporate ownership of vital industries become an
issue for political consideration? Does the division of
labor, fragmenting worker unity, serve to inhibit organ-
izing and thereby participation, and should it be viewed as
a political obstacle to greater participation?
Schattschneider also doesn't consider latent or covert
con-
e
grievances in the range of Y. Therefore, before we know
whether a grievance exists, we must be able to detect
flicts of perceived interest. However, might there not b
grievances which people feel and, perhaps, even can articu-
late to some limited extent, yet which are not yet fully
formulated? Lewis Lips it*, for example, suggests that
grievances may be latent-that is, the individual or group
in question may not yet be fully aware of their terms as
articulated preferences . H Grievances may also be overt
but articulated only in personal terms due to ideological
biases derailing potential translation into political
issues
.
The above weaknesses become more apparent when we
consider that hierarchical job structures, reinforced by
racial and sexual divisions of the workforce and atomistic
lives, can prevent many from developing a political inter-
pretation of their grievances by undercutting efforts to
develop a group or class perspective to help identify what
may be common structural sources. Thus, grievances may
remain at the level of troubles individuals feel without
becoming overt and sufficiently coherent to stimulate
political organization. 12 Without a successful translation
of latent or personal grievances into explicitly political
ones, the base Schatt Schneider requires to alter the scope
of issue conflict remains lacking.
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Schattschneider's focus on overt "political" grie-
vances also can lead unwittingly to an exaggeration of the
individual apathy present because it limits the arena
within which we look for grievances, as well as the nature
of what constitutes a grievance. If, after having studied
non-participants, no apparent issues are found around which
to organize new conflict lines, what else are we likely to
conclude is the source of non-participation?
-part icularly
given the important role "apathy" plays in popular and
journalistic explanations of non-participation.
Schattschneider's analysis itself, however, tends to
downplay both apathy related to choices one makes and
apathy as a condition. Certainly he is right, in contrast
to Berelson, to focus on how the exclusion of the needs of
certain groups from the scope of issue formation illicitly
limits the range of issues that should be allowed to sur-
face in the political arena. At the same time, however, it
is important in our determination of responsibility not to
eliminate by fiat the possibility that people may allow
their will to wane or make other political choices which
render them apathetic about concerns which, we want to
maintain, should remain important to them. The concept of
apathy related to choice should be kept alive, therefore,
as part of a political vocabulary we would want to utilize
selectively and self-consciously.
Perhaps the most important case in which apathy with
respect to needs can occur is that of needs not yet fully
grasped and not likely to be grasped by the agent-the
sense of apathy as a condition fostered by ideology and
pressures of social structure. Schattschneider
' s focus on
behavior and conflict misses this possibility. Again, the
paradigm here is the concentration camp victim lapsing into
total apathy. Consider also, however, the person who has
been taught since childhood that any attempt to influence
present political arrangements will only cause even more
pain and suffering. Political explanation is here denied
expression due to a "realistic" appraisal of structural
pressure and, perhaps, personal danger, deflecting atten-
tion from political resolution of one's troubles. 13 Now it
might be objected that this state is better described as
depoliticization than as apathy. Both claims are true.
For to the extent systematic exclusion from politics
fosters inherently apolitical consciousness, the apathy
that is engendered is surely a subtype of depoliticization
.
In general, Schattschneider 1 s explanation of non-
participation focuses on those overt grievances not allowed
within the present scope of party politics. This explana-
tion overlooks covert grievances and thereby is likely to
miss the more profound ways in which the present "mobili-
zation of bias" may prevent challenges to itself. Further,
it may understate the amount of apathy actually present,
'
whether related to choice or as a condition, by assuming
that people never become apathetic with respect to what
should be important to them. 14
Schattschneider's contribution remains great, how-
ever. For while he pushes aside the concept of apathy, he
restores to center stage the following proposition: the
explanation of non-participation should consider both the
needs of the non-participants and whether they are being
addressed in the present scope of political conflict and
the strong correlation between non-participation and social
and economic disadvantages. Without such considerations,
apathy can become, as it has in much pluralist analysis, an
ideological smokescreen for what is better described as
depoliticization
.
Peter Bachrach and the Duality of Interests Standard
Peter Bachrach develops and enriches Schattschneider's
explanation of non-participation. In this section, I shall
primarily confine the discussion to Bachrach' s earlier
work, for it is here that he exemplifies a transitional
theorist, still within the "reform- paradigm of power
outlined by Lukes (see Introduction) while bordering the
"radical" paradigm. As we shall see later in this section
and in Chapter VI, some of his later work moves him more
explicitly into the "radical" paradigm.
Bachrach's work is indebted to Schattschneider
»
s
critique of pluralism through the "mobilization of bias"
thesis. He does, however, augment this view primarily
through his analysis of the concepts, power, interests,
democracy and participation.
Bachrach's early analysis of power is essentially the
same as Schattschneider
' s , although there is some vacil-
lation in his work. In his early essay, with Morton
Baratz, "Two Faces of Power" (1962), he suggested that
power relations exist when there is conflict between groups
over issues or over what grievances should be allowed to
become issues. Its exercise may be intended or unin-
tended. 15 Its most subtle manifestation occurs through
what he and Morton Baratz have called "nondecision-
making": can the student of politics, they ask,
.
safely ignore the possibility, for
instance, that an individual or group in a
community participates more vigorously in
supporting the nonde c i s ion
-making process than
in participating in actual decisions within the
process? Stated differently, can the researcher
overlook the chance that some person or
association could limit decision-making to
relatively non-controversial matters byinfluencing community values and politicalprocedures and rituals, notwithstanding thatthere are in the community serious, but latentpower conflicts? To do so is, in our judgmentto overlook the less apparent, but nonethelessextremely important, face of power. 16
cn i
In his later article, "Interests, Participation, and
Democratic Theory" (1971), he argues that a power relation
exists when "nondecision-making" prevents the development
of explicit grievances as well as political issues. 17 In
Power and Poverty (1970), however, he and Baratz claim that
nondecisions must be "observable" and that covert
grievances must have the coherency of an articulated
preference. 18 Thus, in the earlier and later work, he
argues for a broad interpretation of the definition of
nondecisions, whereas in Power and Poverty
, he restricts
both. Even here there is some ambivalence, however:
The observer may find that no one is aggrievedin the community. In that event he would be ill
advised to search for evidence of non-decision-
making, if there is no conflict
, overt, or
covert
,
the presumption must be that there is
consensus^ on the prevailing allocation of
values, in which case non-decisionmaking is
impossible . 1"
Bachrach here uses the looser language of "aggrieved"
to modify his view on what constitutes a covert grievance,
although he does not move explicitly to the language of
"troubles." However, when no "grievances" are found, he
continues, we must presume that consensus exists. Still,
note again the ambivalence. In spite of the above remark,
there may be:
latent and potential groups (e.g., the povertypopulation) who are currently uninterested inthe policy making process or are powerless, but
who are likely in the future to become active
and capable of exercising power and its
correlates within the political system. 20
As Isaac Balbus has pointed out, Bachrach here seems
to indicate that there are objective conditions under-
girding power relations. 21 For example, at various points,
Bachrach speaks of: "ideological barriers" ;22 authority in
a pathological state reproducing pathology; brainwashing as
an example of how power can be turned into "authority . "23
These indicate that Bachrach is uncomfortable with the need
to demonstrate the existence of grievances in order to
determine whether a power relation exists. Bachrach,
however, concludes:
Suppose the observer can uncover no grievances,
no actual or potential demands for change.
Suppose, in other words , there appears to be
universal acquiescence in the status -quo. Is it
not possible
, In such circumstances to determine
empirically whether the consensus is genuine or
instead has been enforced through
nondecision-making? The answer must be
negative. Analysis of this problem is beyond
the reach of a political analyst and perhaps can
only be fruitfully analyzed by a philosopher . 24
This statement is revealing in two ways. First, note
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that Bachrach uses "universal acquiescence" to stipulate
the meaning of "consensus" while using "appears" in a way
that reveals the methodology employed. The effects are
somewhat contradictory and, perhaps, indicate his insecur-
ity with behavioral definitions of grievance. For Bachrach
is suggesting that our search for conflict should not rest
until we've found "universal acquiescence" and no potential
demands for change, yet the appearance of surfaced grie-
vances suffices. Secondly, Bachrach seems to indicate
that, although relations of authority may have been esta-
blished by power and may even be illegitimate, once fully
established, they are the province of philosophers, not
social scientists . 25
In other works, Bachrach moves explicitly from his
emphasis on observable conflict, as an essential charac-
teristic of both nondecisions and grievances. In "Inter-
ests.
.
.," for example, he studies the relationship
between political participation and the development of real
wants. 26 He argues that the raison d'etre of democracy is
freedom, yet freedom necessitates the development of real
wants through political participation. Thus, participation
is not simply intrumental to promoting existing wants but
necessary for fully developing their terms as well. In
this claim, he makes a significant move away from the
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theorists we have studied so far. His claim here is that a
political system becomes more fully democratic to the
extent it allows not only the expression of articulated
wants but participatory mechanisms which will enable people
to develop further their real wants. He suggests, there-
fore, that we adopt a "dual conception of interests" which
"recognizes that not all expressed wants reflect real
wants . "27
an
I take, then, the following statement to be
important move away from the position on grievances he
argUes in Power and Poverty: The "dual conception of
interests" is necessary because
Failure to delineate the real from articulatedinterests of lower strata individuals impliesthat their political apathy reflects the
relative absence of personal concerns. Such a
conclusion repudiates what we know to be true-that people consumed by the hardship of everydaylife
. . .
possess neither the energy nor
capacity to transfer moods of bitt erness andfutility into articulated preferences . 28
Thus, when we use the "duality of interests" standard
to investigate American politics, we find that when the
system responds only to articulated preferences, it rewards
its members in inverse proportion to their need. Bachrach
adds, however, that the fact that such bias stems from
inequality in the economic sphere does not necessarily
render the political system less democratic. Instead, the
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essential criterion of democracy is whether the system
provides adequate participatory structures that will enable
all groups to articulate their interests: 29
In other words, when there is a blockage in theconversion process from feelings to articulatedpreferences for a significant ° portion of" thepopulation, there is a reasonable doubt that
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For Bachrach, an essential question then becomes, what
kind of participatory structures should be provided, given
that the most disenfranchised seem uninterested in public
affairs? He responds that, although "public affairs"
appear remote and beyond influence, issues arising at the
workplace are likely to be viewed with greater concern. 31
Further, because large corporations "authoritatively
allocate values," they should be considered political
institutions and subject to democratic control. There
should be, therefore, an expansion "in participation in
decision-making among members within their constitu-
ency. "32 Thus, to foster participation and democratic
control, we need a public policy geared to decentralizing
and establishing public authority over the corporations.
An increase in participation would not guarantee radical
social change (in fact, he suggests workers seem fairly
conservative), but it would dramatically increase the
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likelihood that the power of nondecis ion-makers would be
lessened, and new issues could be expected to emerge.
Bachrach's work can be summarized as follows. First,
he offers a developmental view of political participation,
differing fundamentally from the instrumental view of
Berelson, Dahl, and even Schattschneider
. Secondly, he
offers what Lukes has called a "qualified critique" of the
behavioral concept of power. He does this first, by
developing the paradigm of nondecisions and explicitly
incorporating it into his analysis of power; and, secondly,
at least in his article, "Interests.
. .," by developing
the concept of grievance to include "troubles." Thirdly,
he consistently applies the pluralist concern for
"authoritative allocation of values" and thereby includes
the corporation as a political unit. 33 Fourthly, he
attacks the political and economic division of labor by
demonstrating the importance of direct participation in
developing one's interests. Fifthly, he implicitly attacks
Dahl's view that sheer size limits the potential of parti-
cipation by developing a concern for participation at the
local workplace. Sixthly, he is concerned with equality,
not only because it is necessary to overcome political
resource inequalities (Dahl) or the "mobilization of bias"
(Schattschneider) but because it can help enable us to know
better our real interests and become free. 34 In sumj he
begins to discuss the importance of equality of power in a
democracy
:
The crucial issue of democracy is not theS°sitKio° of the elite [whether businessman orworker but]
. .
whether democracy can diffusepower sufficiently throughout society to incul-
cat e< among people of all walks of life ajustifiable feeling that they have the power toparticipate in decisions which affect themselves
and the common life of the community, especiallythe immediate community in which they work and
spend most of their working hours and energy. 35
Bachrach's explanation of non-participation
Constructing Bachrach's explanation of non-participa-
tion and paradigm of political apathy has pitfalls similar
to constructing Dahl » s because there are important differ-
ences between some of his works. The most important turn
on the epistemological status of both "nondecisions" and
"covert grievances" and the emphasis on, and meaning of,
participation. These have implications for his analysis of
the legitimacy of the present scope of politics.
Thus, in Power and Poverty
, he responds to criticism
by claiming that "a decision which results in prevention of
conflict is_ very much an event--and an observable one to
boot. "36 Elsewhere he worries less about the need for
observable decisions and argues that we should study power
by examining the
-mobilization of bias," the dominant
values, myths, established political procedures and rules
of the game. 37 It ls clear ^ Bachrach . g ^
about the dominant values of a society shaping the wants of
citizens in the interests of a ruling class. Yet he does
seem to indicate that there is an ideological bias against
the development of certain issues-a view not easily
assimilated into the paradigm of nondecisions outlined in
Power and Poverty. Consider, for example, that in "Inter-
ests.
.
."he seems to indicate that the economic and
political divisions of labor, themselves, contribute to
prevent "troubles" from being converted into politically
coherent wants. In fact, he argues that increased partici-
pation may undermine certain values and relations of
authority. It seems, then, that, in practice, he has taken
back the concession made to his critics in Power and
Poverty and moved to a position on nondecisions similar to
his view in "Two Faces of Power" and, in fact, to Schatt-
schneider
' s
.
Unlike Schattschneider, however, political apathy is a
grave concern for Bachrach, indicating whole strata of
society neither fully conversant with their interests nor
fully free:
We know that a predominant number of individuals
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in the lower economic strata are politicallvapathetic and ignorant. We also know that thereis a positive correlation between social statusand political participation-
-that the level ofcitizen participation and the distribution oforganizational resources vary according to theshape of the stratification system. 38
When we consider Bachrach's explanation of non-parti-
cipation, his statements on political apathy, along with
his methodological and substantive concerns, it follows
that:
X (an individual, group, race, subjective class)becomes apathetic with respect to Y (issuespolitics) when the polity denies X the 'participatory structures within which todetermine the meaning of Z (overt and covertgrievances, or troubles X has) in relation to
^*
J •ir
T?US, ? becomes apathetic (ignorant andindifferent) because without such structures Xis likely to lack the energy and capacity to seehow Y and/or Z might advance or retard his orher real interests.
Evaluation of Bachrach's Explanation of Non-Participation
Bachrach is the first theorist studied to begin to
capture the sense of political apathy as a condition of
consciousness. Note that Bachrach introduces the element
of "real interests" and participatory structures to help
enable one to come to know them. When a person is
presented with an array of issues and does not find them to
be in his or her interest, he or she may become apathetic
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to the political order that continuously serves them. Here
Bachrach moves away from Schattschneider
• s view that non-
participants simply reject the present "mobilization of
bias"—to the view that they may become apathetic because
no significant political avenues or exist, or are likely to
exist, through which they can express their needs or
articulate inchoate troubles. For Bachrach, X may become
apathetic to Y when Z is not sufficiently developed to do
more than signal lack of interest for X in Y, as well as
when X believes over time that there is no way to influence
Y. Bachrach, then, has a more subtle understanding than
Schattschneider of both apathy and grievances and of the
mode of political power that can be generated by a "mobili-
zation of bias."
Furthermore, Bachrach articulates the importance of
participation for developing the capacity to know one's
interest, a concern absent in Schattschneider. The effect
is to add critical force to the concept "political apa-
thy." For Schattschneider only criticizes the mobilization
of bias for keeping from the political debate the needs of
most Americans. Bachrach criticizes it for also preventing
the development of a coherent set of needs--and thereby
fostering quiescence or apathy as a condition people suffer
under. Thus, the mobilization of bias is repugnant to
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Bachrach for increasing the likelihood not only that many
will reject politics but that many will beco.e apathetic to
politics, as well.
Consequently, Bachrach emphasizes the necessity for
participatory structures to overcome apathy. m this, he
begins to develop an idea that pluralists largely ignore,
although repressive regimes know all too well: a lack of
political organization with which to develop, sustain and
promote the interests of the disenfranchised leads to
political quiescence. While pluralists acknowledge that
political structures are necessary to win political
contests, the interest group, in particular, they fail to
see the crucial role such structures play in helping make
coherent the troubles people feel.
Bachrach also extends the scope of political interest
to include the workplace and corporations. In doing so, he
increases the range of issues and potential issues that
should be included in any assessment of how extensive
apathy currently is. When we combine his concerns about
corporate authority and the need for greater participation,
for example, we find that the legitimacy of current
economic and political divisions of labor thereby also
become potential issues. Thus, Bachrach maintains that
before we determine how much apathy is present, we should
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ask are there other issues currently or potentially
important to the agents?; and are there social structures
which inhibit or distort present self-definitions of
"interest" and which themselves might become potential
issues?
Finally, Bachrach begins to develop a significant
motivational analysis for understanding apathy as a
condition. With Dahl, apathy produced by poverty often
means poor people lose interest in politics because they
despair of continuing defeat. They know their interest but
become apathetic because the opportunity costs (political
inequalities) involved in continuing to press them become
too great. Bachrach deepens our understanding of how
structural pressures can affect political motivation by
developing the relation between the mobilization of bias
and apathy: the systematic exclusion of overt grievances
from the realm of political issues and prevention of covert
grievances and troubles from becoming overt and clarified
can foster devolution into apathy. Part of that condition,
for Bachrach, is a lack of capacity, energy and opportunity
with which to articulate and press grievances in politi-
cally relevant ways, suggesting a deprivation of both
structural and conceptual resources. For Bachrach, apathy
as a condition results from structural pressures incapaci-
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tating one from knowing and pressing one's interests and
results in non-participation.
While Bachrach does develop some of the promising
themes in Schat tschneider and Dahl, he falls short of of-
fering a fully satisfying explanation of non-participation,
for several important reasons. While he does have some
understanding of the dynamics of apathy as a condition, he
does not adequately discuss apathy related to choice. I
think, for example, it makes sense to say that X becomes
apathetic about issue A because X has freely chosen between
issue A and B and is more concerned with B. Thus, because
A was once important to X, we might conclude that X's
apathy may help X focus on the choice of B--apathy we can
nevertheless hold X responsible for if we want to maintain
that A should still be important to X, B notwithstanding.
Bachrach' s discussion also has difficulties relating
to his commitment to a reformed behavioralism. Therefore,
while Bachrach begins to see apathy as a condition, he
tends to overapply it- -assuming that all who appear to be
apathetic or ignorant actually are. He presumes, for
example, that those in the lower strata who articulate no
preferences are apathetic. Those with overt grievances
apparently reject politics, while those with covert
grievances and those with repeatedly thwarted overt
Ill
grievances become apathetic. It is surely possible,
however, that some might have a coherent set of beliefs
they choose not to articulate and press, perhaps, for fear
of reprisal, or simply because they don't feel anything
good will come of it. Although they are apparently apathe-
tic, in reality they simply refrain on purpose from getting
involved. While Bachrach's analysis of power, of course,
allows for identifying such a relation, his statements on
non-participation are unclear on this type of political
withdrawal. This reflects a problem in some of Bachrach's
work, a tendency to focus on appearances when in uncharted
terrain . 39
Of much greater importance, however, are inadequacies
in his general treatment of the relation of power and
interests. While Bachrach's views on covert grievances and
troubles are an important improvement over Schattschneider
,
he doesn't fully explore the sources of these grievances
and their relation to real interests. Are we to presume
that the troubles a person feels reflect his or her real
interests? Are we to assume that when troubles can be
developed into issues, a person's real interests are more
likely to surface? For example, a person may feel anxious
because he or she has not been promoted along with one of
his or her peers. Does the "real interest" lie within
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being promoted and thus relieving the anxiety? Or is the
point to do away, to the extent possible, with the hier-
archy, which is part of the basis for the driving desire
for promotion and thereby the anxiety? Certainly Bachrach
is correct in suggesting that the articulation of troubles
is an important step in determining real interests, but he
understates the extent to which troubles, themselves, can
be rooted in the ideology and practices of a particular
social and political order.
Bachrach does move away from the crude need theory,
however, by suggesting that participation can reveal
interests (and, I might add, perhaps stimulate troubles)
that could not be predicted simply form the ideas or
grievances held prior to the involvement. For example, he
notes that greater participation may foster in workers a
greater desire and capacity to question current values of
authority. His tacit understanding of real interests,
then, seems to go beyond the analytical category of felt
needs. However, because felt needs remain his primary
analytic framework for determining real interests, he is
open to the following criticism by Steven Lukes:
It^ is here assumed that if men feel no
grievances, then they have no interests that are
harmed by the use of power. ... Is it not the
supreme and most insidious exercise of power to
prevent people from having grievances by shaping
existing order of things?40
r° ie Ln the
-S sensi-
While Bachrach's article, "Interests.
. .," U
tive to this criticism, it does not completely avoid it.
Nor is this problem merely academic. Consider that not
only might the grievances people feel not reflect their
real interests, but they might confuse attempts to come to
know them more fully. For example, given the ideology of
equal opportunity, a person may assume an inordinate share
of individual responsibility for being out of work during a
recession. Given the ideological context, the grievance
illicitly may remain personalized, undermining political
understanding and the development of one's real interest.
To rely on felt grievances as the indicator of real
interests or to equate their absence with no existent
interest may underplay some of the most important power
relations in a society. With respect to apathy and
non-participation, it is to miss several possibilities.
People may be socialized into a condition of apathy, as
when explicitly apathetic roles are important role models.
People may become apathetic because the grievances they
feel never lead them to develop political strategies either
to overcome such grievances, or to overcome them without
developing important new ones. Consider again the worker
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anxious about promotion. Suppose he or she follows the
need to succeed, only to find after advancement that there
now exist a new set of peers to compete with and that
former friends will no longer associate with him or her,
creating anxiety once again.
Finally, if people have not successfully determined
their real interests, they may become apathetic with
respect to issues that should be important to them. This
leads to the controversial aspect of apathy: for example,
I might consider someone apathetic with respect to an issue
which I feel he or she should care about, while the agent
disagrees with my evaluation, denying that the issue is
important. The problem is deepened because it still
remains to be determined whether the "apathy" (if it is
apathy) is the responsibility of the agent or if it results
from the type of structural sources we have discussed.
Three possibilities emerge. I may be incorrectly using the
term "apathy" because, in fact, the issue under consider-
ation is not, and will not become, of any consequence to
the agent. Or apathy related to choice may be an apt
characterization. My use of the term then may prod the
person, who bears responsibility and therefore some degree
of freedom to overcome the apathy, to become more conscious
of the choices made and the consequences. Or, if apathy as
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a condition obtains, my characterization is not likely to
have immediate impact because the agent, in my judgment, is
not in a position to assess freely what should be important
to him or her. In this case, we have a subtype of "false-
consciousness .
"
If the above arguments are sound, how do we locate
responsibility for non-participation and apathy? As Lukes
points out, Bachrach's methodology has an individualistic
view of nondecisions. It follows that we would need to
observe the relevant nondecision-making process before we
determine responsibility for non-participation and apa-
thy. 41 if corporations "authoritatively allocate values,"
for example, they should be considered political. If
corporate allocation of values precludes decisions that
could enhance democratic participation, such value
distribution may be the responsible agency for fostering
apathy. Because corporations are now viewed as the poli-
tical agency inhibiting participation, it is legitimate to
speak of augmented democratic control over the corporation.
What of the "value" of the corporation itself,
however, and the ideology of capitalism which sustains it?
Bachrach's method is weak here both in comprehending the
reasons for apathy and non-participation and in locating
the responsibility as well. For the ideological context in
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which nondecisions occur is often crucial to making rela-
tions of power appear legitimate and removing them from
scrutiny, thereby constituting a more important power
relation, however subtle, than the nondecision itself. 42
Consider the following: a dominant ideology may
foster apathy by manipulating the wants of an agent,
pressing him or her to adopt passive roles functional for
the social system. Bachrach may miss these practices as
examples of power relations because his concept of
nondecision is predicated on the prevention of conflict and
the necessity for observing, at the least, troubles. But
the very point here is that conflict may not surface. In
fact, the more successfully an ideology is established as a
powerful value system, the less likely it is that any
conflict will arise.
Not having the cue of conflict, Bachrach 's method is
likely to encourage an analyst to see such manipulation as
the authoritative working of the system-
-supported by
consensus--rather than as a specific application of power
that supports a particular system of power. This method is
also more likely to miss important structural sources and
actors responsible, in part, for creating the conditions
for non-participation and/or apathy. And by missing impor-
tant agents and agencies, the analyst is likely to exagger-
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ate the responsibility of those he or she does locate.
Perhaps most important, the analyst may misappropriate
responsibility because he or she will fail to see that the
logic, or the normal working of a social system may be
itself the most critical source of apathy and non-partici-
pation. Restricted by an analytic straightjacket
, the
observer fails to grapple with a fundamental question:
when is the authority of a social system, apparently
grounded in free consent, in fact illegitimate because it
subversively fosters unnecessary apathy and non-partici-
pation, curtailing the interests and freedom of the
participants without their consent or knowledge? To
accurately assess levels of non-participation, degree of
apathy, and the reasons for both, it is necessary to go
beyond the category of ''nondecisions
. Not to do so,
perversely, would relegate the study of a society that
engendered "happy slaves" to the world of metaphysics,
removed from immediate political practice and relevant
social theory. 43
There is, I believe, an implicit awareness of some of
these problems within some of Bachrach's work, particularly
in his article "Interests. ..." This awareness points to
the inadequacy of the paradigm of nondecisions, particu-
larly as it relates to non-participation and apathy. As we
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shall see, Bachrach's mos t recent work seems to agree with
my critique. Note the tensions within his arguments in
"Interests.
.
.":
It is the central contention of this paper thata dual concept of political Interest, whichrecognizes that nor , 11 expressed w«nf'q r^I§ctgeaTwanp is an essential stangarg F5r Htlr^
aemocratic m terms of this standard, a systemis democratic to the extent it recognizes andenforces the right of the individual8 to parSci-
and
e
h^ ng .<Lecisl°™ that closely affect himis community. Such participation is anessential means for the individual to discoverhis wants through the intervening discovery ofhimself as a social human being.w
Up to this point, Bachrach is arguing that we can't be
certain that the most important real wants of an agent are
included in. expressed preferences. For a society to be
democratic, therefore, it must include participatory mech-
anisms to enable an agent to come to know his or her real
wants. Discussion is particularly important here, not only
because it helps catalyze opinion but because "it helps
create it. "45 How are we tQ knoW) however, when the
participatory structures we have set up enable or disable
the translation from apparent to real interests?
The presumption that people from the lower
strata have real interests— interests which they
are unable to express, let alone comprehend -
-
does not imply that elites nor anyone else know
what these interests actually are. ^6
If people from the lower strata are unable to express
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their real interests and elites (and "anyone else") do not
know them, when is a successful translation taking place?
Bachrach's answer is only partially satisfying. Let us
recall the following test, in which he retreats somewhat
from the above statements, where it is unclear whether real
interests must be based, at least, in unarticulated
"feelings." When is the democratic "right" to participate
is being violated?:
.
. .
when there is a blockage in the conversionprocess from feelings to articulated preferencesfor a significant portion of the population,
there is reasonable doubt that convergence be-
tween real and apparent needs is taking place.
^
7
Recall also his requirement that "feelings" be present for
us to ascertain that real wants may be lurking below the
surface. The problem is this: Bachrach was unwilling to
concede, at least at this stage of his work, that real
interests may not be reflected in the agent's affect,
because he fears that this position would introduce bias
into the analyst's conclusion about what the agent's real
interests are. Responding to pluralist analysis and
criticism, his critique of pluralism does not go quite far
enough. For how are we ever to know that the participation
mechanism we put in place allows even the effective trans-
lation of "feelings" into real interests, without having
some conception of what those real interests are?
am
er
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Any participatory mechanism will advance cert
interests over others and, for that matter, allow clear
articulation of certain feelings over others. How are we
to know when a particular process allows all the important
feelings of an agent to be conceptualized? According to
Bachrach, it appears, we would have to ask the agent,
certainly a proper place to begin. Yet, by Bachrach 's own
admission, the agent may not be fully conversant with the
meaning of his or her feelings. The analyst and the agent,
then, must decide, using the evidence of the agent's per-
ception, whether the perception of effective translation is
accurate. We are then brought back to the problem Bachrach
states, that the articulated wants of the agent may not
fully reflect his or her real interests.
The problem is deepened when we consider that the
agent's most basic feelings may be so repressed that the
agent can be said to be unaware of them. Moreover, there
may be ideas and modes of life that the agent is unfamiliar
with, which, if experienced, would ultimately prove to be
more satisfying or normatively superior in the eyes of the
agent. The agent's perception of the conversion process,
then, is important evidence, but never a sufficient test,
of the effective translation of apparent to real interest.
What type of participation will advance, then, the
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ability of the agent to ascertain freely his or her inter-
ests and press for them? Just as we cannot fully ground
the real interests of the agent upon the agent's articu-
lated preferences, there is no "value-neutral" way we can
establish what type of participation will advance the
agent's freedom. Bachrach, for example, suggests that
certain participatory schemes may be cooptative^S and that
equality of political power is an important standard to be
brought to bear to determine whether full participation, in
fact, obtains.
The discussion must be taken further. Any evaluation
of what an agent's real interests are and what type of
participation advances the agent's freedom is, at the same
time, an argument in favor of certain participation schemes
and a certain conception of interests. In fact, full par-
ticipation would have as one of its standards the active
involvement of all capable agents in precisely these types
of discussions. Bachrach 's conclusion that "in a democra-
cy, each individual should have the right to participate in
making decisions that directly affect his interests," begs
an essential question: how do we know what the agent's
interests are and therefore whether the decisions the agent
is participating in do, in fact, "directly affect his
interests"?
These issues can have practical implications for the
study of non-participation. Let us take one example.
According to Bachrach, if corporations
"authoritatively
allocate values," they should be subject to political
control; if work-life occupies a preponderant amount of
worker time and energy, workers should participate in con-
trol over their work. Bachrach concludes, however, that
even after participation, workers are likely to remain
status quo oriented. Certainly, this conclusion is not
implausible, but there are certain weaknesses in the
analysis used to arrive at it.
It is crucial, for example, that the type of partici-
pation Bachrach has advanced to this point remains within
the confines of capitalist property relations. While he
thinks that he is advancing the capacity of workers to
develop their interest through democratic procedures, he
misses that he is also advancing a particular schedule of
interests, including some form of participation, but not
including democratic ownership and probably not even
serious control over work. The conclusion that workers may
not become more "radical," therefore, may be determined
more by the proposals and the structual constraints they
will operate under than by an abstract conception of worker
"conservatism." Some workers, it might turn out, will
raw
eve
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remain "apathetic- with respect to worklife even with
opportunities for greater participation, not because they
don't care about who controls production and their work but
because they might think it foolish to spend extra energy
working on someone else's property. Or they might withd
into "apathy" after being frustrated in efforts to achi
serious control. The combination here of the social struc-
ture and values of private property, and participatory
reforms, can lead to conclusions supporting the
conservative view that workers don't really want to govern
themselves. On the other side, if participation were taken
seriously, it might soon bump into the imperative of
private ownership and decision-making over production and
capital accumulation, leading to more radical demands.
The general problems discussed above are inherent in
Bachrach's early method, although he does transcend them
implicitly from time to time. They indicate his commitment
to a reformed behavioralism, his fear of elitism, and
ultimately demonstrate his mistaken presumption that we can
set up neutral (and therefore "non-elitist") procedures
within which workers can develop their real interests.
Partly misunderstanding the relation of consciousness
to social structure, Bachrach thinks he can avoid the
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positivist twin charges of elitism and emotivism by .round-
ing his appeal for greater participation only wlthln terms
that do not themselves question the values participants
hold. m doing so, however, he opens himself up to the
charge that his Methodology does not fully transcend
dominant ideology and, therefore, may unwittingly support
reformed, but still elitist, political structures. m
order to overcome this charge, Bachrach would have to
outline the capacities and interests his reforms would help
foster and demonstrate how his reforms are likely to
achieve these results. 49 otherwise, the unfortunate result
would be to develop a naive faith in participation, which
might lead to the further domination and depoliticization
of workers and the underclass, certainly not a result
intended by Bachrach. Without a critical theory of the
reforms he has proposed, we could not begin to know.
As part of that critical theory, we should admit that
real interests may be harmed by the exercise of power even
though no "feelings" are detectable, and thereby no block-
age exists between feelings and interests. Once we do
this, we can reject a curious assumption with elitist
implications in Bachrach' s own work. Bachrach fears that
if we suggest certain interests may be present in the
absence of felt grievances, we may commit the elitist error
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of insinuating our beliefs into the agents we study.
Therefore, he focuses on unarticulated troubles as well as
overt grievances and the blockage between feelings and
interests. As a result, he presumes that those who have
difficulty articulating their feelings are also those who
do not comprehend their own interests, and he locates this
constellation in the lower economic and social strata. 50 I
shall discuss in Chapters III and V whether political
theorists, even radical theorists, tend to underplay the
articulateness of workers and the underclass. For our
purposes here, we can now ask: if the inability to
articulate troubles into overt grievances and issues is not
the only signpost of the suppression of real interests, is
the present social system meeting the real interests of all
of its constituents? In other words, are we all capable of
misperceiving our real interests, no matter how articulate
and introspective we appear to be?
The "democratic" nonelitism Bachrach supports at best
privileges the hypothesis that, from a democratic point of
view, we must presume that the values and feelings of
workers (especially as developed through "participation")
signal their real interests. Against this, we must main-
tain the possibility values and feelings themselves may be
part of the subordination of all people (particularly
if we are uncritical about the nature of the "partici-
pation" engaged in). At worst, it misses that all
political agendas have an attendant package of interests
and capacities, and if having such agenda is elitist, so
are all people directly or indirectly engaged in political
affairs or analysis. The curious result is to label as
elitist only those who explicitly acknowledge and take
responsibility for the full scope of the proposals they
make
.
One can try to influence people to accept a radically
different set of values and try to develop political struc-
tures to support such values without forcing or manipu-
lating them into such practices. Because all political
analysis is politically engaged, taking responsibility for
the persuasive element of an analysis should not be
mistaken for elitism. Quite the contrary, such is the
hallmark of responsible inquiry. More directly, in poli-
tics, mistaking an effort to persuade with the practice of
elitism can subvert democratic discussion of important
power relations, which may themselves prevent a rational
discussion of a radical political program or any
unconventional ideas. 51
In sum, Bachrach improves Schattschneider
'
s
explanation of non-participation by refining the concept of
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covert grievance and restoring the developmental aspect of
participation to a central place in democratic theory. His
weaknesses result fro ra an inadequate analysis of the rela-
tionship of consciousness to social structure, stewing
from a tenacious commitment to a reformed behavioralism.
Thus, his paradigm of power overstresses the role of
decisions and subjective conflict; it overlooks the
question of whether there may exist "objective" class
conflicts that have not yet surfaced, in part, because of
incomplete consciousness of our situation and our inter-
ests. As a result, he only begins to articulate the
concept of apathy as a condition. Finally, he does not
adequately discuss apathy related to choice.
Ultimately, the major weaknesses in Bachrach's
analysis stem from the insufficiency of the paradigm of
nondecisions. It is not just how the present allocation of
values, present institutions, elites, etc., prevent
COnfllcl:s from rising that is critical. For the present
allocation of values, internalized and perhaps fully
accepted by elites and underclass alike, could itself
constitute the most important power resource of a political
order and the most important impediment to the freedom of
its constituants. To know when values and societal rules
enhance or impede freedom, however, is to become involved
128m the essential debate about how best can „e organize our-
selves politically. It is this debate that is the essence
of democracy, and there are no neutral courts, not even for
the political analyst, to which we can submit it for scien-
tific adjudication.
Bachrach
: a transitional theorist-
I have emphasized the early work of Peter Bachrach
because here he singularly displays the mode of inquiry of
a theorist on the cusp of the reform paradigm, with
internal tensions edging him toward what I will consider in
the following chapters-a radical explanatory framework for
the study of non-participation. In this chapter, reviewing
Bachrach 's early work has helped clarify the transitional
elements between the reform and radical explanations,
pointing to the strengths and inadequacies of the former
and thereby grounding our exploration of the latter. In
the last chapter, I shall consider some of the more
explicitly radical elements of Bachrach's later work.
Before leaving Bachrach, however, I should note some
important developments in his later work, which both
provide an immanent critique of the work reviewed and
substantiate some of the comments I have made. In his 1982
article, "Class Struggle and Democracy," Bachrach makes
certain arguments about the nature of participatory demo-
cracy which, I believe, imply a revision of some of his
earlier discussion and its relation to the concepts, parti-
cipation, grievances and class. Taken together, these
provide him with the basis to extend the parameters of his
concept of depoliticization and move his work closer to
that of Mills and Marcuse, to which 1 will next turn.
Criticizing the work of Carole Pateman, Bachrach
argues that workers' participation "separated from power"
can have therapeutic benefits, while the workers remain
"subjected as before to the will of others." Following
George Kateb, Bachrach suggests that workers, under such
circumstances, could be involved in "repressive
participation." Bachrach writes:
Some proponents of participatory democracy tendto be insensitive to this danger. Intent uponthe value of self development gained throughparticipation, Carole Pateman, for example, does
not
.
consider whether participation, in its
various forms, can elicit recognition of anincongruity between feelings of well-being and a
?
°f individual autonomy; a sense oT
well-being might serve to mask the subordinate
status of the participant and, in fact, might
abet it. By participating, the individual "may
reinforce his or her own repression. 52
Bachrach here extends his earlier work in arguing that
participation can enhance the ability of the worker to know
his or her interests and increase autonomy, if it increases
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the freedom and power of the worker. He at once clarifies
his earlier recognition of the cooptative potential of
"participation'^ and his suggestion ^ & ^ ^
real participation includes whether the worker has greater
power afterward. Moreover, he explicitly acknowledges that
"feelings" are not the ultimate grounds upon which to base
what is in someone's interest or, by implication, final
determination about whether a person is freely pursuing his
or her interests. In his earlier work, Bachrach, like
Pateman, did not fully acknowledge the "incongruity between
feelings of well-being and a loss of individual autonomy":
our feelings may also be a resource for our subordination.
Now, Bachrach argues, the important question becomes:
.
^
what constitutes genuine workers'participation within the context of a relatively
nonparticipatory, class dominated society such
as the United States? Within this contextgenuine worker participation may be said to
exist when workers' demands and actions
challenge the power structure of the corporation
and thus produce the conditions conducive to
raising workers' consciousness
.
54
Here Bachrach seems to acknowledge that some standard
must be brought to bear to determine what constitutes a
higher consciousness, and that real participation involves
a grave challenge to the existing structure of power. Now
the "allocation of values" itself, both as a social system
and as the values held by the participants, is seen as a
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bar to freedom; no longer is the emphasis just on how it is
used through nondecision-making to prevent conflict from
emerging. m shifting away from the paradigm of nondeci-
sions, Bachrach's work suggests important differences
between the reform and radical analysis of power. We now
turn to explicitly radical scholars, where we will see how
these differences manifest themselves in the explanation of
non-participation.
CHAPTER III
POLITICAL SUBORDINATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY:
WRIGHT MILLS' EXPLANATION OF NON-PARTICIPATION
Introduction
The pluralist and reform explanations of non-partici-
pation have informed our understanding of political quies-
cence in two principal ways. Berelson and Dahl remind us
that individuals may bear responsibility for their with-
drawal from politics. Yet, as Schatt scheider
,
Bachrach,
and, in some ways, Dahl demonstrate, the scope of politics
can insulate the polity from the needs of certain groups
and precipitate their withdrawal. Where pluralist theory
places individual free choice at the heart of the analysis,
conflict theory centers on the biases of prevailing insti-
tutions. Taken together, we are provided an interpretation
that admits both of individual responsibility for
non-participation and institutional constraints on partici-
pation
.
Although a synthesis of these accounts surely would be
superior to either alone, it would remain deficient in two
crucial respects. First, it would still fail to investi-
gate the relationship between individual will and conscious
-
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ness and the social structure in which they develop. Even
the reform theorist, for example, does not consider
adequately that the grievances, wants, or even troubles of
non-participants (or participants) may not, in fact,
represent their real interests. Ideological domination of
consciousness, here understood as a power relation, is
ruled out at the start. Neither does the reform theorist
suggest the ways in which the exclusion of certain
interests-and the need to depoliticize those citizens who
have or potentially may have them-can be necessary for the
normal working of certain political orders. For if certain
interests are pressured out of political consideration
because they contravene the parameters of the socio-
economic system itself, it would not just be the present
scope of politics that depoliticizes but the nature and
logic of the political and economic order as such.
To pursue these issues, we shall examine how, in C.
Wright Mills' view, "mass society" depoliticizes citizens
into conformity, indifference and apathy. The strategy
will be as follows: first, I will give an overview of
Mills' description of mass society, following this with his
analysis of the position of the white-collar worker-
-Mills
'
prototype of apathy, and labor leaders and intellectuals --
his potential agents of change. I will then explore the
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relation of his sociological method to his political
writing, with particular interest in applying his ideas on
the study of language and motivation to his explanation of
non-participation
.
I will conclude by suggesting that Mills' explanation
of non-participation includes a two-pronged theory of
apathy: apathy related to choice and apathy as a condition
fostered within certain types of social structures. While
the latter formulation will prove to be problematic, I
shall argue it does advance our ability to comprehend the
full range of concepts necessary in the explanation of
non-participation.
Mills and the Decline of Publ ICS
Do people today have the resources to employ reason in
the interest of their own freedom? Or have centralized
institutional forms undermined their capacity for political
self-awareness? In pursuing these questions, Mills contri-
butes to this study by suggesting that below non-partici-
pation and apathy may lurk unart iculated troubles and that
these may constitute the most important problems and
potential issues of modern American politics. Further, he
argues, there may be kinds of political "contentment" that
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are detrimental to reason and freedom and therefore to
democracy. For Mills, the bottleneck of malaise and the
faltering of reason spring directly from the development of
"mass society" in America.
Mills' fear is that the community of publics charac-
teristic of much of nineteenth-century America largely has
been replaced by a "power-elite" at the top, stalemate in
the middle and a "mass society" at the bottom. The effect
of this transformation has been to reduce the quality of
democratic participation and thereby the freedom and reason
of most Americans.
At the top of the structure of power, Mills suggests
there is an increasingly united and often willfully coor-
dinated "power-elite." Comprised of the top echelons of
the corporate and military establishments, with the
executive branch of government as a junior partner (the
"political directorate"), this elite has concentrated more
power in its hands than "any small group of men in world
history, the Soviet elite possibly excepted."! Gone is the
political order characterized by a diversity of local pub-
lics, with power scattered among the several states held in
coalition by a weak federal center. Instead, we now have
an executive apparatus that reaches into most areas of
social structure. The economy, no longer comprised of a
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"great scatter of productive units" balancing one another,
now is dominated by several large corporations. Similarly,
military definitions of reality now loom large in all
political and economic action, as the military order has
overcome its meager origins colored by civilian distrust to
become a full partner of the power-elite.
The decline in publics is, itself, directly tied to
the ascendancy of these centralized political, economic,
and military institutions. For as they widen their scope,
they undermine four basic requirements of people as members
of genuine publics. At the same time, people lose the
opportunity to express their own opinions (now they receive
those of others through the media), to immediately answer
in public the statements of others and to base meaningful
action on such public discussion. Moreover, they lose the
ability to protect themselves from the intrusions of large
organizations
.
In a public, Mills argues, discussion is the major
medium of communication and the mass media serve to link
various primary publics. As publics dissolve into "mass
society," people no longer have a primary community within
which to discuss problems and clarify their ideas about
society and their position within it. And even the middle
level voluntary association--"the citizen's major link with
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decision" in Urge democracies~ la becoming remote from
individuals and primary publics. Public opinion, thereby,
no longer is sharpened by the kind of discussion necessary
for democracy to survive, removed as it is from the context
of debate within and among vital organizations that are
accessible to the individual. Without publics within which
to develop alternative ideas and strategies, people and
their opinions increasingly are managed in the interests of
the power elite.
A central feature of the social structure that has
emerged, Mills argues, is a political economy dominated by
military needs and "money-making" and the relation between
the two. As corporate men have moved into government to
direct the economy, the distinction between business and
government has become blurred. As military definitions of
reality and opportunities for huge profits loom large in
political and economic decisions, legitimate questions of
defense mutate into a full-blown militaristic posture.
United by psychological similarities, "the structural
blending of commanding positions and common interests,"
and, at times, "explicit coordination," the power-elite is
able to effectively dominate the American social
structure. The result is a permanent war establishment
tied to a privately incorporated economy insulated by a
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political vacuum."
Below the elite and above the "mass" exists what Mills
calls "the middle levels of nower" "m,or p the semiorganized
stalemate." It i<? hpro t-u^t- *-u is e e that the classic pluralist notions
of "balance," "veto groups," and "countervailing powers-
come closest to capturing reality. Yet, Mills argues,
these group conflicts represent second-rate provincial
interests, not the great clash of dominant interests whose
resolution yields the public interest in pluralist theory.
It is in the middle levels that politics such as we have
exists. Even here, however, there is increasing integra-
tion into the expanded state apparatus as bureaucratic
administration displaces electoral politics in importance
with the degeneration of the legislative function into a
balancing of "sovereign localities and practical inter-
ests." In comparison to "modern totalitarianism," whose
integration of autonomous forces is explicit, Mills finds
in the "formal democracies" a less explicit, incomplete
process
:
Yet it is well under way. Leaders of cliquespressure groups and associations maneuver within
and between the organs of the democratic state
and become a central part of that state. Theydiscipline those whom they represent; their chiefdesire is to maintain their organization, even if
this requires them to lose sight of their ends in
the effort to secure themselves as means, even if
it results in their loss of independent action.
power
a
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They ensnare one another; such history as thev
*T
hL
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to
.
ry S°^g on behind men's backs 7including their own. The middle level of im America is no moving balance; It issemiorganized stalemate.^
In Mills' view, then, the pluralist analysis of power
both confuses the top levels with the middle and underesti-
mates the integration of the middle levels into a state
dominated by the interests of the power-elite. The unions,
the farmers, the small businesspeople and professionals vie
with one another in the Congress and through the bureau-
cracy, each to protect its own partial interest. Yet such
competition as exists does not yield the "public interest,"
even as an unintended result. For what separates the top
from the middle is the scope of decisions within which
elites decide, primarily war and economic slump, and the
ability to gain access to elite positions of power. In
these crucial domains, it is the interests of the corpor-
ations and the military that set the parameters for who
shall act and what actions are permissible, and it is the
interests at the top that set the institutional context
within which the middle level struggles to protect itself:
Within the elite as a whole, this coincidence of
military domain and corporate realm strengthens
both of them and further subordinates the merely
political man
. Not the party politician but the
corporation executive is now more likely to sit
with military men and answer the question, "what
is to be done?"3
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Below the politically weak stalemated middle, then
Mills saw emerging a politically impotent mass society. m
contrast to the pluralist image of vying interest groups,
we find here millions of isolated individuals who have
little opportunity for political action or even to develop
political analysis. People in a mass receive information
from relatively few "opinion makers," and the organization
of communication makes "it difficult or impossible for the
individual to answer back immediately or with any effect."
Moreover, effective action based on considered opinion is
difficult because both are controlled and channeled by
authorities, and "the mass has no autonomy from institu-
tions. "4 The individual, therefore, becomes an object of
manipulation by the power-elite of the military, corpora-
tions, and executive branch of the government and its
"agents," especially in the media, educational institutions
and the leadership of voluntary organizations.
The media, for Mills, increasingly "have helped less
to enlarge and animate the discussions of primary publics
than to transform them into a set of media markets in mass
society. "5 In helping develop identities, aspirations,
techniques and escapes not "attuned to the development of
the human being," the media create a "pseudoworld" abetting
the development of mass society. Although they may provide
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some information, the media fails to clarify the meaning of
the narrow milieu of the individual in mass society. 6 in
the end, the media become "among the most important of
those increased means of power now at the disposal of the
elites of wealth and power. "7
Similarly, educational institutions have largely
become centers for the vocational training for white-collar
jobs at the public expense. The political task of enabling
people to better judge public affairs has given way to the
economic function of job preparation: perhaps the only
"political" role left to educational institutions is the
inculcation of nationalistic loyalties. The worst effect
of the transformation of educational institutions into a
"mass medium" is that:
in the hands of "professional educators," many
schools have come to operate in an ideology of
"life adjustment" that encourages happy
acceptance of mass ways of life rather than the
struggle for individual and public transcendence. 8
Nor, for Mills, are political parties or voluntary
associations able to provide an effective link between the
individual and "public decisions":
Mass democracy means the struggle of the
powerful and large-scale interest groups and
associations, which stand between the big
decisions that are made by state, corporation,
army and the will of the individual citizen as a
member of the public. Since these middle-level
associations are the citizen's major link with
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decision, his relation to them is of decisive
Yet voluntary associations are caught in a paradox
that undermines their performance. if they remain small,
they are likely to be ineffective. But if they prosper and
grow, as we shall see in the case of the unions, they
become part of the general structure of power removed from
the individual. Of course, at the very bottom of the
stratification order, even the minimal protection voluntary
associations provide is absent.
As a result of these changes in communication,
education and political organization, the capacity to
develop political understanding is weakened. With
"administration from above and the political vacuum
below, "10 genuine debate cannot occur and there is little
live political struggle. In order to resist the manipu-
lation and drift of mass society, people must be able to
interpret the "facts" that confront them.H Yet the
development of interpretive capacity is dependent on
dialogue within and between "publics" now on the wane.
Even dramatic experiences, such as the structural shifts
involved in a depression, are insufficient by themselves:
.
. .
experience of such a structural shift has
to be organized and interpreted if it is to count
in the making of opinion.
The kind of experience, in short, that might
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serve as a basis for resistance to mass media isnot an experience of raw events
, but the expertence of meanings. The Heck o f interprefiffo^mu^e there fn the experienc e iF^rim^the word experience seriously . ^2 —
Non-Participation, Apathy and Agencies for Change
Throughout his career, Mills searched for a way people
might break with the "main drift" of American society
toward increasing state and corporate administration and
ultimately war. Was it possible for Americans to overcome
their political passivity, to interpret successfully the
"facts" that confront them and build a political movement
to regain individual freedom and societal sanity?
The problem of how to generate participation and over-
come apathy was always, for Mills, the practical obstacle
to his passion to see America, once again, become a place
of reason and freedom. Mills maintained throughout his
work that overturning "mass society" required a fusion of
organization, structural conditions, strategic location in
the social structure, leadership, vision and will-power.
As he became more convinced of the solidification of "mass
society," particularly in The Power Elite and The Causes of
World War III
,
he tended to focus on leadership, ideas, and
will-power as motors of political change. This outlook
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reflected Mills' inability to find any solid hope in the
1950 's of an alternate center of power in American social
structure capable of spearheading a progressive political
movement, and a fear that the decisive actors of our times
had become exclusively concentrated within the power-elite
itself.
Perhaps, for these reasons, it is in Mills' earlier
work that we find a more subtle analysis of the societal
conditions that lie in back of non-participation and apathy
as the dominant political problems of our time, and how a
"mass society" of subordinated people might be overcome.
For this discussion I now turn, in some detail, to Mills'
analysis of unions and white-collar workers.
Agency for change I: the unions
Writing in the economic climate of 1948, Mills sug-
gested in The New Men of Power that unions could become a
formidable agency of change to counter the "main drift"
toward slump and war endemic to the American political
economy. Hadn't labor leaders, through successful orga-
nizing, dramatically increased the economic leverage of
workers, thereby demonstrating the political potential of
organized labor? Backed by numbers and organization, union
leaders were now in a unique strategic position both to
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organize the unorganized and to unite the power of labor
organization to the ideas "labor intellectuals" were
proposing as alternatives to capitalist war and slump.
Although most union leaders were undoubtedly disinclined to
such a task, in 1948 it was Mills' conviction that a small
but significant minority just might have the will and
vision to lead the way. if the "character and timing" of
the next slump created "appropriate conditions," Mills
concluded, the "masses" could be moved.
Mills realized, of course, that there were both
structural forces and limits of character and will that
overshadowed his hope. An initiative by labor, first of
all, would be bucking the "main drift" of economic forces,
including the increased concentration of corporate power
and increasing coordination amongst bus inesspeople to
offset further union organizing. Unions themselves were
focusing on narrow economic concerns and, like
corporations, were becoming increasingly hierarchical.
The character of both union leaders and members
reflected these changes. Since unions have become
institutions with a narrow economic focus, their leaders
tend to be judged and judge themselves by short-run
economic criteria. The leadership selection process of
unions, therefore, looks favorably on what Mills calls "the
rem-
>ers
:
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last representatives of the economic man," thereby
forcing the "apathy and lack of understanding" of memb,
passive
th
aVreSe1Iit;,ti1?^ are ° ften Politicallynd politically and economicallyilliterate, not yet realizing that they arJ notliving in an economy separate from a politicalorder but in a political economy. 13 P iL l i
Moreover, as the potential for crisis inherent in the
relationship between labor and management became national
in scope, the state increasingly was taking over the
function, previously performed by employers, of regulating
the labor force:
Contrary to the liberal theory of the state, thegovernment is not a neutral umpire using itsimpartial wisdom to effect a fair balance it isincreasingly a political instrument of employers
or at least a new amalgamation of business and
'
governmental power. 14
In working to institutionalize through government, and
thereby narrow, the labor-capital struggle, union leaders
were eliminating important political and economic possibil-
ities and serving both as discipliners of the workforce,
and go-betweens for workers, owners and managers. Increas-
ingly, Mills argued, labor leaders were looking to poli-
ticians and government officials, rather than to their
membership or potential allies: in their search to
stabilize their unions as viable interest groups, labor
leaders were finding themselves "more deeply involved with
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the national state." m spite of economic gains, there-
fore, the developing politicized union-employer relation
was eroding the independent political power of the unions,
forcing labor to become "as dependent upon the political
authorities as it is upon the economic strength to withdraw
the worker from the process of production."
The search for stability was having the direct
political effect of blinding union leadership to the
possibility of broadening the political understanding of
their membership and developing a majoritarian strategy
with which to reorganize modern society. Worse, within "an
increasingly monopoly economy," "the economics of cooper-
ation and the politics of compromise," made it likely that
under increased threat to the economy, the unions would
join forces with monopoly industry against their potential
allies in the most unorganized sectors of the economy:
small farmers, white-collar employees, consumers, small
business people, and "underdogs."
Mills concludes that, given the character of both
leadership and membership and their narrow concept of
"union," the "new men of power" were now serving to
integrate workers into the political economy and thereby,
unwittingly "subsidizing the free enterprise system." In
supporting a governmental and party system that they could
ss
o
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not decisively influence, union leaders were surrendering
the potential of their political power. Only a majori-
tarian strategy would help break these trends, Mill
argued-until then the important parameters for decision
would be set, and the important decisions would continue t
be made, as it were, "behind the backs" of union leaders.
Yet Mills had a hope based on the bleak political and
economic future he foresaw. American capitalism was head-
ing for another slump, if not a full-scale crisis. The
politicization of economic struggles was itself a symptom
of these structural troubles and a potential for unions to
press for a political solution to them— thereby breaking
the cycle of boom, slump, and war. Most likely, he felt,
America would continue along the "main drift" of "sophis-
ticated conservatives." On this path, the ultimate answer
to slump could only be the preparation for war and war
itself.
Nevertheless, union leaders had a choice that would
help determine whether the path of the "main drift" would
be followed. In the political interlude between wars, they
could ally themselves with dominant business interests and
remain relatively ineffectual or attempt to win real power
through a majoritarian strategy embracing workers,
"underdogs," and many white-collar workers. The first
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priority would be to allow the political space necessary by
pushing back, as far as possible, the onset of the next
war. Within this space, labor would face the next slump
far more organized, and with more members, than during the
Depression. And this new power could be used in the
interval both to organize the unorganized, particularly the
white-collar workers and farm employees and to stimulate
debate on a political program to help solve the endemic
problem of capitalist slump and war. In doing so, unions
could broaden both their economic power and their political
base
.
The alternative Mills posed involved increased worker
democracy in the economic sphere with an eye toward
worker's control at the point of production and a social-
ization of the means of production. A party of labor was
also needed to put forth a program geared not only to the
needs of organized labor (e.g., wages), but also to the
American public as a whole (e.g., prices and, of course,
war and slump). The "left" strategy would involve an
"economic underpinning," in part because political power
rests on economic power. More crucially, however:
A socialist political program could not be
successfully carried through in this society
unless training were provided in the more direct
democracy of daily life, in the shop and in the
unions. Those who are serious about democracy
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in by giving the impulses of a man a
ThS 1«t0^retUz,e ^selves creatively at work
loTialW* baSLS f°r 3 P°Utics of /emocr^ic-
The alternative Mills argued for required labor to
recognize the increasingly political nature of
-economic-
relations, and develop a program and constituency with
which to contest the changing power relations. Short of a
radical strategy, however, labor would consign itself to
being a junior partner of "sophisticated conservatives,"
while the tendency toward war and slump made problematic
even those gains based on an "expanding pie." To the
degree, therefore, that labor submitted to liberal shack-
ling by the state or subservience to either party in the
political sphere, it would limit its power and short-
circuit its potential. Worse, it would become prey during
uncertain times to the union busting of the "practical
conservatives," the fickle cooperation of business elites,
anti-union public reaction to its narrow self-interested
program, and perhaps the specter of fascism.
The coming slump, then, was, in Mills' view, a
decisive watershed--a "political interlude" in which union
leaders could be the decisive actors. Economic conditions
could not be relied on alone, Mills argued, "for simple
deprivation may lead to apathy." Instead, there
must also be the rejection of old legitimations and the
acceptance of countersymbols
. It was here that labor
leaders were uniquely in the position to unite alternative
ideas to the power of organized workers. Their task was to
organize the unorganized, unite the unions and develop a
broad political program. Complete the task of developing
an informed national union constituency, Mills warned, or
the unorganized may be used against you:
It is the task of the labor leaders to allow andto initiate a union of the power and theintellect They are the only ones who can do ifthat is why they are now the strategic elites inAmerican society. Never has so much dependedupon men who are so ill-prepared and so littleinclined to assume the responsibility . 16
Mills' analysis of the chance for a labor-led coali-
tion, however, also depended on his belief in the potential
of political participation of the "American public."
Writing in 1948, Mills saw the "apathy" of the American
people as neither the consenting abstainers of Berelson,
nor as the "cheerful robots" he was to write about in The
Sociological Imagination. Instead of a "compact reac-
tionary mass," he saw a range of depoliticized citizens,
some disgusted or despairing at the "liberal rhetoric" that
was not speaking to their needs, while others were debased
into a condition of apathy by the structural pressures and
disadvantages of their position in society.
What was the consciousness of those from whom he hoped
a coalition would emerge? First, the "underdog":
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While for liberals the "underdog's" position was
a problem of "adjustment and participation," for Mills
it was "an important aspect of class relations in
America." The problem of their non-participation
could be solved, he felt, through the development of a
"new type of union community," in which they were
likely to become "solid union members":
.
. .
then they will be willing to participate.A type of man must be built into a human being
outside the present system of soc iety so that he
may be able to shake it to its foundations . 18
Similarly, the white-collar workers' numerical growth
and bureaucratic indispensability had to be made politi-
cally relevant through union organizing geared to promote
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their freedom and security. For as things stood, they had
"neither political awareness nor rudimentary organization":
I^ve
r
^
CUPational Geology is politically pas-
struggle except m a scattered way. In thevarious middle-sized cities, they form the rearguard of either business or labor, but in eithercase they are rear guard. 19 ' n
Finally, the workers themselves had a "historic men-
tality of acquiescence," based on the "upward curve" of
American prosperity between 1865-1929. Their "optimistic
mood," although shaken, was not broken even by the slump of
the 1930 's. 20 Yet> after rapid succession of war . slump .war
and the possibility of the next slump being truly devasta-
ting, it was not likely that workers would accept poverty
again. For one thing, the optimistic mood had been shaken
by the Depression, particularly since a war was required to
rescue the business cycle. For another, America had under-
gone important changes that undercut historical and
psychological bases of acquiescence.
The frontier as a "safety-valve" was gone. Also gone
were immigrants who both compared their present lot to a
pre-industrial past in Europe and whose ethnic diversity
could be used to fragment the unity of the working class.
Advertising slogans pushing business loyalty already seemed
banal as contraction of the market helped undermine the
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dream of success through hard work. Although education was
expanding, the opportunity it brought meant less because of
an insufficient number of appropriate jobs. Mills asks:
The personalization of success has been possiblebut now long will the personalization of failure'into individual guilt continue?21
Mills' hope was that changed circumstances, given the
necessary political space and organization, would help
break the back of acquiescence:
Political acquiescence and lack of organization
and leadership are mutually involved. Political
apathy is not a function only of leadership;
certain conditions in the life of the worker,' and
in the history of the United States, lie back of
it
.
zz
Given changing circumstances, the capacity of workers
for political action should not be underestimated. Mills
points to the rapid success of past organizing drives as
evidence of how apathy could transform into action:
The political apathy of the American worker is an
apathy about engaging in electoral politics when
there are no issues about which he feels deeply
or understands fully. He votes neither for
Tweedledee nor Tweedledum. Yet on more stirring
occasions, the U.S. worker may "vote with his
feet." The American worker has a high potential
militancy when he is pushed, and if he knows what
the issue is. Such a man, identified with unions
as communities and given a chance to build them,
will not respond apathetically when outside
political forces attempt to molest what is his. 23
It was foolish, Mills argued, for labor leaders
complain about apathetic workers and support either of
to
the
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main parties. Such support helped reinforce the very
conditions producing apathy and undercut the opportunity to
educate and organize--to make politics come alive:
SL anoliTJ?ieS , 0f , thesJe Partie s alienate people
lllrJ CS ln LlS deeper meanings and demor-a ize
^
those on the edge of political
consciousness.^
Mills concluded in The New Men of Power that a pro-
gressive mass movement led by labor, if unlikely, was
indeed possible. Given the development of a labor-led
program that spoke to white-collar workers, small farmers
and farm employees, and ,,underdogs M
; and given union,
community, and national forums to formulate and discuss a
radical national program against war and slump, the
American people would conceivably respond.
In those "who suffer the results of irresponsible
social decisions and who hold a disproportionately small
share of values available," labor had potential allies.
But labor leaders still had to choose to fight. For it was
only through the leadership of labor that ideas of
intellectuals, countering dominant legitimations, could be
welded to organization that could vie for power. It was
here that the best hope lay to:
focus the deprivation politically, inculcate the
truth about common interests and common
struggles, and offer some hope of winning a
better tomorrow. 25
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Prototype of apathy: the white-collar workers
By the 50's, however, Mills became disenchanted with
labor and began to give up his hope that labor leaders
would become strategic actors spearheading a progressive
coalition. With the increasing stability of capitalism and
the integration of the unions as another interest group
within the corporate economy, Mills dismissed the "labor
metaphysic" as a romantic illusion concluding, as Marcuse
would also, that the working class was now a conservative
political force standing against both revolution and
structural reform. 26
If labor's recent history had worked against Mills'
hopes, the politics and consciousness of the white-collar
worker met his fears. In this world, Mills found a "new
little man," shaped by large centralized bureaucratic
institutions, stuck in a dull routine of enervating work
and leisure and devoid of participation and power.
Although white-collar employees were faced with the adverse
effects of the "main drift" of American society—war
,
recession and boom--they lacked the organization and per-
sonal capacity for a political response. As persons in a
mass without community or tradition, the white-collar
worker, for Mills, embodied the most profound apathy of his
time . 27
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The apathy of the white-collar worker had its roots in
the displacement of the old middle class by the new. The
centralization of property, accelerating after the 19th
century, had eroded the unison of property and work as a
"basis of man's essential freedom," and the lost indepen-
dence of livelihood altered the basis of one's life plan
and the psychological rhythm of that planning. 28 With the
change from "democratic property" that the owner works to
"class property" that the employee works for the owner, the
basis of political and economic security had fallen back
from "individual independence in the old sense" to
controlling the job in the centralized enterprise one is
dependent on. Where the old middle class was comprised of
the independent entrepreneurs of small business and small
farmers, as well as independent professionals, the new
middle class consisted largely of dependent employees in
salesrooms or in offices, pressured small businesspeople
and farmers, and salaried professionals. The idea of the
independent old middle class, further blurred by an
outdated "rhetoric of competition," now obscured the
reality of a new dependent "middling class" of salaried
employees
:
The broad linkage of enterprise and property, the
cradle-conditions of classic democracy, no longer
exist in America. This is no society of small
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entrepreneurs
--now they are one str-H,™ .
nt-Vio*-o- „u ^, . j L atum amongothers above them is the big money; below them
nnT^^iT^ emP lQyee ; before them?' thefate of*
world"2f
Uy dePe^ent relics; behind them their
The development of the "new middle class" was created
by the need to solve the problem of turning increases in
productivity into increased profitability:
The immense productivity of mass-production tech-nique and the increased application of technolo-gic rationality are the first open secrets ofmodern occupational change: fewer men turn outmore things in less time.^O
Increasingly, therefore, more and more people were in
the business of manipulating symbols (money and paperwork)
and people, and fewer were manipulating things. Increased
productivity, however, posed heightened problems of coordi-
nation and of getting rid of the surplus created. It was
the "new middle class," characterizing this shift, that was
making a living organizing and coordinating, however indir-
ectly, people who make things and the things themselves,
and turning the things into profit for owners. 31 As a
result of the enormous increase in the coordination and
distribution network and particularly the distributive
occupations of trade, promotion, and advertising , 32 the
bulk of the white-collar class that developed fell into
either what Mills called the "great salesroom" or the
"enormous file." For Mills, the political marginality of
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the white-collar worker could not be understood without
comprehending the type of work-life (and leisure) that
helped shape his or her character and political orientation.
The great salesroom. Selling in the world of the
small entrepreneur, Mills recalls, was "one activity among
many," while in contemporary America, it has become
pervasive, an activity "unlimited in scope and ruthless in
its choice of technique and manner." Americans are living
in a "time of venality" in which the "market now reaches
into every institution and every relation," public and
private, and in which the salesperson's perspective domi-
nates--"^ some part everybody has become a salesman. "33
For those who actually are employed in sales, whether
as "salesmen" on the road or "salesgirls" in the store, it
is a world in which appearance counts more than talent (or
rather talent is knowing how to appear) and manipulation
replaces genuine interaction between employer and employee,
as well as salesperson and customer. Further, it is a
world in which personality, rather than high grades or
experience, counts most in the employment process.
With the tightened organization of the market, the
saleperson's range of prerogatives has been greatly
narrowed from the world of the small entrepreneur. He or
160
she sells the goods of others and neither makes choices
regarding product selection nor price. Even the "last
autonomous feature of selling, the art of persuasion and
the sales personality involved, becomes expropriated from
the individual salesman." Indeed, employees themselves are
part of a "personality market" servicing the shift in
employer needs away from manual skills to the art of "han-
dling," selling to, and servicing people. 34
In this atmosphere, the salesperson becomes a "commer-
cial mask" in which basic human characteristics such as
kindliness and friendliness become transformed into
instruments of the sale—a choice of tack for a particular
customer from a repertoire of poses. While the as yet
imperfect standardization of the consumer means that the
salesperson will have some choices to make as how to handle
the individual, they will remain within the frame of sales
strategies mapped out for the salesperson . 35
The result of this process, Mills argues, is the
"self-alienation" of the salesperson. Consider the
description of the "salesgirl" he recounts:
She wears a fixed smile on her made up face, and
it never varies. I never heard her laugh spon-
taneously or naturally. Either she is frowning
or her face is devoid of any expression. When a
customer approaches, she immediately assumes her
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orced smile. It amazes me becausealthough I know that the smiles of most sales-girls are unreal, I've never seen suchcalculation given to the timing of a smile. 36
Mills suggests that sales work, far from being a lofty
promotion to the independence and dignity we often connect
to middle-class life, piles additional burdens on the
worker. Where the manual worker sells labor energy and
skill, many white-collar service workers also sell their
social personalities, involving an additional sacrifice of
one's self to a multitude of consumers or clients or
managers. He concludes that the use of personality in the
service of the monotonous tasks performed is itself a major
source of "occupational disability," so much so that any
theory of the "increasing misery" of the working class must
consider the "psychological aspects of white-collar work": 37
The personality market, the most decisive effect
and symptom of the great salesroom, underlies the
all-pervasive distrust and self-alienation so
characteristic of metropolitan people. Without
common values and mutual trust, the cash nexus
that links one man to another in transient
contact has been made subtle in a dozen ways and
made to bite deeper into all areas of life and
relations. People are required by the salesman
ethic and convention to pretend interest in
others in order to manipulate them. In the
course of time, and as this ethic spreads, it is
got ^ on to. Still, it is conformed to as part of
one's job and one's style of life, but now with a
winking of the eye, for one knows that
manipulation is inherent in every human contact.
Men are estranged from one another as each
secretly tries to make an instrument of the
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The enormous file. The alienated work-life of the
"salesgirl," for Mills, had its parallel in the work-life
of those who inhabit the "enormous file." m the office,
as behind the counter, under the aegis of Frederick
Taylor's "scientific management," the manager tries to
fashion the worker into an instrument of production. Here
the attempt centers on lowering the cost of producing
paperwork by "rationalizing" the work process both through
management and the use of newly developed machinery. 39
The practical effect of the new management techniques
has been to multiply the division of labor within the
office and, in so doing, to reduce costs by eliminating
some work and simplifying the rest. The fate of the
bookkeeper typifies the changing nature of white-collar
work described by Mills. Once central to running the
office, the bookkeeper's authority is now usurped by the
office manager, and his or her routine functions by the
machine operatives. Similarly, secretarial roles have been
reorganized for greater cost efficiency. For great pools
of secretaries, the emphasis has become simply one of speed
and accuracy with little need for initiative or hope of
gaining intimate knowledge of some segment of the business,
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or even the private contact with the boss that formerly
added status to the secretary's job. Instead, the "white-
collar girl" is replaceable in work that can be speeded up
and regulated by nonexecutive personnel. "In short," Mills
writes, "the prized white-collar spot for women is becoming
more and more the job of a factory-operative . "40
In the new office, Mills concludes, employees increas-
ingly have become machine attendants, and work, as in the
factory has become collective, standardized and "special-
ized to the point of automation." With the manager's
increasing power to design and service office functions and
with the introduction of ever more sophisticated machinery,
the number of routine jobs had been increased while the
amount of initiative required had declined. As a result,
the worker now became part of a "uniform mass in a soul-
less place," daily regulated by an "impersonal time
schedule," and easily replaced:
Seeing the big stretch of office space, with rows
of identical desks, one is reminded of Herman
Melville's description of a nineteenth-century
factory: "At rows of blank-looking counters sit
rows of blank-looking girls, with blank, white
folders in their blank hands, all blankly folding
blank paper. "41 y
In the store and in the office, a common theme
emerges. White-collar workers are increasingly subjected
to standardized work and have little chance either for
contact with those in real authority or to learn the whole
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operation. White collars notwithstanding, their labor is
alienated
.
"new
ec-
Mills' analysis of the white-collar strata-the
middle class"~was undertaken to help him locate the obj
tive position and understand the subjective viewpoint of
the "new middle class" in the American social structure.
His conclusions about objective social standing, following
Max Weber, are based on an analysis of class, status, and
power and may be summarized as follows.
Class position, for Mills, is best analyzed in terms
of both amount and source of income. When Mills wrote,
white-collar workers were clearly earning more than wage
earners although the difference between the two groups was
steadily narrowing, and there was overlap between sales
employees, office workers and skilled workers. Yet the
source of their income dictated clearly that white-collar
workers were "not 'in between Capital and Labor'; they are
in exactly the same property-class position as the
wage -workers . "42
For a variety of reasons, prestige remained superior
among the "new middle classes." They had superior income
and the ability to "borrow" prestige from apparent similar-
ities to the "old middle class" and from the status of the
firm they worked for. Their educational levels were higher
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and the style and, to some degree, content of work more
prestigious. The greater proportion of native-born
white-collar workers and their relatively fewer numbers
compared to wage workers added further to their status.
The basis of their prestige, however, was not solid and
M show[s] no signs of being permanent," although white-
collar prestige continued to have psychological importance.
Class, status and occupation, considered together,
told Mills something of the power of white-collar groups.
Chiefly, they exercised a "derived power"--they were the
"assistants of authority." As a whole, white-collar
employees had more power than wage earners, and those that
manage the "white-collar masses" were similar in power to
the old middle classes. However, Mills continued:
It must be remembered that white collar people
are not one compact horizontal stratum. They do
not fulfill one central, positive funct ion that
can define them, although in general—EHeir
functions are similar to those of the old middle
class. They deal with symbols and with other
people, co-ordinating, recording, and
distributing; but they fulfill these functions asdependent employees, and the skills they thus
employ are sometimes similar in form and required
mentality to those of many wage-workers .43
In general, white-collar workers were for Mills more
of a "middling" class whose title traded upon images of an
independent middle class now on the wane. Far from inde-
pendent, most white-collar workers were not only dependent
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employees but isolated Individuals sinking in the morass of
an increasingly bureaucratized mass society.
Organized irresponsibility manlgulatiog ^
a dominant form of power
Just as the working person lacked ownership over and
was controlled by the machine, so the white-collar worker
had become a "cog" in the bureaucratic machine without
ownership or control or any notion of responsibility for
what the enterprise does:
The bureaucratic enterprise itself sets the paceof decision and obedience for the business andgovernmental officialdom and the world of clerksand bookkeepers, even as the motions of theworkers are geared to the lump of the machine andthe command of the foreman/^ 6
Viewing society as a whole, although the "bureaucratic
ethos" had not yet become totally dominant, the "loose-
jointed integration of liberal society was being replaced,
especially in its war phases, by the more managed integra-
tion of a corporate-like society. "45 America was increas-
ingly coming under the sway of a "managerial demiurge," led
by men whose personalities fit the increasing bureaucra-
tization of power.
The "managerial demiurge," however, did not reflect a
shift away from private property in the power structure.
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Instead, "a huge and complex bureaucracy of business and
industry" had come into existence "under the owners of
property," with its authority resting precisely on the
"right of property ownership . "46 Moreover, business and
government leaders and, to some degree, labor leaders, had
become "interlaced by committee and pressure groups, by
political party and trade association":
The managerial demiurge means more than anincreased proportion of people who work and liveby the rules of business, government, and laborbureaucracy; it means that, at the top, society
oecomes an uneasy interlocking of private andpublic bureaucracies, and at the bottom, more and
more areas become objects ot management and
manipulation. ^' " a
Therefore, state and corporate bureaucratization of
property was protecting private power rather than elimi-
nating class relations. Corporate bureaucracies were
regulating employer-employee relations (as were those
unions that existed) and their graded hierarchies frag-
mented class solidarity at the base of the power pyramid.
Government bureaus were also regulating employment and were
involved in class management through tax, price and wage
policy, "administering who gets what, when and how."
Schools were tracking potential employees based on class
and ability in "pre-existing hierarchies." The bureau-
cratic context, then, was not only manipulative in that it
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was hiding power relations within an enterprise but also in
that it was hiding the class basis of property in America. 48
Therefore, "the forms of power that are wielded, all
up and down the line, shift from explicit authority to
manipulation," a more insidious form of power than coercion
because of its hidden nature. 49 Behind the shift stands
the capacity for manipulation by the bureaucracies and the
means of communication to extend the "managerial demiurge"
to opinion and emotion and "even to the mood and atmosphere
of given facts." In front stand the victims of mass
society who are the objects of manipulation of the "mana-
gerial cadres" and their "manipulated and manipulative
minions." It is not just that the managers of bureau-
cracies and of communications scheme, utilizing an explicit
ideology of manipulation, to get people to conform to their
objectives. It is, more importantly, that in modern
"industrial societies everywhere," individuals are
distanced, through cold abstractions and remote hierar-
chies, from the managers who wield power over them, and the
managers from them. As a result, the individual feels
helpless, and the manager, who is just "following the
rules" of his enterprise, does not feel accountable for the
total result of which his work is a specialized part.
Although Mills' description of the mode of manipu-
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lation characterized by the "managerial demiurge" could be
more precise, we can summarize it as follows: manipulation
has become the chief form of power in twentieth century
America, and its ascendancy is directly tied to the bureau-
cratic context of decision-making. m this context, there
is an explicit ideology of manipulation to get people to do
what the enterprise needs them to do, accomplished through
the media and psychological techniques used in advertising,
industrial psychology and personnel practices. More funda-
mentally, however, bureaucracy as such creates an object
relationship between manager and individual. Mills here
recalls Marx's claim that, for the bureaucracy, the world
is an object to be manipulated . 50
"Organized irresponsibility" results. One either
hides behind or is dwarfed before a system of power in
which responsibility seems impossible to ascertain.
"Organized irresponsibility" is a manipulative form of
power precisely because it gives the appearance that no one
is wielding power when power is, of course, being wielded
by living people. Unable to see clearly who is doing what
and why, you follow the rules that regulate your behavior
and may even come to internalize them. You are used for
ends you cannot see, in ways you are unaware of, by people
you do not know. You follow motives that are external to
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you, not because you believe in them but because following
them is how you function within the organization: the
result is that you fit yourself in without clearly seeing
how you are being fit in.
Both through explicit psychological manipulation and
the obliteration of clear lines of power and responsi-
bility, "organized irresponsibility" is largely an institu-
tional context based upon and held together with the power
of manipulation. And as I shall discuss subsequently, it
not only manipulates individuals directly but also nurtures
a character development whose lack of grounded sense of
self is ripe for further manipulation.
The political meaning of white-collar work
In analyzing the social structure white-collar workers
find themselves in, Mills aims to understand both the
character formation and organizational push we may expect
to see from the "new middle class." On both counts, Mills
finds a stratum that will neither be able to objectively
understand its position in American society nor press
independently to improve it. The politics of the "new
middle class," for Mills, is that of "rearguarders"--
followers of those in business and labor who will success-
fully claim prestige and attain power. With regard to
I /I
their own lives as biographical examples of a collective
historical experience, they are ignorant and apathetic.
Individually, some will strive for success and even suc-
ceed, but collectively Mills expects little from them of
political significance.
White-collar workers will not, in Mills' vi«W, be
independent political actors because they are alienated
from their work, from their leisure and from their own
personalities. As we have seen, like wage workers, white-
collar workers have little effective control in the plan-
ning Of work. The "manipulative grasp" of the managers is
even greater with white-collar workers, however, because
their very personalities are often essential parts of an
alienated work proces.
Ironically, the result of stripping work, In (his way,
of intrinsic meaning also creates a morale problem which
serves to undermine the sel f-compu 1. s ion of the Protestant
work ethic. The problem is solved from management's point
of view through the "human relations" of the personnel
department. The broad hope here is to identify "job
enthusiasm" with the "American way" and thereby bypass
worker alienation and legitimize the growth in business
power. "Sophisticated conservatism" of this sort updates
Taylorism in asserting that to have happy, efficient,
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cooperative workers, an enterprise must have intelligent,
rational, knowledgeable managers:
It Is the perspective of a management elite
engineers Vi! ^^-°^tv% la«e ifM is advice to the personnel managerto relax his authoritarian manner and widen hismanipulative grip.
. . . [The attempt if to]
aUe
q
n:tioT5i
aUenati0n WiChi
"
the b
— »£ work
Yet, "they have not found a really sound ideology"52
to replace the "work ethic" and belief in independence of
the individual. The crisis of legitimizing work remains
unsolved
:
In the meantime, whatever satisfactions alienatedmen gain from work occurs within the framework ofalienation; whatever satisfaction they gain fromlife occurs outside the boundaries of work; work
and life are sharply split. 53
If the employer "solves" the problem of alienation
through "human relations" techniques, the worker "solves"
it in the sphere of leisure. As rationalization of the
work process increased the worker's perception of work as a
sacrifice of time to make money to live, the "leisure
ethic" began to replace the work ethic. Yet, for Mills,
leisure is debased as well, serving more to excite,
astonish, or distract than to "enlarge reason or feeling or
allow spontaneous dispositions to unfold creatively." 5^
And as the home declines in importance as the worker's
psychological center, leisure takes over the task of
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preparing people for work. instead of relaxing us, how-
ever, as it did for the old bourgeoisie, or regenerating
our creativity, as it did for the craftsman, leisure now
diverts us from the "restless grind" of work to the
"absorbing grind" of passive enjoyment of glamour and
thrills. Our leisure thereby encourages a work image and a
holiday image of the self: "The bright two weeks [of
vacation] feed the dream of the dull pull." For the rest
of the year, the most we can hope for is to live the
cherished "holiday" role vicariously.
Mills' analysis of the work and leisure of the
white-collar worker always has as its backdrop his image of
work as craft. Where real craft would develop a person and
"reveal him to the world," most white-collar work alienates
the worker from himself and from the world. Where "work-
as-craftsmanship" involves the "simple self-expression of
play and the notion of ulterior value of work," as well as
discipline, independence and hard work, much modern work is
tedious, below the capacity of the worker and only a means
to an end. The end, leisure activity, turns workers into
spectators or thrill seekers instead of sensitizing them to
better perform their craft. Lacking the chance for real
self-development in work, the worker often loses interest
in development outside it. Instead of developing a craft,
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the pursuit of income becomes the major rationale for work,
for work "has no other legitimating symbols, although
tainly other gratifications and discontents are associated
with it. "55 This state ls mos(. clearly embQdied by ^
trade unions:
The only significant occupational movement in theUnited States, the trade unions, have the pureand simple ideology of alienated work: more andmore money for less and less work. 56
White-collar workers, Mills argues, have not as clear-
ly understood their situation. Instead, they work at jobs
where their very characters become a means of production
while their leisure provides few resources with which to
creatively confront work, or with which to demand a crea-
tive worklife. Lacking the idea of craftsmanship as a con-
trast model, devoid of firm tradition, subject to the pro-
paganda of communication while "relaxed of mind and tired
of body," living in a community of strangers, the worker of
the modern metropolis has few resources with which to
comprehend the white-collar world he or she inhabits.
The white-collar world Mills describes is one of indi-
vidual competition for success--and that means, largely,
competition for status. It is an odd competition, however,
based on insecure symbols--on a "tarnished image." The old
image of success stressed entrepreneurship based on inde-
pendent property and was shored up by continually expanding
more
e on
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opportunity and new groups on the bottom to lift the pres-
tige of those who came before. The new image is that of
advancement through a prearranged hierarchy, aided by
equitable educational opportunity, but based mor
agility of personality and handling people than the
development of ability and solid skill. And where educa-
tion in the nineteeth century was, ideally, geared to turn
out a "good citizen" within a democratic republic, in the
1950 's it aimed to develop the "successful man" in a
"society of specialists with secure jobs. "57
Moreover, as competition for white-collar jobs
increases, Mills predicts, the occupational structure will
not be able to support the number of graduates turned out.
Those jobs people do get will likely force them to work
below their skill level, increasing boredom and disillu-
sionment: as "the educational link becomes insecure, a
consciousness of somethimg wrong with middle-class life
becomes more widespread . "58
Further, with the tightening of the stratification
order, the status differential between white-collar and
wage worker will decline, income differentials diminish and
security of employment become more similar. Status, how-
ever, remains a very important ingredient of white-collar
life. Unlike wage workers who have been more successful at
delimiting their aspirations, white-collar workers dream of
the climb up the prestige ladder. I„ fact; MiUs ar „ues
prestige and social esteem are extremely important defining
characteristics of white-collar workers and a major consi-
deration in locating them in the soclal structure
. Row .
ever, the American prestige system is now very unstable and
uncertain:
unease
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The problem of status ambivalence and anxiety is felt
most acutely by white-collar workers due to the confluence
of the following forces: the rationalization of the work
process lessens the importance of experience and education,
fragments skill and diverts attention from solidarity with
other workers or the development of skill to status compe-
tition. However, as Karl Mannheim observed, those depen-
dent on an authoritarian hierarchy for their self-image, as
well as for their livelihood, will frantically grasp claims
of status. The process turns out to be self-defeating
because the status climb for the future is elusive, and the
work of status seeking is self-alienating in the present:
Striving for the next rank, they come to antici-
pate identification with it, so that now they are
not really in their places. Like money, status
23 to S^ie^^ffffi^ St
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If white-collar work was subjecting the worker to
"status proletarianization," white-collar life offered an
insecure refuge. Instead of living within a cohesive com-
munity where prestige, whatever its level, is known and
secure from one generation to the next, metropolitan living
allows different arenas for the pursuit of prestige. Posi-
tively, this allows for increased mobility for the proper-
tyless. Negatively, each individual must win anew status
positioning and, in the process, cut him or herself off
from past generations.
The larger the city, the greater the distance between
areas of prestige claiming, particularly with the segrega-
tion of work-place and residence. With the decline of
white-collar status in work, therefore, Mills argues, the
claims of prestige are increasingly cashed in the sphere of
residence, leisure and consumption. "Physically close, but
socially distant, human relations become at once intense
and impersonal--and in every detail, pecuniary . "61 People
rely on appearance for their prestige in a "market of
strangers" with whom one shares "interests" rather than
descent or tradition, has "contacts" rather than relations,
IS
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and lives in a mass of
-uniformity" rather than a cohesive
community.
As ties become more superficial, then, self-respect
maintained through the display of the "token of economi
worth." Thus, quoting Thorstein Veblen, Mills argues that
the struggle for existence has, to a "very appreciable
degree, been transformed into a struggle to keep up
appearance. "62 But it is an unsuccessful and ultlmaCely
unsatisfactory struggle:
Self-respectability is not the same as self-
respect. On the personality markets, emotionsbecome ceremonial gestures by which status is
claimed, alienated from the inner feelings they
supposedly express. Self
-estrangement is thusinherent in the fetishism of appearances . 63
As the gap grows between potential accomplishments and
the forces that actually determine life chances, Mills
suggests, ambition increasingly takes the form of the
"conscientiousness of the good employee." Leisure becomes
lost in "consumer dreams," a sphere the individual "knows
how to converse in," for "here he can make no mistakes."
Life itself appears accidental, as a game or lottery, and
success seems dazzling, beyond the person's reach,
something to be enjoyed vicariously . 64
Popular culture augments this process by presenting
success in movies and novels as either something to be
avoided for the evil path it will take one on, or something
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to be sought within oneself-as a spiritual value. I„
this, popular culture reflects the transformation of one's
self-image in American society from that of a producer to
that of a "relaxed consumer." But the relaxation is
illusory
:
progress, failure is an individual specificationof declining opportunities. But regardless ofits true
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source, failure in the literature of
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> ^ imputed to theindividual, and is often internalized by him asguilt, as competitive dissatisfaction. Theimperative to keep trying, not to slacken off,
results in anxiety. But in the literature of
resignation, such anxieties are relieved, not by
an external success but by an internalization oftne goals of success themselves . 65
American white-collar workers, Mills suggests, are
caught in a crossfire. On the one hand, the American
prestige system in which they live is now subject to such
strain that there is a virtual "status panic. "66 0n the
other hand, the achievement of status is itself uncertain,
with contradictory popular images on the idea of success.
The retreat into consumption cannot solve this problem
because consumption requires income which, of course,
requires some success. The message to the white-collar
world depicted by Mills is this: work hard but expect
little enjoyment from work and don't expect to go too far.
When you fail, you will still be blamed for your inade-
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quacies, and you will blame yourself as well. In any case,
don't worry because success, you will be told, is not what'
it's cracked up to be, so do as you are told at work and
seek your success in spiritual fulfillment off the job.
You will try to find your satisfactions in consumption and
vicarious living, your self-respect in competition over
appearance, and your craft in molding yourself into a happy
person despite your life. But, Mills argues, you will fail
because your position remains insecure, your relations
transitory, and your self-esteem shallow.
The white-collar world Mills describes is one of
anxiety, guilt, and "status panic"--a world resigned to
giving up control over itself at work and, to a great
extent, In leisure as well. In general, it reflects a
society in which there is widespread insecurity as the
average person is "expelled from the Horatio Alger dream."
As Americans despair at what Leo Lowenthal called "pene-
trating the thicket of grand strategy in politics and
business" 67 there develops:
a curious contradiction about the ethos of
success in America today. On the one hand, there
are still compulsions to struggle to "amount to
something"; on the other, there is a poverty of
desire, a souring of the image of success. ^8
There is a change Ln that image, too. As collective
insecurities become widespread, "collective" means to
1establish individual security are developed: the "litera
ture of resignation," trade unions, social security and
government management of economics and the opportunity
structure, increasingly managed education, in different
ways all serve this function. However:
The governmental pension is clearly of another
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WaS an indePendent prosper-ity, appily surrounded by one's grandchildren;the end now envisioned is a pensioned securityindependent of one's grandchildren . 69 y
The political relevance of white-collar workers
In ascertaining the political relevance of the
white-collar worker, Mills looks to the interstices of
social structure, consciousness and organization. He
rejects the liberal view that their unawareness of their
propertyless condition and dependency means, in fact, that
American workers, particularly white-collar workers, form
vast middle class. It is, instead, "the grand problem of
the psychology of social strata" to explain the lack of
correspondence between "political mentalities" and "object
ively defined strata." Nor does he agree with what he
considers to be Marxian analysis positing nonownership of
property as the "only factor, or even the crucial one,
determining inner-consciousness or political will."
Finally, he rejects the view of some Marxists and "new
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middle class" theorists such as James Burnham, who in
different ways argue that if a class is indispensable, it
will inevitably attain political power.
Instead, Mills expects us to see a leveling out of the
life chances of most white-collar and wage workers, due
primarily to the rise of the latter and the "status prole-
tarianization" of the former. But against both "Marxists"
and "new middle class class" theorists, he suggests that
this process will take place within the political hagplin*
of unions, farm blocs and trade associations in the context
of a welfare state that will "manage class chances without
modifying basic class structure . "70 Those who are vulner-
able, given the likelihood of tightened opportunities, will
try to protect themselves by advancing income and security
advantages . 71
What of the white-collar workers themselves? Will
they be able to protect themselves through unionization--if
not through class consciousness?
Mills argues that people join unions either for
instrumental reasons or out of principle. Generally, media
antipathy to unions makes the latter difficult although
this problem can be mitigated by exposure to pro-union
persons or political ideas. The neutralization of anti-
union ideology might then make instrumental acceptance
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possible, in which case the most salient job fact encourag-
ing a white-collar worker to become pro-union is the
feeling that he or she cannot get ahead otherwise. Unions
themselves support an instrumental view by selling them-
selves as a vehicle of advancement.
Yet white-collar workers may still reject unions on
instrumental grounds for fear that the boss will equate
them with wage workers. Thus, status concerns will
continue to play important roles in both instrumental and
principled rejection of unions. For Mills, whether in or
out of unions, white-collar workers are likely to remain
psychologically the "little individual scrambling to get to
the top" instead of a dependent employee banding with
others for a collective ascent. 72
VThat is the likely fate of white-collar unionization?
Mills suggests that the prestige factors that increase
resistance to unionization are being mitigated by the
general decrease in white-collar prestige. However, the
emergence of white-collar workers as a broad identifiable
stratum, after the solidification of the welfare
-war fare
state, denies them the period of autonomy farmers and wage
workers had. Whether they win out in broad numbers,
therefore, is likely to be determined by the various
struggles between labor and business. In this
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confrontation, white-collar workers will attempt to follow
ascendant interests, whether in business or labor.
To the extent white-collar workers organize, however,
they will likely become merely another interest in the
administrative state, following the example of the trade
union experience. In doing so, they will take their place
within the politics of the "main drift" of a war economy in
which unions and "sophisticated conservatives" vie for
advantage within a powerful absorptive state. While
white-collar unionization may enlarge the labor consti-
tuency, it will, in a broader sense, follow the patterns
established for wage workers:
Trade unions, after all, are the most reliableinstruments to date for taming and channeling
lower-class aspirations, for lining up the
workers without internal violence during times of
war, and for controlling their insurgency during
times of depression. There are no reasons why
unions should not perform the same services among
white collar groups. '3
Where may we expect white-collar workers to move
politically? Comprised of diverse groups whose needs are
often contradictory,
. white-collar workers lack a common
material interest around which to organize, Mills argues.
Dependent on large-scale institutions for work, they have
the psychology of people who are given standardized work
but retain illusions of status. Not forming a homogeneous
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class, they lack symbols around which to rally, and those
symbols they have are losing meaning for them.
For a stratum to accumulate power, Mills writes, it
must have a favorable interplay between:
will and know-how, objective opportunity, and
organization. The opportunity is limited by thegroup s structural position; the will isdependent upon the group's consciousness of itsinterests and ways of realizing them. And both
structural position and consciousness interplay
with organizations, which strengthen conscious-
ness and are made politically relevant bv
structural position. 7^
Mills finds Marxist and liberal analyses of "the new
middle class" wanting in not paying sufficient attention to
all these factors. When one considers them, he suggests,
white-collar workers will remain "dependent variables" in
the context of business and labor. Psychologically
anxious, sociologically under crosspressures and status
ambiguity, economically divided, and politically devoid of
organization or ideology, they have no "public position"
and do not know which way to go privately as individuals.
Thus, they remain vacillating and confused:
They are worried and distrustful but, like so
many others, they have no targets on which to
focus their worry and distrust. They may be
politically irritable, but they have no political
passion. They are a chorus, too afraid to
grumble, too hysterical in their applause. They
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run rhw ^ n -ya 1 u -L P ge, in the long, t ey will follow the ways of power, for inthe end, prestige is determined by power. >5 *
As a stratum relevant to historical change, Mills
suggests, they are merely waiting. As a stratum relevant
to the present, they are politically passive.
Agency for change II: the intelligentsia
By the close of the Eisenhower decade, Mills had
concluded that neither the "working class" nor the
white-collar worker was psychologically or politically
predisposed to becoming what he so desperately sought--a
way out of the "conservative mood." Yet, before he died in
1962, Mills did entertain moments of hopefulness that a
young intelligentsia could spark a New Left, perhaps
throughout the world, and break the drift toward war.
"From Turkey to South Korea, to England, Okinawa, Japan,
the American South, and even Poland, Hungary and Russia
itself," he saw students and young professors breaking out
of the post-war apathy. And in "Cuba, a genuinely
left-wing revolution begins a full-scale economic
reorganization of U.S. corporations. Average age of its
leaders: about 30--and certainly a revolution without any
Labor as Agency. "76
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Events, the desire to combat his own despair, and his
elite theory of power had helped Mills return to his
roots: the best hope, however remote, now lay with the
ability of people of ideas to utilize the opportunities for
history-making he saw as a potential of the centralization
of political power after the war. The chance to
appropriate "history-making" from the "grip of fate," of
course, was being squandered now by the elites of power.
The task was for legitimate publics to form out of the
drift of mass society, to replace responsibly and
democratically elite power with an enlightened public
will. Although the "NATO intellectuals" had clearly
defaulted in this responsibility, it was nevertheless to
the intellectuals that Mills once again turned to help
create the ideas, the ideology, necessary to grab the new
opportunity for real "history-making" now being so
irresponsibly wasted.
The real job of intellectuals, Mills asserted, was to
develop a "politics of truth," based on responsible analy-
sis of society. Structurally, intellectuals were isolated,
lacking independent organization or a political party to
provide the institutional support for this work, or the
historical agency to test their theories through action.
They were faced, therefore, with the choice of becoming
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"abstracted empiricists," "grand theorists," or simply
people who became part of "pragmatic politics 11—all these
meant adopting the "liberal rhetoric" that concealed the
"conservative mood." Of three roles Mills saw open to
intellectuals—philosopher kings, advisers, or independent
critics --the times demanded that intellectuals adopt the
last. Their isolation might mean that they would appear
Utopian; but this utopianism--"the politics of truth"--was
the only available antidote to the "crackpot realism" that
was moving us toward World War 111.77
It was for intellectuals, as Mills saw it, to clearly
state the important problems and thereby help people
understand and act responsibly in the times they lived in.
If society was fraught with troubles of milieu and
potential issues of social structure, it was to the
intellectuals that Mills turned to state these troubles and
issues as problems and to discern when troubles of milieu
had at their base structural causes and should be discussed
as vital issues of the day. If the "grand theorists" and
"abstracted empiricists" had fetishized theory and fact, it
was nevertheless the job of the real intellectual to relate
the two in such a way that they would inform and test each
other, and provide greater clarity and the basis for a
program of action. Finally, clarification meant neither
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acceptance of given perceptions of reality nor imposition
of what intellectuals thought ought to happen:
,
If we tal
^ the simple democratic view thatwhat men are interested in is all that concerns
us, then we are accepting the values that havebeen inculcated, often accidentally and oftendeliberately by vested interests. These valuesare often the only ones men have had any chanceto develop. They are unconsciously acquiredhabits rather than choices.
If we take the dogmatic view that what is tomen s interests, whether they are interested init or not, is all that need concern us morallythen we run the risk of violating democratic
values. We may become manipulators or coercers
or both rather than persuaders within a societyin which men are tying to reason together and in
which the value of reason is held in high esteem.
What I am suggesting is that by addressing
ourselves to issues and to troubles, and
formulating them as problems of social science,
we stand the best chance, I believe the only
chance, to make reason democratically relevant tohuman affairs in a free society, and so realize
the classic values that underlie the promise of
our studies. /8
American intellectuals were faced with the problem of
being isolated from independent organizational support.
But they had behind them a strong tradition of freedom--
however banal and empty the content of that freedom had
become. It was for intellectuals now to give content to
the hollow form of American democracy by spearheading the
structural clarification that would enable enlightened
publics to form and vie for power.
In turning to intellectuals, and particularly the
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young intelligentsia, Mills may, indeed, have been trying
to break out of the despair of what Peter Clecak calls
"radical paradoxes"-the discontinuity between what ought
to happen for society's sake and what is likely to happen
given structural realities. Nevertheless, Mills' analysis
of the role intellectuals ought to play in shaping events
had never really changed. In the late 40 « s , it was the
labor intellectuals who would be critical in formulating
the ideas the "new men of power" might be able to advance
because of their structural position. The problem in the
late 50' s was that no clear agency, rooted in a pivotal
position in the social structure, could be found. Intel-
lectuals for Mills were, at least potentially, a last
refuge of truth--if only they had the will to play this
role. Moreover, as dissent mounted worldwide, they were
the potential guides for the emerging "new left" based in
the young social activist: "help them to focus their moral
upsurge in less ambiguous political ways; work out with
them the ideologies, the strategies, the theories that will
help them to consolidate their efforts: new theories of
structural changes of and by human societies in our
epoch. "79
Mills himself doubtless understood that youth as an
agency of change lacked the structural position that Marx
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had argued formed the basis of labor's pivotal role in
"history-making." Indeed, Mills even wondered whether the
hope he sometimes saw in youthful rebellion was justified.
"What's missing?" his assistant Saul Landau recalls asking
him. "The New Left, that's what's missing," replied
Mills. 80
Yet "the 60 »s," most of which Mills never saw, proved
his hope justified, at least up to a point. The upsurge of
students as a political force driven by moral outrage
demonstrated that Mills' turn to youth as an agency for
change was more than mere wish-
-more than a self-delusion
with which to escape "radical paradoxes." Peter Clecak is
certainly right when he suggests that Mills would have been
upset and even appalled at some aspects the "cultural
revolution" took in the West—particularly in its self-
indulgent and anti-intellectual forms. 81 Yet Mills would
himself have been deeply influenced by the events of that
period that he died too young to see, events that would
have undoubtedly broken his heart. Is it possible to see
clearly what politics Mills himself would have advocated
had he lived through ten years of the Vietnam war?
Students, young intellectuals, and youth, the antiwar,
feminist, and antinuclear movements, however, have had a
profound influence on the 20 years since Mills died. They
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have been an agency of change. Unfortunately, they were
not powerful or wise enough to be the agency Mills hoped
could break the "main drift" of a society continuously
gearing for war.
Non-participation and apathy as troubles of mass society
For Mills, then, America was facing a serious dilem-
ma. Structural changes had undercut the very institutions
which could enable Americans to understand those changes.
Worse, no solid new agency of change was on the horizon
which could enable us to comprehend our lives (and our
troubles) as biographical examples in the epoch of mass
society and help point a way out.
Instead, the tendency toward elite-centralized power,
bureaucratic structures encouraging adaptation and the
manipulative techniques of modern communication were
serving to keep individuals stuck in the milieu of a mass
society. Without a "community of publics" to provide a
"context in which reasonable opinions may be formulated"
and a genuinely liberal education to "help produce the
disciplined and informed mind that cannot be over-
whelmed ... or sunk by the burden of mass life," people
are able to discover few practical means through which to
discern and press their political interests. Instead,
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people drift under a regimen of top-down administration.
Whether in military service, corporate job ladders, middle-
level management, or menial work, the person in the mass is
left with no transcending view, no project truly his or her
own—"only routines that exist." In the end, people are
not in a position to know what they really want for they do
not truly observe their real experience, and their desires
"often are insinuated into them" -.82
Men in masses are gripped by personal
troubles, but they are not aware of their true
meaning and source. Men in public confrontissues, and they are aware of their terms. 83
Unable to forge interepretive links between their life
and their times, people in a mass feel vaguely anxious,
isolated and pointless, losing "the self-confidence of the
human being"- -if they ever had it. 8^ Common sense is one
of the few resources left but ripped from firm social tra-
dition through administration and manipulation, it too is
likely to be debased. 8 5 por Mills, then, mass society ali-
enates people by manipulating their wants and by curtailing
their ability to confront critically its social structure.
Non-participation and, at its worst, apathy are the
result of the structural isolation people suffer in modern
"metropolitan" America. Physically impeded from easy
access to discussion and organization, intellectually
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manipulated by modern communication, and ideologically
restricted by the decline of publics, people tend to follow
projects supportive of the drift and purposes of the power
elite. While the reciprocal relation between milieu and
social structure must be understood for genuine political
awareness, mass society serves to prevent precisely this
kind of knowledge. For Mills, the absence of political
debate indicates pathology more than consensus:
It is not merely paradoxical to say that the
values of freedom and reason are back of the
absence of troubles, back of the uneasy feeling
of malaise and alienation. In a similar manner
the issue to which modern threats to freedom and
reason most typically lead, is above all, the
absence of explicit issues--to apathy rather than
to issues explicitly defined as such .06
In Mills' view, the advent of the apathetic person,
"the cheerful robot," means that democracy and freedom are
on the wane. Worse, we can no longer be content simply to
believe that deep within people resides "an urge for
freedom and a will to reason." We must instead ask, he
warns, can a person indeed be made into a "cheerful and
willing robot":
Can he be happy in this condition, and what are
the qualities and the meanings of such happiness?
It will no longer do to merely assume, as a
metaphysic of human nature, that down deep in
man-as -man there is an urge for freedom and a
will to reason. Now we must ask: What in man's
nature, what in the human condition today, what
in each of the varieties of social structure
195
makes for the ascendancy of the cheerful robot?And what stands against it? 8 ? '
Truth and Method
Writing in the quiescent 1950' s and early 1960's,
Mills offered us tools to penetrate the silence. Bachrach
and other critics of pluralism reveal their indebtedness to
Mills in their discussions of grievances. Yet it is Mills'
work that often remains richer and more suggestive, both
politically and methodologically.
Essentially the difference is this: Mills is unwill-
ing to be confined by the paradigm of "nondecisions" and is
unwilling to equate quiet with happiness, or happiness with
virture. His idea of the modern polis and his American
pragmatism forbid any compromise between truth and dispatch
of method. It is a very sad commentary on modern life that
people's self-understanding, because blunted, might stand
against their freedom and reason. But it is a theoretical
possibility and a practical matter that has to be faced
squarely. To retreat from it, as Bachrach and Dahl did, to
overlook it as Schattschneider and Berelson had done,
solves nothing. The questions Mills poses are these: Can
people be socialized against their interests by manipulat-
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ing their wants or by derailing issues that might spark
heightened political consciousness of their interests?
Might the very rationality of a social structure inhibit
the motivation and restrict the reason and freedom upon
which a democratic society depends?
While Mills' political writings pose these questions
as practical issues, much of his work, particularly on
method, language and motivation, undergird their validity.
His methodological warning might be as follows: any analy-
sis concluding that people are free is weakened (indeed,
any analysis would be weakened) if it ignores, at the
outset, the influence of social forces on the language,
culture and political orientation of a people. An analysis
would also be deficient if it did not admit the possibility
that certain forms of societal organization, by their
nature and logic
,
stand against democracy. These methodo-
logical concerns are the backdrop of Mills' political
critique of "mass society."
Mills' view of persons
Behind Mills' method and analysis stands a radically
social view of persons that emphasizes the central role of
language as mediation between persons, between persons and
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social structure and within persons as "thinking." For
Mills, language is "the ubiquitous string in the web of
patterned human behavior." It can be viewed functionally
as a system of social control because a symbol, "an event
with meaning," produces a similar response for utterer and
hearer
:
A vocabulary is not merely a string of words-immanent within it are societal textures--institutions and political coordinates. Back of
a vocabulary lie sets of collective action. 88
Following G. H. Mead, Mills argues that thinking
follows the pattern of conversation. The process of
thought has as its base an internalized organized set of
attitudes, the "generalized other," with and against which
we carry on an "internal conversation." The individual,
presumably, explores his or her world by comparing daily
experiences with such cultural preconceptions.
Within the process of symbolic interaction, therefore,
lie possible seeds of discord, for our reflection does not
simply mirror dominant values: we consider the meaning of
language in terms of social behavior; and we understand our
reflection in terms of meaning and language. 89 Thus, while
both the language of the self and the generalized other are
both socially derived, the former is based upon the point
of view of experience, while the latter upon cultural
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precepts. Because the person thinks through dialogue, the
socialization process has a dynamic quality built into it.
The psychological processes, therefore, which signal
contentment or despair at our political situation, them-
selves are based on the interplay between experience and
cultural expectations. Mills criticized Marxist and
non-Marxist theory alike for missing the social basis of
individual psychology and thereby confusing the psycholo-
gical with the personal. While an individual's psychology
may be more or less his or her personal problem, it remains
rooted in the relation between experience and expectation
mediated by language.
Moreover, behind social behavior and interpretation
lie basic values and vocabularies of motive which, espe-
cially in complex societies, can yield discrepant meaning,
mixed motives, and motivational and value conflicts. While
such conflicts certainly occur between region, class or
race, we might infer from Mills that they could even occur
within the same person. These are highlighted when
changing functional requirements in a society exacerbate
the tension between behavior and understanding: old
behaviors become dysfunctional because, as their utility
declines, their meaning changes. For all these reasons,
the very process of socialization, especially in complex
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societies, can bring about revision of meaning, and conse-
quently of understanding and action. 90
Understanding motivation: situating persons
In Mills' view, social interpretation should explore
the situational patterns within which people form motives
and intentions:
For men live in immediate acts of experience andtheir attentions are directed outside themselves
until acts are in some ways frustrated. It isthen that awareness of self and motive occur.The question" is a lingual index of such condi-tions . " 1
The motive has a dual function: it is a "name" for a
consequential situation, and its choice is part of an
attempt to influence others (and perhaps ourselves)
. For
example, as we influence people by "naming" their acts or
prospective acts or imputing motives to them, we also
describe what we, in fact, believe the action to be.
Motives, then:
stand
^
for anticipated situational consequences of
questioned conduct. Intention or purpose (stated
as "program") is awareness of anticipated conse-
quences; motives are names for consequential
situations, and surrogates for actions leading to
them. 92
Understanding human behavior, then, requires making
judgments about a person's motivation. Although we can't
"plumb behind" a person's verbalization to directly check
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our motive imputation, we can't understand human motivation
except with the aid of the vocabulary of the actor. In
Mills' view: "motives are circumscribed by the vocabulary
of the actor." The terminology of motives we employ in the
explanation of conduct, therefore, must find its source in
the "vocabularies of motives actually and usually verba-
lized by actors in specific situations . "93 Psychological
terms like "desire" and "wish" fail to help us explain
intentions and actions because such terms must themselves
be explained socially. 94 instead, we can construct "typi-
cal vocabularies of motive" that exist in given historical
situations, types of situations and actions and refer "to
the typical constellation of motives which are observed to
be societally linked with classes of situated actions. "95
Such constructions can help us control our imputation of
motives
:
As over against the inferential conception of
motives as subjective "springs" of action,
motives may be considered as typical vocabularies
having ascertainable functions in delimited
societal situations.
. . . Rather than fixed
elements "in" an individual, motives are the
terms with which interpretation of conduct by
social actors proceeds. The imputation and
avowal of motives by actors are social phenomena
to be explained. The differing reasons men give
for their actions are not themselves without
reasons . 96
Understanding language and, through it, motivation, is
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central to MiUs , SQcial psychologyj methodologyj ^
political analysis. People require language to mediate
themselves and their environment. Their language develops
as they probe outside themselves, thereby creating issues
about which they are uncertain. They must then answer the
question, "Why?," which in its nature requires them to
learn, interpret and formulate a vocabulary admitting of
intentions and motives. This is why Mills claims his ana-
lytic model for explaining motives "is based on a sociolog-
ical theory of language and a sociological psychology . "97
While explaining why people impute motives to others is
important for understanding the development of language,
action, and social control, the discovery and explanation
of motives must be rooted in language available to the
person
.
Mills' conception of motives and language have
important implications for research methodology. Instead
of depending on abstract questions asked of individuals, as
is the common research practice, the researcher can "tenta-
tively delimit the situations in which certain motives may
be verbalized." This approach allows the construction of
"situational questions" and consequently allows us to test
deductions from out theory. 98
j both methods which
impose non-situated questions and theories which impose
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schemes of motive development on the person are likely to
founder for similar reasons: both run the risk of explain-
ing the behavior of people in a vocabulary that could not
have motivated them because it was not their own. For
example, in Mills' view, the motivational principles of
Freudian theory are themselves specific to sexually
repressive societies and are applicable only to them. 99
On the other hand, imputation of motives need not be
sheer guesswork nor involve complete autobiographical
reconstruction:
The variable is the accepted vocabulary ofmotives the ultimates of discourse, of eachman s dominant group about whose opinion he
?
are
f:
Determinat ion of such groups, their
Ttl0n|,T i c [laracter ' would enaUe ^dellmitaTionana methodological control or assi^nF-^
motives tor specific actsT^Q
Therefore, societal structures, historical periods and
culture are reflected in the individual's vocabulary of
tives. In terms of structure, for example, the study of
tives along strata defined by occupational lines we would
presume to be important. So too would be basic cultural
and political explanations.
If, for example, we take the terminology of motives
that constitutes hedonism, we find pleasure and pain to be
unquestioned motives for human action. One form this
response takes is for pleasure, during our own period, to
mo
mo
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be often equated with "the good" and have the prima facie
force of that concept. Instead of accepting hedonism as a
principle of human nature, we need to determine the social
patterns and vocabulary of motives attendant to typical
situations during our period. We might ask, for example,
what are the structural sources and the meaning within
particular situations of the good being equated with the
pleasant? In the study of non-participation, this warns us
against assuming that because people refrain from political
activity, participation is a cost human nature rebels at
bearing. It will be recalled that this idea is an
important ingredient in the pluralist account of non-
participation.
Similarly, overt behavior cannot establish indepen-
dently for us the meaning of an action. The same behavior
can be differently motivatedlOl and therefore be a differ-
ent act. Presumably, different acts can be similarly
motivated. In the end, determining the meaning of an
action, including the real reason for it, involves ascer-
taining what was reasonable to expect in a given situation
by a particular person. And knowing what is reasonable
involves situating the action in time and place and
comprehending the actor's intentions. Appearances, there-
fore, never suffice in explaining political behavior, and
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analyses that suggest active imputation is "unscientific"
are bound to founder.
Mills summarizes his disni^inn «-p uuxa a cussio of human motivation in
the explanation of action when he suggests:
!!f*mo^ f S t0 take a11 ^ese terminologiesof motive and locate them as vocabularies olmotive in historic epochs and specified situa-tions Motives are of no value apart from thedelimited societal situations for which they arethe appropriate vocabularies.
. . .
7
Rather than interpreting ' actions andlanguage as external manifest a! ions of subjectiveand deeper lying elements in individuals, thereasearch task is the locating of particulartypes of actions and socially 8s ltua t
P
e clusters
Piv?n I ' ' ^ lan§ua§ es of situations asg e must be considered a valuable portion ofthe data to oe interpreted and related to theirconditions. To simplify these vocabularies ofmotive into a socially abstracted terminology isto destroy the legitimate use of motive in the
explanation of social actions. 102
Ideology and apathy
There is an important disjuncture between Mills'
writings on methodology and his political writing on "mass
society." This principally takes the form of great sensi-
tivity to the "vocabulary of an actor" when discussed
abstractly as methodology, and far less concern when
discussed concretely, particularly in White Collar
, The
Power Elite and The Causes of World War III . I will
discuss this issue in greater detail when we evaluate
Mills' explanation of non-participation.
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Nevertheless, Mills' theoretical writings have prac-
tical importance in his political writing on apathy. For
Mills, the link between thought and action also suggests a
link between political understanding, political action and
freedom. The more we are able to act responsibly with
clear intentions and the more our actions help clarify our
intentions and the nature of our responsibility, the freer
we are: both in terms of political thinking and political
activity. These views implicitly loom large in Mills'
writing on non-participation: the less able a person is to
form clear political intentions, the more likely he or she
is to be manipulated, confused, and/or drift.
On the other hand, Mills does not believe that clear
motivation is achieved independently of social structure,
beliefs and even habit. While self-conscious self-location
within the social structure may require breaking with habi-
tual or ideological ways of thought, ideas of any kind are
always more than mere sensory experience:
The value interest implications [ethos] of a
social structure are the guiding threads along
which problems emerge. Problems are relative to
an ethos.
Ideas, then, are meanings which have collective habits
behind them, and reason must be grounded in such ideas and
their development through dialogue.
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In emphasizing the social nature, rooted in language
of human interaction and motivation, Mills' methodological
writing suggests a link between ideology and political
motivation and action. If a person believes a certain
course of action correct, such beliefs in themselves
constitute a fundamental pre-condition for the action.
People also commit themselves to certain courses of action
by positing motives they or others might hold in certain
situations. Similarly, "trying on" roles begins to commit
people to attendant beliefs and motives.
Given this background, the political problem of ideol-
ogy that Mills poses is twofold. In the first place, Amer-
ica lacks both a conservative and a radical ideology with
which to "converse" with dominant modes of thought. Mills
finds it ironic that those ideologies which would allow
people to make their own history are on the decline in the
U.S. at the same time that "history-making" is in the hands
of elites and not subject to fate. The result is that we
are confused by a "liberal rhetoric" that provides the
terms of issues and conflicts: "... political decisions
are occuring, as it were, without benefit of political
ideas; mind and reality are two separate realms."
104 In
part, Mills has in mind here a "scientific" administrative
approach that asks only questions of technique.
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As a result, two specific problems of non-participa-
tion and inadequate ideology are raised: the disjuncture
between "troubles" and our ability to interpret them; and
the development of the apathetic person--"the cheerful
robot." Malaise and troubles for Mills emerge out of the
ethos and milieu one is in. Their source seems to lie more
in a discontinuity between the values one holds and their
utility for interpretation than result from historical or
structural contradictions. Basically, troubles now result
from the inability of contemporary symbols to explain the
new problems emerging from elite-centered power. Denied
the dialogue necessary to develop such symbols, we sense a
threat to our values but don't understand the source of the
threat. As a result, we develop malaise or feel troubled:
To formulate any problem requires that we state
the values involved and the threat to those
values. For it is the felt threat to cherished
values--such as those of freedom and reason--that
is the necessary moral substance of all signifi-
cant problems of social inquiry, and as well of
all public issues and private troubles. *-05
Here Mills' work appears to be the forerunner of
Bachrach's with the emphasis on felt troubles. Yet, for
Mills, these troubles are structurally rooted in the logic
of mass society and can result not only in acquiescence but
in acceptance .
Americans, for example suffer from "anxious obsole-
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scence," rooted in the need of the system to create a
"panic of status" necessary for the industrial and commer-
cial apparatus. Yet without the institutional support and
interpretive alternatives to "liberal rhetoric," the
individual remains stuck in milieu. Personally unable to
transcend such troubles:
The market apparatus transforms the human being
into the ultimately saturated man--the cheerful
robot--and makes "anxious obsolescence" the
American way of life. 10°
Individually isolated, people sense the threat this
problem poses to their own values, but they cannot under-
stand the source of the threat:
Great and rational organizations— in brief,
bureaucracies--have indeed increased, but the
substantive reason of the individual at large has
not. Caught in the limited milieu of their
everyday lives ordinary men often cannot reason
about the great structures—rational and irra-
tional—of which their milieux are subordinate
parts. Accordingly, they often carry out series
of apparently rational actions without any ideas
of the ends the serve. . . . Rationally organ-
ized social arrangements are not necessarily a
means of increased freedom—for the individual or
for the society. In fact, often they are a means
of tyranny and manipulation, a means of expropri-
ating the very chance to reason, the very capa-
city to act as a free man. 1-07
I will explore later the tension that remains both
between Mills' concept of "troubles" and of the "cheerful
robot" and his notion of mass society and methodological
concerns with the "vocabulary of the actor." Even given
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these problems, however, and others I shall subsequently
discuss, Mills provides excellent insight into the explana-
tion of non-participation and the fact of apathy. The
troubles of modern times, unanswered by analysis and
action, result in social and personal drift. Problems are
not formulated because the values we hold and the threat to
those values are not successfully articulated. Mills sums
up his analysis when he writes:
The values involved in the cultural problem of
freedom and individuality are conveniently
embodied in all that is suggested by the ideal
of the Renaissance Man. The threat to that
ideal is the ascendency among us of The Cheerful
Robot, of the man with rationality but without
reason. The values involved in the political
problem of history-making are embodied in the
Promethean ideal of its human making. The
threat to that ideal is twofold: On the one
hand, history-making may well go by default, men
may continue to abdicate its willful making, and
so merely drift. On the other hand, history may
indeed be made--but by narrow elite circles
without effective responsibility to those who
must try to survive the consequences of their
decisions and of their defaults.
In the absence of explicit formulation of troubles and
issues, we are left with what Mills calls the "conservative
mood." The heart of this mood is not an ideology or a
vision but a feeling of powerlessness resulting from the
inability to trace the source of troubles. It is a
surrendering of the central Western goal of controlling
one's own fate through reason. Shorn of ideas or coherent
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ideology, political decisions appear arbitrary:
The psychological heart of this mood is a feeling
of powerlessness--but with the old edge taken
off, for it is a mood of acceptance and of a
relaxation of the political will. lQ 9
Mills' explanation of non-participation:
a summary of his political and methodological concerns
Mills' sociology, methodology, and political analysis
taken together constitute a radically social interpretation
of political life. Sociologically, Mills' theory centers
on the role language plays for understanding, both between
persons and within the individual. Yet, language contains
the seeds of change in that it allows the possibility of
discrepant meanings. The human need to ask, "Why?"H0
requires ascription of motives, for the self and for the
other, in the language of the person questioning. Because
such "naming" of actions simultaneously serves to influ-
ence, the potential for change is built into the nature of
language. Furthermore, with changing functional require-
ments and increased societal complexity, old interpreta-
tions falter, troubles emerge, and the need to answer the
question, "Why?" becomes more acute. Both in its nature
and use, therefore, language allows discrepant meaning.
The need to comprehend one's environment also implies
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a link between thought and action. Understanding requires
ascertaining motives and intentions, which help explain and
justify ("name") conduct. Similarly, to hold a viewpoint
begins to commit one to the action it prescribes and,
conversely, certain actions commit one to the roles and
explanations of the action. To understand, then, also
involves the incipient formulation of a plan of action,
actual for oneself or presumed for others.
Language is also the mediation between persons and
social structure. Society, and particularly the indivi-
dual's subculture, reside "within" an individual to the
extent that person incorporates its language. Society is
composed of structures that are in part constituted
comprehended and legitimized by its language. At the base
of Mills' social theory, then, is his view that people
through language create society as society through language
creates people.
Several methodological rules follow from Mills'
sociology. First, the explanation of action involves
claims about what is reasonable to expect, given a
particular situation with specified actors and their vocab-
ularies. 111 Secondly, he is adamant in his opposition to
abstract method and, we would presume, favorable to
research instruments most capable of "situating persons,"
212
such as depth interviews. Thirdly, understanding the
meaning of action involves, in part, an internal comprehen-
sion of the motives of the actor: motives that can't be
restated in the vocabulary of the actor would, therefore,
have no explanatory power.
Finally, because language is the medium of self-
constitution, both individual psychology and values are
socially based. We see this most clearly, perhaps, in
Mills' greatest contribution to sociology, his exploration
of the emergence of troubles for persons. For Mills,
troubles signify a discontinuity between old meanings and
new situations. Whether they truly are personal or
potentially public (and thus fodder for issues) depends on
the extent to which social structure is responsible for
their development, not whether they reside "in" or
"outside" the person. However, Mills' measure of public
vs. private at times tends to be somewhat crude, relying on
the number of people feeling similar troubles.
At the root of modern troubles is the threat to the
Enlightenment values of reason and freedom. This is the
political heart of Mills' analysis of mass society and the
power-elite, the failure of voluntary organizations, and
the default by intellectuals. The political problem is to
clarify the troubles resulting from this threat as politi-
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cal issues and then to act.
The failure to accomplish this has resulted in what
Mills variously calls "anxious obsolescence" and "the
cheerful robot," in personal and political drift and a
relaxation of political will--or simply put, in apathy.
The essential cause of apathy, however, is structural and
not personal. Political apathy results from the inability
of the person to locate the source of his or her troubles
and develop them into public issues. It can devolve into
the inability of the person even to be troubled by the
increasing erosion of freedom.
In modern America, this condition takes the following
form. Subject to "one-way communication," and lacking
institutional forms to help break that pattern, the
individual is unable to understand, let alone counter,
domination by the power-elite. Instead, he or she remains
trapped in a personal milieu, while administrative
rationality and consumerism dominate political
consciousness
.
With old values failing and no new replacements, Mills
sees a deterioration of the human mind and spirit. The
main symptom of this deterioration is a mistaken notion
that increased "rationality" means increased freedom- -this
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in the face of troubles signaling a decline in our freedom.
The result is a social psychology of unresolved
troubles, augmented by a "status-panic" (in the interests
of business elites) that encourages adaptation to admini-
strative rationality and adoption of consumerist mental-
ity. Within this context, the tendency is for persons to
become "cheerful robots," or remain personally troubled.
Although Mills is not clear as to which form dominates, or
as to what the relation is between them, he implies that
the two are not contradictory: unresolved personal anxiety
and troubles can feed conformity, and conformity, involving
a denial of freedom, can lead to anxiety and troubles.
One thing is clear, however, Lacking institutional
support, counterideology , common sense based on tradition,
and public issues, people in mass society are often
anxious, or compliant, or both. As a result, they are ripe
for manipulation. Instead of a public outcry at elite
power, a "conservative mood," fed by a social psychology of
powerlessness, dominates American consciousness. Americans
don't act--they drift.
Mills' Explanation of Non-Participation
Mills' work, taken as a whole, contains an
explanation
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of non-participation that goes beyond the reform conception
in two principal ways. First, non-participation may result
not only from particular institutional constraints against
participation but also from the logic of the social struc-
ture itself (i.e., "mass society"). Here Mills provides an
example of the third face of power described by Lukes. Let
us recall that an exercise of power
can occur in the absence of actual, observable
conflict, which may have been successfully
aver ted--though there remains here an implicit
reference to potential conflict. This potential,
however, may never in fact be actualised. What
one may have here is a latent conflict
,
which
consists in a contradiction between the interests
of those exercising power and the real interests
of those they exclude .
Secondly, as Lukes notes, people may be socialized
against their interests. Therefore, conflict is not for
Mills, as it is for Schattschneider or even Bachrach, the
ultimate determinant of whether power is being exercised.
In Mills' view, the power-elite institutional nexus
serves to create a mass society which solidifies its own
position. A mass society, however, requires "one-way
communication," a decline in voluntary organizations and
administration from the top. It is abetted by a "status
panic," "anxious obsolescence," "consumerism" (and other
aspects of dominant ideology), and, therefore, induces
adaptation to elite power. In a word, then, mass society
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requires non-participation and can, at best, allow symbolic
participation. Both through an ideology of acceptance and
the social psychological fruits of unresolved troubles, a
mass society induces non-participation and apathy, both of
which are functional for the structural requirements of
mass society.
However, while Mills gives an analysis of conscious-
ness formation, rooted in developments in the soical
structure, he continues to assign an important role to
human responsibility. Not having a theory of the "progres-
sive march of history," Mills sees mass society as the
result of human intention and human default. With the
institutionalization of the power-elite, however, primary
responsibility for the maintenance of centralized power
falls on the shoulder of elites, and secondary responsi-
bility on intellectuals and religious leaders.
Yet, in not relegating the development of conscious-
ness and the logic of mass society merely to the logic of
an historical stage, Mills sharpens for us the connection
between individual responsibility and political non-
participation. Whatever the faults of his analysis of
social structure, his explanation of non-participation
allows for the liberal emphasis in individual responsibi-
lity, the reform concern with constraints and the radical
connection between social structure and consciousness.
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Paradigm of apathy I:
apathy related to individual and group responsibility
In Mills' view, abdication of responsibility can lead
to a relaxation of political will. Political decisions
will then increasingly appear arbitrary, reinforcing the
apathy. Apathy, therefore, can result from personal and
group responsibility, as well as from structural sources.
People can be held reponsible individually and collectively
for allowing their will to wane and for the acceptance they
then allow illegitimate projects. This is the heart of
Mills' critique of the "intellectual default." People can,
in principle, then, be held responsible for some forms of
political apathy. Recall, for example, his warning on the
decline of the Renaissance Man as an ideal:
The threat to that idea is twofold: On the one
hand, history-making may well go by default, men
may continue to abdicate its willful making, and
so merely drift.
To the extent, then, that people have power with respect to
their political interests, they can be held responsible for
their apathy. Mills' paradigm of apathy related to choice
can be represented as follows:
X (a person, group, sex, stratum, subjective or
objective mass or society) can be considered
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responsibly apathetic with respect to Y
(something important, of which knowledge is
available, and something X could conceivably
influence if X could choose to) if X does not
care or demonstrate care about Y.H3
Note that, for Mills, the sign alerting us to apathy
does not necessarily have to be anything X does or does not
do with respect to Y. The stipulation is simply that it
was reasonable to think that X was capable of caring and
didn't. To be useful, however, such a stipulation must
also indicate that it is not reasonable to believe that
even the most committed citizens can sanely care about
everything at once. Apathy, then, we presume, might result
from X deciding not to decide on Y or something relevant to
it, with consequent weakening of the will, passivity, or
even eventual personal inability to decide. Or one might
become passive to one concern, thereby unwittingly becoming
apathetic to a related issue. For example, one might
become passive with respect to scientific matters, thereby
becoming apathetic with respect to the political issue of
nuclear power. Also note that while Mills doesn't say so,
his formulation leaves room for apathy related to other
choices a person makes. For example, some people might
have become apathetic with respect to the internal policies
of Pol Pot's Kampuchea because they opposed the Vietnam war.
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Paradigm of apathy II:
apathy as a condition fostered by social structure
For Mills, apathy can also result from the suppression
of the ability to use freedom and reason to make explicit
those troubles and issues that threaten cherished values.
In the modern world, freedom is itself directly threat-
ened- -and this threat is the main "trouble" left unarticu-
lated, and about which current malaise revolves. Instead
we are left with the person in a condition of apathy, often
happily pursuing unfreedom:
The advent of this man points to freedom as
trouble, as issue and--let us hope--as problem
for social scientists. Put as a trouble of the
individual --of the terms and values of which he
is uneasily aware--it is the trouble called
"alienation." As an issue for publics— to the
terms and values of which they are mainly indif-
ferent—it is no less than the issue of democra-
tic society, as fact and as aspiration. . . the
issue to which modern threats to freedom and
reason most typically lead is, above all, the
absence of explicit issues— to apathy rather than
to issues explicitly defined as such.
The issues and troubles have not been clari-
fied because the chief capacities and qualities
of man required to clarify them are the very
freedom and reason that are threatened and
dwindling
.
In the above formulation, Mills articulates a notion
of apathy that is opposite in image to that of Berelson.
Where for Berelson apathy results from contentment
having
at its base a freely arrived at assessment of
one's
220
position in society, for Mills it is rooted in a mistaken
assessment (if one at all) unfreely arrived at. But Mills
goes further. His description of the "cheerful robot" is
not merely a vision of false consciousness by which a his-
torically malleable subject is socialized into a repressive
dominant ethos. It is a glimpse of "1984," where not only
does socialization against one's interest take place, but
where one's very ability to reason and to act freely in
pursuit of a political interest is threatened.
Mills here implies that apathy is not only a parti-
cular form of political consciousness, but a condition
whereby contemporary consciousness is incapable of politi-
cal reason. Yet his formulation is vague. Is he implying
that the human spirit is under assault? Is this assault so
basic as to alter the structure of the human mind?--
changing, for example, in current Marxian terms, the funda-
mental human capacity of praxis , or intentional activity?
Mills does not provide the answer, although I think we
can take a reasoned guess based on his work. Human
sociality, through the medium of language, implies a
capacity to reason and the potential of self-conscious
freedom. These potentialities were highlighted as values
in the Enlightenment concept of freedom, practiced in
precorporate American politics and are currently under
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assault as values. Because of the human capacities for
intention, reason, and self-consciousness mediated by
language, human sociality implies the capacity for publicly
reasoning about "the good." Political democracy is the
form the public expression of these potentials has taken,
where "the political" is recognized as a distinct sphere of
human activity.
The modern threat of apathy, then, is a direct assault
on the actualized potential to form political intentions
and act upon them. Apathy as a condition signals not that
people will merely act against their political interests by
not part icipating- -but that they will be in a state of
drift. It is the modern capacity itself to form political
intentions and carry out political activity that is on the
wane. By denying people not simply an ideology to counter
liberal rhetoric but a mode of life that admits of the
development of political reason, the democratic political
form is threatened. Mills fears, therefore, not only that
people will develop the wrong ideology but that the modern
historical form of the capacity for political interpreta-
tion will disappear. Because Mills sees the political form
as having attained some independent legitimacy within
capitalism, its disappearance signals more an epochal shift
than mere socialization against one's interest. In his own
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way, Mills fears the end of ideology.
Mills' paradigm of apathy as a condition may be
reproduced as follows:
X (a person, group, sex,H5 stratum, subjective
or objective mass, society) is in a condition of
apathy with respect to Y (something important,
e.g., freedom) if X is unable to care about Y.
Inability to care involves a lack of capacity to
formulate issues relevant to Y, form intentions
relevant to Y and act in their terms. Political
apathy as a condition is the inability to form
political issues and programs out of the malaise
and even "happiness" that characterize alienation
as latent trouble. Lack of political freedom is
both cause and effect of political apathy as a
condition
.
Dimensions of apathy as a condition:
political subordination and political mortification
The above paradigms represent Mills' two-pronged
theory of apathy. In distinguishing between apathy related
to choice and apathy as a condition, Mills clearly separ-
ates himself from the other theorists we have looked at.
He also enriches our understanding of how political issues
may be deflected and broadens the scope of our study of
apathy by suggesting the political form itself may be in
trouble
.
For Mills, apathy as a condition can be created when
potential public issues are derailed from forming. There
are several ways this occurs. The first is through the
223
kind of nondec is ion-making and limitation of participation
that Bachrach insightfully discusses. Here, the cycle of
confusion, despair and suppressed troubles begins as
certain issues and troubles are pressured out of politics,
and the knowledge and ideas, and necessary participation
and discussion, are limited.
Apathy can also be induced when the social structure,
ideology, and rationality of the present system mutually
serve to inhibit the formulation of issues from troubles
and of troubles from malaise. Here Mills goes beyond
Bachrach in claiming that it is not just the scope of
politics that derails issues but the nature of the poli-
tical and social order itself. The way in which partici-
pation is constricted is, then, a functional constituent of
mass society and not merely a byproduct of it: democratic
participation can only develop as mass society is overcome.
More directly, Mills suggests how socialization
against one's interest can involve directing or constrict-
ing the range of what legitimately should count as
politics. The role of women as "darling little slaves,"
the structure of work, the quality of leisure, for Mills,
are all latent political problems of contemporary social
structure. 116 Yet, to the extent individuals are stuck in
personal milieu, such socialization practices are unlikely
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to be overcome.
Finally, Mills suggests, postmodern society has the
techniques with which to manipulate wants. This power is
insidiously used to insinuate into people the "drift" and
purposes of the power-elite. The result is apathetic,
aimless people with no projects of their own. In claiming
that wants can be manipulated and that the rationality of
the social structure can block reason and thereby limit
freedom, Mills clearly distinguishes himself from the
reform concept of depoliticizat ion
.
Mills' analysis is also richer in its description of
how apathy may develop. For Mills is the only theorist we
have looked at who captures important relations between the
society's structure and the social psychology that radiates
through individuals. Here he goes beyond the claim that
bias of conflict merely allows the dominant scope of poli-
tics to go unchallenged. Instead, he implies, the ration-
ality of the present bias sets up a social psychology that
is supportive of it and helps it dynamically reconstitute
itself
.
Similarly, Mills tacitly suggests how people in a mass
might socialize themselves into an apathetic posture. The
clearest example involves his discussion of personal
milieu. Systematic inability to clarify troubles and
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create issues may press us to personalize inherently
political problems. In fact, personalization of this sort
encourages drift and thereby hides itself as a latent issue
of social structure. While these ideas remain incomplete
in Mills, we can infer that mass society both structurally
fosters apathy and encourages individuals to perpetuate it
in the way they think about their own malise and troubles.
Where with Schattschneider we were shown how certain
needs are left out of politics, with Mills we have seen how
the political interest of coming to know what we need, both
as individuals and as members of a community, is itself
subordinated to mass society. Such political subordination
is a complex form of depoliticization
,
hinging on the way
mass society inhibits or channels political knowledge and
the reasons it must do so to preserve itself as a social
structure. The dominant outcomes of political subordi-
nation in a mass society are unresolved troubles, malaise,
and ultimately apathy. Non-participation is both the
result and the cause of entrenched subordination.
However, as we have seen, Mills goes further and also
suggests that the political form may itself be in trouble.
Here Mills implies two things. First, political
understanding and politics as a way of establishing the
public good have been forces for reason in American
226
history. Secondly, mass society, particularly with the
development of manipulation techniques, is moving toward
the eradication of any reasonable conception of politics.
In this view, he suggests an epochal shift that goes beyond
simple changes in the scope of political subordination.
Erving Goffman has described as mortification of the
self the way in which mental hospitals stunt the self-
concept of inmates . Borrowing from Goffman, we could
reasonably propose that Mills' notion of the "cheerful
robot" suggests mortification of the political self and the
political mortification of American society. This develop-
ment seems to take the form of an historic shift away from
political questions to questions of power maintenance and
technique. Yet, in his darker moments, as we have seen,
Mills seems to suggest that the human potentials of reason
and freedom, basic to the emergence of the political sphere
as a historical form, are themselves in trouble:
We know of course that man can be turned into a
robot, by chemical and psychiatric means, by
steady coercion and by controlled experiment,
but also by random pressures and unplanned
sequences of circumstances. But can he be made
to want to become a cheerful and willing robot?
. . . It will no longer do merely to assume, as
a metaphysic of human nature, that down deep in
man-as-man there is an urge for freedom and a^
will to reason. Now we must ask: what in man s
nature, what in the human condition today, what
in each of the varieties of social structure
makes for the ascendency of the cheerful robot?
And what stands against it? 11 '5
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Mills here implies not only that the contemporary
historical form of democratic political reason is on the
wane but also the human potential of reason itself. While
this idea is vague and undeveloped, Mills raises the
theoretical possibility that political mortification may
take an absolute form as well as one relative to our the
historical period of "mass society." In the relative form,
people are socialized, to utilize their human capacities in
ways that ignore their political interests. In the abso-
lute form, the potential for freedom and reason inherent in
human sociality is under assault because the capacity for
intentional action is itself threatened. However, even in
the case of relative political mortification an important
element of socialization is altered: explicitly political
argument and indoctrination would recede as important
constituents of dominant ideology
.
Evaluation of Mills' Explanation of Non-Participation
In evaluating the work of C. Wright Mills, a critic is
faced with two choices. Aspects of Mills' work can be iso-
lated from the rest and, sometimes easily, made the target
of smug criticism. Mills' later work, in particular,
is
boldly written and can lend itself not only to sharp
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criticism but to easy distortion.
When taken as a whole and read sympathetically,
however, Mills' work is richly suggestive and sometimes
prescient: of all the theorists considered, Mills clearly
provides the greatest insight into the relation between
apathy, non-participation, responsibility, and social
structure. In differentiating between personal and struc-
tural sources, Mills sharpens our explanation of non-parti-
cipation by more precisely locating responsibility for
apathy, a concern that should be central to any theorist
exploring the democratic nature of society.
Moreover, while Mills suggests that apathy may be a
condition that people in mass society suffer, he is not a
crude false-consciousness theorist. His argument is not
that people are simply indoctrinated but that they are also
denied a mode of life, and particularly real communication,
that would allow them to ascertain their interests and act
in their terms. 120
Further, Mills' exploration of troubles, malaise and
issues provides the notion of false consciousness he
develops with a social-psychological basis. Explicitly,
Mills shows how unfree integration in one's situation can
foster individual isolation and anxiety as well as public
acceptance. Implicitly, he leaves room for the wedding of
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structurally initiated anxiety to ideologies that require
insecurity. Consumerism surely benefits from a "status
panic" and both are abetted by the malaise and anxiety of
the person stuck in personal milieu.
Mills also distinguishes himself by exploring the
relationship between daily life and political culture. For
non-participation is generated not only by the inadequacy
of the public forum but also by the defective quality of
work-life, culture and leisure: his argument is therefore
partly an attempt to politicize areas of life now not
normally thought of as political.
For example, a particular work-life (e.g., "sales-
girl") fosters certain roles and presses us to accept
motives attendant to those roles. The structures within
which we find ourselves thereby become important parameters
for the commitments we are positioned to make and the way
we think about them. We may imply from this that our
active re-creation of roles, through the commitments we
make (because of the position we are in), is a crucial
resource for legitimating beliefs and ideologies. We not
only learn ideologies that harm our interests but we pursue
modes of life that in both thought and action also do so.
Moreover, we shall see in the last chapter, it is
important for us to consider explorations of concepts of
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depoliticization with the richness of Mills. For as the
state tries to rescue itself from fiscal crisis while the
economy tries to regenerate its competitive position in
world markets, neither will be in a position to meet the
demands citizens are likely to make of them. This is
particularly true since increasing austerity is proving to
be necessary to accomplish the required system readjust-
ments. Even greater depoliticization, therefore, may soon
become an urgent system imperative: those interested in
preserving and extending the democratic form will need to
know if and how greater depoliticization might be insin-
uated into American political life. It is important to
note that while apathy is not today a fashionable concept
among political theorists, it is still an important self-
interpretation of citizens for their non-participation and
a common description used by journalists.
Perhaps more importantly, apathy as a condition is the
sturdiest form of depoliticization, short of new
legitimations, particularly because of the tendency for the
individual to blame him or herself for what is a structural
effect. Nothing would calm the nerves of elites fearing an
aroused public as much as a return to the apparent "apathy"
of the 1950' s. And should further depoliticization be
sucessful, we may expect that some social scientists may be
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more than willing to characterize severe political subordi-
nation and mortification as individual apathy (if not
happiness)
,
shifting responsibility once again to the
victims
.
If human action can only be understood fully with the
help of the language of an actor, glibly equating apathy
with happiness or indifference, without ferreting out the
motivational background of the quiescence, may reflect the
theory of the observer more than the reality of the
observed. In the end, Mills argues for an analysis of
apathy that transcends the appearance of personal happiness
or indifference and suggests important structural sources
of passivity.
The urgency for comprehending what is sound in Mills'
theory equally presses us to discover where it is defi-
cient. For Mills' analysis of the development of non-
participation is, I believe, at times misleading, and
certain of his prescriptions can themselves lead to further
depoliticization. It is with these concerns that I shall
here confine the discussion.
There are two general problems in Mills' writing
relevant to the study of non-participation. The first has
to do with his analysis of social structure and the second
with the way in which he leads us to believe individuals
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accomodate themselves to it. Both point to problems with
his extreme formulations of apathy as a condition of
persons within a mass society "drifting" toward war.
In Mills' analysis of social structure, there are
several important areas where he does not focus sufficient
attention on why Americans did not combat the purposes of
the power-elite. Mills, for example, does not pay enough
attention to either the direct repression of Blacks nor to
the subordination of women as aberrations of the democratic
ideal. Nor does he sufficiently analyze the way in which
the repression of workers' struggles or the segmentation of
workers through job hierarchies and ethnicities has served
to break down potential vehicles for social change. Mills,
of course, is aware of these concerns and at different
points in his writings makes reference to them. Never-
theless, their importance and continued relevance as
crucial factors contributing to depoliticization get lost
in the descriptions of mass society he offers in his later
writings. Instead of a history torn with violence and
struggle, one often comes away from Mills with the idea
that Americans have lost a recent Golden Age to the moral
debasement of corporate society.
Similarly, in The Power Elite and The Causes of World
War III, he tends to move away from the dynamic economic
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analysis he offered in The New Men of Power and accepts too
easily the success of American capitalism in the 1950 's and
early 1960's. This point should not be belabored, of
course, because Mills was far from alone in worrying (on
the left, or celebrating on the right) that the economy
itself would offer few opportunities for a new political
thrust. His greatest concern was that the success of the
corporate economy was inextricably coupled with a "military
ascendency," the two together creating a "permanent war
economy." The result, he feared, would be World War III.
Yet the economic mini-crises of the 1970' s and early
1980 's indicate that significant repoliticization of the
type he suggested for the late 1940 ! s might still be
possible. The growth of the state in the twentieth century
has reflected, as Mills knew, the organizational needs of
capitalism. As a result, however, the seeds for the
politicization of certain "economic" and "administrative"
relations have been sown. While capitalism is partly
legitimized by state responsibility for social welfare and
economic growth and stability, it also faces structural
problems of capital shortage and stagflation that put
pressure on welfare programs and can't be solved by limited
state planning. As people continue to hold the state
responsible for social welfare and planning, latent polit-
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ical issues of the state's relation to the economy and the
economy itself can become overt- -"economic" and "admini-
strative" problems, therefore, may take a directly politi-
cal form. ^21 xf the state can no longer deliver what
people have grown to expect of it, then, and if no new
legitimations are available to counter what will appear as
a broken social contract (e.g., reductions in social
security) , some political space may become available to
move against what Mills called the "main drift" of
"moneymaking" and war.
As Mills saw the American economic system entrenching
itself, he also began to view social change as a process
that elites could increasingly influence. In The New Men
of Power, Mills gives a coherent analysis of how labor
leaders might fashion a break with the "main drift," and in
various works, he intelligently suggests how intellectuals
might, if nothing else, speak "truth to power." Yet he
also sometimes seems to indicate that members of the
"power-elite" themselves might work to fashion a new way.
Because elites had concentrated so much power in central-
ized institutions, they were potentially able to use that
power to properly manage history. The knowledge, Mills
felt, was available; what was needed was the will.
Now Mills, of course, knew that he was not really
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speaking of independent elites but of elites who were also
part of a class system and who must necessarily respond to
system imperatives. Paul Sweezy, for one, takes him to
task for slipping too glibly into "elite" analysis and
forgetting the evidence Mills himself offers of a class
system in operation . 122 Mills does, however, talk at times
as if both elites and intellectuals have more independent
power than they actually have, without raising the essen-
tial question of what reforms we might be able to expect of
enlightened elites at particular times . When he does so,
he puts forth a simplistic analysis of power in twentieth-
century America: elites have the choice of manipulating us
for the ends of the corporate-military nexus or leading us
out of our collective morass. Although they choose to do
the former
:
Far from being dependent upon the structure of
institutions, modern elites may smash one
structure and set up another in which they enact
quite different roles. In fact, such destruction
and creation of institutional structures, with
all their means of power, when events seem to
turn out well is just what is involved in "great
leadership," or, when they seem to turn out
badly, "great tyranny. "123
When Mills' analysis shades into voluntarism of this
sort, it can itself aid unnecessary depoliticization . In
his passion to find a way back to freedom, reason, and
democracy, paradoxically, Mills' analysis implicitly
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encourages us to believe that elites could act better, if
they would, and that such actions could be decisive in
altering the current course of history. Yet, to the degree
we believe this and attempt to pressure elites into such
behavior (as Mills at times also implies we can do if we
overcome our "civilian hesitations") , 124 we may setting
ourselves up for disappointment, despair and eventual
withdrawal. We may wind up, then, complaining about
"corrupt officials" or politicians who don't do what they
say they'll do and miss important constraints operating on
these elites at the start. 125
If the "labor metaphysic" was, as he claimed, a
Marxist illusion, Mills also knew that those in a position
to change things --the power elite- -were very unlikely to do
so for the better. And while he had prophesied and later
celebrated the emergence of the new left, it was more dif-
ficult for him to ground it as a viable agency for change,
given its uncertain position in the social structure.
This reveals an ambiguity in Mills' work. The young
intelligentsia was spearheading a "moral upsurge" that was
helping break down the apathy of the 1950' s. "Who is it,"
he asked, "that is getting disgusted with what Marx called
'all that crap'?: ... it is the young intelligent-
sia. "!26 But to play the historical role of people of
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ideas, as an agency of change, it needed to be connected to
actors whose decisive position in the social structure
could facilitate change. And his analysis did not reveal
the existence of such actors, except to suggest that
"alert" people were responding. Yet, in articulating his
thesis of the power elite, he pointed to whom he considered
the decisive actors, underlining their responsibility and
thereby bolstering the politics of moral upsurge and
protest at their default. How was the new left to sustain
such protest, and how would change come about? No definite
answer was given, but Mills chided:
. Let the old men ask sourly, "Out of
Apathy--into what?" The Age of Complacency is
ending. Let the old women complain wisely about
"the end of ideology." We are beginning to move
again . 127
Nevertheless, in Mills' account, the impact the
developing new left might have remained unclear. For on
the one hand, they could spark an enlightened political
conscience, while on the other they would inevitably bump
into the objective realities of an entrenched social
structure. What then could they accomplish within these
parameters?
This reveals a deeper tension within Mills between his
voluntarism and his conception of structural constraints.
As we have seen, he discusses the system needs of money-
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making and preparation for war and the need for a compliant
consumerist society that will not question the moral base-
ness of its work, leisure, and circumscribed political
realm. Thus there remain powerful constraints on what the
system can bear, creating a structural condition fostering
and needing widespread non-participation. His exhortations
do not always suggest the strength of these constraints,
however- -especially when directed at the power elite
itself- -and he does not show that their strength has
diminished
.
Of course, he was trying to harness the moral and
political activism, in part, of young students, to the
experience at devising sound theory of those older intel-
lectuals who were still relevant and progressive. The
theory of the future openings for structural change had
still to be developed and he hoped he could play his part.
He died too young. It remains an open question, then, if
he would have been able to help clarify and incorporate
into relevant theory the constraints under which the
students of the 1960 's did operate during the political
odyssey of the new left. The taste for voluntarism,
unaccompanied by such theory, could and did become a
vehicle for depoliticization as well as immediate action.
In retrospect, given a society which proved to be neither
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static nor pre-revolutionary , there was perhaps an essen-
tial ambiguity to the role the new left could play. It
could spark change, but it could not bring about social
transformation
.
It may be true, as Peter Clecak writes, that Mills'
attempt to find hope in the despair of America heading
toward world war led him to focus too much on what elites
and particularly intellectuals and students might do. In
his search for reason and freedom, Clecak writes, Mills
tended to look to undemocratic means to re-establish the
democratic form. For this study, the more important point
is that when Mills' work focuses too narrowly on leadership
he ironically lures us into further depoliticization:
important avenues of mass action may be missed and our
faith in democratic decision-making tacitly undermined. 12 ^
Furthermore, Mills did admire the new form of power
insofar as it could potentially break the "grip of fate."
The problem was a lack of knowledge and moral vision, which
he hoped intellectuals could provide publics, who could
then, ideally, pressure or take power from elites. Yet,
without significant concentration of power, it is unclear
that the type of history-making he now saw as possible
could be accomplished. Within Mills' own conception of how
public decisions can best be made, therefore, there is an
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implicit discord between the need for elites as history-
makers and the democratic ideal of publics as images of
what a future polity should include. To the degree one
takes from Mills the former impression, however, the need
for maximum participatory involvement recedes even before
the priorities of the social system are altered. Certain
aspects of Mills' images of both the means and ends of
social change, therefore, can be depoliticizing to the
extent they are internalized by the publics he is trying to
influence .129
In criticizing Mills' elite theory of power, Peter
Clecak concludes that:
In his desire to perceive the making of history
as an increasingly conscious activity, Mills
probably assigned too much weight to the elites
at the top. Having done this, he was committed
to overexplaining the powerlessness of other
groups. The myth of consolation appealed to
powerless individuals [e.g. intellectuals], but
implicitly subverted the creation of a new
politics .130
As we have seen, Mills' focus on elites, students and
intellectuals, in part, did tend to "subvert the creation
of a new politics": questions of capitalism as a system
and the need to democratically organize publics often drop
into the background of exhortations to elite and intellec-
tual responsibility.
Clecak is a bit off the mark, however, in suggesting
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that Mills' emphasis on elites forces him to "overexplain
the powerlessness" of other groups. The more important
problem is that Mills tends to misexplain the nature of
their powerlessness, alternating between suggestions that
the great mass of Americans are either "morally insensible"
and "indifferent," or "cheerful robots" following the lead
of the "power-elite." In fact, as he shows in The New Men
of Power
,
there exists a range of depoliticized citizens,
many of whom are neither completely indifferent nor laden
with the apathy or cheerful "idiots."
In Mills' early writings on methodology, he suggests
that to explain social behavior we must attempt to recon-
struct the typal vocabularies of social actors in order to
aid our understanding of how behavior is motivated. Yet in
some of his political writings, he does not pursue this
concern. Robert Bohlke points out, for example, that in
Mills' chapter on work in White Collar , there is "not one
reference to the feelings expressed directly or indirectly
by white collar workers. "131
Indeed, in Mills' later political writings, political
withdrawal is explained largely in terms of indifference or
apathy induced mainly by "mass society" as social struc-
ture, and lack of will and moral vision, themselves,
sympi.toms of the type of person mass society produces. Had
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he followed the precepts of his early methodology, he might
have deepened our understanding of powerlessness by sug-
gesting richer explanations of why persons adapt to mass
society
.
In Mills' earlier work, human intention and the
connection between thought and action are crucial ingred-
ients in helping to explain why people behave as they do.
Yet in The Power Elite and White Collar , Mills focuses on
how individual intentions are preempted in mass society.
As we have seen, he often does this quite suggestively.
Yet powerlessness cannot be understood unless we also
explore how intentional action and commitments on the part
of the person, himself or herself, are part of the process
whereby people adapt to the constricts of a system of
power. Let us consider some ways this occurs.
Recalling Schattschneider ' s work, I might boldly
suggest that people sometimes understand the political
order better than Mills often allows: people may ration-
ally withdraw from political involvement because they
accurately perceive that their needs are not being met and
are not likely to be met within it. 132 Exhortations to
toughening the political will or comments about "cheerful
robots," really accomplish little here, because people
often must make concrete choices about how to spend their
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limited time and energy in the struggle for economic and
social survival. While Mills greatly aids our understand-
ing of how political "non-actors" may misperceive their
needs, it is presumptuous to assume that they all never
do. Non-participation may then appear from the outside to
be motivated by apathy or indifference, but from the point
of view of the non-actor, it may be self-conscious poli-
tical withdrawal. While Mills' framework is capable of
including Schattschneider ' s insight, his later political
writings do not adequately do so.
Consider now the person whose comprehension of social
structure is weaker than those in the above example. A
person may become a good "consumer ist , " for example, not
simply because he or she is indoctrinated or manipulated
into such a role but because consumerism is the most
feasible arena, given constraints of social structure, in
which to pursue freedom and dignity. The person's desire
for both is partly rooted in and defined by the American
ethos of democracy and Western culture in general. But the
pursuit of freedom and dignity is displaced from political
and ethical arenas onto the economic (narrowly construed)
,
not simply because of consumerism as ideology or dominant
consumerist roles but due to a series of resolutions
(perhaps daily) of the following tension between thought
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and action: I think I am free and worthy of dignity. I
act in situations in which my freedom and dignity are
limited. The resolution comes when the person finds areas
of life, in this case consumption, where he or she can, in
fact, act in ways that protects the self-image of a free
and dignified person.
This type of tension may be resolved differently, of
course, for people of different classes, ethnic groups,
sexes and personal backgrounds. For a lower-middle-class
worker trying to resolve his or her aspirations for free-
dom, given a clearly instrumental work-life (with limited
advancement possibilities), and a society whose self-image
is meritocratic, an "ideology of sacrifice" for one's
family (and especially one's children) may prove the best
resolution . 133
For a Black mother on the margin of economic exis-
tence, it may be necessary to revise completely dominant
ideas about freedom to protect what little dignity one may
hope for in life and to survive:
Here is what a mother says correcting what her
children have been told in school--not because
she is a social critic or a radical but because
s
no
he is scared to death that if her children do
t learn to swallow their anger and keep it down
every day, they will not survive
"Once a while back, maybe two years it was,ULU-G . VYLia-j-^- 7 J ' , . i
mv girl came home and said the teacher made
them
sav that everyone born here in the country
of A-
merica is born equal and we're all the same. . .
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I was preparing their supper and I kept on think-
ing to myself how I could let my children believe
that when that's not they way they're going to
live. So, 1 called my girl over, and the other
children too; and 1 told them that there is the
white man and the black man, and the rich man and
the poor man, and the sheriff and the rest of us,
and there's the ones who have got a say and the
ones who don't. That's what I told them, and you
know what, I had them repeat it to me, out loud,
and they did; and I told them they should listen
to what they just said, and they'd better keep
repeating it to themselves, saying it, until the
end of their lives like we all do. "134
There are many variations in the way persons will
reconcile the beliefs they bring to a situation and the
lives they can, in fact, live. It may be possible to
generalize some of these from biographical sketches of
types of persons. Frank Parkin, for example, suggests that
the American political order may contain not only a domi-
nant value system, based on aspirations for improvement
within a framework of equal opportunity, but a subordinate
system as well. The latter helps people understand their
position in a social structure when the facts of inequality
are clearly not comprehensible within the dominant system.
The subordinate system would be clearly an accomodative one
in which
:
its representation of the class structure and
inequality emphasizes various modes of adapta-
tion, rather than either full endorsement of, or
opposition to, the status quo . 1 -3j
Within the subordinate ideology, Parkin, argues, the
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dominant values are not so much rejected or opposed
as modified by the subordinate classes as a result of their
social circumstances and restricted opportunities . "136 ye
must go beyond Parkin, however, and also insist that per-
sons do not just modify roles to help them understand their
situation but do so to preserve and extend their dignity
and self-worth. People, then, become committed to such
roles as ways of resolving conflicts about their identity
and to find meaning in their lives.
Mills, unfortunately, tends to play up either manipu-
lation into apathetic roles, drift, or, at his best,
connectives between the psychology of self-blame for
failure, anxiety, and lack of alternate institutions to
help clarify troubles. In doing so, he misses the import
of his early work stressing the need to understand the
"internal conversation" of an actor in order to adequately
explain behavior.
As a result, in his later work, he both exaggerates
the degree of uniformity of mass society and the degree of
apathy prevalent and misses not only other forms of
depoliticization but a vital element in the resiliency of
depolitized roles: the person's commitment to that role
because the self-conception is partly carved by the person
out of a concrete life situation in the search for identity
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and meaning. Ironically, Mills also misses the way in
which contrasting self-conceptions can divide different
groups who may have more in common than is apparent to
either, thereby helping create the fragmentation that looks
like a "mass society" at the bottom of the power pyramid.
Let us take another look at the example of the
worker. Success is based upon sticking with an unsatis-
fying job to help the worker's family succeed. If the
worker is white and confronted with a Black welfare
recipient whose implicit claim is that unemployment is
caused by structural inequality based on race, rather than
personal failure, the worker finds his or her sacrifice
demeaned. In this situation, as William Connolly argues:
"the worker's very possession of a job may appear to be
more a matter of luck than of self-discipline and desert."
Furthermore
:
The worker is caught in a bind. To repudiate the
ideology of sacrifice is to lose the claim to
respect available under present circumstances, but
to affirm it is to set the worker against the very
constituencies with whom he must be allied if
significant changes in this undignified life-
situation are to be generated. The ideology of
sacrifice generates political orientations that
help to perpetuate the worker's plight while the
plight itself generates powerful pressures to
perpetuate the ideology. Yet this bind^ itself
cannot be acknowledged without undermining the
identity available to the worker. The worker is
thus under a double pressure, first, to accept the
ideology and, secondly, to resist the suggestion
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that its role in securing his identity outstrips
its truth value. 137
Moreover, as evidence piles up demonstrating that the
worker's desires are based on a mistaken notion of what is
worth sacrificing for, the workers may suppress those
doubts rather than give in to them. Confronted with
middle-class students who reject the life the worker wants
for his or her children, the worker may become filled with
rage rather than question the value of middle-class life. 138
Writing in reaction to the mood he percieved in the
1950' s, Mills tended to assume that the American public was
being manipulated into a massive deception. He saw all
around him signs of immorality, loss of values, debased
work and culture and tried to explain why people would live
under these conditions. Suggestive as his explanations
are, they miss an important element of depoliticization
:
people are not only deceived, but in their attempt to
create a life of meaning and worth and self-consciously
establish their identity within that life, they deceive
themselves. They do so, to be sure, because their self-
consciousness operates within the confines of ideological
and structural constraints. Nevertheless, it is as actors
with intentions and with specific vocabularies of motive
and as persons trying to maintain dignity by pursuing
integrity of thought and action, that their commitment to
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"mass society" to whatever degree, is maintained-
-even in
the face of evidence of its lack of worth.
Mills' explanation of non-participation, then, falters
primarily because he does not incorporate into his later
writing the concerns he brings to sociological methodo-
logy. In this, he falls prey to the opposite trap of the
pluralists: instead of accepting the appearance of
contentment, he too often accepts glibly the appearance of
"cheerful robots" as the reality of persons subordinated to
mass society.
As I have argued, however, Mills' notion of political
subordination does extend our ability to analyze non-
participation by suggesting an important explanation of the
way that people may devolve into a condition of apathy.
However, when he advances his bleaker formulations, which I
have termed political mortification, he does little more
than posit a negative ideal-type: his own analysis lacks
the rigor and, I believe, the conviction to sustain such a
notion, and his language theory is, at best, in serious
tension with it.
If Mills were to have successfully developed a concept
of political mortification, he would have had to follow a
strategy like the following. First, he would have had to
show why people were becoming automatons in a society that
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was transparently harming their interests. Secondly, he
would have had to determine how transformations of social
structure become rooted in character structure, to erase
the potential for rebellion at this condition.
The first stipulation would be met if Mills could show
that people were successfully being socialized with inher-
ently apolitical new legitimations devoid of critical
content. However, while Mills discusses the "bureaucratic
ethos" and "rationality without reason," he seems to doubt
that these types of "values" could become the centerpiece
of a new ethos. This is why, I believe, he so often talks
about people in a state of drift with no new values to
replace the old. In fact, it is the lack of solid values,
for Mills, that makes people in mass society so ripe for
manipulation.
The second stipulation would require Mills to adopt a
social psychology that would "capture" the "cheerful robot"
as a type in the character structure and insulate it from
the vicissitudes of social change. If, for example,
persons' introjected apathetic personalities, as well as
learned apathetic roles, their character as well as the
social structure would become formidable reservoirs of
passivity. As he leaves it, alterations in social struc-
ture would quickly modify the character structure once
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again: in Mills' formulation, the individual does not hold
up his or her end of the dialectic between "mass society"
and the "cheerful robot" as a quasi-independent source of
acquiescence. The person merely reflects the needs of the
society
.
If Mills were able to show powerful new apolitical
legitimations and a social psychology of intractable
apathy, along with his analysis of mass society, he would
then have given us the ingredients of a powerful theory of
relative political mortification. Had he gone further and
demonstrated how even the potential for critical thought
itself was being rooted out of language and sociality
itself, he would have successfully inititated the bleakest
notion he alludes to: absolute political mortification.
In the end, he neither shows why the once powerful
legitimations of freedom and democracy fall so quickly
before the onslaught of mass society nor why the "cheerful
robot" as social type is so intractable. Perhaps the
reason is this: to have filled out the range of apathy as
a condition that he alludes to, Mills would have had to
confront the hopelessness he would be describing. Although
he often wrote as if the struggle against "mass society"
were hopeless, he always worked to find a way to break
through the despair. Taking Mills' work as a whole, it
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would probably not be inaccurate to say the "cheerful
robot," for him, was more of a fear than a reality of
twentieth-century life. 139
Mills fails, as we have seen, to establish a viable
concept of political mortification. He does so, primarily,
because he does not show us what language actors in such a
condition would speak and what character structure they
would exhibit. To complete our study of the range of
explanations, we may use in examining non-participation,
therefore, I now turn to Herbert Marcuse's study of
One-Dimensional Man
,
which I take to be an explicit attempt
to establish a paradigm of political mortification.
Marcuse does describe for us a person whose language,
values and social psychology span both the concepts of
relative and absolute political mortification I have
suggested": for Marcuse, people increasingly were speaking
a one-dimensional language, in a one-dimensional society,
legitimated by technological rationality, with passivity
embedded in the character structure through what he calls
"repressive desublimation . " The result of this composite
development was to rob thought and action of all potential
for criticism and progressive change. I now turn to the
question of whether he makes his argument successfully.
CHAPTER IV
THE THESIS OF ONE-DIMENSIONAL SOCIETY
Introduction
In the last chapter, we saw Mills raise the question
of how well people could be conditioned to adapt uncriti-
cally to "mass society." I now take that issue as our
starting point by turning to Herbert Marcuse's work:
Marcuse's paradigm for explaining depoliticization centers
precisely on the theoretical possibility of the total
integration of the people of advanced industrial society
and their inability to comprehend this circumstance.
Marcuse's work is important, as Jurgen Habermas points
out, for he helps us answer a question vital to explaining
how modern capitalism may legitimize itself in a post-free
market era. Shorn of the legitimations based on the "free
exchange of equivalents," how will state intervention into
the economic and social order necessary to correct system
"dysfunctions" and the depoliticization required for state
intervention to proceed unimpeded, be made plausible to the
inhabitants of advanced capitalist society?
In this chapter, therefore, I shall locate and
articulate the essential elements of the "one-dimension-
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ality" thesis, draw out certain underlying assumptions and
suggest how these may extend a conceptual map necessary for
comprehending contemporary depoliticization
. Ironically,
as we shall see, Marcuse's work is both explicitly an
attack on technocratic theory and modes of social organi-
zation and implicitly an argument that technocratic social
theory can, in fact, become human practice. In the next
chapter, I will criticize this line of thought by
suggesting that there are inherent limits to the degree to
which technocratic rationality can integrate people into
"mass society."
As we shall see presently, there are more and less
extreme statements of the "one dimensionality" thesis: the
moderate Marcuse focuses on technological rationality as an
ideology with which corporate capitalism and state
socialism can be legitimated; the extreme Marcuse focuses
on the eclipse of subjectivity itself within advanced
industrial society.
My strategy, then, will be to fully articulate the one
dimensionality thesis by examining, in turn, Marcuse's
analysis of: advanced industrial society as social struc-
ture indefinitely able to contain qualitative change;
technological rationality as legitimation; the ideological
character of contemporary science and technology; one-
dimensional language; one-dimensional character structure;
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and the prospects for liberation. In exploring these, I
shall explain how they relate to Marcuse's less and more
extreme statements on the thesis of technological hegemony,
laying the groundwork for the critique of these arguments I
will undertake in the next chapter.
Marcuse: A Theorist of Political Mortification
Can men and women be made into "cheerful and willing
robots"? This question, posed by C. Wright Mills as a
pessimistic aside in his analysis of "mass society," is the
principal departure point for Herbert Marcuse's analysis of
American society. Whereas Mills' answer remained
tentative, Marcuse boldly put forth the following thesis:
American society of the 1960 1 s was rapidly becoming
"one-dimensional" due to the indefinite suspension of
structural contradictions within American capitalism and
the eradication of the critical dimensions of thought,
action, and character structure of its people. As a
result, only the dimension of the given social order
remained, insulating the theory and practice of "advanced
industrial society" from transcending critique and
liberation
.
Before exploring how and whether Marcuse deepens our
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ability to explain depoliticization
, we need to be clear
about what he is and is not saying and what I am attempting
to do here. Marcuse is arguing that there are tendencies
within all advanced industrial societies, pointedly
including the Soviet Union, 1 toward becoming one-dimen-
sional. He is not arguing that all advanced industrial
societies, in particular capitalist America and communist
Russia, are becoming the same, although he does point to
the egregious domination of technological rationality in
both. 2 He is suggesting, he claims, only tendencies,
although he writes much of his work as if the fact were
complete or nearly so.
This brings us immediately to a severe complication
that we face in reading Marcuse. His writing is at times
very difficult to comprehend. He often places a near total
burden on the reader to discern whether his ideas are
difficult because they are complex and insightful or simply
confusing and perhaps confused. 3 As we shall see,
particularly in Chapter V, Marcuse' s writing contains both
kinds of ideas. His theory suffers for it, and his style
has both won him followers who don't understand him and
critics who can too easily dismiss him because of it.^"
We are, of course, here interested in only the content
of Marcuse 's analysis. In his view, advanced industrial
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society will be able to contain qualitative change into the
indefinite future, ironically through the very technolo-
gical advancement that could potentially liberate people
from the "realm of necessity." Whatever potential for
liberation exists in technology or in human nature, both
are now being used to reinforce domination. Yet, if people
only could understand their situation, they might be able
to break the lockstep of "one-dimensional" society.
As with Mills, much of Marcuse's fervor (and
theoretical excesses) can be understood as a reaction to
what he considered to be a very dangerous world situation
and perhaps the ultimate irony of contemporary life.
Instead of technology being used to "pacify existence," as
he would say, it was serving to threaten human survival
through nuclear holocaust. Read sympathetically, Marcuse
often provides a compelling moral critique of social
systems that foster such social insanity.
Yet Marcuse's work must stand or fall on his political
and social analysis. Just as some of his colleagues of the
Frankfurt School devoted themselves to understanding why
socialist revolution did not occur in Europe, even when
"objective conditions" seemed to be present, Marcuse tried
to comprehend specifically why the advanced "forces of
production" of the 1960's did not unmask the "relations of
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production" that held them back. How, in short, had the
forces of production-
-technology and science, themselves-
-
become a mode of domination instead of a vehicle for
liberation? Much of his work from the 1930 's on, in one
way or another, is devoted to this problem.
5
For the purpose of exploring competing theories of
depoliticization, I shall focus here almost exclusively on
Marcuse's concept of "one-dimensional man." It would be
difficult to find a clearer paradigm of political mortifi-
cation. Through our examination, we will be better able to
ascertain whether, and in what way, such a notion can aid
our ability to explain depoliticization.
Political mortification: relative or absolute?
Marcuse offers, I shall argue, a theory of both
relative and absolute political mortification, and his work
vacillates throughout between them. Although I shall
explore these theories later after discussing Marcuse's
analysis of American society, let me preview them as
follows
.
Technological rationality, Marcuse argues, has become
a powerful new legitimation, replacing the ideology of fair
exchange of market capitalism. Although it is inherently a
political ideology, in that technology now sustains a par-
259
ticular form of domination, its categories are apolitical
,
focusing only on how to manage efficiently an industrial
system geared to ever -increasing productivity. Questions
of value are, therefore, suppressed. Left at this level,
Marcuse is suggesting a model of relative political
mortification based on the simple false-consciousness of
technological rationality: if we define the political as
that area of human interaction concerned with discerning
and acting on the proper way to organize public life,
technological rationality eliminates political discourse
from public consideration.
If Marcuse had left his formulation at this level, he
would have been suggesting political mortification only
relative to the domination, into the immediate future, of
people's consciousness by technological rationality as
ideology. However, he goes much further by suggesting that
political mortification may be unlimited in scope and
duration, that is, absolute. The link between his two
attitudes to the future of political discourse turns on the
fate he sees for human subjectivity. Is technological
rationality simply false consciousness in which political
domination masquerades in apolitical categories, or does it
portend the end of human subjectivity itself and, with it,
the capacity for political thought? Consider the following
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from Marcuse:
I have just suggested that the concept of aliena-
tion seems to become questionable when the indi-
V
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entifV themselves with the existence
which is imposed upon them and have in it their
own
i
development and satisfaction. This identifi -
cation is not illusion but reality. However
, the
reality constitutes a more progressive stage of
alienation. The latter has become entirely
—
object ive ; the subject which is alienated is
swallowed up by its alienated existence. There
p[ only one dimension, and it is everywhere and
in all forms.' The achievements of progress defy
ideological indictment as well as justification;
before their tribunal, the " false consciousness "
of their rationality becomes the true conscious
-
nes s .
This absorption of ideology into reality
does not, however, signify the 'end of ideo -
logy
.
" On the contrary , in ii specific sense
advanced industrial culture is more ideological
than its predecessor, in as much as today the
ideology is in the process of production itself.
In a provocative form, this proposition reveals
the political aspects of the prevailing
technological rationality .
6
In this statement, as in much of his 1964
One-Dimensional Man
,
Marcuse is arguing three things
.
First, technological rationality has become ideology.
Secondly, individuals identify themselves so closely with
advanced industrial society that any ideological indictment
of it is, for practical purposes, all but impossible.
Thirdly, alienation "has become entirely objective,"
meaning that the human subject as we know it ceases to
exist and instead becomes an object (and not just treated
as one) in the technological ensemble. The latter would
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actually be beyond alienation and beyond false conscious-
ness because both concepts are predicated on the capacity
of real subjects to be able, at some point, to come to know
that they don't accurately understand their situation. The
first notion falls within what we have termed relative
political mortification, while the third is a form of
absolute political mortification. However, a problem
immediately emerges. If technological rationality is
ideology, it must be held by subjects (as false conscious-
ness); if humans have become completely objectified in the
technical apparatus, they cannot hold any ideology because
they cease to be subjects. As he often does, Marcuse also
stakes out a middle ground all within two paragraphs:
subjectivity exists in theory but is channeled and rendered
impotent for all practical purposes. He elaborates this
position when he writes shortly after:
Thus emerges a pattern of one-dimensional thought
and behavior in which ideas
,
aspirations , and
obj ectives that, by their content, transcend the
established universe of discourse and action are
either repelled or reduced to terms of this
universe. They are redefined by the rationality
of the given system and of its quantitative
dimension .
'
Read simply as descriptive statements, the above
propositions could be understood as different degrees of
political mortification now in existence. The real Marcuse
could then be simply thought of as occupying the middle
ground between complete obj ectification of persons and
technological rationality as ideology. However, even this
strategy would fail to address an important dilemma in his
work. For it may be that these different empirical
s tatements about the degree of political quiescence now
existing really should have in their foundation different
and perhaps incompatible concepts of subjectivity as well.
And it could be, therefore, that while some of his
empirical propositions are useful, the basic concept of
subjectivity he professes remains flawed.
I shall ask, therefore, does Marcuse's basic notion of
subjectivity enhance or detract from our overall ability to
explain depoliticization? Are there portions of his milder
empirical statements (as insights that require modifica-
tion) on one-dimensional society that we can adopt while
rejecting a common and unsatifis factory notion of subjec-
tivity.
In the next chapter, I will argue that in Marcuse's
work there is both a primary concept of subjectivity that
remains unsatisfactory, as well as aspects of an implicit
richer concept in tension with the primary one. When the
former is emphasized, it dramatically understates the
potential for criticism inherent in human sociality. ° At
times, misunderstanding the nature of human sociality
itself, Marcuse's "subject" as analytical category tends to
facilitate exaggeration, in empirical analysis, of the
degree and severity of apathy prevalent, reducing all
depoliticization to political mortification in one form of
another. This tendency is further aggravated by the
problematic analysis Marcuse gives to contemporary social
structure, particularly the stability of American
capitalism.
The essential problem is this: Marcuse's subject
allows for the theoretical possibility of absolute poli-
tical mortification, which, I shall argue, is an impossible
concept, at least as pursued by Marcuse. Moreover, it
betrays a social anthropology, which, if true, would give
no grounds for any reasonable notion of human freedom or
liberation, Marxist or otherwise.
In the end, Marcuse's analysis of depoliticization
will compare unfavorably with the concept of political
subordination extracted from Mills and elaborated in
Chapter III. From the forthcoming critique of Marcuse, I
shall be able to further develop this concept and suggest
more fully its power in the explanation of depolitici-
zation. But first, let us turn directly to Marcuse's
analysis of political mortification in America as an
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"advanced industrial society."
One-dimensional persons: an overview
As I have suggested, Marcuse attempts to explain why
people passively acquiesce to domination just at that time
in history when the technical potential for liberation
exists
:
The most advanced areas of industrial
society exhibit throughout these two features: a
trend toward consummation of technological
rationality, and intensive efforts to contain
this trend within the established institutions.
Here is the internal contradiction of this
civilization: the irrational element in its
rationality. It is the token of its achieve-
ments. The industrial society which makes
technology and science its own is organized for
the ever-more-effective domination of man and
nature for the ever-more-effective utilization of
its resources. It becomes irrational when the
success of these efforts opens new dimensions of
human realization .
9
How is it, then, that the social relations are able to
"hold back" the forces of production by preventing "new
dimensions of realization" from opening up?
Marcuse' s investigation can be analyzed on at least
two different levels. At the more obvious level, Marcuse,
like Mills, describes a system of elite power of admini-
stration and domination of communication, culture,
economics, and politics. This power is dependent on modern
technology and communication techniques which allow elites
both to manipulate needs and to provide material abundance
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to meet those needs, ensuring quiescence and even "happi-
ness." Any criticism that occurs either appears irrational
or is harmlessly channeled, in safety-valve fashion in
pseudo-oppositional activity. Marcuse writes, for example,
"One-Dimensional thought is systematically promoted by the
makers of politics and their purveyors of mass informa-
tion. "10
At a more profound level, however, Marcuse is offering
much more than an analysis of simple elite manipulation.
For one thing, elites themselves are subject to the techno-
logical ensemble. "The world," he writes, "tends to become
the stuff of total administration, which absorbs even the
administrators . "H To be sure, the privileges of some are
"veiled" and protected within one-dimensional society.
More importantly, however, the limits of technological
rationality "appear in the progressive enslavement of man
by a productive apparatus which perpetuates the struggle
for existence and extends it to a total international
struggle which ruins the lives of those who build and use
this apparatus . "12
Basic to Marcuse' s thesis is that the "productive
apparatus" of advanced industrial society, in dialectic
with technological rationality as a closed universe of
meaning, both projects a society of total domination and
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establishes the material preconditions for overcoming the
repression heretofore made necessary by scarcity. In this
process, the forces of production of science and techno-
iogy, geared to the sole principle of ever greater produc-
tivity, have themselves become the primary relations of
domination. Much of the very high level of repression that
still exists is, therefore, in Marcuse's judgment,
unnecessary repression. Accordingly, the possibility
exists at least in theory, however remote in "one-dimen-
sional society," of creating a liberated technology and
productivity that can meet "true" human needs and transcend
the unnecessary lack of freedom that now prevails.
With such a "specter of liberation" haunting advanced
industrial society, Marcuse argues, the subjugation of the
masses to unnecessary repression cannot merely result from
simple manipulation of wants but must correspond to some
deeply felt need. Otherwise the pointless character of
contemporary domination would become too transparent. His
specific contribution, then, is his attempt to show how
one-dimensional society creates the immediate and
unreflective identification of the needs of the individual
with those of the technical apparatus. As we have seen, at
his most extreme, Marcuse suggests that people actually
lose their status as subjects and become merely functional
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units of advanced industrial society. In this way, "one-
dimensional" persons are created, shorn of the capacity to
comprehend their situation.
In order to understand how individuals can become what
amounts to a mere reflection of the needs of the technical
social structure, I will examine four closely related
aspects of Marcuse's theory. For Marcuse, contemporary
economic and social structure has produced stability and
affluence and is able to contain qualitative change indefi-
nitely. It has as its bedrock technological rationality as
ideology--but one with a fundamental difference from
previous ideologies: it creates a universe of discourse
consisting of only one dimension, the dimension of the
"positive," lacking "negative," critical or oppositional
concepts. Moreover, the development of technological
society has created a character structure of such weakness
that it is susceptible to adaptive socialization right down
to the instincts . For Marcuse, the eradication of the
potential for criticism from thought and language and the
incorporation of the needs of technological rationality
directly into the character structure are the hallmark
characteristics of "one-dimensional man." I shall
therefore examine, in turn, the social structure, the
ideology, the language and the psychological profile of
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"one-dimensional society." Once I have completed this
task, we will be in a better position to see what kind of
sense to make of Marcuse when he boldly writes of contem-
porary America:
.
. .
domination-
-in the guise of affluence andliberty--extends to all spheres of private andpublic existence, integrates all authentic
opposition, absorbs all alternatives. Technolo-
gical rationality reveals its political character
as it becomes the great vehicle of better domina-
tion, creating a truly totalitarian universe in
which society and nature, mind and body are kept
in a state of permanent mobilization for thedefense of this universe. 13
The Social Structure of Containment
In an important respect, Herbert Marcuse 's analysis of
social structure can be viewed as an attempt to explain a
fundamental anomaly in Karl Marx's theory of revolution.
For Marx, the capitalist mode of production created both
alienation and technological progress. It was able to do
so because it prevented workers from apprehending a
fundamental truth: it was they who were creating the value
of society through a mode of production, which they also
"created," that denied them freedom. The genius of
capitalism was that it would someday provide the material
basis for freeing workers from the grind of using their
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very beings as instruments to overcome raw necessity. When
the material and technological base of capitalism became
sufficiently advanced, the way the social relations of
capitalism "held back" the potential of the forces of
production would become transparent. This "contradiction"
would issue in revolution as a decisive historic move
toward freedom and away from what would then become
completely unnecessary exploitation. Thus, Marcuse tries
to explain why, given substantial technical mastery of
nature, the revolution has not arrived.
In Marx's time the laborer was fooled, essentially, by
what Marx called the "fetishism of commodities." Because
the activity of producing was reduced to mere labor-time so
that the work output could be exchanged in the market and
because production was reduced to production for exchange
with no regard to the need fulfilled, both became
commodities of the marketplace:
A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing,
simply because in it the social character of
men's labor appears to them as an objective
character stamped on the product of that labor:
because the relation of the producers to the sum
total of their own labor is presented to them as
social relations existing not between themselves,
but between the products of their labor.
. . .
There it is a definite social relation between
men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic
form of a relation between things.
^
Commodities are therefore fetishized in that they take
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on human attributes, appearing to interact with one another
while the relations between persons become reified, appear-
ing as relations between things. What Marx called deri-
sively "Monsieur le Capital" "acts," while people become
objects under his laws--in reality, of course, they
acquiesce to market social relations.
As capitalism develops, "dead labor" in the form of
machines and technology increasingly replaces and dominates
living labor. As the worker becomes more and more an
"appendage of the machine," the product of human labor
increasingly dominates the worker, intensifying alienation,
commodity fetishism and reification . 15
However, Marx argues, once the laborer's toil ceases
to be the essential condition of productivity, "surplus
labor" "ceases to be the condition of the development of
social wealth . . . the mode of production which rests on
the exchange value collapses." At this point, the worker
will be ready to replace "labor-time" as the measure of
wealth and "exchange value" as the measure of use with "the
appropiation of his own universal productivity, i.e. , his
knowledge and his mastery of nature through societal
existence--in one word: the development of the societal
individual." 16
Marx's hope, however, turns into Marcuse's despair.
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For while Marcuse never abandoned "orthodox Marxism" on
basic "contradictions" within capitalist production,
particularly the liberating potential of science and
technology and the pivotal role of the working class as
revolutionary agent, he argues strenuously that both are
now being contained, perhaps indefinitely.
In classical Marxism, Marcuse argues, there is a
"political revolution" in which "the proletariat destroys
the political apparatus of capitalism but retains the
technological apparatus, subjecting it to socialization."
The "immediate producers" would then introduce qualitative
change: "production toward the satisfaction of freely
developing needs." However, a revolution is predicated on
the "negation," the liberating forces as a class that
understands its alienation and needs to end it, existing
within the society prior to the change:
Now it is precisely their new consciousness, this
"space within," the space for the transcending
historical practice, which is being barred by a
society in which subjects as well as objects
constitute instrumentalities in a whole that has
its raison d'etre in the accomplishments of its
overpowering productivity . 17
In twentieth-century America, Marcuse argues, "the
more technology appears capable of creating the conditions
for pacification [of existence], the more are the minds and
bodies of men organized against this alternative . The
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technological base for revolutionary change appears to
exist while the agency for change is absent. In fact, the
technological base itself must be altered, for it is the
present "technical continuity" that integrates workers into
advanced industrial society. Marcuse argues:
.
. .
to the degree to which the established
technical apparatus engulfs the public and
private existence in all spheres of society-
-that
is, becomes the medium of control and cohesion in
a political universe which incorporates the
laboring classes--to that degree would the
qualitative change involve change in the techno-
logical structure itself. 19
For Marc use, then, it is the present technological
structure itself that is the basic "fetter," the most
important mode of containment of the freedom from
alienating labor that technology promises. The irony
Marcuse suggests for Marxian theory is acute. Technolo-
gical rationality clouds both optimistic moments of the
Marxian dialectic: in becoming a force for social
cohesion, it integrates the working class and removes
itself as an immanent critique of capitalist social
relations. I shall shortly discuss how, in Marcuse' s view,
technological rationality has come to have substantive ends
(productivity and domination) and become the main
legitimation of monopoly capitalism. Before we turn to
technological rationality as ideology, however, let us
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explore its practical workings in contemporary America.
The premier and incontrovertible fact about the
technological apparatus of "one-dimensional society" is
that it demonstrates its efficiency and utility through
"overwhelming productivity." For the great majority,
Marcuse argues, American industrial capacity has removed
material need, making protest appear Utopian if not
downright foolish, given the promise of an "ever-more
comfortable life." Certainly, there remain those whose
"life is the hell of the Affluent Society," who "are kept
in line by a brutality which revives medieval and early
modern practices." For the rest, however, "society takes
care of the need for liberation by satisfying the needs
which make servitude palpable," through the production
process itself . 20
Marx wrote in the Grundrisse that: "Production thus
creates the consumer. Production not only furnishes the
object of a need, but it also furnishes the need for an
object. "21 One-Dimensional Man can be read as an attempt
to explain the contemporary significance of Marx's
statement: while the ever-growing need for commodities is
certainly created, the primary need developed is for an
irrational production process itself.
The achievements Marcuse catalogued appeared awesome.
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Long-term economic stability seemed assured, with record
levels of affluence and increasing employment opportun-
ities. Business and government partnership was success-
fully managing potential economic crises. Technical
development and innovation had vastly accelerated and
become primary in the production process, marginalizing the
power of the traditional working class, which was totally
integrated anyway.
Internationally the interimperialist rivalry between
capitalist powers had been frozen, with communism serving
as an "enemy" all productive and psychological forces could
be mobilized against. Writing before the Vietnam war was
at its height, Marcuse believed that national liberation
struggles were being successfully contained, protecting
capitalism abroad. The confrontation with communism also
gave greater rationale to government integration with the
economy and accelerated defense spending, greatly spurring
the development of technology.
In fact, the state had become so closely identified
with the technical base of production that it could no
longer generate ideological principles able to unify a
class-divided society and had transcended its role as a set
of "mediating" institutions, capable of establishing a
peneral interest out of partial interests. The state, in
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short, was tending toward becoming a mere reflection, as
were all other institutions and people, of the technolo-
gical base. 22
Marcuse called the state that had developed a "welfare-
warfare" state: a state of "total administration." Its
genius was to repress the majority by providing for its
manipulated needs while reserving coercion for a relatively
small minority. As such, it created "unfreedom" by
restricting (1) real free time (not administered leisure)
that was now technologically feasible; (2) production to
meet "true" human needs; and (3) critical intelligence. 23
Because of the "technical" availability of each of these,
the welfare state was, for Marcuse, an exercise in
unnecessary repression . 24
The welfare-warfare state, therefore, served the
function of promoting and containing productivity within
the bounds of capitalism:
. . . the prospects for a streamlined containment
. depend primarily on the ability of the
vested interests to adjust themselves and their
economy to the requirements of the Welfare
State. Vastly increased government spending and
direction, planning on a national and
international scope, an enlarged foreign aid
program, comprehensive social security, public
works on a grand scale, perhaps even partial
nationalization. . . .25
However, the welfare-warfare state was engaged
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primarily in raising an administered standard of living in
which the decline of opposition became "an objective
societal process insofar as the production and distribution
of an increasing quantity of goods and services make
compliance a rational technological attitude." 26 Instead
of freeing people, therefore, the state was helping to
stabilize a socioeconomic system geared toward ever-greater
productivity, depending heavily on the production of "junk"
(and the need for it), planned obsolescence, and the
production of fear of the enemy. Furthermore, keeping
production within the bounds of capitalism not only
required increasing administration but also advertising,
public relations and indoctrination to ensure consumption
and fealty to the system.
In Marcuse's view, however, the need for products and
productivity itself was not the result of simple manipu-
lation such as media advertising. Marcuse was extremely
concerned that media such as television and radio helped
close off the mental space available for reflection,
largely through their pervasive intrusion into most corners
of a person's life. 27 in particular, the media seemed able
to project a pseudo-objective universe of meaning devoid of
critical content.
The more fundamental problem, however, was that people
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were no longer capable of any reasonable conception of
autonomous action. With the change from competitive to
monopoly capitalism, the traditional family, and particu-
larly the father's role within it, had been greatly
weakened. The family lost its role as the primary vehicle
of socialization, particularly to the mass media. In
"advanced industrial society" there was little need for the
strong personality characteristic of the entrepreneur-
-the
need now was for persons capable of complete adaptation to
the technological milieu. 28
The father, then, as ego-ideal and principal force,
according to Marcuse, in creating the super ego through the
resolution of the Oedipal situation, was not available to
help shape an autonomous individual . 29 Instead a very weak
ego developed, incapable of mediating the personality with
his or her environment and incapable of reflection. And a
weak superego was unable to direct the forces of the id,
particularly allowing increased aggression in this new
world "without fathers." 30
I shall discuss subsequently fuller implications of
Marcuse 1 s psychological profile of "one-dimensional man,"
and particularly the fate of subjectivity. For our
purposes here, the crucial element of this transformation
is the way people immediately identify with the needs of
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advanced industrial society. In a world without fathers or
real leaders, the weak ego adopts technological rationality
and its representatives as the ego-ideal for all. That is,
it adopts ever-increasing productivity for its own sake as
the only important value. Television and other media loom
large here, encouraging people to identify with a variety
of "institutional fathers," who in one way or another
represent technological rationality. Private critical
mental space is, thereby, closed off.
Against this backdrop, manipulating consumption for
its own sake is a relatively easy task, ensuring with the
"defense" economy disposal of ever-increasing surplus
production. As Morton Schoolman points out, people become
technicians of consumption as well as production.
For Marcuse, it is basic that the change in character
structure, along with the new "ego-ideal," allows advanced
industrial society to immediately harness newly released
instinctual drives to perpetuate the society and contain
change. The aggressive energy of Freud's "death instinct,"
in his view, is channeled into labor, providing the produc-
tion necessary for ever-increasing manipulated consump-
tion. However, because rationalized labor does not satisfy
aggression in its "primary form," frustration results, re-
lieved by ever-greater need for rationalization and produc-
279
tion. The outcome, which Marcuse calls a "vicious cycle of
progress," results in "repetition and escalation," in the
form of ever-increasing need for channels in culture and
production through which to release aggression . 31
The "enemy" enters here, once again, as a critical
means of stabilizing advanced industrial society. It
provides an important target for all the aggression being
released, displaces concern with the domination one is
subjected to, and provides a psychological underpinning for
the "defense" economy, resulting in greater production,
more rationalization and more "totalitarian" control. In
this way, rationalization leads to increased aggression and
further rationalization.
The decline in the need for direct instinctual repres-
sion, made possible by the economic and technological
obsolescence of the need for a strong superego, also issues
in functionalizing newly released energy from the libido.
Where formerly repression would preserve libidinal energy
in the unconscious and release it in imagination, subli-
mation and fantasy, technical success has now made such
repression obsolete. At this juncture, Marcuse claims,
"The Pleasure Principle absorbs the Reality Principle [of
Freud]. . . . This notion implies there are repressive
modes of desublimation . "32
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Sexual liberation now becomes functional for the esta-
blished order. People can dress as they please, say what
they want, relate to each other in hitherto prohibited
ways. For with the decline of the ego and superego and,
therefore, the critical faculties, the hook-up between
intellect and instinctual energy is disengaged.
The media with their overwhelming power can therefore
easily manipulate such desublimation to seek the objects
made available by the production machine. Desublimated
libidinal striving makes the individual ripe for intensely
manipulated consumption. Moreover, the media foster a
pseudo-objectivity, appearing detached in the face of
horrifying events and juxtaposing "sense" and "nonsense,"
the serious news interspersed with frivolous "news" or
commercial advertising. The result is to erode critical
intellectual and emotional faculties, and, coupled with the
sheer power of the media, to close off the person's mental
space for reflection.
Culture is also vitally affected. It was Che
connection between the intellect and the instincts, parti-
cularly through sublimation, that preserved critical
content of thought in earlier stages of capitalism. Even
apparently nonrevolut ionary art preserved this potential.
Whether in music, literature, art, most particularly pop
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entertainment, immediate release of instinctual energy robs
culture of its transcending value. Even "beat" ways of
life are an effective safety-valve for desublimated
energy. Moreover, as even the fine arts become more
available as a commodity at one's fingertips with the
television knob or in the store, they become diffused,
turning into "cogs in a culture-machine which remakes their
content. "33 whether cultural creations begin, therefore,
as genuine works of art with transcendenting value or
whether they begin as desublimated works like Lolita (with
immediate "desublimated" gratification possible), they end
up as the stuff of mass culture. In either case, they lose
their alienation from a reality of domination, their
capacity to state what Marcuse calls "The Great Refusal."
Culture thereby becomes functional for mass society.
A similar fate befalls philosophy, social science,
education, and politics. In the hands of positivists and
particularly analytic philosophers, Marcuse argues,
philosophy becomes primarily a mode of therapy. By
accepting ordinary language without attempting to penetrate
its ideological meaning and by ruling out as meaningless
oppositional concepts that attempt to transcend "ordinary
language," this kind of philosophy helps to coordinate
thought with the needs of established social structures.
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Similarly, a social science committed to "operational
definitions" of reality commits the analyst implicitly to
the current form of social organization, undercutting the
important critical role of universities. Educational
institutions at all levels conform to the role for which
they are needed, as vocational training grounds for various
aspects of production.
In the political world, potentially oppositional
concepts like freedom are redefined in terms favorable to
technological rationality. Politicians may prattle on
about democracy, justice, freedom, and the like, but they
are really talking about preservation and extension of the
going order. Similarly, union leaders and businessmen work
together for the "national interest." Even potentially
oppositional political parties, whether socialist or
communist, have chosen to vie for power within the parlia-
mentary systems of capitalism, rather than struggle for
qualitative change. Although they do so primarily to
retain a fundamentally conservative mass base, not simply
out of default of leadership, Marcuse argues, the result is
that no serious political opposition exists to challenge
advanced industrial society.
The ideology of pluralism is therefore free to hide
the fact that countervailing powers "cancel each other out
283
in a higher unification-
-in the common interest to defend
and extend the established position to combat the histor-
ical alternatives, to contain qualitative change. "34 Poli-
tics within advanced capitalism thereby becomes reduced to
"choosing" between masters at election time, and this is
called "democracy." The function of those elected is
primarily to redefine political problems in technical
terms, predetermined by experts, which the "masses" cannot
understand. The division of labor is thereby extended to
the political world: there are those who set the technical
rules, those who administer them and those who choose the
administrators. In this way, technological rationality
cancels politics as a separate function—political problems
become technical problems. 35
For the worker, the classical agent of change, an
entire sociocultural world is thereby established, pro-
moting adaptive behavior and uncritical thought. There are
no institutional or personal resources capable of producing
a social being able to comprehend the extent of domina-
tion. The decisive element of the worker's complete
integration, however, depends on the structure of the tech-
nological work world. Marcuse claims: "Assimilation in
needs and aspirations, in the standard of living, in lei-
sure activities, in politics derives from an integration in
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the plant itself, in the material process of production . "36
Here we have a twofold process at work. The worker is
increasingly under the power of management, through scien-
tific management and industrial psychology, speed up,
higher levels of job training, worker isolation, a faster
rate of obsolescence, declining chances for promotion due
to preference for college graduates, and "worker
participation" that fosters an eagerness "to share in the
solution of production problems." At. the same time,
management loses its character as responsible "boss" of the
enterprise; managers become "bureaucrats in a corporate
machine," themselves subservient to technique. With the
ascendancy of technological rationality and the sundering
of the "master-slave" dialectic, there appears to be no one
to hold responsible.
Moreover, as machines become decisive in determining
productivity, the worker loses his or her "professional
autonomy." The "rhythm" of the process of production
itself, Marcuse argues, further integrates the worker. The
workers "in the most successful areas of automation" have
instilled in them a "drugging rhythm"--they get in "the
swing of things" with, as Trent Schroyer describes
Marcuse 's view, a "mimetic adjustment to a technical
process." While tension and mental effort are increased,
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replacing physical drudgery, these too contribute to the
overall effect of inhibiting criticism and the complete
integration of all workers into the production process.
Standardization and routine engulf the white-collar
"unproductive" jobs of typists, bank tellers, and sales-
people, just as surely as they do those of the automated
and semiautomated production worker. And even the "new
working class," which is in a position to promote change
because of its pivotal position and knowledge of the
production process, is well rewarded and well integrated.
Contemporary American social structure, therefore,
seems able to contain change into the foreseeable future.
With the integration of the worker at the point of
production, the worker as the historical negation, "the
beast of burden" of capitalism is itself transcended.
Moreover, capitalists become subservient to managers who,
themselves, must listen carefully to the experts on
productivity in research institutions and universities.
Management itself, therefore, becomes a functional unit
subservient to technological rationality.
With the contradictory positions of capital and labor
collapsed within a technological totality, Marcuse sees the
decisive break away from monopoly capitalism to "advanced
industrial society." In its ability to contain contra-
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dictions, the social structure of advanced industrial
society ushers in a qualitatively new mode of alienation:
the worker no longer is used by an alien power against his
or her own interest. Instead the worker's interest, right
down to the instinctual level, has become harnessed to and
identified with the production process as he or she becomes
merely a functional unit within it.
As the worker's needs become ever more closely identi-
fied with those of society, alienation itself appears
simply to be an abstract idea, denied practical expression
and reserved for the little critical theory that survives.
With the total integration of the working class, advanced
industrial society circumvents the problem of alienation,
in Marcuse's eyes, leaving "no ground on which theory and
practice, thought and action meet."
Yet a fundamental contradiction remains. Within even
the most advanced capitalist societies, profit and private
appropriation remain the regulators of the economy, thereby
keeping technological rationality working for partial
interests. Advanced industrial society of the capitalist
variety, therefore, "continues to face the conflict between
the growing potential of pacifying the struggle for
existence and the need for intensifying the struggle;
between the progressive "abolition of labor" and the need
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for preserving labor as the source of profit." Although
much of the value of society is no longer created by labor
but by machines and the application of knowledge, the
liberation this change portends must be denied expression
to maintain private appropriation. Similarly, in communist
societies, "the enemy without, backwardness, and the legacy
of terror" help maintain an oppressive bureaucratic
structure geared, not to the liberating potential of
technics but to '"catching up with and surpassing 1 the
achievements of capitalism. "37
In both types of society, therefore, technological
rationality emerges in dialectic with a system of domina-
tion and becomes itself the primary form of domination.
Moreover, it becomes the method by which partial interests
are protected in each society, protected so well, in fact,
that there is no agency capable of exposing this
circumstance. In the United States, Morton Schoolman
suggests of Marcuse's view, "as technological rationality
organizes social relations around technical logic,
technical rather than class status, the ideology of
production rather than the ideology of producers,
determines all goals. Capitalists become bureaucrats, and
political domination becomes administrative rule. "38
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Technological rationality as legitimation
Before the development of capitalism, production
systems were legitimized by political authority, myth,
religion and culture. Capitalism, however, decisively
confronted traditional authoritfy of this sort with the
means-end rationality of the market through its ability to
develop an economic system of "self-sustaining economic
growth." According to Jurgen Habermas:
The rationality of language games, associated
with communicative action [in traditional author-
ity], is confronted at the threshold of the
modern period with the rationality of means-ends
relations, associated with instrumental and
strategic action. 39
The ability of capitalism to sustain growth "guaran-
tees the permanent expansion of systems of purposive-
rational action and thereby overturns the traditionalist
'superiority' of the institutional framework to the forces
of production. "^0 As a potentially liberating industrial
base develops, therefore, it also provides its own
legitimation- -the fair exchange of equivalents in the
market (reciprocity) --to protect the newly emerging private
appropriation of the capitalist mode. However, in adopting
the category of "reciprocity," Habermas continues, the
bourgeois ideology "still employs a relation of
communicative action as the basis of legitimation."
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Values, in other words, still provide the legitimating
force behind means
-end rationality.
The essential difference is that "reciprocity is now
the organizing principle of the sphere of production and
reproduction itself":
Only with the emergence of the capitalist mode of
production can the legitimation of the institu-
tional framework be linked immediately with the
system of social labor. Only then can the
property order change from a political relation
to a production relation
, because it legitimates
itself through the rationality of the market, the
ideology of exchange society, and no longer
through a legitimate power structure. ^1
The justification for the structure of power thereby
becomes reversed, with the economic system now legitimating
the political system: with the emergence of capitalism,
society's institutional framework becomes "only mediately
political and immediately economic (the bourgeois constitu-
tional state as 'superstructure')."^2 Thus, capitalism
both provides for the permeation of "subsystems of
purposive-rational action" preoccupied with economic growth
and the legitimation necessary for the political system's
adaptation to this development . ^3 xt also provides the
material basis for liberation, which will only become mani-
fest, as Marx put it, once its "mystical veil" is stripped
off by "freely associated men" consciously regulating
production "in accordance with a settled plan."^ This
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will necessarily happen, Marx believed, because the
"bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolution-
izing the instruments of production and thereby the rela-
tions of production and, with them, the whole relations of
society." The very process of capitalist development
continuously upsets political authority and legitimation
including, ultimately, its own "and man is at last com-
pelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of
life and his relations with his kind. "^5
As we have seen, Marcuse suggests that the development
of the dialectic of liberation as outlined by Marx has been
derailed by the transition of capitalism, not to socialism
but to advanced industrial society. Essential to this
process is technological rationality as a replacement for
market ideology.
Jurgen Habermas points to two changes in capitalist
political economy, discussed here earlier, that lie at the
heart of Marcuse' s analysis of technological rationality as
ideology. First, dysfunctions within liberal capitalism
produced a need for stability that was met by increased
state intervention in the economy. Secondly, the
maturation of capitalism brought with it the institution-
alization and interdependence of research and technology to
the point that they became the leading production force.
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The implications for Marxist theory are manifest, in
Habermas' view, in that these changes render inoperative
both the orthodox view of the relation between the base and
superstructure, and the theory of surplus value.
With the development of state-regulated capital, the
relations of production could no longer serve as the
primary legitimation for private appropriation. Instead,
the need to regulate the business cycle undermined the
basic ideology of just exchange, thereby making implausible
legitimation based in the "unpolitical" economic order.
Indeed, the economic base "has to be comprehended as in
itself a function of governmental activity and political
conflicts. "^6 with the state no longer simply a function
of, or legitimated by, capitalist social relations, both it
and the institutional framework at large become repoliti-
cized. Thereby arises a need need for legitimation, to
protect private appropriation and conceal the function of
the new political order.
Habermas suggests that the free exchange market is
replaced by a "substitute program" of a particularly
"negative character" designed to compensate for the
dysfunctions of the market. Utilizing the bourgeois
ideology of achievement, with the school replacing the
market as the locus of status, it guarantees a "minimum
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level of welfare," offering an increase in privatized
rewards in the form of commodities, secure employment,
stable income, and social security. This program, however,
mandates a latitude for state manipulation that can both
"secure the private form of capital utilization and bind
the masses' loyalty to this form ." The repoliticized
state, therefore, becomes oriented not toward developing,
in Habermas' idiom, "practical goals," but to solving the
"technical problems" involving capital dysfunction and the
need for growth.
However, state intervention cannot allow democratic
decision-making to question whether, in fact, the tasks
performed by government are primarily "technical." The
repoliticized institutional framework, devoid of adequate
legitimation, therefore requires a depoliticized mass to
allow the politics of state interventionism to proceed.
Depoliticization is partly assured by the changing
function of the traditional working class, due to the
increased role of science and technology in producing value
and increasing productivity. Workers at once become less
central to production and are better rewarded and thereby
integrated, along with capitalists, managers, and the "new
working class" into advanced industrial society. Workers,
therefore, no longer develop within capitalism as a
potentially autonomous class and provide no leverage with
which to criticize the real role of the polity.
Moreover, the dominance of science and technology,
along with state interventionism, enlarges the scope of
organizations geared to "purposive-rational action," as
against those that practice political or cultural values.
Issues of purpose and meaning therefore give way
increasingly to questions of techniques. Habermas argues
that while the social interests rooted in capitalism still
determine the pace and direction of technical progress,
defining the system as a whole there:
. . .
arises a perspective in which the develop-
ment of the social system seems to be determined
by the logic of scientific-technical progress.
The immanent law of this progress seems to pro-
duce objective exigencies, which must be obeyed by
any politics oriented toward functional needs . .
then propaganda can refer to the role of
technology and science in order to explain and
legitimate why in modern societies the process of
democratic decision-making about practical pro-
blems loses its function and 'must' be replaced by
plebiscitary decisions about alternate sets of
leaders of administrative personnel. ... It is
a singular achievement of this ideology to detach
society's self-understanding from the frame of
reference of communicative action and from the
concepts of symbolic interaction and replace it
with a scientific model. Accordingly the cultur-
ally defined self-understanding of a social
life-world is replaced by the self-reification of
men under categories of purposive-rational action
and adaptive behavior. ^7
For Marcuse, then, the role of science and technology
had come full cycle from that envisioned by Marx. They now
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became the basis of the new ideology that would legitimate
state intervention in the economy to protect private
appropriation. By providing a system of concepts that
excused state (and, 1 might add, corporate) behavior as
fulfilling technical needs only, science and technology
helped make plausible the depoliticization borne by the
inhabitants of advanced industrial society:
At the stage of their scientific-technical
development, then, the forces of production
appear to enter a new constellation with the
relations of production. Now they no longer
function as the basis of a critique of prevailing
legitimations in the interest of political
enlightenment, but become instead the basis of
legitimation. This is what Marcuse conceives of
as world-historically new.4-8
There is, however, a qualitative difference between
technological rationality and previous ideologies. Bour-
geois ideology engendered support by appealing to normative
principles based on an illusory fairness of market rela-
tions. This obscured the reality, in Marx's view, that two
classes stood in opposition to each other. The pervasive
changes brought about by the technological domination of
society, however, also alter both the ideology and the
reality
.
Habermas suggests that with the development of
technocratic consciousness, the "reified models of the
sciences migrate into the sociocultural life-world and gain
objective power over self-understanding . "^9 Technocratic
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consciousness does not engender loyalty by appealing to
normative principles but rather by providing an explanation
of how society may best function to ensure privatized
rewards. Its acceptance, therefore, depends on advanced
industrial society's ability to provide rewards, inculcate
adaptive behavior, and cast a social world in which the
appeal to normative principles is suppressed. In this
context, the forces of production cannot provide a critical
standard for the relations of a production, as the latter
now appear to be the technically necessary organization of
society. Indeed, the very idea of rationality becomes
debased to the idea of system "adjustments . "50
Acceptance of technological rationality, however, is
accomplished not only by creating an ideology of technique
but also by increasingly creating in Morton Schoolman's
interpretation of Marcuse, one "monolithic technical class"
out of the opposing classes that Marx described. This
development provides structural underpinning for suppress-
ing questions of fairness, and supports a technological
model of self-understanding by transforming questions of
class domination into questions of administration. Techno-
logical rationality, therefore, does not have the appear-
ance of ideology.
In Habermas ' view, this development can ironically be
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called post-historie because the productive forces now
legitimate existing society, rather than spearheading the
critique by which people could see the possibility of the
"practical mastery of previously ungoverned processes of
social development ."51 They do so, essentially, by
suspending the ethical dimension of life. It is, however,
post-historie also in a related sense described by Morton
Schoolman: with the development of advanced industrial
society, Marcuse would argue, all individual behavior
becomes increasingly adaptive, and human subjectivity
itself recedes.
With the related suppression of subjectivity and
ethics, technological consciousness shows itself not to be
an alternate system of belief so much as a state of mind.
In the end, one follows technical roles not because one
believes in them but because there is no ethical or poli-
tical standard or cognitive ability to question them. As
subjectivity and normative judgment recede as categories of
human life, individuals become mere functional units
following technical rules in a society geared simply to
ever-greater productivity. Technological rationality is,
then, less a legitimation in the old sense, than a descrip-
tion of and reference point for behavior in technological
society.
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Yet technological consciousness remains ideological in
two important senses. It obscures the fact that even if
advanced industrial society creates one "technical class,"
it still operates in the interest of an elite. According
to Schoolman, in Marcuse's analysis, "the interests of the
ruling class are newly embodied in technics precisely at
that moment when that class's rule is abolished by
technics. "52 At the most fundamental level, however,
Habermas writes:
with the veiling of practical problems it [tech-
nological consciousness] not only justifies a
particular class's interest in domination and
represses another
-
class's partial need for
emancipation^ but affects the human race's
emancipatory interest as such. 53
Technological rationality as domination
Marcuse's argument, however, goes one problematic step
beyond that of Habermas. The ideological aspects of
science and technology are rooted in the contemporary
nature of science and technology themselves and not just in
the way their categories are misapplied to obfuscate deeper
questions of value. Technological rationality is not just
a value-neutral mode of organizing work that has been illi-
citly applied to the organization of people. Instead, for
Marcuse, it is a system of values whose content and ends
are marked by systematic domination over people and
298
nature. By creating a social world in which technical
reason is the only available form of reason, the ends of
technology, such as efficiency, productivity and technolo-
gically determinined growth, become the unquestioned goals
of people adapted to this society.
Marcuse arrives at his position from several direc-
tions. In studying Nazism, Marcuse became convinced of the
potential for domination of technology through willful
political manipulation. 54 He ax so discovers, however, that
technics can itself become a process of social organiza-
tion. Technology, then, can be used for political ends,
and it also contains ends of its own. While in Nazism the
former predominated, in societies where technological
rationality is relatively unfettered, as in the United
States, it can become the mode of domination . 55
Marcuse criticizes Max Weber for confusing the
rationality, or formal reason, developed under capitalism
with reason as such. The impact of this error is to allow
political domination to masquerade as rationality and
thereby to remove the possibility of a liberated rational-
ity based on a liberated technology and science from
pointing the way to a truly rational reconstruction of
society. 56 Because the "formal rationality" Weber
discussed, in fact, developed under capitalism, it reflects
much more than neutral technique. Marcuse writes in his
essay, "Industrialism and Capitalism in the Work of Max
Weber":
.
. .
the very concept of technical reason is
perhaps ideological. Not only the application of
technology but technology itself is domination
(of nature and men)
--methodical
,
scientific,
calculated, calculating control. Specific
purposes and interests of domination are not
foisted upon technology "subsequently" and from
the outside; they enter the very construction of
the technical apparatus
. Technology is always a
historical-social project : in it is projected
what a society and its ruling interests intend to
do with men and things. Such a "purpose" of
domination is "substantive" and to this extent
belongs to the very form of technical reason. 57
Marcuse is, then, not just arguing technological
rationality is ideological because it protects decisions
about the actual application of technology from public
scrutiny, although it does do that. His argument at its
most fundamental level is that technology and science, as
we now know them, are themselves modes of political
domination
.
Marcuse traces these flaws back to the Enlightenment
attitude toward nature as an object for human control that
required a calculus of predictable relationships among
identifiable entities. Nonquantifiable qualities, on the
other hand, would "stand in the way of an organization of
men and things in accordance with the measurable power to
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be extracted from them." Instead of a dialectical concep-
tion of the relation between persons and nature, reason was
viewed as a property of the subjective consciousness and
nature as a separate "subject" (with laws) and object (to
be controlled). In this way, reason itself became viewed
as the pursuit of knowledge for instrumental control over
nature . 58
The way in which nature and persons dialectically
transform one another is, however, lost with this mode of
apprehension. The Enlightenment concept of reason, there-
fore, laid the groundwork for viewing the modern organiza-
tion of material existence as itself independent of the
particular way in which human subjects constitute them-
selves at this historical phase. Reification of nature,
then, became ipso facto self-reification of persons. For
in thinking of material existence as an abstract object for
instrumental control, scientization closes off reflection
on both the way in which people transform nature and the
way in which nature (as transformed people) transforms them
as well. If nature is viewed abstractly as an object, the
other side of the dialectic--self-constituting subjects--
will lose consciousness of the human subjectivity inherent
in their organization of nature. In discovering the "laws"
with which to assert instrumental control over nature,
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therefore, persons become subservient to the mode of appre-
hending and technical structure of the nature they have
created. The idea of reason as control over nature turns
full cycle and becomes reason as control over persons.
Even pure science is not free of Marcuse's indict-
ment. Adopting the functional form "How
. . .
?" over the
metaphysical "What
. . . ?", science distorts reason as
conceived in classical philosophy by focusing on control
over substances to the exclusion of questions of the pur-
pose of substances. Science is, therefore, constitution-
ally incapable of pointing toward transcendence, indiffer-
ent to questions of quality, focused on discovering the
"laws" of a universe it thereby helps objectify and control:
In this reality, matter as well as science is
"neutral," objectivity has neither a telos in
itself nor is it structured toward a telos. But
it is precisely its neutral character which
relates objectivity to a specific historical
subj ect--namely , to the consciousness that
prevails in the society by which and for which
this neutrality is established . 59
Marcuse concludes, therefore, that the neutrality of
science is of a "positive character." Because modern
science developed in dialectic with the rationality of
capitalism, it denudes nature of inherent ends in the same
way that the market creates relations of abstract labor
power between persons, replacing traditional authority.
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Marcuse agrees with Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer when
they suggest, "by virtue of the rationalization of the
modes of labor, the elimination of qualities is transferred
from the universe of science to that of existence . "60
"Operationalism," "verification," "formalization," "func-
tionalization," all of these, are aspects of a science
which is tied to the single purpose of controlling nature.
Science, as presently constituted, may vary considerably as
to the practical ends it may be put to, then, but not with
respect to its attitude and relation to nature and people:
The principles of modern science were a priori
structured in such a way that they could serve as
conceptual instruments for a universe of self-
propelling, productive control; theorectical
operationalism came to correspond to practical
operationalism. The scientific method which led
to the ever-more-effective domination of nature
thus came to provide the pure concepts for the
ever-more-effective domination of man by man
through the domination of nature. . . .
The point which I am trying to make is that
science, by virture of its own method and
concepts, has projected and promoted a universe
in which the domination of nature has remained
linked to the domination of man. 61
In fact, Marcuse suggests the possibility of a new
science that would provide a liberating rather than a
repressive mastery of nature. 62 if the "fatal link"
between the domination of man and nature could be broken
through a fundamental change in the "nature of progress,"
the very structure of science would be altered:
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Its hypotheses, without losing their rational
character, would develop in an essentially
different experimental context (that of a
pacified world); consequently, science would
arrive at essentially different concepts of
nature and establish essentially differents
facts. °^
Science would then develop a transcendental framework,
replacing itself as a functional system of instrumental
action. Liberated science would work to preserve, foster
and release the potential of nature, rather than strive to
control it technically . 64
In the above description, I have avoided the ambigui-
ties (and confusions) in Marcuse's position in favor of his
strongest thesis: technology and science have become,
themselves, modes of domination. At times, Marcuse writes
as if he means technology and science are apolitical and
become political only because of the uses they are put to.
He also sometimes suggests, in "orthodox" fashion, that
modern technology as it is can, after all, point the way to
liberation. He would certainly be hard pressed to deny
that it is, of course, present science and technology which
suggest to him the emancipatory potential of a liberated
science and the way to a liberated society. 65
We have been looking at his stronger thesis, however,
not because it is the most sensible, for it is not, but
because it is most central to the idea of "one-dimensional
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society." If persons are to be deprived of the faculty of
critical thought, the core of the one dimensionality
thesis, they must have a mode that is, in principle, acri-
tical of apprehending the world. If technological ration-
ality remained only a means to attaining political ends
brought in from the outside, however, there would also have
to remain a language open to critical reflection and not
restricted to the goal of functional control. For a strict
thesis of one dimensionality to be coherent, technological
rationality cannot be dependent on any ends other than
those it establishes itself .
What is needed is that the essential characteristics
of universal technical processes come to prevail, limiting
mental powers to the rationality they circumscribe. For
example, the technical goals of regimentation of produc-
tion, specialization of work, and standardization of the
material and human aspects of work, are geared to increased
precision, calculability and efficiency of production.
These ends of technological rationality require not a
subject who acts with discretion or takes initiative but
one who reacts in predictable, "objectively quantifiable"
ways that can be charted for future planning. In this way,
the goal of technical mastery of nature becomes technical
control over people, and technological rationality becomes
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the mode of contemporary domination:
It is my purpose to demonstrate the internalinstrumentalist character of this sc ientific
rationality by virtue of which it is a priori
technology, and the a priori of a specific
—
technology--namely technology as a form of social
control and domination . °°
In the end, domination is complete when people become
mere objects in the technological ensemble. A fully one-
dimensional society, therefore, requires the complete
eclipse of subjectivity, which, in turn, mandates
domination based on a ubiquitous rationality of technique,
in principle immune to reflection. Technology itself,
then, is for Marcuse "the great vehicle of reification -
-
reification in its most mature and effective form." "The
web of domination has become," he argues, "the web of
Reason itself and this society is fatally entangled in it.
And the transcending modes of thought seem to transcend
Reason itself. "67
The reification of thought: one-dimensional language
As we have seen, Marcuse views technological rational-
ity as the dominant mode of perception of advanced indus-
trial society. 68 This mode is the form of the official
language of government and business, of the social sciences
and philosophy, and, as such, is the cornerstone of produc-
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tion and consumption, work and leisure. The very ability
of American society not only to "deliver the goods," but to
continuously grow and increase productivity enables it both
to project and to validate its own definition of reality:
the administered standard of living of the welfare state
results in a decline of oppositon as "an objective societal
process in so far as the production and distribution of an
increasing quantity of goods and services make compliance a
rational technological
. attitude . "69
The pressure toward ever-greater productivity and the
ability to grow thereby produce ever-greater rationali-
zation of production and consumption and the need and
ability to increasingly rationalize society as a whole. 70
Marcuse argues that, due to the power of the production
system, a language geared to the adaptation of individuals
to the technical "project" is being promoted through the
media, government, academia and the organization of the
production system itself. 71 He calls this "one-dimensional
language" and suggests that it is an inherently apolitical
reified language, incapable of conceptualizing criticism of
the established order. 72 in particular, it is powerless to
unmask and, in fact, supports a technical world of
domination, in which subjects and objects alike are viewed
as instrumentalities. Instead, one-dimensional language
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works to subvert the twin threat to the system: communism
as a historical alternative (or liberalism in Stalinist
countries), and the technological capacity to overcome the
need for alienated labor and administered society. As
such, Marcuse views it as a language with which advanced
industrial society suppresses history and subverts the
possibility of freedom:
As long as this constellation prevails, it
reduces the use-value of freedom; there is no
reason to insist on self-determination if the
administered life is the comfortable and even the
"good" life. This is the rational and material
ground for the unification of opposites, for
one-dimensional political behavior. On this
ground, the transcending political forces within
society are arrested, and qualitative change
appears possible only as a change from without. 73
The one-dimensional language of contemporary American
society
Language is the medium by which persons comprehend
their life situation. For language to serve adequately as
a liberating mediation of experience, however, it must be
capable of doing more than providing simple conceptual
reinforcement of the immediate life of the person. It
must, for example, have the potential to interpret that
life in terms of its historical context. If language is to
be a true mediation of experience, it must, in Marcuse'
s
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terms, be able to maintain the potential for a critical
distance between the language used by the subject and the
dominant definition of the object the subject is thinking
about
.
Marcuse argues that the "official" language of
contemporary society is one-dimensional precisely because
it does not mediate the person's experience; rather it
produces an immediate identification with established
society. Although Marcuse does not discuss other forms of
language in history that may have been completely uncrit-
ical of their society, he does pinpoint the egregious fault
in one-dimensional language: the operational nature of its
concepts render them, in principle, incapable of aiding
transcendence beyond the established order. One-dimen-
sional language is in style and form a functional language
on the model of technological rationality. As such, it is
a pseudo- therapeutic language that abets the adjustment of
individuals to a repressive social order.
One-dimensional language "hammers away" at people
through the media, government, education and business until
they acquiesce in (if not always accept) functional defini-
tions of reality. The power of dominant institutions to
communicate their message, thereby, literally overwhelms
criticism.
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In contrast to two-dimensional dialectical modes of
thought, Marcuse describes a universe of technological
behavior of social "habits of thought." Here, he claims,
we find the disappearance of "the tension between appear-
ance and reality, fact and factor, substance and attri-
bute"; 74 the immediate identification of essence and
existence and between the thing and its function. As such,
the "language of total administration" finds within itself
the same kind of identifications which are essential to the
theory of operationalism. Discovery, demonstration and
critique are replaced by designation, assertion, and
imitation, thereby undermining autonomy. Language becomes
magical and ritualized as images replace concepts. Unable
to conceptualize repression or point the way to freedom,
language becomes authoritarian.
Operationalism, in science, Marcuse argues, refers to
identifying a particular set of operations by which we
determine the property of a concept: according to P. W.
Bridgeman, " the concept is synonomous with the corre -
sponding set of operations
.
"75 jn Marcuse' s view, this
type of "reasoning shapes the expression of a specific
social and political behaviorism. "76 The form of the
language of "politicized and standardized usage," and the
power of the dominant institutions to propagate this
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language, together are able to project a discourse in which
the defining characteristics of concepts and persons become
identified with their functions in the system. In this
process, the power of dominant institutions emanates not
just from the propaganda machine but also from the ability
to show that predominant concepts work--that is, they meet
the requirements of their "abridged definitions":
the^ functionalization of language expresses an
abridgment of meaning which has a political
connotation. The names of things are not only
"indicative of their manner of functioning," but
their (actual) manner of functioning also defines
and "closes" the meaning of the thing, excluding
other manners of functioning . 77
If the form of one-dimensional language is function-
alism, the political and commercial style, while varied,
mirrors that form in suggesting definitions that also close
off criticism. Predominant is the tendency to force
together unlike terms, thereby unifying what were previ-
ously antagonistic historical categories. Contradictions
that once would have been considered an insult to logic are
now taken as "a principle of the logic of manipulation," in
a "realistic caricature of dialectics." The "beneficial
destructiveness" of one-dimensional society allows for a
"total commercialization" in which there is a "smooth
linguistic conjunction of conflicting parts of speech."
For example, we hear (or heard when he wrote) of "luxury
311
fall-out shelters," "clean bombs," "harmless fall-out"
--constructions which, using the "syntax of abridgment,"
reconcile the meaning of opposite terms "by welding them
together in a firm and familiar structure . "78 As a result,
opposition forces are denied a language with which to
develop criticism.
Perhaps the best example he gives of this tendency is
the following. Although peace and war are opposite con-
cepts, the current tendency is to propagandize that we work
for peace by preparing for war. However, when peace no
longer is a conceptual negation of war, criticism of war
loses the frame of reference of the oppositional concept,
peace. Thus, the thesis: we prepare for war; and the
antithesis: we work for peace, are synthesized as: prepar-
ing for war is working for peace. This synthesis, however,
redefines oppositional concepts by forcing a false unifi-
cation. Shorn of concepts that could provide critique,
oppositional ideas:
are immediately evaluated ... in terms of the
public language--a language which determines "a
priori" the direction in which the thought process
moves. Thus the process of reflection ends where
it started: in the given conditions and rela-
tions. Self-validating the argument of the
discussion repels the contradiction because the
antithesis is redefined in terms of the thesis. 79
Sometimes the contradiction is not explicit in the
sentence but is concealed directly within the noun. We
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have, for example, "socialist" governments which work for
capitalism, despotic governments which are called demo-
cratic, rigged elections which are called free.
At other times, distinctions are concealed by forcing
together different spheres or qualities. There is a
tendency to fuse a person and his or her function in an
"authoritarian identification." For example, Israel's
Begin, New York's Koch, England's Thatcher would create the
impression that individuals are mere appendages or proper-
ties of their job. Alternately jobs can be humanized by
constructions such as "Georgia's high-handed, low-browed
governor," creating "personalized and hypnotic" images--the
stuff of a human interest story. In fusing the governor
with his function, features and politics, "one indivisable
and immutable structure" is created, "which in its natural
innocence and immediacy, overwhelms the reader's mind . "80
Similarly, speaking of Edward Teller as the "father of
the H-bomb," joins together the spheres of family procrea-
tion and military destruction. Or a "scientific-military
dinner" unites "the efforts to reduce anxiety and suffering
[science] with the job of creating anxiety and suffering
[the military]." The effect is to project magical and
hypnotic images that unite formerly distinct and often
contradictory concepts or spheres of life and force them
together "into a solid, overpowering whole":
The^ imposing structure unites the actors and
actions of violence, power, protection and
propaganda in one lightning flash. We see the
name of the thing in operation and only in
operation--it cannot be otherwise
.
8 1
To the degree acquiesced to, these fixed images
project a closed definition of the thing or person in terms
of their current function. Furthermore, the ability to
produce enticing, "realistic," action-oriented images
enhances the attractiveness of the images and their
acceptance. The result is an ascendent political and
commercial style of "overwhelming concreteness . "82 The
idea of a thing-in-itself gives way to the thing-as-its-
function: lost is the capacity of the concept to mediate
the difference between the real nature of the thing and its
current definition. Instead, the image fosters immediate
identification with the operational definition of the thing
and thereby with the established order.
The "image-mongering" reflected in the ascendent
political and commercial style also reflects itself in the
syntax of the sentences used. Marcuse contrasts a "classi-
cal" philosophy of grammar with prevalent tendencies of
speech. In the former, a subject "is first a 'substance'"
and its predication in the sentence does not change this
fact. A subject remains different from its predicates
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whether actively or passively related to them and, if not a
proper noun, it is more than a noun: "it names the concept
of a thing, a universal which the sentence defines as in a
particular state or function." The "grammatical subject,"
then, always "carries a meaning in excess of that expressed
in the sentence. "83 It is the conceptual distance between
the subject and its predicates that allows them to mediate
one another within the sentence.
The style of dominant usage, however, is always to
couple the noun with the same adjectives, continuously
repeating this formula and thereby hypnotically creating a
fixed meaning in the person's mind. Words become cliches
circumscribed by the publicized and standardized language.
Immediately identified with its predicates:
The noun governs the sentence in an authoritarian
and totalitarian fashion, and the sentence
becomes a declaration to be accepted— it repels
demonstration, qualification, negation of its
codified and declared meaning. 84
In this form, prepositions become evocative and predication
becomes prescription. And through repetition, a "false
familiarity" develops that promotes the self-identification
of individuals with their given functions. The subject as
concept, thereby, gives way to the noun as obj ect- image
,
where the latter is established through a closed set of
dynamic-sounding, endlessly repeated predicates.
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As the examples we have seen show, Marcuse describes a
variety of concepts, whose closed definition short-circuits
their potential for critical mediation. Behind all these
examples, however, is a common theme: a functionalized
language freezes concepts in the present, thereby rooting
out their potential as a historical agency.
Perhaps Marcuse' s central argument can be made clearer
if we look a a fundamental political concept such as
freedom. Early in One Dimensional Man
, he concludes that
the concept "freedom" has, through "mass information," been
transformed through "monopolistic" repitition into a
hypnotic dictation--a self-validating hypothesis. If
"'free' are the institutions which operate (and are
operated on) in the countries of the Free World; other
transcending modes of freedom are by definition either
anarchism, communism, or propaganda, "85 then "freedom" as a
concept cannot be employed to discover whether or not the
Free World is, in fact, free. The problem is that we have
a concept based on a previous historical situation, freedom
as an aspect of the development of capitalism, ritualized
through a functional redefinition, ^6 claiming that today
capitalist societies are the only free societies. If all
important concepts have a universal as well as particular
aspect, the present "official" definition of freedom
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sunders the universal (to transcend domination in any
historical period), in favor of the particular historical
manifestaton. And, in Marcuse's view, even this particular
aspect, it appears, is borrowed from the past and misap-
plied in the present. Thus, the partial truth of capital-
ism as an aspect of freedom from traditional authority
becomes the total lie of a "free world." In taking this
partial truth and operationalizing it (redefining it in
terms of the working of capitalism as an international
system), the universal aspect of freedom, its capacity to
aid transcendence, appears to be an irrational desire for
Utopia. Freedom as transcendence becomes, in politics and
even in political and philosophical inquiry, a nice though
irrational ideal or a mere value judgment separate from the
"real world." The "official language," therefore, becomes
a mode of control—what is "given" is true and rational;
what opposes the given is false or irrational.
In contrast to funct ionalized language, Marcuse looks
to dialectical thought, for example, as embodied in The
Communist Manifesto . Here we find, in contrast to "hypno-
tic nouns" with "frozen predicates," an open language that
unfolds with each of the two key terms, the "bourgeoisie"
and the "proletariat" "given contrary predicates":
The "bourgeoisie" is the subject of technical
progress, liberation, conquest of nature, crea-
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tion of social wealth, and of the perversion anddestruction of these achievements
. Similarly theproletariat" carries the attribute of total
oppression and of the total defeat of oppression
.
. .
the subject [here is] an historical agent
whose identity constitutes itself in and against
its historical practice, in and against its
—
social reality. The discourse develops and
states the conflict between the thing and its
function, and this conflict finds linguistic
expression in sentences which join contradictory
predicates in a logical unit—conceptual
counterparts of the objective reality. In
contrast to all Orwellian language, the
contradiction is demonstrated, made explicit,
explained and denounced. 87
If we contrast this example with that of the
functional redefinition of freedom, we find the core of
Marcuse's thesis. Operational language is constituted by
redefining concepts so that they become totally functional
for the established society. Freedom, as defined above, is
a falsification of the concept "freedom" because it sunders
its universal element and thereby removes its critical
dimension. For Marcuse, the redefinition is testimony to
the "omnipresent power of the given facts," as formerly
critical concepts become themselves "facts" of the given
reality. As such, they do not search for truth but rather
establish it and pass judgment in a "prejudged form." One
is free, then, if one fits into the operational definition
as established in harmony with the given social order.
There is no judgment possible of whether the social order
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is free; the only judgment possible is of ideas, opinions,
or facts that contradict it. These are immediately evalu-
ated because freedom as a concept capable of mediating the
given reality, of being able to explain, describe and pass
judgment on it, instead simply mirrors it.
What is lost is memory and history. Operational con-
cepts "forget" the past, the conflicts, hopes and aspira-
tions that led to the present because they exorcise the
universal from the particular. Freedom as quest becomes
freedom as daily existence. Marcuse follows Adorno in
arguing that the suppression of memory is itself linked
with the bourgeois principle of progress and rationality,
where the present is seen as rational (and to be further
rationalized) and "Memory, Time, Recollection" and
tradition as "irrational leftovers"^ Q f the past.
Dialectical concepts, on the other hand, are at once a
way to recall what was, to see what is, and to look into
what will be. In contrast to operational concepts, they
are historical because they examine both dimensions of
reality: the given and the actual, is and ought,
appearance and essence. Both dimensions are necessary to
sustain the tension needed for critical abstract thought:
The two dimensions are antagonistic to each
other; the reality partakes of both of them, and
the dialectical concepts develop the real contra-
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dictions. In its own development, dialecticalthought came to comprehend the historical charac-ter of the contradictions and the process oftheir mediation as historical process.
. . The
suppression of this dimension in the societal
universe of operational rationality is a suppres-
sion of history and this is not an academic but
a political affair. It is a suppression of the
society s own past- -and of its future, in as much
as this future involves the qualitative change
the negation of the present. 89
In Marcuse's view, concepts like "proletariat" are
historical precisely because they describe and explain what
is, in such a way as to also show what was and what may
be. "Proletariat" as used by Marx is not a noun-image
(although it is in Stalinist propaganda) that excludes
critical thought through a closed definition because it
reveals a subject that is always in the process of becom-
ing. It is in this sense that dialectical subjects consti-
tute themselves "in and against" their historical practice
and social reality. The proletariat is, therefore, both a
product of capitalism and the potential for socialism. It
both mirrors the positive reality and portends its
negation. However, "freedom," operationally defined, is
not capable of accurately portraying either what is or what
can be. In remaining only positive, it is partial and
therefore untrue, although the apparent rationality of
operationalism, and the power of political and commercial
propaganda do, indeed, make falsehood appear true:
320
The unified, functional language is an irreconci-lably anti-critical and anti-dialectical
language. In it operational and behavioral
rationality absorb the transcendent, negative
oppositional elements of Reason. 90
This is the core of Marcuse's thesis on language. Yet
there is an apparent ambivalence that Marcuse exhibits,
concerning to what degree this language can or does
circumscribe the understanding of ordinary people of the
world they live in.
Even in One Dimensional Man
, Marcuse maintains that
there is opposition to one-dimensional language and society:
. . .
the popular language strikes with spiteful
and^ defiant humor at the official and semi-
officical discourse. Slang and colloquial speech
have rarely been so creative. It is as if the
common man
. . . would in his speech assert his
humanity at the powers that be, as if the
rejection and revolt, subdued in the political
sphere, would burst out in the vocabulary that
call things by their names: "headshrinker" and
"egghead, ,r "boob tube," "think tank " "beat it,"
and "dig it," and "gone, man, gone. "91
And again, later in his more optimistic Essay on
Liberation
,
he suggests that there is a "methodical
reversal of meaning" of the ordinary discourse of function-
alized language, "in the most militant areas of protest."
Hippies, for example, take harmless words out of their
context and use them for tabooed objects or acts: "trip,"
"grass," "pot," "acid," constitute such usages. Black
militants are even more successful, creating an actual
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reversal of meaning. The soul, for example, "lily-white
ever since Plato," is taken over as the key phrase of Black
pride. Moveover, it is now black that is beautiful. 92
Even within the traditional confines of ordinary
usage, Marcuse seems to indicate that there exists a
critical dimension. In his severe and exaggerated attack
on ordinary language philosophy, which I shall not pursue
here, he praises Karl Krauss, who maintained that analysis
of ordinary language could reveal the social and political
context in which the language developed and is used. These
deeper meanings which, "with various degrees of awareness
and explicitness, [enter] into the individual communica-
tion," overlap with one-dimensional language, and could be
surfaced, thereby penetrating the distortion of ordinary
usage. Thus, in both the various examples of countercul-
tural usage and the depth layer beneath ideological
meaning, Marcuse seems to indicate that ordinary language
is not completely closed to immanent critique by its
users. Nevertheless, Marcuse still concludes that the
consciousness of the average person remains imprisoned
within the "straightjacket of common usage," and revealing
the truth of such distortion "is not the job of ordinary
thought in ordinary speech." It is apparently only the
theorist (i.e., the critical theorist) and perhaps those
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imbu ed with the "new sensibility," who have some vantage
point in the critique of ideology. The average person is
ultimately incapable^ of that.
Marcuse's Freud: one-dimensional character structure and
the eclipse of subjectivity
We have seen from the above discussion how social
structure, science and technology and language in Marcuse's
view, circumscribe a repressive world of "one dimension-
ality." While one might conclude that a complete thesis
could be based on these elements alone, for Marcuse the
picture also includes a pessimistic psychological profile,
based on his adaptation of Freud for the study of repres-
sion in technological society.
Marcuse turns to Freud, in part, to explain why revo-
lutions have failed to occur or why they have themselves
reproduced domination. He recounts the Freudian myth of
the primal horde, in which repression is restored through
guilt of having overthrown the father, reproduced in bio-
graphy (ontogenesis) and the development of the species
(phylogenesis) . In his view, the Marxian concept of false
consciousness must be expanded to include psychic repres-
sion of this sort. He writes in Eros and Civilization :
ever since the first, prehistoric
restoration of domination following the first
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rebellion, repression from without has been
supported by repression from within: the unfreeindividual introjects his masters and their
commands into his own mental apparatus. The
struggle against freedom reproduces itself in thepsyche of man, as the self
-repression of the
repressed individual, and his self
-repression inturn sustains his masters and theirinstitutions. It is this mental dynamic which
Freud uncovers as the dynamic of civilization . 93
Marcuse turns to Freud for another reason as well, to
enable him to maintain the hope that domination may yet be
overcome. In much of Marcuse 's writing, from Eros and
Civilization (1955) to An Essay on Liberation (1969), there
recurs the theme that it is Eros
,
the "life instinct," that
could potentially guide the critique of domination. This
becomes particularly important since Marcuse fears, as we
have seen, that the productive forces have become a mode of
domination, and the working class decidedly
non-revolutionary. Eros
,
then, becomes a "material basis,"
as John Fry puts it, to ground the possibility of
liberation in an otherwise reified society. It allows
Marcuse to shift critical theory from now hopelessly
distorted consciousness to the subterranean yearning of the
life instincts. 94 Ultimately it is Eros
,
borrowed and
adapted from Freud's later metapsychology , that saves
Marcuse from complete despair, even in One Dimensional Man .
Marcuse 's adaptation of Freud has two components. The
first is his attempt to bring out the "historical
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substance" of Freud's categories by, as he says, "unfolding
their own content. "95 The second is his analysis of the
contemporary "obsolescence" of Freud's concept of man, due
to the advance of technological society.
For Marcuse, certain Freudian terms "do not adequately
differentiate between the biological and the social-
historical vicissitudes of the instincts." He, therefore,
introduces two terms to augment the fundamental psychoana-
lytic concepts of "repression" and the "reality principle."
If basic repression is characterized by those modifi-
cations of the instincts "necessary for the perpetuation"
of the human race in civilization, then we must distinguish
from it "surplus repression" as that repression necessary
only for social domination per se . Behind Freud's "reality
principle," Marcuse claims, lies the fact of scarcity,
which requires the repression of the pleasure principle in
order for labor to proceed. The reality principle does not
acknowledge, however, that repression may continue even
after a society has the potential to overcome scarcity, due
to the specific distribution arrangements and mode of work
society imposes on its members. The "performance princi-
ple," Marcuse argues, is now the "prevailing historical
form of the reality principle" obscuring the present
capacity to overcome want. Because the struggle against
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scarcity was "bound up with and shaped by the interest of
domination," scarcity continues to be created, artificially
under the performance principle in the interests of elite
domination, requiring and sustaining repression that is now
historically in excess of what is necessary:
the specific historical institution of the
reality principle and the specific interests ofdomination introduce additional controls over and
above those indispensable for civilized human
association. These additional controls arising
from the specific institutions of domination are
what we denote as surplus
-repress ion . 96
The obsolescence of Freud's "man":
Marcuse's despair--and hope
One Dimensional Man may be understood as an analysis
of the practical collapse of the distinction between the
individual and society due to the pervasive domination of
technical rationalization. This eclipse of subjectivity in
the face of the "objective" onslaught of technique, renders
obsolete the type of person described by Freud.
I have discussed earlier some specific ways in which
the "man" described by Freud has become obsolete, according
to Marcuse, particularly with the decline of the family and
the father's role and the consequent shrinkage of the ego.
This "regression of ego" is nothing less than the disap-
pearance of the individual capacity to think and reason
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privately and in opposition to society. The genius of
advanced industrial society is its ability to "resolve" the
conflict between individual and society by making society's
needs the individual's own.
Marcuse, then, begins with Freud's person, in whom
there exists "a constant struggle between the three basic
forces of Eros
,
the death instinct [Thanatos]
, and the
outside world." Three principles guide this struggle: the
seeking of pleasure, the desire to return to the painless
world before birth (Nirvana ) and the reality principle,
modifying the instincts to conform with the outside
world. 97 in the struggle for life, productivity must be
assured to overcome scarcity; therefore, the individual
must be desexualized in order to "live in a context of
unpleasurable work." Eros
,
then, must be transformed from
polymorphous-perverse sexuality to genital sexuality, whose
aim is reproduction and which forms the basis of the
monogamous family. Here the father enters to repress the
child's desire to return to the mother and the painless
state before birth. In dominating the Oedipal conflict,
the father reduces the scope of sexuality and accomplishes
the introjection of morality through the creation of a
superego that can tame the instinctual forces of the id.
Without the repression of the instincts, Freud
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asserts, life would be impossible because the instincts are
conservative in nature, seeking pleasure, calm, gratifi-
cation. They are, therefore, profoundly unproductive,
incapable, as Marcuse puts it, of the "alienated produc-
tivity that is the motor of cultural progress. "98 The
aggression created by the suppression of the instincts
becomes externally the force for alienated productivity and
internally that of social morality. In the mature indivi-
dual, it is the job of the ego to mediate betweem the id,
superego, and the outside world. It is just this function
that allows the individual that amount of "discontented"
freedom possible in civilization. However, according to
Marcuse, because Freud maintains that this freedom has as
"its inner logic" suppression and sacrifice of happiness,
he also holds out, however remotely, the possiblity of
freedom in harmony with pleasure:
Thus Freud reveals the actual negativity of
freedom and in refusing to transfigure it ideal-
istically he preserves the idea of another
possible freedom in which the repression of the
instincts would be abolished along with political
oppression, while the achievements of repression
would be preserved. 99
If civilization has produced discontent in the
struggle to overcome scarcity, overcoming scarcity could
become the basis for transcending a civilization with
discontent as its hallmark. Was not the first suppression
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of the instincts, Marcuse reasons, due to "neither nature
nor poverty nor weakness ... but rather the despotism of
domination" introduced by the primal father? And are not
the instincts themselves, as Freud argues, fundamentally
conservative, seeking balance and gratification rather than
"striving for what is endlessly higher and unattained"?100
If domination is not an instinctual necessity and if seek-
ing gratification need not require endless productivity,
then a pacified world, free of domination, in which work
becomes play, 101 can be envisioned. This is the "decisive
correction of Freudian theory" Marcuse introduces:
The achievements of repressive progress herald the
abolition of the repressive principle of progress
itself. It becomes possible to envision a state
in which there is no productivity resulting from
and conditioning renunciation and no alienated
labor: a state in which the growing mechanization
of labor enables an even larger part of the
instinctual energy that had to be withdrawn from
alienated labor to return to its original form, in
other words, to be changed back into energy of the
life instinct
. . . alienated labor time would not
only be reduced to a minimum but would disappear
and life would consist of free time. 102
The very ability to understand this historic oppor-
tunity has been undercut, however, by the development of
one-dimensional character structure as a product of
progress as well. It is precisely the conscious ego,
capable in principle of such reflection, whose capacity for
mediating experience has been sharply curtailed by the
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strengthening of the institutions of technical reason over
the family and the father. Instead of a critical faculty,
the ego has been reified, reduced to "automatic reac-
tion"^ to stimuli from the outside world. The instincts
themselves, as we have seen, become directly linked to the
one-dimensional world either as libidinal attachments to
desublimated objects (e.g., the auto as an object of libi-
dinal cathexis), or productivity as a direct outlet for
aggression, or the enemy as a personified object of aggres-
sion. Consumption, productivity and the enemy, then, all
become instinctual needs of the one-dimensional person. As
productivity increases and, with it, the promise of freedom
from alienated labor, surplus repression must intensify to
guarantee future productivity, thereby intensifying
aggression and the need for the enemy as an outlet. This
psychological constellation, therefore, roots in the
biological structure, as John Fry describes Marcuse's work,
"the fundamental disposition to support the economically
essential and self-beneficial arms economy." The enemy
syndrome, thereby, fosters interclass harmony (and inter-
imperialist harmony as well) : "Both political apathy and
economic prosperity are further ensured in a single
stroke. "104
Technical reason is imposed from the outside on the
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immature ego as the now collectivized ego-ideal-the model
for conduct. It replaces the shattered ego and the weak
superego. As Schoolman concludes, in Marcuse's argument:
"the essential elements of subjectivity, the psychic
apparatus itself, are eroded by the technical appara-
tus. "105 The individual then, becomes reduced to part of a
mass, in which mediation between the self and others is
displaced by immediate identification. Behavior now is
determined by "mimetic" adjustment, rather than introjected
codes of morality, and the "multidimensional dynamic
has given way to a one-dimensional static identification of
the individual with the others and with the administered
reality principle . "106
In the child, then, one-dimensional society creates a
very weak ego with the ubiquitous ego-ideal of technolog-
ical rationality, represented by its institutions and
leaders. In the mature adult, it reaches down into the
"biological structure" to harness both aggressive and
libidinal impulses, for the sake of productivity, consump-
tion, and consensus. The result is a society whose members
are all on the road to becoming objective reflections of
the needs of the technical structure. Armed with Freud's
metapsychology and concept of "man," as he interprets them,
Marcuse finds that "man" has been rendered obsolete in
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today's world. As an "ideal," however, the concept retains
critical force:
That which is obsolete is not, by this token,
raise If the advancing industrial society andits politics have invalidated the Freudian model
of the individual and his relation to society ifthey have undermined the power of the ego todissociate itself from the others, to become and
remain a self, then the Freudian concepts invoke
not only a part left behind but also a future tobe recaptured
.
iU /
Liberation or Apocalypse?
In Marcuse's world of one-dimensional people, three
possibilities emerge. If productivity continues, society
can continue going along, as described above, unless there
is an atomic war, which seems quite likely. Should the
productive apparatus falter, however, the severe aggression
that continuously develops in advanced industrial society
could break free into a modern barbarism. Finally, there
is the remote hope of liberation, most remote in One
Dimensional Man of 1964 but rekindled by 1969 in An Essay
on Liberation .
I have suggested before that, although advanced
industrial society uses the aggressive energy available in
productivity, this does not satisfy aggressivity in its
"primary form" and therefore creates frustration and
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further aggression. As the individual produces, under a
repressive instinctual structure that does not allow
gratification, enjoyment, or peace with what is produced,
such denial also instigates further aggression and the
basis for further production. As instinctual repression
increasingly becomes surplus and unnecessary repression,
therefore, production becomes less able to satisfy agres-
sive impulses, and production and rationalization must be
accelerated. This "vicious circle of progress," is
augmented by the fact that in a Vaterlose Gesellschaft
("society without fathers"), in which incorporation in the
technological ensemble rather than conscience guides
behavior, a breakdown in the productive process would
unleash the terrible aggression accelerated by
rationalization itself. As it is:
.
. .
the activation of surplus aggressive energy
releases instinctual forces which threaten to
undermine the established political institu-
tions. The sanctioning of aggressive energy
demanded in the prevailing situation makes for a
growth of popular extremism in the masses--a rise
of irrational forces which confront the leader-
ship with their claims for satis faction . 108
Marcuse states, in fact, that the "preservation of demo-
cracy, and civilization itself," increasingly depends "on
the willingness and ability of the government to withstand
and to curb aggressive impulses 'from below.'"109
In the end, we find in Marcuse the curious mix of a
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world of subjectless people, completely adapted to mass
society, yet fully capable of destroying it and them-
selves. In One Dimens ional Man
, however, Marcuse seems to
suggest that ever-increasing productivity, technical reason
as ego-ideal, cathected rewards instinctually tied to the
person's identification, unfree cultural institutions and
the creation of "enemies" will harness aggression success-
fully and allow advanced industrial society to continue
indefinitely. Unless, of course, there is nuclear
holocaust
.
The happy consciousness of an amoral society
The people that inhabit this world, Marcuse charac-
terizes as having a "happy consciousness." Shorn of the
old-fashioned superego, granted "satisfactory liberties,"
they are incapable of judging misdeeds of the person or the
society. HO Their extremely weak ego may be able to help
channel aggression into production and consumption, but it
can only do so because it "submits quickly to required
modes of thought behavior"--that is, completely identifies
with technological rationality.
Their happiness is itself, therefore, marked by domi-
nation. In the earlier stages of capitalism, there was a
need to repress instinctual energy through the centrali-
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zation of erotic energy into genital sexuality, develops
of the monogamous family based on heterosexuality
, and its
sublimation into socially productive labor. This was an
extremely repressive organization of the instincts, inten-
sifying as it did the need for gratification and subli-
mating gratification, which further intensified the
need. HI There was, however, a hidden negative virtue
here. The very process of sublimation preserved in
fantasy, wish, imagination, and unconscious thought the
potential of libidinal liberation. The creative link
between instinctual frustration and cognitive comprehension
of its source was suppressed but not disengaged.
The repressive desublimation of advanced industrial
society qualitatively alters this circumstance. For one
thing, society's technological advancement and affluence no
longer require the old mode of severe instinctual repres-
sion. In fact, technological society requires a direct
cathected libidinal tie between the individual and the
products of society:
We are again confronted with one of the most
vexing aspects of advance industrial civiliza-
tion; the rational character of its irrational-
ity.
^
Its productivity and efficiency, its
capacity to increase and spread comforts, to turn
waste into need, and destruction into construc-
tion, the extent to which this civilization
transforms the object world into an extension of
man's mind and body makes the very notion of
alienation questionable. The people recognize
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themselves in their commodities ; they find theirsoul in their automobile, hi-fi set, split-levelhome kitchen equipment. The very mechanism
which ties the individual to his society has
changed and social control is anchored in the new
needs which it has produced. 112
There is, therefore, not only no need for a repressive
sexual morality but a vital need for a liberalized sexual-
ity. In the context of a free society, Marcuse would
argue, such desublimation would be liberating, and, in
fact, a condition for liberation. In advanced industrial
society, however, desublimation ties the individual
instinctually to the production apparatus. It also encour-
ages the further decline of the ego, since gratification
can now be immediately obtained without the old-fashioned
search of the ego that often issued in sublimation, repres-
sion, and further search for fulfillment. The decline of
the ego and of subjectivity itself is, therefore, the
effect of and necessary condition for repressive desubli-
mation. The result is, again, an eclipse of subjectivity
so severe as to threaten the distinction between individual
and society, and with it the need for norms to regulate
conduct. The need for guilt and anxiety are, therefore,
overcome. Any act or deed appears permissible:
The result is the atrophy of the mental organs
for grasping the contradictions and the alterna-
tives and, in the one remaining dimension of
technological rationality, the Happy Conscious -
ness comes to prevail. 11^-
Perhaps the most provocative way to summarize
Marcuse' s thesis is to suggest that in one-dimensional
society alienation is overcome. U5 There is no longer an
ego capable of guiding the individual and no need for a
superego replete with a moral code of behavior. Even
sublimation, the reservoir of alienated wishes and desires
has been transcended and with it the possibility that the
individual might harbor needs, at some frontier of the
psyche, different from those of society. The individual
now is the society. And yet Marcuse concludes, of course,
that the needs people have are not freely arrived at and do
not suggest what is essential about people. He suggests
that the fact that people are apparently no longer
alienated by their existence signals "a more progressive
stage of alienation." Alienation has become "entirely
objective," defying ideological indictment. The "false
consciousness" of technological rationality therefore has
become "true consciousness." Before we question the logic
and validity of this provocative hypothesis, we need ask,
does Marcuse see any way out of this dilemma?
Liberation by the few?: radical intelligentsia
as a subjective vanguard
If nuclear war or the descent into barbarism is
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avoided, there is a glimmer of hope-but nothing more. As
is characteristic of Marcuse, he offers few practical ideas
toward the liberation he so desperately seeks. Sometimes
he suggest that the only hope lies in disengaging the war
economy. At other times, he puts forward the notion of
somehow undermining the mass media, particularly televi-
sion. In his essay "Repressive Tolerance," he argues that
we must deny tolerance to the purveyors of one-dimensional
rationality in order to puncture the ubiquitous false
consciousness that has "destroyed the basis for universal
tolerance." 116 Critical psychotherapy always remains
useful to reclaim the private mental space now fully
invaded by mass society.
Given Marcuse 's analysis of one dimensionality it is
less surprising that he offers few practical ideas on
liberation than that he holds out any hope at all. Accord-
ing to his study, after all, "there is no ground on which
theory and practice, thought and action meet."
Marcuse' s turn to Freud is decisive here. For just as
he looks to psychoanalytic metapsychology to demonstrate
how deeply false consciousness is embedded, here he seems
to maintain that this consciousness does not fundamentally
alter basic "human nature." If the human essense was
itself altered and then gratified, it would be inappropri-
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ate to speak about domination of what would then become
gratification of natural human needs. What happens,
instead, is that a deeply felt "second nature" of needs is
created, needs that are stabilizing and fundamentally
conservative, "the counterrevolution anchored in the
instinctual structure." People are tied "libidinally and
aggressively to the commodity form," with merchandise,
productivity, and the enemy all becoming biological or
instinctual needs. One-dimensional society does, there-
fore, meet the needs of this "second nature" it creates
socially in its inhabitants, and any attempt to transform
it will also have to change these needs:
To the degree to which this foundation is
itself historical and the malleability of "human
nature" reaches into the depth of man's
instinctual structure, changes in morality may
"sink down" into the "biological" dimension and
modify organic behavior. Once a specific
morality is firmly established as a norm of
soical behavior, it is not only introjected--it
also operates as a norm of "organic" behavior:
the organism receives and reacts to certain
stimuli and "ignores" and repels others in accord
with the introjected morality, which is thus
promoting or impeding the function of the
organism as a living cell in the respective
society. In this way, a society constantly
re-creates, this side of consciousness and
ideology, patterns of behavior and aspira- tions
as part of the "nature" of its people, and unless
the revolt reaches into this second" nature
,
into these ingrown patterns , social change will
remain "incomplete," even self-defeating . 1^-7
The problem for Marcuse is, then, how can a revolution
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be made by a populace "biologically" wedded to its own
domination? His answer in capsule form is the following.
The working class remains the agency of change, but it is
hopelessly programmed and virtually incapable of critical
reflection. Technology and science remain the vehicles of
liberation but in their present form constitute, instead,
institutions of domination. Given these conditions,
consciousness of repression and the development of needs
qualitatively different from those now existing must
precede revolution. A new subject is needed to break free
of the vicious circle: a revolution is needed to create a
free society, but it presupposes a need for the freedom it
would create, a need now absent.
This circle seemed complete in 1964, but by 1969
Marcuse was writing An Essay on Liberation to suggest a
possible way out. Here the question of "second nature"
becomes decisive, because it implies a more basic nature
that technological rationality obscures. Not surprisingly,
the real nature of people resides for Marcuse in Eros, the
struggle for gratification of the "life instinct," and what
has changed by 1969 is that Marcuse finds people exhibiting
this "new sensibility" of Eros .
Marcuse 's turn to Freud had always been two-pronged:
it enabled him to show how deeply manipulation could root
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itself, as well as to believe that if one drilled deep
enough, one could find hope. Eros was used by Marcuse in
Eros and Civilization to explain failed revolutions and to
provide a practical standard to judge progress, for a
Marxism confused by a regressive technological milieu of
abundance. Shorn of a real subject in One Dimensional Man
,
it becomes merely theoretical construct, the last strand of
hope-as-an-idea
, before the technical onslaught.
With An Essay on Liberation
, Marcuse finds in the
student rebellion of the West real live people who exhibit
a political radicalism that can tap basic moral disposi-
tions of the "human organism" and can help reveal the
"biological foundation for socialism." They seem well
prepared because they've experienced less repression of
"authentic" instinctual needs, due to the displacement of
the father, permissive child rearing, prolonged adolescence
and freedom from responsibility. Their violation of
taboos, therefore, is not restricted to sexuality (since
they're freed from the repressive restrictions of only
genital sexuality) but, in fact, "leads to refusal and
rebellion." Consequently, it bypasses the absorption into
the status quo of repressive desublimation
:
This radicalism activates the elementary, organic
foundation of morality in the human being. Prior
to all ethical behavior in accordance with speci-
fic social standards, prior to all ideological
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expression, morality is a "disposition" of the
organism, perhaps rooted in the erotic drive tocounter aggressiveness, to create and preserve
ever greater unities" of life. We would thenhave this side of all "values," an instinctualfoundation for solidarity among human beings--a
solidarity which has been effectively repressedin line with the requirements of class societybut which now appears as a precondition forliberation
.
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In their style, dress, speech and acts, they exhibit
what Marcuse calls the "Great Refusal" of being absorbed
under a repressive reality principle that denies the life
force of the id. If they engage in "uncivil disobedience"
and confrontational direct action or use language that
sounds obscene, they are, in fact, resisting illegitimate
authority and obscene governmental and corporate acts, in
ways that cannot be absorbed in the repertoire of
permissible acts: their refusal refuses func tionalization
within the going order:
They are not professional martyrs: they prefer
not to be beaten, not to go to jail. But for
them, this is not a question of choice; the
protest and refusals are parts of their
metabolism.
Moreover, they are part of the "new working class" of
technical and scientific workers and managers and may
someday hold pivotal jobs in the production process. And
although this "class" is otherwise "well integrated and
well rewarded," it increasingly has objective revolutionary
342
potential because of its position and the decline of the
"old working class." It could be former students, as
"calculating managers" of the whole, who might use the
power of society to reveal to its workers their oppression.
"The student rebellion," therefore, "hits this society
at a vulnerable point; accordingly the reaction is venomous
and violent. "120 The university and its defense against
financial and political debasement becomes, thereby, "a
vital part in the larger struggle for change," for it
remains the critical institution in which to develop "true
consc iousness . "121
In addition to the student rebellion, Marcuse points
to "ghetto populations" and liberation struggles as signi-
ficant breaks from corporate hegemony. Both share a vital,
basic need to revolt. In the case of the former, there is
the advantage of being somewhat uncorrupted and bulwarked
in easily organized centers dispersed throughout society.
There are the severe disadvantages of being racially
divided from white allies, internally divided (e.g., the
Black bourgeoisie), often engaging in unpolitical protest,
and generally being marginal to the production process.
x\lthough Third World guerrillas can win specific revolu-
tions, put economic pressure on imperialism and provide
powerful moral examples of non-Stalinist socialism (e.g.,
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Vietnam, Cuba, and China after the "cultural revolution"),
their success ultimately depends upon breaking corporate
capitalism at its "strongest link. "122
It is, then, revolution in the U.S. which will be
decisive, in Marcuse's view. If it does occur, it must
beg_in with a new consciousness to counter the near total
"social determination of consciousness":
Historically, it is again the period of enlight-
enment prior to material change-
-a period of edu-
cation, but education which turns into praxis:
demonstration, confrontation, rebellion . 123
The proto-new-subjects will be agents of revolution but not
an agency of change. Initially they will be in opposition
to the working classes, who, although diminished in power,
are still necessary for revolution due to numbers and
structural positioning, although their needs nevertheless
remain those of a repressive society. Their task will then
be "liberation [which] would mean subversion against the
will and against the prevailing interests of the great
majority of people. "124 Confrontation of this sort will
undoubtedly increase tensions between them and their needed
allies, just as surely as it is the only way to expose the
system. In a period of disintegration, Marcuse neverthe-
less concludes, the "masses" may become (somehow) suffi-
ciently disengaged to better judge these efforts at
liberation for themselves.
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Delegitimation and capitalist crisis
The development of a new consciousness, however, will
be of no avail unless corporate capitalism begins to
weaken. "Corporate capitalism," Marcuse now claims in An
Essay on Liberation
, "is not immune against economic
crisis": the huge defense economy burdens the taxpayers
and helps reduce profit margins, while economic conversion
risks high unemployment. Foreign outlets for productivity
will meet increased resistance in the Third World. Main-
taining an adequate profit rate and preventing widespread
unemployment will necessitate intensifying demand, "thereby
stimulating the rat race of the competitive struggle for
existence through the multiplication of waste, planned
obsolescence, parasitic and stupid jobs and services." A
high standard of living and a wasteful economy will drive
wages sky high. These contradictions coming home to roost
may intensify class struggle, but they will not issue in
revolution, for state power will contain them within the
bounds of capitalism: "the translation of the economic
into the radical political struggle would be the conse-
quence rather than the cause of change."
Change would require a period of unstructured, dif-
fused disintegration, which could be sparked by economic
crisis and "activate resistance" against political and
345
"mental repression." Under such circumstances, the
legitimating backbone, the "moral fiber" necessary to
stability, could wear thin. Prefiguring Jurgen Habermas
'
Legitimation Crisis
, Marcuse declares in 1969:
Now it is the strength of this moral fiber, of
the operational value (quite apart from theirideational validity), which is likely to wear off
under the impact of the growing contradictions
within the society. The result would be a
spread, not only of discontent and mental sick-
ness, but also of inefficiency, resistance to
work, refusal to perform, negligence, indiffer-
ence—facts of dysfunction which would hit a
highly centralized and coordinated apparatus,
where breakdown at one point may easily affect
large sections of the whole. To be sure, these
are subjective factors, but they may assume
material force in conjunction with the objective
economic and political strains to which the
system will be exposed on a global scale. Then,
and only then, that political climate would
prevail which would provide a mass basis for the
new forms of organization required for directing
the struggle. 12y
It is, then, only with the convergence of the
weakening of "the global economy of capitalism" and
"radical enlightenment" that authentic liberation might
develop. As to the present, we seem to be in a "nonrevolu-
tionary but prerevolutionary situation," marked by the
"objective necessity" for revolution due to an irrational
social system, yet encumbered by "the paralysis of the
masses," and missing, thereby, the "objective factor"
necessary for revolution.
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The immediate revolutionary job is, then, one of
political education. Marcuse suggests that this can take
the varied forms of critical psychoanalytic therapy to help
regain private mental space; critical social and political
theory to expose our real condition; and action to pene-
trate the repressive totality of the language and deeds of
the society. Such actions can be confrontations with
authority or a series of reforms informed by the "radical
social content of aesthetic needs," ranging from better
zoning to protection from noise and dirt, closing cities to
autos, restricting transistor radios, birth control,
decommercializing nature or "total urban reconstruction."
These programs, Marcuse insists, "would become increasingly
subversive of the institutions of capitalism and their
morality"
:
The quantity of such reforms could turn into the
quality of radical change to a degree to which
they would critically weaken the economic, poli-
tical, and cultural pressure and power groups
which have a vested interest in preserving the
environment and ecology of profitable merchan-
dizing .126
In a period of growing crisis, then, such reforms
could help generate the delegitimation necessary for revo-
lutionary success. Moreover, if a revolution is success-
fully carried forth "by the non-repressive forces stirring
in existing society," led by people who, Marcuse claims,
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are "allergic to domination," with the "achievements of
productivity" at their "disposal," the revolutionaries
would be in a good position to avoid the imposition of
"repressive controls" afterward. Such a revolution could
avoid the psychic and political Thermidor, the "return of
the repressed" (guilt of having overthrown "the father")
that has abetted the reimposition of authority after other
revolutions
.
The promise of liberation
As for the present, Marcuse claims, it is a time for
"utopian thinking," of developing the subjective conscious-
ness that can understand the objective irrationality and
objective possibilities. We can now imagine, he suggests,
a society in which labor time can be reduced to a minimum
and in which work becomes play. Productivity would cease
to be an end in itself and instead exhibit the aesthetic
quality of "display." It would be guided by a "technology
of liberation" born of a gaya scienza "free to project and
design the forms of a human universe without exploitation
or toil. "127 An aesthethic environment would be created
for people to spend time that would now be truly free
because they would be fully able to decide how to utilize
it: it would mean the "Aesthetic principle as form of the
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Reality Principle . "128 The new society would be populated
by "a type of man" for whom time and death would lose the
now debilitating quality of anxiety and fear:
a type of man with a different sensitivity as
well as consciousness: men who would speak a
different language, have different gestures,
follow different impulses; men who have developed
an instinctual barrier against cruelty,
brutality, ugliness. 129
For Marcuse, then, liberation is nothing short of life
fully exhibiting the qualities of Eros
,
as a desublimated
art of free existence. The mark of reason and rationality
would be whether or not the gratification of the "life
instincts" was being asssured, whether or not the pleasure
principle was being realized. The concepts of freedom,
reason and happiness would merge, as people would be, for
the first time in history, free to use their reason to
fulfill their human essence of living a gratifying, happy
existence. The mind-body dualism would be overcome, as
people would be "cured" of the effects of unnecessary
repression, and this would be exhibited in gesture,
physical movement and thought. Our very senses would be
free to become "productive in their receptivity." In
short, the liberation Marcuse envisages, suggests the end
of human alienation: 130
Technique would then tend to become art, and art
would tend to form reality: the opposition
between imagination and reason, higher and lower
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faculties, poetic and scientific thought, would
be^ invalidated. Emergence of a new Reality
Principle: under which a new sensibility and
desublimated scientific intelligence would
combine in the creation of an aesthetic ethos . 1-31
The strategy and dilemma of overcoming
"repressive tolerance"
If the objective agent of revolution, the working
class, has been derailed from its mission, the young
intelligentsia-as-subject prefigures the sweeping libera-
tion he suggests. It is the job of this agent of revolu-
tion to prepare the subjective groundwork for a revolution
that must still await economic and social crisis. Then,
perhaps, the vital need for revolution still might be
developed in the vast majority of the people, who are
presently in no position to judge their real interests:
In the last analysis, the question of what are
true and false needs must be answered by the
individuals themselves, but only in the last
analysis; that is if and when they are free to
give their own answer. 13
2
In the meanwhile, Marcuse suggests, "it makes sense to
say that the general will is always wrong—wrong in as much
as it objectively counteracts the possible transformation
of society into more humane ways of life. "133 The strate-
gic dilemma the young middle-class intelligentsia face,
then, is that in their protest against authority they also
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must protest against the present needs of the majority,
thereby ultimately for everyone's real interests. More-
over, their protest must not be too tame, must not confine
itself to present laws and institutions, or it will be
absorbed by the one-dimensional political arena. Given
Marcuse's analysis, the agents of revolutionary conscious-
ness must initially confront both the objective class of
revolution and the "semi-democratic" system that gives them
latitude to maneuver.
In his essay "Repressive Tolerance," Marcuse confronts
this dilemma by developing an argument to justify the
privileged position he ascribes to the radical intelligent-
sia. "The problem," he argues, "is not that of an educa-
tional dictatorship, but that of breaking the tyranny of
public opinions and its makers in the closed society. "134
Because the condition doesn't exist for democratic toler-
ance, knowledgeable people capable of deliberation and
choice need a "discriminating" tolerance as part of the
"struggle for a real democracy." Tolerance as now practiced
really amounts to a pseudo-tolerance, masked in a spurious
objectivity which hides the manipulative grasp and destruc-
tiveness of dominant interests. This "toleration" must be
countered by withdrawing tolerance from ideas and actions
that further regimentation and destruct iveness , and favor-
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ing ideas and actions, including unlawful and even some
violent acts, that promote freedom and pacification. In
the present stage of civilization, Marcuse argues, it is
possible to identify movements, policies and opinions that
would promote the use of the material potential for freedom
and peace. Such constitute the base of democratic ration-
ality and their strengthening requires "suppression of the
repressive ones":
In past and different circumstances, the speeches
of the Fascist and Nazi leaders were the immedi-
ate prologue to the massacre ... if democratic
tolerance had been withdrawn when the future
leaders started their campaign, mankind would
have had a chance of avoiding Auschwitz and a
World War. 1 35
If the choice were between democracy and rule by an
elite, Marcuse argues, democracy would certainly be prefer-
able. Today, however, a destructive elite rules, one which
may destroy all life on the planet. This elite is protect-
ed by the "end of ideology" as a false consciousness that
"has become the general consciousness," and by programmed
needs supportive of the institutions of domination.
Through indoctrination and the mythology of genuine demo-
cratic tolerance, it controls the mind. Through repressive
desublimation, it weakens the power of the intellect by
removing the force of the id from its attempt to discern
reality and seek happiness. Discussing the latter, Robert
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Paul Wolff suggests:
Tolerance for Marcuse, is liberating when it isthe established order's grudging acceptance of
negative or oppositional expressions which seekto tap the unconscious as a way of attacking
surplus repression. Tolerance is repressive whenit is as in our present society, an easy accept-
ance of the surface manifestations of the nega-tivity in such a manner as to rob it of itstranscending capability and leaves surplus
repression untouched . 13o
It is, then, the job of radicals to begin to recreate
the conditions for real democracy. First and foremost is
the need to develop free mental space, to subvert the con-
ditions by which the mind is made into a "subject-object"
of one-dimensional politics. And this work "must begin
with stopping the words and images which feed this con-
sc iousness .
"
In contradistinction to "repressive tolerance,"
Marcuse argues, we need a "liberating tolerance" of both
discussion and deed, that "would mean intolerance against
movements from the Right [and the establishment], and
toleration of movements from the Left." "Liberating
tolerance" is justified because the left is much weaker
than the status quo and therefore cannot present its
message effectively. Moreover, truth is not entirely
relative: pacification and freedom, in Marcuse 's view, are
possible consequences of left thoughts and actions, but
they are an impossible consequence of those from the
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right. Consequently, discussion under "repressive toler-
ance" does not fulfill the mission of tolerance in a
democracy: to allow ideas to compete in the search for
truth. "Liberating tolerance" is then an attempt at
achieving some balance. For if tolerance does not take
sides, it protects a whole that is extremely violent and
fundamentally intolerant, under the guise of tolerance
protected by law seeking to prevent violence:
Such extreme suspension of the right of free
speech and free assembly is indeed, justified
only if the whole of society is in extreme
danger. I maintain that our society is in such
an emergency situation, and that it has become
the normal state of af fairs. 137
K.eal tolerance, truly democratic tolerance, Marcuse
concludes, will never "be the gift of the powers that be."
It can only be won with "the sustained effort of radical
minorities," willing to break the hold of one-dimensional
society, through their thought and the example of their
actions and thus create the condition necessary for a real
democratic majority: rational people who can think for
themselves and have within them a need for freedom. Radi-
cal students are the protosubjects of the real democracy
that might be established, and they have potential allies
among ghetto populations here and liberation struggles
abroad. Their ultimate success of creating a revolution
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without a consequent Thermidor is "no more--and no less--
than a hope." While the immediate situation is one of
"containment," Marcuse concludes in 1969, "it is hard to
see" how struggle for the "betrayed promises" of this
society can be "arrested indefinitely . "138 jn t^e pre sent
prerevolutionary situation, it falls to minorities
"militantly intolerant and disobedient to the rules of
behavior which tolerate destruction and suppression," to
prepare the subjective groundwork: consciousness of the
omnipresent grasp of one-dimensional society is the first
step, the "Archimedean point," upon which future
revolutionary change depends. 139
Marcuse 's Explanation of Non-Participation:
A Summary of the Paradigm of Political Mortification
It should be clear by now that Marcuse does, indeed,
devote much of his work to analyzing the ascendency of what
Mills called "the cheerful robot." Political mortification
is Marcuse 's explanation of non-participation. Within this
general framework, however, there are at least three Mar-
cuses that bear directly on our study.
First, there is the "precise" Marcuse who postulates
that technological rationality has become the legitimation
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of advanced industrial society, doing for it what the fair
exchange of equivalents did for capitalism. Secondly,
there is the person I should like to call the "common
sense" Marcuse, offering an often suggestive panoply of the
causes of quiescence. These range from a psychological
profile of frustration and safety-valve release to a
confused and debased language; a political economy geared
to no ends other than self
-perpetuation and growth; a
scientific and technological complex that is politically
ascendent; and a manipulated mass of people unable to alter
these circumstances. Integral to this Marcuse is an
intense and vital moral concern. With the world on the
brink of achieving the means to overcome want and misery,
this potential is used, instead, to create the conditions
for a new barbarism, or worse, total annihilation with
nuclear weapons
.
Writing always with the backdrop of the
Nazi extermination camps, Marcuse' s sensibility is vigilant
against the potential for human barbarism, and concerns
itself with unearthing the structural and psychological
causes of such horror.
It is this fear, I believe (and my view must remain
speculation) , that helps create the "one-dimensional"
Marcuse, a theorist whose caricature of people is often so
severe as to be contemptuous of any serious notion of human
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liberation. This Marcuse does, of course, offer an ideal
of liberation, which is itself so sweeping as to make one
wonder whether it is not caused by profound lack of faith
in what real people are capable of. It is almost as if the
people Marcuse studies are so immune to moral sensibility
that he must create new people to replace them.
The first two Marcuses fall, roughly, into the cate-
gory I have called theorists of relative political mortifi-
cation, while "one-dimensional" Marcuse puts forth a thesis
of absolute political mortification. Many of Marcuse'
s
most important propositions, in fact, straddle both camps,
their residency often depending on the implication he
draws, at the time, of their real meaning. The distin-
guishing characteristic is always this: when Marcuse
argues that people can, in fact, become objects of the
technical ensemble (and, again, not just treated as such),
when he argues that subjectivity is, itself, being tran-
scended, his concepts fill out a theory of absolute
political mortification. For example, when he suggests
that a fully func tionalized language can, in fact, become
the only language people speak, whether or not he believes
this now to be the case, he fulfills this requirement.
Fully credentialed one-dimensional people, it seems to me,
would be in an complete state of absolute political
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mortification . 140
There is a further complication, in that Marcuse's
work often embodies a curious mix of idealism and
materialist determinism. At the extreme, consciousness
seems fully determined by the requirements of the base of
the technological infrastructure. At the same time, he
seems to hold that there are forms of human reason and
truth, centered on the rational use of human activity to
pacify existence and extend libidinal gratification, that
remain even while subjectivity is eclipsed. Moreover,
there is the core of the human essence as Eros
,
which seems
at once a "forgotten" (in the sense of totally repressed)
ideal of human life, and a "material" substratum based in
libidinal striving. The connection between libido as
energy and Eros as a conceptual ideal that is repressed is
not clearly spelled out, it seems to me, nor is it clear
how Eros as an ideal can be maintained at any level of the
human mind, if the ubiquitous onslaught of technological
rationality Marcuse describes is possible.
I shall not attempt here to untangle all these
elements of Marcuse's work, nor shall I explicitly try to
ascertain precisely what elements fit most closely into
which of the several versions of political mortification he
offers. My purpose, in the forthcoming evaluation, will be
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to discuss whether and in what way Marcuse's theory of apa-
thy as a condition augments the discussion of political
subordination developed by Mills and, indeed, the develop-
ment of a conceptual map for explaining non-participation.
Before launching into this evaluation, let me summar-
ize Marcuse's main points. Advanced industrial society
(the American variety) is a decisive break from simple
corporate capitalism, in that technological rationality is
now both a central organizing principle and a legitimating
force. Nevertheless, although the needs of technical
development determine the policies of the society, sun-
dering the independence of capitalists, society remains
organized to maintain elite privilege.
The foremost problem presented to this repressive mode
of organization is that it creates both the technical
possibility of overcoming the need for alienated work and
the need for ever-greater productivity and a repressive
organization of society as a whole. It "solves" this
problem by developing a social structure of containment, a
one-dimensional language, a science and technology whose
telos is, itself, domination, an ideology of technological
rationality as a new legitimation and an unnecessarily
represssive instinctual and character structure.
The repression developed in one-dimensional society
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is, however, historically unique in that it both meets some
basic needs of people and creates in people a fundamental
need for the social system itself. People are satiated
with privatized rewards and adapt in mimetic fashion to the
needs of the technical ensemble. Their very instincts are
harnessed, with aggressive energy feeding productivity and
alienated labor and libidinal energy cathected onto objects
of consumption. This mode of denying a primary release of
instinctual energy, particularly aggression, creates an
escalatory effect which further intensifies the need for
productivity. Communism (and other "enemies") provides an
effective and stabilizing release for this pent-up
frustration and serves further to displace rivalry among
capitalist powers and between the capitalist elite and the
working class.
The decisive effect of one-dimensional society is to
remove the present organization of science and technology
as an immament critique of contemporary social relations
and to fully integrate the working class, the classic
Marxist agency of change, into advanced industrial soci-
ety. If there is hope for transcendence, it must await the
convergence of capitalist crisis and the political work of
those imbued with the "new sensibility," largely the stu-
dent population and the radical intelligentsia. Until such
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time, the job of students and others not yet integrated,
such as those populating the ghettoes, is to break thrugh
the "repressive tolerance" that has choked off critical
thought in American society.
Based on this summary, we can reproduce Marcuse's
paradigm of apathy as a condition as follows:
X (a mass, class or society) is in a condition of
apathy with respect to Y (something enhancing
human liberation) if X is no longer capable of
caring about Y. A lack of ability to care
involves being devoid of a language, an ideology,
a character structure, or a social structure with
a progressive dynamic that could provide an
Archimedean point for critical reflection. At
its most extreme, apathy devolves into absolute
political mortification, in which human subjec-
tivity itself is transcended. At its least
extreme, it consists of apathetic individuals
committed to a fundamentally apolitical ideology
and psychologically manipulated into adaptation.
I have called this relative political
mortification
.
Before moving on, let us note three divergences with
Mills' paradigm of apathy as a condition. First, Marcuse's
analysis really is about masses of people or whole soci-
eties and gives little consideration to particular groups
and the reasons for their quiescence. Secondly, unlike the
view of Mills, reform for its own sake generally plays
little role in Marcuse's thinking, and there is little
exhortation for elites or people in general to act
responsibly. His standard of what people should care
361
about, therefore, seems usually to have full-scale libera-
tion as its backdrop. Measured against such an exacting
standard, one will surely find lots of apathetic people.
Thirdly then, his analysis doesn't focus so much on whether
people can care about something important, but rather on
whether in mass society people have become incapable
,
perhaps permanently, of caring about liberation
. This is,
of course, partly why I have chosen to study his work. I
now turn to evaluate his argument.
CHAPTER V
THE LIMITS OF INTEGRATION INTO "TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY"
Introduction
In this chapter, I shall crititically confront the
thesis of "one dimensionality" examined in Chapter IV. The
argument will be that Marcuse extends his conception of
false-consciousness beyond any bounds that are reasonable
and that his analysis of the eclipse of subjectivity is,
itself, based on an impoverished subject. He thereby
derives an overly functional view of why people acquiesce
to political domination. This will be the focal point of
the forthcoming critique. While there are aspects of
Marcuse' s analysis, which I have called relative political
mortification, that will prove worthy of consideration, his
stronger formulation of the one-dimensionality thesis
remains unsubstantiated at best and possibly not credible
in any case.
The critique of Marcuse is essential today. For in an
era of mounting systems "dysfunctions," exploring the
limits of the integrating capacity of technological ration-
ality becomes increasingly important. Understanding these
limits gives us, at the same time, important insights as to
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how social systems may have to be legitimated in the
future. Ironically, in evaluating Marcuse's "one-dimen-
sionality" thesis, we are also asking: if society cannot
be fully integrated in the way Marcuse presumes, where else
is corporate capitalism likely to turn in its search for
legitimation? I will turn to this question in the final
chapter
.
Evaluating Marcuse's Explanation of Non-Participation
With our study of Marcuse we have come, in a sense,
full cycle from our opening discussion of Bernard
Berelson's explanation of non-participation. The apathy
that Berelson saw as the necessary condition for American
democracy to continue is now viewed from a radical lens as
a profound false-consciousness that stabilizes a "totali-
tarian" society immune to critical reflection. There is
also a profound irony here, I shall argue; for Marcuse,
like Berelson, errs decisively in both overstating the
amount of apathy present and misconstruing the nature of
what apathy does exist.
The irony is deepened when we consider that Marcuse
would sharply criticize Berelson's analysis for failing to
penetrate the appearance of apathy and contentment. Yet
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there is a sense in which Marcuse duplicates Berelson's
error, for with all the "depth" psychology employed by the
critical theorist, he devotes virtually no thought to
unearthing the complex of attitudes, beliefs, aspirations,
fears and reasons that motivate the political behavior of
real live human beings. Instead, like Berelson, he takes a
snapshot of American people and develops his explanation
from it. Moreover, Marcuse also exaggerates the stability
of the socioeconomic system itself, although he does have a
much more sophisticated understanding of the ingredients
necessary to maintain that stability.
The differences between the critical theorist and the
positivist are, of course, even more important. Underlying
Berelson's analysis is a fairly simple concept of subjec-
tivity, in which humans respond to their environment
through a fairly straight-forward calculus of pleasure and
pain. Participation in political life, then, is under-
standably limited in that it is not pleasurable, and this
is implicitly justified because participation is not seen
to have intrinsic value. Both human development through
reason and activity and its obverse, false-consciousness of
the real situation one is in, are ruled out at the start.
Each agent, Berelson would have to argue, is fully capable
of understanding the merits of participation and of the
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political system. Any attempt to charge that agent with
partial or false understanding would be undemocratic in
politics and unscientific in inquiry.
Marcuse, of course, commits both sins and should be
defended on both counts. Any social theory contains within
it an idea of the parameters of human nature and how people
are likely to act in specified situations. Each theory,
when confronted with a dissident example, will explain the
example in ways that protect the core of the theory. The
explanation will often have the form of ascribing false-
consciousness to the dissident. If people seek pleasure
and if participation is rewarding only to the extent that
it maintains a political system providing the goods to
enhance contentment, how would Berelson explain a contented
person who participated? If an important element of his
thesis were that contentment leads to non-participation, to
protect this core, he might suggest that the person isn't
really content, ascribing false-consciousness, or he would
have to admit that sometimes contentment leads to partici-
pation (depending on other factors), weakening the thesis.
Such caveats, however, are an integral part of theo-
rizing per se
,
and they do not by their appearance under-
mine a particular theory. If some motivations are not
clear to an actor, if some structural arrangements are
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imperfectly understood, if an actor's behavior does not
correspond to his or her beliefs, if these are possibil-
ities inherent in human action, then all theory should seek
to explain human activity in terms that include but extend
beyond the professed motivation of the actor. Because the
connection between motivation, intention, understanding and
action is complex, there is nothing improper or undemo-
cratic about trying to discover the actual relationship
that obtains. On the contrary, because democracy depends
upon extending the capacity to reason, such intellectual
activity is necessary for a democratic temper to exist in
political theory.
It is, in fact, Marcuse's discussion of apathy as a
condition, a form of false-consciousness, that contributes
to our study by completing the conceptual map necessary for
explaining non-participation. As I shall argue in the
concluding chapter, neither the apathy related to choice of
Berelson, nor the depoliticization based on rational deci-
sion described by Schattschneider , nor even the political
subordination characterized by Mills, nor the combination
of all these exhausts the possibilities. The question
posed by Mills, "can men be made into cheerful and willing
robots?" must be faced squarely, and Marcuse, to his
credit, does so.
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Yet, like Berelson, Marcuse's concept of subjectivity
is itself flawed: this shortcoming ultimately brings down
much of his theoretic enterprise in the explanation of
quiescence. Berelson looks at the human subject, as it
were, from the outside, finding creatures of relatively
straightforward motivation who, taken together, constitute
a system of individuals that appears to be defined by the
sum of its parts. The combination of these individuals
(who could be understood metaphorically as vectors) consti-
tutes the social and political order. This concept of the
human subject allows Berelson to understand his role as
that of a scientist whose concepts and method are value
neutral with respect to his object of inquiry: the unstat-
ed goal seems to be the study of the functional parts of
the uncriticized whole suitable for the purpose of social
control
.
Marcuse is sharply critical of this type of technocra-
tic consciousness with regard to political analysis, parti-
cularly because it severely distorts the amount of freedom
now prevalent in society and grossly underestimates the
capacity for liberation inherent in the human species. The
subject whom Marcuse believes can exist, in fact, at times
assumes mythological proportions, as Peter Cleckak points
out, appearing here and there as Orpheus, Narcissus, and
even Prometheus .
1
There is a fear, transparent in Marcuse's work, how-
ever, which I believe motivates his often vitriolic attack
on positivism. For all the aesthetic sensibility Marcuse
seems to believe people capable of, he is gravely concerned
that technocratic consciousness can, through social manipu-
lation, completely circumscribe human consciousness
itself. Marcuse's anger at positivists is on the surface
motivated by their role as ideological shills for an
oppressive system, but his underlying fear is that people
can become (and are rapidly becoming) identical to the
objects of inquiry assumed by positivist theory. The
technocratic project is most dangerous because people can
conform to its requirements . 2 The eclipse of subjectivity
Marcuse fears, then, occurs at precisely that moment when
positivist theory becomes human practice.
The question must be asked: if the human subject, as
Marcuse understands it, is capable of such sweeping libera-
tion and rich sensibility, how is it that real live people
can conform to the positivist ideal he despises? The
answer, I believe, is that both Marcuse's Utopia and nega-
tive Utopia are burdened by a common and inadequate of
subjectivity that ultimately undermines the core of the
thesis of one dimensionality. There is a sadness to this
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because, at the same time, Marcuse often provides rich
insights as to how a society on the irrational road to
holocaust can maintain the consent of what must remain its
subj ects .
The Impossible The sis of Absolute Political Mortification
Marcuse' s writing is often filled with what could be
read critically as confusing and even contradictory asser-
tions or sympathetically as sweeping imaginative insights.
Both exist and ample literature exists detailing his vir-
tues and flaws.
3
I will focus here on the several types of explanations
of non-participation Marcuse offers, rather than attempt to
disentangle and analyze the full range of his theorizing.
My departure point is his thesis of "one dimensionality"
taken seriously and literally as a vision of absolute poli-
tical mortification.
There is little doubt that while Marcuse hedges on his
thesis, at the very least it comprises an important element
in One Dimensional Man . Morton Schoolman takes this thesis
so seriously that he calls his book on Marcuse The Imaginary
Witness : when society becomes truly one-dimensional, who
would be left to observe this fact? Human subjectivity, as
we understand it, would have been transcended. After all,
Marcuse does write that alienation:
• ; • ^
as become entirely objective ; the subject
which is alienated is swallowed up by its alien-
ated existence. There is only one dimension, andit is everywhere and in all forms. The achieve-
ments of progress defy ideological indictment as
well as justification; before their tribunal, thefalse consciousness" of their rationality
becomes the true consciousness.^
Taken to its extreme, for Marcuse, people can become
objects in the technological ensemble. At the very best,
if they retained any subjectivity, it would be so removed
from their practical capability that they would be indefi-
nitely incapable of comprehending their situation.
In either case, I believe that Marcuse 's concept of
subjectivity is a radical departure from that of Karl Marx
and that Marx provides a vantage point from which to criti-
cize Marcuse. For Marx, alienation is objective in that it
refers to more than a state of mind, fostered as it is by
an objective social structure at a particular point in his-
tory. Alienation, however, is dependent upon the active
recreation of the alienated structures and roles by human
subjects. Alienation is, therefore, objective and subjects
become objectified, but they never, in any sense, become
objects
.
For Marx, the hallmark of human existence and poten-
tial is the characteristic of praxis
,
understood as "sen-
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suous human activity." The existence of such activity is
essential for Marx's concept of alienation; we see this in
various places throughout his work. Early on, Marx borrows
the "transformative method" from Feuerbach to criticize G.
W. F. Hegel for inverting the subject-predicate relation:
"It is important that Hegel always converts the Idea into
the subject and the particular actual subject, such as
'political sentiment,' into the predicate." For Marx,
Geist ( as false-consciousness) is the product of real live
subjects, predicated on their activity
,
and, I believe
technological rationality would also remain predicated in
the same way. Marx should reject Marcuse's view when it
comes close to asserting that technological rationality is
supplanting human consciousness itself.
Later, Marx develops a greater appreciation for the
seeds of an adequate notion of praxis within Hegel's work.
About Hegel's Phenomenology
,
Marx now asserts:
. . .
Hegel grasps the self-development of man as
a process, obj ectification as loss of the object,
as alienation and transcendence of this aliena-
tion; that he thus grasps the nature of work and
comprehends objective man, authentic because
actual, as the result of his own work
.
The
actual active relation of man to himself as a
species-being or the confirmation of his species-
being as an actual, that is, human, being is only
possible so far as he actually brings forth all
his species -powers which in turn is only possible
through the collective effort of mankind, only as
the result of history--and treats them as
objects, something which is again only possible
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in the form of alienation .
5
Species-life needs to be developed, therefore, but it is
already characterized by work and exists "in the form of
alienation." Alienation limits people from fulfilling
their species-nature, but it is predicated on alienated
people-as-praxis
.
Finally, in the famous passage in Capital:
We pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as
exclusively human. A spider conducts operationsthat resemble those of a weaver, and a bee putsto shame many an architect in the construction ofher cells. But what distinguishes the worst
architect from the best of bees is this, that the
architect raises his structure in imaginationbefore he erects it in reality. ... He not
only effects a change of form in the material on
which he works, but he also realises a purpose ofhl s own that gives the law to his modus operandi
and to tfhich he must subordinate his will. 6
For Marx, people do this even while alienated and
while misunderstanding the social relations dominating
their labor and the real purposes of their actions.
Nevertheless, it is fair to say, the essential charac-
teristic of alienated labor would never be the "mimetic"
adjustment to a technical process that Marcuse describes.
For Marx, the basis upon which any future liberation
depends is the complex of intention, action, purposes and
willpower that presently exists in work, no matter how
alienated, and these constitute the core of human activity
as such. Work may be boring, habitual, scientifically
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managed, and indeed programmed, but it always remains the
activity of human subjects. From the outside, and Marcuse
looks at them this way, workers may appear to be drones and
may even think of themselves as such, but at the core
, they
bear essential resemblance to the architect and no resem-
blance to the bee.
In response, Marcuse might argue that the above analy-
sis does not take into account the prevasive impact of
science and technology that exists today, in contrast with
the period when Marx wrote. Marcuse does, in fact,
criticize Marx for "undervaluing" their effect on "man's
being and consciousness," and this is embodied most
decisively in Marcuse' s claim that "by virtue of the way it
has organized its technological base, society tends to be
totalitarian. "7
This argument fails, however, in that it avoids the
essential issue raised. For Marx, ideology was always
necessary to fool people, while for Marcuse (in his theory
of absolute political mortification), ideology in Marx's
sense is obsolete. Morton Schoolman captures this
essential distinction between the two writers when he
claims
:
The reciprocal relationship of base and super-
structure as was conceived by Marx is altered by
Marcuse decisively in favor of an all-pervasive
and all-determining material basis encroaching
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upon manipulating, and coordinating ideology
until there ceases to be any difference betweenbase and superstructure, ideology and reality
subject and object. 8
If this assessment is true of Marcuse, his claim that Marx
"undervalues" science and technology can be true and remain
irrelevant to this discussion. It is not how much impact
technics has that is essential but what kind of impact.
The argument here is that it cannot turn people into mere
objective reflections of the technical base. Nor can
Marcuse sidestep this criticism by suggesting, as he does
at the beginning of One Dimensional Man
, that he is only
elucidating tendencies. This is also beside the point
because I am denying that they can even be tendencies,
since the end result is not possible.
Schoolman provides an excellent illustration to
support these claims against Marcuse. In reviewing the
literature of industrial psychology, he finds since the
mid-fifties an increasing acknowledgment that workers are
more complex than allowed for in the models of Frederick
Taylor and Elton Mayo. If the original techniques of
industrial management were not very successful, they were
now obsolete, replaced by "job rotation," "job enlarge-
ment," "participative management," "work teams," "human
relations training," "sensitivity training," "job enrich-
ment," "encounter groups" and even Eastern philosophy.
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These were developed to take into account the complex
rationality and emotional needs of workers, who were suf-
fering from a variety of maladies stemming from rational-
ization of the workplace, ranging from frustration,
meaninglessness of work, psychological failure, reduced
output and errors, to putting off difficult decisions,
daydreaming, impatience and aggression. White-collar
workers were also suspected of suffering from similar
ills. "Personality and organization" theory emphasized
techniques that would enhance the "growth needs" and
"self-realization" of white-collar workers throughout the
organizational hierarchy.
Schoolman claims, and I think he is right, that
Marcuse would explain these developments as a logical
extension of the methods of Frederick Taylor and Elton
Mayo, whose "substance and function has remained the
same": increasing rationalization at work brings with it
increasing rationalization of the human mind to conform
with the work process. There is, however, a better expla-
nation, argues Schoolman, in that the very proliferation o
such techniques indicates their failure rather than their
success. If human "irrationality" of the type suggested
above results from the increasing rationalization of work,
there may exist a fundamental "contradiction between human
nature and the nature of work in a technological society":
What this suggests is that the increasing
rationalization of production results not in more
extensive domination but in increasing resistance
to domination. Technological domination maytherefore reach its limits long before total
rationalization has been consummated, and at thehighest stages of rationalization this process
may be sowing the seeds for its reversal.
§
Let me now state the case somewhat differently than
Schoolman does. Viewed from Marcuse's perspective, the
list of industrial psychology techniques would be seen as
technical adjustments of the system toward increasing
rationalization. These would be effective because they
increase the worker's immediate satisfaction, thereby
enhancing motivation and productivity. Ultimately the
worker is so well integrated, he or she becomes indistin-
guishable from the apparatus itself. In these assumptions,
Marcuse differs little from functionalist industrial
psychologists themselves.
This line of thought, however, has no less a critic
than Thomas Fitzgerald, who, as director of employee
research and training at Chevrolet of General Motors, wrote
an article in The Harvard Business Review (1971) to warn
management against these techniques. For one thing, he
argued, programs such as "job enlargement" would wear thin,
requiring continuously developing new techniques. More
importantly, should more meaningful reform be intitiated,
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such as "worker participation," it could get out of hand
and challenge the prerogatives of management:
Once competence is shown (or believed to be
shown) m, say, rearranging the work area, and
a^r . P^rticiPation has become a conscious,officially sponsored activity, participators may
well want to go on to topics of job assignment,
the allocation of rewards, or even the selection
of leadership. In other words, management's
present monopoly--on initiating participation, onthe nomination of conferees, and on the limita-
tion of legitimate areas for review—can itself
easily become a source of contention.
Fitzgerald, with greater awareness of the politics of
the workplace than Marcuse, bluntly states: "History does
not offer many examples of oligarchies that have abdicated
with grace or goodwill." For his part, none of the
industrial psychology "reforms" listed can replace the
old-fashioned work ethic, now departed. They either will
fail to adequately address the motivation problem or lead
to demands for actual structural reform threatening the
system itself. 10
Reinstating subjectivity (even without full political
consciousness) back into the worker, we now find that the
techniques of ever-greater integration Marcuse fears may
either fail to integrate the worker or themselves spark
more radical demands. In the end, as Schoolman claims:
"Technological rationality is frustrated by the rationality
of subjectivity . "11 We must wonder, therefore, if
technological rationality cannot fully iffipose its wiu afc
the closest point to the "technological base,- the work-
place itself, how can it extend its grasp in the way
Marcuse claims, out into the political culture itself?
Subjectivity ja^Td^^tJ^^^
The argument presented so far is that technological
rationality cannot completely circumscribe consciousness in
any sphere of human interaction. I have already counter-
posed Marx's conception of false consciousness and praxis
to that of Marcuse and found the latter wanting. Moreover,
the examples drawn from industrial psychology seem to
indicate a practical limit to the extent to which humans
can be expected to adapt to a technical ensemble.
Marcuse'
s discussion of "one-dimensional language" is
an attempt to show how technological rationality, through
the medium of language, abets mimetic adjustment to
advanced industrial society. If such a language does not
and cannot exist as the only medium of human "discourse,"
however, this would also severely undermine Marcuse'
s
thesis. Is this the case?
If we recall Marcuse 's notion of liberation, we find
the quest for a qualitatively new science, free of domina-
tion and the telos of control over nature. Such a science
would also require methods, concepts and, indeed, a lan-
guage fundamentally different from that now utilized by
science. The present scientific language, for Marcuse, is
the form of the contemporary language of domination.
Jurgen Habermas critically confronts Marcuse 's view on
the relation of science and liberation. He argues that
there can be no qualitatively "new" science, if newness
means anything fundamentally different than the instrumen-
tal control over nature through purposive-rational action.
If this is true, the search for emancipation cannot depend
on a new science as the basis of human interaction. For
Habermas, liberation depends, instead, on several moments
in the historical dialectic: work as instrumental control
over nature through purposive-rational action and technical
rules; interaction dependent on conventions and norms
regulating conduct; and discourse which can call into
question doubtful norms or conventions, including the uses
to which science is put but not the project of technical
control itself as an aspect of human endeavor. Behind the
idea of discourse stands the ideal of undistorted communi-
cation which reveals, for Habermas, a human "emancipatory
interest" as such.
We can extend this argument to suggest that while
instrumental control over nature remains a partner in the
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quest for liberation, rationality cannot completely circum-
scribe human consciousness, although it can provide an
ideology that distorts this reflection, even for a critical
theorist
:
.
. .
with the institutionalization of scien-
tific-technical progress, the potential of the
productive forces has assumed a form owing to
which men lose consciousness of the dualism of
work and interaction.
. . . The increase in
adaptive behavior is, however, only the obverse
oitHi dissolution of linguistically mediated
interaction. This is paralleled subjectively by
the disappearance of the difference between
purposive-rational action and interaction from
the consciousness not only of the sciences of
man, but of men themselves. The concealment of
this difference proves the ideological power of
the technocratic consciousness . 12
Haberraas
_is extremely concerned about how far systems
of purposive-rational action can go in their ability to
dominate institutions and "detach" communicative action as
the basis for human consciousness: "today the psychotech-
nic manipulation of behavior can already liquidate the old
fashioned detour through norms that are internalized but
capable of reflection." Tomorrow "biotechnic intervention
in the endocrine regulating system," or in genetic trans-
mission itself could potentially "completely dry up" "old
regions of consciousness developed in ordinary language
communication." He remains unsure but these considerations
draw out, in his
of technological
view, the underlying model
rationality. Furthermore,
of the ideology
they urgently
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press us to recognize the distinction between the language
of work and that of interaction, because it is only by
penetrating the ideology of technological rationality by
"removing the restrictions on comunication" in the sphere
of interaction, that we can use the developing technology
in the interest of emancipation-
-and stave off the vague
possibility of total technological domination.
I should like to state the case somewhat more strongly
in reference to Marcuse. Complete domination of technolo-
gical rationality could not result from the type of social
control he suggests, although we will here leave it as an
open question as to whether the negative Utopia Habermas
warns of is at all possible. Further, if it would be pos-
sible to achieve total operant conditioning, I conclude,
this would constitute a fundamental and decisive change in
the evolution of the human species. Post-history in this
sense would clearly mean that human beings, as we now
understand that term, would cease to exist. Moreover, a
decisive examination of this potential would not only
include the question of whether it is feasible to complete
such widespread conditioning, but also whether, in fact,
conditioning of this sort would completely eliminate from
the "mind" the potential of human interaction and discourse.
In any case, the examples of technological domination
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of consciousness that Marcuse offers fall far short of even
beginning to establish this possibility. The evidence
Marcuse offers is paltry, to say the least, and at times
smacks of the most superficial behavioralism: the behavior
of the American people conforms (appears to conform) to the
needs of the technological apparatus, therefore, people are
presumed to be becoming one-dimensional. How does he
know? To put it bluntly, Marcuse provides little evidence
to support the thesis that absolute political mortification
is possible. The evidence he does supply consists largely
of superficial descriptions even of behavior (e.g., mime-
sis ) » virtually no analysis of the process of subjectivity
that lies behind the appearance of adaptation, a highly
speculative psychology, and an untenable thesis of one-
dimensional language.
One-dimensional language?
Those who believe that the moral concern which
prompted Marcuse 's thesis of one-dimensional language is
now behind us only need to listen to any press conference
in which President R.eagan defends what he calls the "Peace-
maker." The President is, of course, referring to the MX
missile and it is this type of bastardization of language
that worried Marcuse so. A similar example, it will be
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recalled, occured when President Nixon's press secretary
Ronald Ziegler termed as "inoperative" a previous statement
on Watergate by the President, a statement that was actual-
ly a lie. This use of language, however, condemnable, does
not constitute the basis for one-dimensional language.
Marcuse claims that there is a tendency to define
basic concepts in functional terms and then to operation-
alize these definitions. Taken to its logical conclusion,
a completely functional language could be developed in
which people would follow the rules of closed predefined
concepts, immune to reflection. If this occurred, people
would be following essentially technical rules of behavior;
and their behavior would, indeed, become lawlike. Systems
theory, it would appear, would become the theory and
practice of society, although presumably there would be no
subjects left to use it as a theory.
In no significant way does Marcuse establish this
case. Let us recall an extreme example he gives in which
ordinary language is manipulated to incorporate the equa-
tion, "preparing for war is preparing for peace." Here
Marcuse is claiming both that a fundamental concept, peace
(or war, for that matter), is being functionally redefined
to preserve the going order, and that this radical redefi-
nition conflates dialectically opposite terms. He is wrong
.
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on both counts
.
To the extent that people accept the locution "prepar-
ing for war is preparing for peace," they do so because
they retain an implicit distinction between war and peace.
Their agreement, instead, is predicated in the acceptance
of a theory of how one can best deter war, in this case, by
"strengthening" a nation militarily so that it will not be
challenged. Munich is the contrast model here. Of course,
we can object to this theory and claim, for example, that
such war preparations are well beyond what is necessary for
strength, or perhaps some would argue that pacifism, parti-
cularly in a nuclear age, is a more assured route to
peace. But these objections would not be arguments demon-
strating that the distinction has collapsed, for our claim
is that we are engaging in unnecessary or extremely
dangerous preparation, or in truth preparing for an
imminent war. Ronald Reagan's preparation for war may
appear to us to be insane, but his use of the "Peacemaker"
as the name for the MX missile is not, strictly speaking,
illogical. If he secretly intends to use it in a "first
strike," he would be lying, it will now appear, to those
whom he has manipulated into accepting his deterrence
theory. If, in fact, he has lost the distinction between
the concepts war and peace, he would actually be insane in
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a critical respect. But those sane people who agree with
his usage, whether honest or dishonest, do so based on an
implicit distinction they hold between the terms war and
peace in their understanding of the name "Peacemaker."
Marcuse needs to show, instead, that the term "peace-
is now fully defined by the term "war," as in "war is
peace." This he has not done and cannot do. For if the
term "war is peace" did not remain a contradiction in our
language, we would have not a one-dimensional society but
an insane society. Schizophrenics, for example, at times
develop insane languages on this model to cope with an
unbearable reality.
Marcuse could intelligibly claim that pushing the
locution "preparing for war is preparing for peace" too far
is dangerous for human survival and ultimately could under-
mine important aspects of coherence in our language, adding
to the danger. If such usage were manipulated by elites,
it could sow mass confusion, allowing war preparation to
continue. If the confusion spread to elites, we would have
a society in complete interpretive breakdown, in an impor-
tant sense the opposite of a one-dimensional society. As
the breakdown of coherence progressed in an age of nuclear
weapons, the survival of the society would clearly itself
be threatened. People would become dangerous to themselves
and others in precisely the same way as certain mental
patients are. This is the real danger posed by terms like
"Peacemaker." But a mass insane asylum is not a one-
dimensional society.
If opposite terms cannot be collapsed with the result
Marcuse envisions, can all important terms be functionally
defined and can this constellation of terms constitute the
sum of rules for human behavior? Marcuse criticizes posi-
tivist social scientists for defining democracy in terms of
the criteria they presume characterize the contemporary
American political system. Taken together, these consti-
tute the operational definition of the term. His deeper
fear is that, first, terms like "democracy" can, in fact,
be defined in this way and that, secondly, all important
normative concepts can thereby be rendered functional
becoming essentially technical terms. The first point
could be true only if we conceived of operationalization in
the highly qualified sense of stipulating a limited set of
relatively self-contained defining terms, but this
approach, if widely adopted, would severely undermine the
importance of the concept. His second concern remains
unfounded
.
"Democracy" is what has been called an "essentially
contested concept" in that it carries moral approbation in
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general and is therefore sought as the imprimatur for a
variety of social systems. Each conception of democracy,
however, carries with it certain assumptions about politi-
cal anthropology, socioeconomic organization, and how other
important terms such as "freedom" and "justice" are to be
filled out. "Democracy" is, then, a term which helps
constitute a way of life that sets the context for human
intention, purposes, thought and action. If "democracy"
were to be "operationally" defined in the above sense, it
would at once lose its ideological power: confined to a
discrete set of "operations," it would no longer be an
important context for human interaction, now only tangen-
tially related to the important terms that do set the
context. It would be reduced to a quasitechnical terra.
Marcuse, then, is right in criticizing positivists for
uncritically equating democracy with certain practices in
U.S. political life, but wrong in assuming that if demo-
cracy could actually be reduced to this scope, it would
remain an important concept.
The real ideological power of positivist redefinitions
of democracy is that they trade on our ordinary usage of
the term, which carries an implicit understanding of it as
crucial in constituting a desired way of organizing poli-
tical life. Operationalizing the term would, therefore,
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either cut it off from any significant relation to concepts
like "freedom" and "justice," or similarly reduce the
importance of these terms by operationalizing them as
well. Moreover, the operational criteria of democracy,
such as elections, would also have to be given discrete
definitions. All these would have to be reduced, essenti-
ally to quasi-technical terms and, as such, they would
provide little ideological purchase. On the contrary, what
is pernic ious about the project of positivists
. then, is
not that they will successfully operationally the concept,
but that they are likely to only partially re-define it,
retaining much of its moral imprimatur and ideological
power
.
Can language consisting solely of functional technical
terms be established? Let us now contrast "democracy" with
a technical concept, whose operational criteria can be
specified. Let us define "boiling water" as a condition
that obtains when water reaches a temperature of 212° F at
sea-level atmospheric pressure. We have now stipulated
sufficient criteria for the definition of the concept:
when water is heated to 212°F under atmospheric pressure,
it boils changing from the liquid to the gas state. We
notice immediately that the concept "boiling water" entails
other concepts, whose definition would entail others still,
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such as temperature, molecules, etc. What begins as a
simple operational definition, then, soon becomes more
complex. This is unimportant, however, for the point of
the term "boiling water" only is to stipulate a condition
that exists with a certain mixture of heat, water and atmo-
spheric pressure. "Boiling water" differs from the term
"democracy" in that there is nothing within the rules we
follow to apply the concept that tells us anything about
its use or why one would ever, in fact, boil water. On the
other hand, democracy and the concepts it is tied to them-
selves entail reasons for their own application.
Let us contrast a hypothetical society in which a
bubbling underground spring is viewed as a gift of the gods
with our own in the age of nuclear power plants where
technicians are charged with the job of boiling water with
the heat of nuclear fission. In the former, water boils
but "boiling water" does not exist as a technical terra. To
the extent that it exists at all, it is a religious
concept. In the latter, technicians follow rules to
control nature for an intended result, the production of
electricity to light and heat homes and provide power for
machinery. However, the concept and the rules to realize
it only make sense in a social context that is able to
apprehend the concept and its criteria and has established
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the purpose in doing so. The latter appraisal is dependent
upon norms of behavior and reflections on these norms as to
how to live. These judgments cannot be reduced to techni-
cal rules, although technical requirements may enter into
the judgment. A society may be short on energy and choose
not to use nuclear power because of insoluble problems with
the technology. The closer the "technical" problems come
to threatening important norms or values , the stronger they
become as reasons for a course of action: in this case,
life itself may be threatened. However, technical rules
themselves cannot establish their own ultimate value or
purposes: they remain dependent upon the sphere of com-
municative discourse to establish the meaning of the social
practices they help constitute.
Yet it is this sphere that Marcuse fears can be com-
pletely circumscribed from human consciousness. If the
above argument is correct, however, this cannot be possible
(short of the unlikely and perhaps impossible negative
Utopia Habermas describes) because technical rules by
themselves do not motivate behavior. And if the technical
rules derived from the law-like behavior of physical
properties cannot be meaningfully detached to stand inde-
pendently from communicative discourse, then we would
expect the rules governing "purposive-rational" behavior in
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social systems also to be incapable of such detachment.
In fact, this is the case. The "technical" rules
governing the concept "pricing" in a market economy may be
derived by studying the relationship between supply and
demand. As long as the economy remained a free market
economy, and as long as this relationship is not reflected
on, or is reflected on and accepted, it would indeed help
predict pricing behavior. Now suppose shortages develop in
food products while there is an abundant supply of automo-
biles. Such a development could help call into question an
important normative underpinning for market economies
--the
efficient use of resources to provide the greatest good for
the greatest number. Government could in this case decide
to subsidize the increased production of food through a tax
on automobiles. In the short run, as production of food
increased, its price would drop and more and more people
would eat. The system would be adjusted by human inter-
vention through government into the pricing mechanism that
is partly justified by an important norm of market theory
itself. Without understanding this modification and the
reason for it, the new pricing systen would be unintelli-
gible. It is decisive, however, that the alteration of the
"technical" rules governing pricing can develop out of an
immanent critique of the market theory of which pricing is
392
a conceptual component. "Technical" terms like "pricing"
bear a more immediate relationship to the norms and values
implicit in communication than do terms like "boiling
water .
"
For Marcuse to fully develop the thesis of one-dimen-
sional language, therefore, he would have to reveal a fully
enclosed "systems language," in which all concepts are
defined by discrete operational requirements: "subjects"
would be defined by a closed set of predicates; verbs would
"describe" movement not human action; with the sundering of
human "purposes," the relation between "subjects" and
"objects" would be altered, as the opposite terms merge.
It might take the form when W (water) is subjected to X
(212°) and Y (sea-level pressure) then Z (water boils). Of
course, it would not be a language at all but a set of
lawlike statements of precisely the same character as those
that stipulate the conditions under which the concept
"boiling water" is operational.
Technical language cannot exist on its own because it
is dependent on the language of human interaction to
discover the laws that would form the basis for its rules
and on human subjects to follow those rules for some
purpose, in part, removed from the rules themselves.
"Subjects" following only technical rules would, in fact,
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be objects determined by laws-a truly one-dimensional
language would signal the end of the human race as we now
know it
.
Up till now the discussion has been a bit unkind to
Marcuse because it has not acknowledged his own ambivalence
about how far one-dimensional language has developed.
Referring to one-dimensional language, he remarks that
"people don't believe it, or don't care, and yet act
accordingly." There appears to be for Marcuse a remaining
critical potential to language exhibited in slang, collo-
quial speech and the depth layers of Karl Krauss discussed
earlier in Chapter IV. Marcuse, therefore, maintains that
it is possible to "make the established language itself
speak what it conceals or excludes, for what is to be
revealed and denounced is [still] operative within the
universe of discourse and action." However, Marcuse also
maintains that the universe of discourse is "closed" and
that ordinary usage is stuck within the "straightjacket of
common usage," which is a "totally manipulated and indoc-
trinate universe." Can this contradiction be resolved?
Morton Schoolman resolves it, I think correctly, in
the following way. While Marcuse stresses the importance
of understanding the "social context" in which ideological
language develops, he "fails to push the notion of social
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context to a concept of an intersubjectively constituted
context of meaning":
For^ Marcuse, social context appears to mean
social structures or political institutions that
create ideological meanings completely indepen-dent of the language and meaning constituted by
the activity of the society's members. ... It
is as though the individual comes to know two
entirely different languages, one constituted
intersubjectively and the other structurally
determined, neither of which can be understood in
the least in the other's terms. Only such a
structural theory of the formation of the "pre-
vailing universe of discourse" could explain how
ideological meanings are closed to critical per-
spectives . 13
Therefore, if ideologically distorted ordinary lan-
guage does not emanate from, and, in fact, exists indepen-
dently of the depth layers of language that do develop
within human practice, the individual has no critical pur-
chase within speech to uncover the distortion. Extending
Schoolman's argument, if such a separation can occur and
technological rationality can independently motivate
behavior, there is nothing in principle to stop the func-
tional language of the technical base from eventually
eroding that subjectivity now still revealed by language's
"depth layer." As systems of purposive-rational action
extended their grip on society, the need to define a way of
life through norms and values would recede, and the ideo-
logy of technological rationality would completely
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circumscribe "consciousness," which would by now be reduced
to functional behavior. The end result would truly be
"one-dimensional man." But it is precisely this idea of a
one-dimensional language of technical rules removed from
the intersubjectively established language of human prac-
tice that we have challenged. If this separation is not
discarded, then Marcuse's thesis is implausible; if it is
discarded, then his case is fraught with contradictions.
In either case, the thesis of one-dimensional language as
evidence for absolute political mortification is undermined.
Nor, once again, can this objection be avoided by
claiming the domination of technological rationality is
only a "tendency," for it is the plausibility of the end
result that I am questioning. In fact, disclaimers of this
kind would only heighten the suspicion that Marcuse does
believe fully that "one-dimensional language" is a plau-
sible outcome of advanced industrial society. What began,
then, as an apparently unkind discussion of Marcuse's
language theory is now revealed as a straightforward
attempt to draw out its underlying assumptions.
R.eal people and false-consciousness
In his discussion of the world of ordinary language
and how analytic philosophy itself becomes ideological,
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Marcuse argues:
In one way or another, all possibly meaningfulpredicates are prejudged. The prejudging judg-
ment might be as broad as the English * language
or the dictionary, or some other code or "con-'
vent ion. Once accepted, it constitutes an
empirical a priori which cannot be transcended.
But this radical acceptance of the empirical
Lby ordinary language philosophers] violates the
empirical, for in it speaks the mutilated, "ab-
stract individual who experiences (and express-
es) only that which is given to him (given in a
I
^-
teral sense)
,
who has only the facts and not
the factors, whose behavior is one-dimensional
and manipulated. By virtue of the factual
repression, the experienced world is the result
of a restricted experience, and the positivis t
cleaning of the mind brings the mTnoin line with
the restricted experience
.
1*+ "
We must now ask, how can Marcuse conclude that the
"English language" can become an "empirical a priori" that
becomes a weapon for the "positivist cleaning of the
mind"? Part of the answer has already been given. If lan-
guage can be conceived, as Marcuse believes it can, as a
one-dimensional universe of terms that mirror only the
"positive" technological universe, consisting of closed
"operational" definitions of what become essentially
"technical" terms, of a series of terms that cannot
contradict one another, then the mind must be an essenti-
ally inactive receptacle that is "given" thought from the
outs ide
.
It is apparent by now that the origin of "one-dimen-
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sional" thought is, in some unspecified way, the technical
base. The character of the mind and, indeed, of human
subjectivity is presently determined not by its own logic,
nor even by a dialectical relation between the human
subject and the objectified technological universe, but by
the logic of technics itself. 15 Thought processes mirror,
and not just metaphorically, the needs of advanced indus-
trial society and the "person" incorporates them as his or
her own.
Now this is, of course, a negative-utopia for Marcuse--
not the desired state of affairs. Yet this fact cannot
save Marcuse from the argument advanced here, that his con-
cept of mind, and of human subjectivity itself, is essen-
tially one-dimensional. For the type of transformation
that people would have to make, from two-dimensional action
to one-dimensional behavior, is so radical that it would be
tantamount to creating objects out of subjects. I shall
soon ask, does Marcuse' s view of psychology and liberation
significantly mitigate the force of the questions I have
raised?
First let me ask a question. Marcuse' s analysis of
contemporary society has been valuable for this study
because it attempts to examine, in stark fashion, how peo-
ple may be conditioned not to engage in political thought
398
and action or to engage only in uncritical political think-
ing and mimetic activity. We have defended him against
methodological and political charges on the issue of
whether false-consciousness is an illicit concept and
criticized him for extending his argument well beyond any
reasonable concept of false-consciousness. Is there a
contrast-model that retains the importance of Marcuse's
attempt to conceptualize the role of false-consciousness in
the study of depoliticization
, while avoiding his errors?
Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb criticize writers of
both the left and right for too glibly accepting the idea
that economic rewards are a sufficient motivation for the
integration of workers into an industrialized society.
They title their 1972 book The Hidden Injuries of Class
,
because in their study of the beliefs, aspirations, and
motivations of workers, they find a far more complex rela-
tion between the appearance of worker integration and the
reality of emotional damage in a class society. Even those
workers who have made it into "middle class" American life,
they argue, are far from content with their achievements.
Sennett and Cobb's work is a powerful indictment of
writers such as Marcuse, who profess to analyze conscious-
ness without seriously considering both the actual beliefs
that workers hold and the active role of the workers in
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helping create those beliefs. How would Marcuse, the
authors might ask, explain the feelings of someone like
Frank Rissarro, who has climbed the ladder from the factory
into the "white-collar" world but does not feel his new
work is worthwhile when compared to jobs that produce
useful things? Yet he has climbed this ladder to gain
respect and personal dignity. Or Frank O'Malley, who
understands that success and respect require advancement
over one's fellows, and that such advancement erodes
fraternity, the respect of others, and ultimately self-
respect. Sennett and Cobb unearth a rich complex of
aspirations, attitudes and beliefs that, taken together,
constitute the "internalizing of class conflict, the
process by which struggle between men leads to struggle
within each man. "16
In sharp contrast with Marcuse, the authors argue that
class conflict is, indeed, not dead, but that it must be
studied in relation to specific aspects of ideology, cul-
tural background, intergenerational differences, specific
work and even personal circumstances. Taken together, they
do find important common themes in the responses of those
they interview. American workers define their self-worth
in terms of ability to succeed, educational accomplishment,
personal sacrifice, and freedom. Yet they are caught in
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binds at every turn. They are "free" to advance, but if
they do, they sacrifice fraternity and respect, and if they
don't, they risk their dignity. They want their children's
lot to be better than their own and they will sacrifice for
this goal. But when their children become educated, workers
may feel betrayed by the status distinction that has now
been insinuated into their family, are ambivalent about the
kind of work their children will do and are often resented
by their children who never asked for the sacrifice in the
first place. In order to maintain dignity and respect,
they judge themselves and others, yet they don't feel
qualified to judge. They feel anxious and often guilt-
ridden about their lives and blame themselves for these
feelings--"if only I had worked harder," "made use of that
education," "sacrificed more." Whether they succeed or
not, they often feel as if they have failed and they blame
themselves for their failure.
Consider now the passivity of men such as these in
this light. Rissarro has achieved much of what he consi-
ders the "good things" in life, yet after superficial
declarations of satisfaction, the doubt shows. Rissarro
views himself on the receiving end of the good things , a
passive agent who is not the cause of even his own
success: "I was just at the right place at the right
time." Far from being a disclaimer of modesty, what
Rissarro's comment reveals is a man who feels he doesn't
belong in the world he now inhabits, as an outsider
intruding on the middle class, illegitimate in his new
situation and undeserving of respect. He explains his
achievements to himself as luck-
-the intervention of an
outside force. To explain it as achievement would be to
respect himself, but he is not confident of his dignity.
Yet he wants respect and so he continues to judge himself
and others in a social situation that will only reconfirm
his doubt.
Rissarro's comprehension of himself as a passive
agent, however, is a far cry from adaptation to a mimetic
process. In fact, it is his active struggle for identity
and respect which is crucial in turning the blame for his
situation not on society or on a class structure, but on
himself
. Indeed, if he weren't such an active, self-
blaming judge, he might be more willing to listen to
theorists like Marcuse. Sennett and Cobb report:
The examples we have so far given of assertion of
individual ability in families point to three
general results of such assertion: the search
for respect is thwarted; the individual feels
personally responsible for the failure; the whole
attempt accustoms him to think that to have
individual respect you must have social
inequality .17
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Sennett and Cobb capture the sociological significance
of John Schaar's critique of equal opportunity as ideo-
logy. When it totally circimscribes identity development
within the countours of achievement ideology, equal oppor-
tunity is hostile to equality, community and self-respect.
The result is not contentment but deep personal injury,
most intense for those strivers of ethnic and class
backgrounds whose status is insecure in America to start
with
.
While the analysis of writers like Sennett and Cobb is
a healthy antidote to superficial studies of consciousness,
it exaggerates the sufficiency of studying the beliefs and
the self-interpretation of the agent in the explanation of
his or her actions. Most of us only imperfectly know why
we do what we do. While the explanation of behavior surely
must include the beliefs of the participants, those beliefs
sometimes constitute a partial or even false understanding
of the real situation the agent is in.
A fuller accounting must include both the structural
constraints on action and beliefs and the unconscious and
semiconscious motives of the participant. A white worker
may hate Blacks and join the Ku Klux Klan because he be-
lieves Blacks to be welfare cheaters. While we can always
ask, "Do you really hate Blacks for this reason?" we can
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accept the self-assertion at some point and still conclude
that this belief is not the real reason, while it is cer-
tainly the reason he gives. We may say that the real
reason is that he is part of a racist labor market in which
he sees Blacks shuttling continuously between menial jobs
and state dependency for survival or that the white worker
has suppressed fears about his own adequacy or discontent
as a worker and projects them onto the most available
target. In the investigation of human behavior, we must
always ask if the beliefs of the participant accurately
capture the situation he or she is in. In doing so, we
distinguish between the immediate unreflective motivation
for action and the underlying constraining factors.
Moreover, the self-interpretation of the agent may
itself not only result from structural and psychological
constraints but contribute to them. I may work in a soci-
ety in which work is unsatisfying, organized instrument-
ally, complemented with an ideology of achievement, and
preserve my self-respect by believing that I do what I do
so that my children will prosper. I see young middle-class
radicals criticizing the kind of work I am forced to do and
rejecting the type of life I want for my children. To
maintain my identity, I suppress my doubts about my work
and life and explain the behavior of the radicals as
Utopian or adolescent. I, therefore, reject a potential
alliance that might help me explain the constraints on my
worklife, thereby strengthening those constraints through
my active recreation of the ideology of achievement into,
first, the ideology of sacrifice, and secondly, my main-
tenance of the ideology in the face of challenge. 18 From
the point of view of my position in the labor market, I
adapt an important aspect of dominant ideology to my situa-
tion, reject alternatives, suppress doubts, close off new
ways to understand my situation, and shore up the factors
that constrain me in my position, now under radical
attack. My "self-creation" can end up as self-deception
and even irrationality, and the fact that I help do it can
strengthen the deception.
Moreover, were I to accept the position of the radi-
cals, I would find important institutions such as my labor
union arrayed against me, constrained by a corporate eco-
nomy to favor pay incentives over redefinitions of work.
Should I be elected president of my union, I would find
that our new program would itself be in a bind. Advancing
it might incur plant closings, while retreating from it
would undermine the legitimacy of the "new" institution I
have helped create, and undermine worker motivation as
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well. If my program became one of full worker's control
over production, it would find itself in contradiction with
capitalist prerogatives of control over the workplace, and
perhaps be repressed. To be successful, my program would
have to generate substantial refashioned institutional
support to create pressures for structural change within
capitalism. Perhaps my work would be successful enough to
throw American capitalism into a bind; to allow it to
continue would threaten investment strikes and underpro-
duction, while to repress it would undermine worker
motivation and productivity and threaten revolution.
Having successfully created institutional pressures
for change, other workers like me would now have an oppor-
tunity to work under self-managed industries. Seeing that
work can be more satisfying than they had imagined, the
need would lessen for them to maintain the ideology of
sacrifice in the face of counter-evidence as to its desira-
bility. The bind they were formerly in between rejecting
an ideology vital to their self-respect and rejecting
constituencies with whom they could align would now loosen
its hold. Released doubts would now lessen their anxiety
and strengthen their resolve to struggle for a better
life. They would believe they can change their life and
have a structural opening for such change to be feasible.
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Surely, then, Sennett and Cobb are right in suggesting
that ideology is not simply imposed on workers, and Marcuse
is wrong in assuming that it conditions them in the way he
says. Of course, people do not simply create ideology to
meet their life situation, for the ideology they commit
themselves to is itself constrained by social structure and
institutional arrangements, closing off other avenues for
thought and action and fostering suppression of doubts.
And such institutional complexes cannot be easily discarded
as they provide, however unfairly or imperfectly, basic
needs of food, shelter, and security for many people, as
well as rooting identity and belief. It is, then, this
complex of attitudes, beliefs, needs, programs for action,
institutions, and social systems that, taken together,
constitute a truly dialectical relationship between the
active agent establishing meaning in his or her life and
the social structure that both constrains and enables the
agent to think and act. The struggle for self-conscious-
ness is nothing less than the struggle to overcome the
false and partial understanding about one's real situation
and make this dialectic as transparent as possible. Sim-
plistic and exaggerated theories of false-consciousness
must be decisively rejected, for they undermine, at the
same time, the quest for adequate explanations of action
and the quest for freedom itself.
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Marcuse's Freud and subjectivity
In the above discussion, I have argued that Marcuse's
account of subjectivity itself at times tends to be one-
dimensional, thereby fundamentally misconstruing the nature
of false-consciousness in political life. To this Marcuse
might respond that while reasonable people can disagree
about the degree of adaptation that has been reached or is
likely to be reached, he too believes human subjectivity to
be more complex than I have granted him. What I have done,
he might suggest, is only describe his views on the thought
and action of people's "second nature"--the depth sociali-
zation that fosters adaptation right down to the "biology"
of people. Human subjectivity exists, but it is so
repressed that in any description of thought or behavior,
it appears completely transcended.
This rejoinder would advance Marcuse's case, but only
so far. It advances it because we do see in Marcuse's
psychology some residual doubt about how far socialization
can go. For example, Marcuse speaks not only of mimesis
but also of guilt, sublimation and introjection . The
difference between these concepts is important: where
mimesis implies an incredibly weak ego (or none at all)
that simply reflects the needs of society, concepts like
guilt, introjection and sublimation imply both norms of
conduct and identity development. Moreover, the process of
introjecting morality, and the function of guilt and subli-
mation, betray a relation between the individual and soci-
ety that cannot be harmonized in the way mimesis suggests.
Guilt is necessary because all individual needs are not
compatible with those of society, and sublimation is a way
for the individual to gain gratification from desires that
would be otherwise thwarted. Mimesis
,
however, implies no
such conflict between individual and society.
For Marcuse, concepts like introjection and guilt are
more appropriate for the era of competitive capitalism,
with the decisive paternal resolution of the Oedipal con-
flict, while mimesis becomes increasingly appropriate
during the decline of authority characteristic of advanced
industrial society. Marcuse might argue that usage of both
sets of terms implies a society in process of transforma-
tion. This explanation remains inadequate, however, for it
still implies that mimesis could become the primary and
perhaps sole mode of socialization. Yet Marcuse offers no
substantial evidence for this claim, and I have offered
evidence against it.
Moreover, even if we presumed with Marcuse that
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beneath mimetic adjustment there resided a more primary
nature, Marcuse 's account of subjectivity would remain
flawed. Here a contrast with Freud is helpful. For Freud,
individual maturation is based on a process of development
through which humans learn how to manage their needs, more
or less successfully. The process is complex, involving
particular developmental stages and their resolution (e.g.,
the Oedipal situation), at times immediate identification
(e.g., the oral phase) and at others repression, guilt,
introjection, sublimation, etc. Through this process, the
individual develops a sense of self-identity and a sense of
others, and such is a necessary basis for cognitive deve-
lopment as well. I become relatively free as I learn what
needs I should and should not act on and why I act as I do
in given situations. Against this process of development
and subjectivity, however pessimistic in Freud's analysis,
Marcuse offers essentially an ideal--by 1969 a "biological
foundation for socialism." Having found Freud's "man" now
obsolete, it is here that Marcuse locates the substratum of
real human subjectivity. Subjectivity, then, becomes
reduced to a hope for the future.
However, he offers us little understanding of the
process by which such subjectivity would develop. There
are times when Marcuse does come close to stipulating the
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conditions necessary for the development of self
-identity
.
In his essay "Repressive Tolerance" he writes:
Frequently brushed aside is the question as to
what has to be repressed before one can be a
self, oneself. The individual potential is first
a negative one, a portion of the potential of his
society: of aggression, guilt feeling, ignor-
ance, resentment, cruelty which vitiate his life
instincts. If the identity of the self is to be
more than the immediate realization of this
potential (undesirable for the individual as
human being) then it requires repression and
sublimation, conscious transformation. This
process involves at each stage (to use the ridi-
culed terms which here reveal their succinct
concreteness) the negation of the negation,
mediation of the immediate, and identity is no
more and no less than this process. "Alienation"
is the constant and essential element of iden-
tity, the objective side of the subject- -and not,
as it is made to appear today, a disease, a
psychological condition. Freud well knew the
difference between progressive and regressive,
liberating and destructive repression . 19
Marcuse here stresses obj ectification , and the necessity of
some constraints for the development of the self and the
development of the psyche--even in a liberated psyche of
the future. More characteristically, however, Marcuse
fluctuates between the despair of total alienation and the
hope of total liberation.
Instead of a portrait of psychic and cognitive deve-
lopment, we are left with a rather mechanistic portrait of
both the requirements for establishing true subjectivity
and the nature of subjectivity itself. For Marcuse, the
emergence of real subjectivity is predicated on overcoming
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scarcity and the need for the performance principle, and
thereby unnecessary repression. Unlike Freud, for Marcuse
the necessity of repression is evaluated primarily by the
material development of society, not by the developmental
structure of the psyche in relation to the presumed needs
of civilization as such.
Yet what kind of subjectivity is Marcuse offering?
Certainly it is not on the model of Freud, for this is the
type of person who has become obsolete with the passing of
competitive capitalism. Indeed, having abandoned in prac-
tice Freud's developmental scheme and providing no replace-
ment, Marcuse leaves us to wonder how a person would deve-
lop a concept of self and other and conceptual categories
with which to interpret the world. We are left, instead,
with the ideal of a "new man" who would presumably be free
to use reason to gain gratification, substantially free of
the need for sublimation, repression, and fantasy charac-
teristic of earlier unliberated social systems. What
remains, then, is an image of a core of true human subjec-
tivity as Eros
,
that can be reached by stripping away the
layers of "oppressive" mental structuring.
Morton Schoolman, for example, criticizes Marcuse for
utilizing essentially an "economic" model in which in-
stincts press for unsublimated modes of discharge. For
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Marcuse, then, thought as mediation of a pleasurable exper-
ience is peripheral to the direct gratification of an
impulse. Here is the basic problem. If freedom is defined
largely by the pursuit of unsublimated gratification, the
subject who is pursuing that "freedom," or simply following
the libidinal drives for gratification, would be in no
position to choose alternate paths to gratification or
between different types of gratification. Indeed, he or
she would be in no position to decide if present
gratification would be in his or her long-term interest.
The idea of choice itself seems undermined. The
unfortunate collapsing of freedom, reason and happiness in
Marcuse is symptomatic of the eclipse of subjectivity
within his ideal of human development.
In his conception both of extreme apathy and of total
freedom, therefore, Marcuse leaves us little in the way of
a viable concept of subjectivity. His lack of rigor opens
up his argument to internal confusion and makes interpreta-
tion of what he really intends difficult. If we look, for
example, at his reason for the rise of the "new sensibil-
ity," we find it resides in the lack of severity of
parental repression and freedom from responsibilities.
Yet, were these not some of the same ingredients that
created the post-capitalist person so ripe for manipu-
lation. And why is Marcuse so sharply critical of the
"beats" in 1964 and so hopeful about "hippies" in 1969?
Without greater clarity about the development of subjec-
tivity, Marcuse falls into the trap of selectively and
illicitly using similar evidence at different times to
reach different conclusions. If students are reared more
permissively than workers, confronting less paternal
authority, by Marcuse' s own account in One Dimensional Man
we would expect them to be more integrated into advanced
industrial society, not less so. Similarly, Marcuse needs
to explain more clearly why desublimation is today so
repressive, while in the hoped-for future, it would be an
important basis of human liberation.
Instead, we are left with the vague idea of Eros. It
is no wonder, then, that Alisdair Maclntyre concludes that
Marcuse is a "pre-Marxist" thinker, while John Fry asserts
that libido as a "material substratum" allows him to "have
his idealist cake and eat it too," while Morton Schoolman
criticizes him for behaviorism. In the end, Marcuse 1 s
adaptation of Freud does not save Marcuse from the charge
that he has offered an inadequate account of human subjec-
tivity. Neither the total alienation of one-dimensional
"man" nor the "freedom" of liberated "man" contains within
it a subject worthy or capable of being free.
This result is, perhaps, not as surprising as it might
seem at first glance. Marcuse turns to Freud to help fill
in a social psychology largely vacant in Marxist thought.
Yet both the Marxist hope for a liberated future and the
Marcusean fear of the contemporary reach of technological
rationality present an image of the person and society
standing in a far more harmonious relation than Freud ever
imagined. Neither did Freud envision the communal future
desired by Marcuse nor did he present a scheme of human
development that would admit of the full participation and
sensibility necessary for that ideal. In his attempt to
explain the present and give hope to the future, therefore,
Marcuse must and does discard the Freudian model of the
development of human subjects. But what does he replace it
with?
Morton Schoolman, focusing on Marcuse' s analysis of
technics, explains it this way. Marcuse' s analysis of the
psychological underpinning of one dimensionality is based
on a "prior allegiance" to a framework that comprehends
"social life exclusively in terms of the historical condi-
tions, material factors, in the final analysis, structural
elements constituting and determining the subject." Mar-
cuse, therefore, "preinterprets" Freud's metapsychological
categories in ways that render them compatible with
415
Marcuse'
s analysis of social structure. The result is that
he severely downplays Freud's constitutional factors of
development and the development of the ego, focusing
instead on the malleability of the instincts for social
control. In this way, Schoolman might have added, Marcuse
can retain the liberating potential of technics through
overcoming scarcity, by showing that although the need for
scarcity has been largely overcome (he assumes), now direct
instinctual programming channels behavior and prevents
freedom. This reasoning enables Marcuse to develop his
thesis of surplus repression, thereby perserving his
Marxian cum Marcusean hope that advanced technology is the
base upon which liberation can still be built. In the end,
Schoolman may well be right when he concludes that:
"Marcuse 's (pre-) interpretation of Freud can produce no
other effect than to erase all limits on the extent to
which the individual can be socialized. "20
Marcuse' s turn to Freud, then, does not accomplish
what is required of it. It neither provides a substantial
depth dimension with which to root the one dimensionality
thesis, nor does it preserve an ideal capable of someday
being practiced. On the one hand, we have the image of
persons as fully programmed objective reflections of the
needs of a repressive technology, whose instincts--both for
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life and death-become resources for system stability.
This is "second nature." Yet it is second nature with only
apparent depth-for Marcuse gives us reason to believe that
it can be quickly altered in reaction to changes in the
technical base of society. Completely adaptable indivi-
duals would provide little opposition, therefore, to
changes in social structure of a progressive cast. This
conclusion is truly ironic: Marcuse originally turns to
Freud, in part, because of the presumption that a tenacious
repressive psychology is itself an important impediment to
successful revolution.
Below second nature we have a more primary nature that
at times appears as art-as-life and at others as a living
embodiment of the pleasure principle. Yet, if Schoolman is
right, "second nature" is not really an analysis of the
logic of human development at a particular time in history,
but of technological categories imputed to the mind: in
dominating second nature, technological rationality sub-
verts Eros
,
the primary nature of people.
Marcuse' s dilemma is this. Without Freud, he is
unable to show either the subject's role in his or her own
repression or the relationship between the instincts and
cognitive and ego development. Without Freud, in short, he
has an impoverished psychological subject. Yet with Freud,
417
he can't identify the individual with the society in the
way he wants to in either the oppressive one-dimensional
phase or in the future communitarian phase. Marcuse's
adaptation of Freud is unsatisfactory, then, because in
discarding Freud's pessimism, he also discards Freud's
model of subject development without replacing it with one
that could bring forth the basis of a reasonable notion of
liberation--a complex human subject. The irony emanating
from this lacuna in Marcuse's thought is that when applied
to the unliberated present, Freud's model of human
development appears as an exercise in optimism in
comparison to Marcuse's.
Beyond liberating tolerance
Marcuse's problematic account of subjectivity also
becomes the underpinning of what amounts to an ultimately
quiescent political strategy. As we have seen, Marcuse is
predisposed to believe that technological rationality both
dominates the political system and consciousness, so that
the essential conditions for democracy do not exist. His
essay "Repressive Tolerance" may be understood as an
attempt both to undermine the belief that democratic
tolerance does exist and to stipulate how conditions may be
recreated under which people could reason freely. He
writes
:
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. .
the alternative to the established semi-democratic process is not a dictatorship orelite no matter how intellectual and intelli-gent but the struggle for real democracy. Partof this struggle is the fight against an ideology
°J t
t° 1
.
eranc
1
e which, in reality, favors andfortifies the conservation of the status quo ofinequality and discrimination.21 M
Given the prevailing conditions of "tyranny by the
majority," however, Marcuse concludes that the tolerance
necessary for a free society can only be won by the efforts
of radical minorities--"militantly intolerant and disobe-
dient to the rules of behavior which tolerate destruction
and suppression." Exhibiting the "new sensibility," radi-
cal minorities are in the privileged position of being able
to reason and speak the truth. Liberating tolerance is,
for Marcuse, nothing less than speaking the truth and act-
ing truthfully, while deterring others from speaking and
acting falsely. For Marcuse, it will be recalled the
"telos of tolerance is truth."
Marcuse is certainly correct in pointing out the
selective tolerance of liberal polities. His equation of
liberating tolerance with truth, of course, puts him in
much more difficult water, for which he has been roundly
criticized. What he should have said, perhaps, was that
all polities set parameters for what they will tolerate,
and that he is trying to redefine those parameters in a
more reasonable way, using coercion when necessary, just as
419
polities themselves do. Whatever objections one might have
to this reformulation, it would allow Marcuse to claim that
the present system is one of pseudo-tolerance and maintain
the important conceptual distance between tolerance as an
important condition for the search for truth, and truth
itself.
Alasdair Maclntyre sharply criticizes Marcuse for not
recognizing that the "telos of tolerance is not truth but
rationality." For a person to be rational, he or she must
state ideas in such a way that we could know what would
count as evidence against then, and they be held open to
criticism and refutation. Rationality does not guarantee
truth, but it is an important means to attain it. The
toleration of alternate ideas is, therefore, necessary to
achieve a truer understanding of our situation because it
allows us to use reason more fully. Marcuse himself
suggests that in the last analysis, people should decide
what is in their interests --if and when they are free to
choose. Yet, the closer he comes to stipulating what that
choice must be, the more specious his notion of freedom
becomes and the more questionable the "truths" arrived at.
Human beings at any one time only imperfectly know
their situation. There always exist, theoretically, new
ideas and information which could bear on their self-
420
understanding, and the point of view of that understanding
is itself subject to change. From the point of view of
justice, I may view as fair an exam I didn't study for and
failed, while, from the point of view of my freedom, it
restricts my ability to get a job. I may ultimately decide
that 1 cannot be truly free unless I follow the dictates of
what I perceive as just. I am in the best position to
capture the truth of my situation only after reasonably
exhausting the possible ideas, information, and points of
view pertinent to it. Moreover, to deepen my knowledge, I
would need to explore which of the conventions and con-
straints of my society harm my interests and inhibit ray
freedom and which enhance both. The ideal of equal oppor-
tunity and the need for an education for respect and a good
job may have thrown me into a competitive educational rat
race, while the ideal of equality and the hostility of
corporate capitalism to authoritarian patriarchy may have
fueled rebellion against illegitimate authority. For me to
more fully understand the real role of present ideas,
information, conventions and structural arrangements, I
need to compare them to some alternate set. My judgment is
further enhanced by opening it to discussion and criticism
by others. Having done all this, I am in a better position
to know how I would be freer or what is in ray real inter-
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est. In short, I become more fully self-conscious of the
situation I am actually in, and self
-consciousness requires
tolerance of competing ideas within the individual and
within the society. Neither the pseudotolerance of "semi-
democratic" societies nor the "liberating tolerance" Mar-
cuse prescribes enhances such self-reflection.
Marcuse would agree that in an egalitarian society of
equal access to education, media and other resources, such
reflection would be desirable and, in fact, part of the
real democracy he would like to see. Under present circum-
stances, however, it is the "radical minority" that must
work for the "emergence of a true and sovereign majority"
in spite of the present needs of the majority. They seem
to know the truth while the majority presently seems
incapable of knowing it. Neither requires the type of
tolerance described by Maclntyre.
The quiescence involved in this line of reasoning is
manifest. First, it illicitly excludes, from the start, a
strategy that includes "the majority." Grossly exagger-
ating the eclipse of subjectivity, Marcuse' s theory of
"tolerance" reinforces the constrained scope of thought and
action open to the "majority" (constraints that suggested
the theory to him in the first place)
,
by denying them an
alternate practice. Secondly, it encourages a lack of
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reflection on the part of the "radical minority," legiti-
mizing any insensitivity to "the majority" that might
already exist, thereby unnecessarily widening the breach
between them. Instead of confronting authority, "radical
minorities" mistakenly might confront potential allies in
"the majority," deflecting attention from deeper structural
troubles, ultimately fostering misinterpretation of politi-
cal reality and furthering depoliticization
. For even when
the target of a political action is clearly designed to be
an institution of power and not "the majority," confronta-
tional strategies remain fraught with the difficulty that
important aspects of authority to be confronted may be
closely identified with by "the majority." Marcuse's stra-
tegy simply magnifies this important problem.
Thirdly, it understates the intense personal reflec-
tion and political activity that often are vital to the
development of radical political actors as well. During
the 1960's, many young student radicals, indeed, had been
raised in privileged homes with nonrepressive child rear-
ing. Yet their ideas, rather than stemming from some vague
"organic" foundation, were often extensions of those of
their parents and their radicalization the result of the
broken promises of liberal reform. In Young Radicals
,
Kenneth Kenniston reports that: "What is most impressive
423
is not their secret motivation to have the System fail but
their naive hope that it would succeed and the extent of
their depression and disillusion when their early reformist
hopes were frustrated . "22 Kenniston's conclusion concern-
ing the students who worked in the "Vietnam Summer" of 1967
is consistent with a reading of the seminal statement of
the student protest of that era--the 1962 Port Huron
Statement
: the most striking thing about this document is
that it attempts to formulate and heal the breach between
American ideals and practice.
For both "radical minorities" and "the average
person," I conclude, therefore, that Marcuse's ideas on
"repressive tolerance" deny most people a theory that would
help them practice true self-liberation. We can agree,
then, with much of Marcuse's critique of the pseudotol-
erance of liberal societies and even the need to confront
militantly its manifestation and still concur with Alasdair
Maclntyre when he writes:
The only education that liberates is self-
education. To make men objects of liberation by
others is to assist in making them passive
instruments; it is to cast them for the role of
inert matter to be molded into forms chosen by
the elite. The majority of men in advanced
industrial society are often confused, unhappy
and conscious of their lack of power; they are
often^ also hopeful, critical, and able to grasp
immediate possibilities of happiness and
freedom. Marcuse underrates most men as they
are; the false contempt for the majority into
which his theory leads him underpins policiesthat would in fact produce just that passivityand that irrationalism with which he charges
contemporary society.
^
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Advanced industrial society or the politics
of corporate capitalism?
As we have seen, the lens of technological rationality
distorts Marcuse's perception of human subjectivity and
underplays both the active struggle of people to understand
their lives and their potential for self-liberation. It
also clouds Marcuse's analysis of social structure in a way
that reinforces his inadequate account of subjectivity and
exaggeration of political passivity. I shall focus here on
these latter points. Many of Marcuse's structural predic-
tions, such as long-term stability and mounting affluence,
domestic and international integration have been severely
challenged by a decade of economic uncertainty, a stalled
domestic standard of living, a domestic legitimation
crisis, a state fiscal crisis, increasing world disorder
and worldwide hunger. In his later writings, Marcuse
discusses some of these issues and tries to incorporate
them into his work. 24 The inaccuracy of his predictions is
less important to the analysis here, however, than is the
predisposition to gloss over the rumblings beneath the
veneer of stability.
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Marcuse preinterprets the relation of social struc-
ture, elites and masses in ways that privilege the claim of
technological hegemony over evidence of important struc-
tural difficulties. Marcuse looks at institutions such as
welfare and trade unions after they have been afforded some
legitimacy within the social system and concludes that they
are part of the growing administrative grasp of government
within advanced industrial society. Their development, for
Marcuse, is evidence of our society's ability to manage its
contradictions, particularly between the potential of
automation and the need for alienated labor, in ways that
strengthen the whole. There is, of course, evidence that
enlightened elites at times do press for governmental
reforms to meet changing socioeconomic reality. Yet these
reforms often have far more to do with struggle and demands
from below, ranging from voting pressure to militant
strikes and even rioting. Moreover, writing during the age
of Reagan, it is obvious that these gains are precarious
and require struggle to be maintained.
The system adjustment Marcuse claims, then, rests on
the problematic assumptions of the eclipse of subjectivity
and that accommodative institutions are in a simple func-
tional relation with the system as a whole. In fact,
however, the relation is complex, with the institutions
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proving both functional for the society and at the same
time putting new constraints and pressures on the system.
These pressures are more easily accommodated at some times
than others, and sometimes these institutions bump into
each other. Today, corporate desire for higher profits,
union demands for their share of the pie, welfare cries for
simple economic justice are all competing, however une-
qually, for a relatively shrunken surplus. Moreover, this
competition, once again out in the open, has been a feature
of American life at least since the 1930' s. Marcuse's
fundamental error here is to assume that a complex process
of demands, militant action, compromise and even, at times,
betrayal and defeat, leading to the development of accom-
modative institutions, can be explained instead by a logic
of administrative rationality. This explanation, which
assumes an eclipsed subjectivity, provides an account of
social structure that further and mistakenly underpins
Marcuse's analysis of the eclipse of subjectivity. Toge-
ther they provide the core of his over- functional view.
Moreover, Marcuse's analysis of advanced industrial
society makes certain presumptions that are not warranted.
For one thing, the central role he assigns productivity for
its own sake clouds somewhat the role of profitability as
the central system imperative. How can we explain, for
s c> s
s
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example, employer decisions to forgo productivity increa
that might result from worker participation schemes or
decisions to use labor-intensive technologies when labor i
cheap, without immmediate reference to management decisions
based on profitability? And how would he explain the
decisions, for example, of U.S. auto makers until recently
to continue to produce inefficient cars, even in the face
of foreign competition over the last 20 years? What is
technological about that rationality?
In addition, the economy is far more complex than
Marcuse's notion of advanced industrial society reveals.
There is, for example, a dual labor market, one consisting
of higher-paying corporate jobs, often unionized, the other
of lower-paying nonunionized jobs within firms that must
struggle much harder to remain competitive. Further,
between and within each labor market, there is segmentation
by race, sex and class background. If the working class is
integrated, this result probably has more to do with its
inability to forge a common interest
,
rooted in these
structural differences, than because it simply has incor-
porated the Interest of the system as a whole. Similarly,
while more and more people are becoming dependent employees
whose narrow range of decision-making and power resemble
each other, there remain important differences in work- Life
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and status. While some differences are artificially
created to produce worker competitiveness and division, 25
and some are based on sectoral position in the economy, and
some are based on the nature of the job itself, all have
consequences for worker consciousness.
These cleavages are of prime importance in understand-
ing how contemporary political struggles may be waged. To
whom, for example, will unionized workers turn in the
search for allies to help protect the gains they now see
being eroded? Will nonunionized workers, particularly
Blacks, Hispanics and women, be seen as potential allies or
threats? Marcuse's theory of advanced industrial society
does not help answer these important question. Instead, he
vacillates between his pessimistic moments when he sees one
large degraded working class, to more optimistic moments,
for example in his 1972 Counterrevolution and Revolt
,
when
he sees young workers now beginning to understand the
nature of their degradation.
Yet this either-or dichotomy itself distorts reality.
Might not young workers displace important sources of their
degradation by seeing the threat to their dignity coming
from below rather than above? And do they not react to it
apolitically through alcoholism and drug use, quasipoliti-
cally through adsenteeism and sabotage, as well as politi-
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cally through wildcat strikes and union insurgencies?
Moreover, where will older workers turn? What meaning will
the crisis in legitimacy have for those with a greater
stake in more traditional values now on the wane?
Lacking both a concept of subjectivity that allows for
political decisions and actions, that may neither be simply
conditioned nor purely revolutionary, and a complex analy-
sis of social structure, Marcuse falls prey to reduction-
ism: either there will be a revolution, which is unlikely,
or advanced industrial society will make the necessary
adaptive changes to consummate its hold, or there will be a
final barbarism.
Perhaps intuitively recognizing some of these diffi-
culties, Marcuse 's more recent writings seem to speak more
about "monopoly capitalism" than advanced industrial
society and to indicate that now managing crises is more
like juggling severe problems than "absorbing alternatives"
in ways that strengthen the whole. 26 However, Marcuse'
s
commitment to the thesis of the hegemony of technological
rationality cannot help but bias his analysis, not only to
crude false-consciousness theory but also to glossing over
the complexity of social structure as well. Yet, political
strategy today depends on comprehending just that complexi-
ty. So does political explanation. Marcuse' s strategic
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and explanatory failures are, themselves, symptomatic of
the shortcomings not only of his analysis of subjectivity
but also of social structure as well.
In the end, Marcuse's prime limitation is that he
attempts to develop an over- functional explanation of how
modern industrial societies maintain themselves. My prime
purpose in the preceding argument has been to draw out and
challenge the assumptions behind that view and to argue
that his extreme one-dimensionality thesis distorts our
understanding of social and political reality. One under-
lying theme emerges. Marcuse's fear of the potential
functionalization of all aspects of modern society leads
him to miss the important ways in which social systems,
even when hegemonic, are not purely functional systems.
As we have seen, adaptive institutions and practices
can produce ambiguous results. Industrial management
schemes may integrate workers, but they can also wear thin,
escalating the need for new techniques. Desublimated
libidinal attachments to objects can ensnare one in a con-
sumer world, but they can prove unsatisfying, leading to a
rejection of that world. Trade unions can help integrate
workers into corporate capitalism while also putting new
constraints on the system itself. By his own account, weak
parental authority can lead to an immature ego ripe for
manipulation— or lead to the "new sensibility."
In trying to explain far too much within a pure func-
tional theory, Marcuse can unwittingly subvert the study of
depoliticization. For example, industrial management may
help depoliticize the worklife of people, not by adapting
them to organizational needs but by failing to convince
them of the sincerity of management's goals. The result
could be a wave of cynicism, drug and alcohol use, or
perhaps apolitical protest that is quickly dissipated.
These possible results do not follow from the original
intention of management but the effect is depoliticization
at work nonetheless. The unintended consequences of acti-
vity of adaptive ins tituit ions are critical to the study
both of quiescence and activism, and an over-functional
view can only obscure their significance. In overlooking
these, one, at the same time, will miss the complex nature
of depoliticization and the possible openings for change
under the surface of what appear as encompassing functional
relationships
.
If human subjects could become the type of subject
assumed by posit ivist theory and feared by Marcuse, these
ambiguities would not emerge. But because they cannot,
analysis of the functional capacity of instituitions cannot
be derived from what Mills called "grand theory"--it must
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be rooted in the study of specific human practices within
the context of particular institutions and the constraints
of a general social structure. This study, by and large,
Marcuse does not undertake. Neither society, nor institu-
tions, nor individuals are reducible to the presumed
functional requirements of a social system abstractly
conceived
.
The Tenuous Thesis of Relative Political Mortification
The criticisms presented here, I believe, undermine
some of the central elements of One Dimensional Man . It is
now appropriate to qualify the argument in the following
way. Partly out of richness of thought and partly out of
lack of clarity, Marcuse not only presents an untenable
thesis of absolute political mortification but also a
useful conceptualization of relative political mortifica-
tion. In order to pursue this line of his thought, we have
to hold in abeyance, for a moment, Marcuse 's analysis of
the erosion of subjectivity and my criticism of that view.
As we have seen, there is evidence in Marcuse 's
discussion of language and psychology of some ambivalence
about how far the process of mimetic adjustment has gone.
Moreover, when Marcuse writes concretely about the appli-
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cation of techniques of social control, he tends to exag-
gerate less the extent of adaptation. For example, in
writing about the application of personnel management
technique, Marcuse argues that the operational nature of
the concepts employed tends to redefine general discontents
into specific personal grievances. If a worker complains
that "wages are too low," this may be redefined, after
scrutiny of the individual worker's situation, to mean that
the worker's "present earnings, due to his wife's illness,
are insufficient to meet his current obligations." In
reformulating the grievance
, the potential of a general
critique including all wage earners is collapsed into a
gripe about a particular situation:
Once the personal discontent is isolated from the
general unhappiness, once the universe of con-
cepts which militate against functionalization
are dissolved into particular referents, the case
becomes a treatable and tractable incident. 27
Operational redefinitions of this kind are ideolo-
gical, in the first instance, because they make the
worker's situation plausible to him or her in ways that
hide the implicatin of the grievance for society as a
whole. Marcuse, of course, carries this line of argument
much too far, suggesting that such concepts could poten-
tially circumscribe consciousness. But as this example
shows, Marcuse does have a prior concern with ideological
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distortion that is based on the need to hide political
reality from subjects capable of penetrating the ideology.
In fact, if we turn from Marcuse* s analysis of the
"masses" to his discussion of "reason" itself and, in fact,
the implied role performance of critical theorists, we find
in Marcuse a richer concept of subjectivity. Marcuse
argues, for example, that in classical Greek philosophy,
"reason" has the ontological function of distinguishing
what is true from what is false to preserve "being" from
destruction. The "struggle for truth" is "the essentially
human project" of people faced with an "antagonistic real-
ity"-- 1^ world afflicted with want and negation, constantly
threatened with destruction":
To the extent to which the experience of an
antagonistic world guides the development of the
philosophical categories, philosophy moves in a
universe which is broken in itself (dechirement
ontologique )
--two-dimensional
. Appearance and
reality, untruth and truth (and as we shall see,
unfreedom and freedom) are ontological condi-
tions . 28
For Marcuse, the purpose of reason is to reduce anta-
gonisms and distortions to a minimum, but he does maintain
that some repression will always be necessary for existence
and that "alienation" (understood, 1 believe as objectifi-
cation) is not eliminable. If the individual is to be more
than an "immediate realization" of the negative antagon-
istic elements of society, identity "requires repression
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and sublimation, conscious transformation." Let us recall
Marcuse's claim:
This process involves at each stage
. . . the
negation of the negation, mediation of theimmediate, and identity is no more and no lessthan this process. "Alienation" is the constant
and essential element of identity, the objective
side of the subject.
. . . Freud well knew thedifference between progressive and regressive
liberating and destructive repression . 29
In spite of these assertions about the fundamental
role of reason and the ineliminable elements of identity
development, as we have seen, Marcuse concludes:
The stabilizing tendencies conflict with the
subversive elements of Reason, the power of the
positive with that of negative thinking, until
the^ achievements of advanced industrial civili-
zation lead to the triumph of one-dimensional
reality over all contradiction . 30
It seems, then, when Marcuse discusses the "average
person" in "one-dimensional society," he finds near com-
plete adaptation, and when he discusses liberated people,
it will be recalled, he finds an organic or biological
foundation for truth. However, when he discusses reason
and identity development abstractly, he finds a more
complex picture: identity is mediated and not a mere
reflection of experience; the search for a reality hidden
by appearances is a never-ending process in which appear-
ances never completely subsume the essential nature of
people as reasoning beings. Moreover, these interpreta-
tions are consistent with Marcuse's explicit views on the
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role of art and his implicit view on the role of theorists
like himself. Art surfaces repressed truths in sublimated
form. Critical theorists like Marcuse and readers who can
understand him, retain the ability to develop self-identi-
ties and to reason, capacities denied the rest of the
population.
We can perhaps conclude from this, as Morton Schoolman
argues, that Marcuse' s concept of subjectivity is not so
much incorrect as "under specified , " and that there are
important clues in his writing on reason and on critical
theory that can help us fill out a more adequate concept.
If we give Marcuse the benefit of the doubt here, we can
then proceed to read One Dimensional Man more sympathetic-
ally as an attempt to demonstrate, as Habermas puts it, how
late capitalism can make depoliticization plausible through
an ideology of technological rationality. Moreover, we can
rescue Marcuse 's social psychology from the superficial
arena of "mimetic adjustment . "31
Now we place ourselves in the position of putting
forth what I should like to call a tenuous thesis of rela-
tive political mortification. The core of this thesis
would be how technological rationality might, as I dis-
cussed in the last chapter, serve as a new ideology to
legitimate state intervention into the economy to correct
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dysfunctions, while preserving depoliticization. Depoliti-
cization is made plausible to the degree that people
believe that the ^ate is carrying out only_ "technical-
imperatives for effective system maintenance. A techno-
cratic state able to mitigate class exploitation, along
with a program of privatized rewards, a social psychology
of adaptive (although not exclusively mimetic) behavior and
plebiscites on alternate sets of leaders and administrative
personnel substituting for the clash of politics, would
together undergird this project.
If the first step toward an adequate thesis is clari-
fying the role of science, technology and administration as
an ideology for subjects
, the second is discarding Mar-
cuse's highly speculative and unsubstantiated notions about
how the basic metapsychological instincts biologically wed
people to a system of domination. As we did with the
questions of ideology and subjectivity, we need to read
Marcuse as having a richer conception of human psychology
than his more extreme formulations within One Dimensional
Man allow. If, for example, we favor Marcuse' s accounts
emphasizing sublimation, introjection
,
fantasy and even
guilt over his rather mechanical mimesis formulation
(designed to explain the negative Utopia we are tending
towards), we recapture important psychological insights
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within Marcuse's theory of repressive desublimation
.
Robert Paul Wolff best captures these insights in his
explanation of Marcuse's theory. Within all people, he
recounts, there exists a "psychical pool" within the uncon-
scious in permanent opposition to the established society.
The power of negative critical thinking is partly entailed
in its ability to tap these psychological resources in the
effort to imagine a different society. From this vantage,
the genius of repressive desublimation is that it "absorbs"
the opposition into dominant class interests by refusing to
clamp down on these hidden impulses. As Wolff puts it:
Such a reaction [clamping down] only heightens
the force of the repressed desires and, Antaeus -
like, redoubles their energy. Rather, the appro-
priate move is to permit the specific, overt act,
but to rob it of its unconscious significance by'
immediately accepting it into the repertory of
permissible acts.
The act, therefore, is unable to mobilize the hidden
psychic energy because it "ceases to serve as a surrogate
for the entire unconscious . "32
If we ease our interpretation of Marcuse into these
directions, we find a society with the following
characteristics: (1) an inherently apolitical ideology; (2)
a mass psychology that defuses, in safety-valve fashion,
psychological discontent; (3) "operational" concepts chat
tend to personalize and/or trivialize real grievances; (4)
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a language and social psychology that confuses any attempt
to clarify troubles or create political issues; (5) a need
for an expanding supply of privatized consumer rewards; (6)
an "enemy" or underclass upon which to displace pent-up
grievances. Considered as a whole, such a constellation
would form the basis for a concept of relative political
mortification that could be a constituent part of a series
of concepts that help us explain non-participation and the
tenacity of depolit icization
.
Even here, however, we must qualify this assertion.
While such a conceptualization makes sense, it would
remain, it seems to me, an unstable constellation. It
requires, after all, an economy whose surplus constantly is
expanding, certainly a more problematic idea today than in
1964. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the process of
desublimation tied to a consumerist economy would not
itself generate unrealizable demands for ever more objects
for instinctual release and spark disharmony rather than
increased energy for productivity. Or if the promise of
consumerism, once attained, now appears less gratifying
than previously imagined, additional pressures could be
generated on the system. 33
These examples simply underscore the argument made at
the end of the last section: there is a healthy measure of
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unpredictability to the outcomes we can expect from what
are, ostensibly, adaptive practices. Finally, a focus on
relative political mortification would continue to severely
underrate the very significant and often transparent coer-
cive power relation operative even during times of apparent
consensus and affluence. In the 1950' s, fear of losing
one's job was undoubtedly as powerful a social glue as
scientific management.
Any severe dysfunction in the social system, then, can
upset the already precarious balance on which the techno-
cratic project is based. If the system fails to "correct"
for exploitation, the latency of class conflict may be
called into question. If repression that extends beyond
the underclass is utilized, it heightens the problem.
Moreover, the existence of an underclass is destabilizing
in itself, since its members are not fully included in the
rewards mechanism, the repression that is severely applied
from time to time, and the protest that it is used to
suppress, threaten to raise normative questions, even if
these take a reactionary form. Even sustained affluence
can help surface ethical questions, as it did in the 1960 's
and 1970 's for many students who rebelled at the prospect
of the dull life of a middle-class technocrat, morally
insensible to the needs of others.
There are, however, more profound reasons that such a
thesis would remain tenuous. The great strength of techno-
cratic consciousness lies in its ability to present
technological rationality as a value-neutral method by
which social systems can be effectively organized. That
is, it does not appear to be ideology at all because it
makes no explicit claims about how people should live their
lives. Instead, it claims to be an efficient system for
providing goods and services and proves its ability to the
degree it does provide them, thereby mitigating class
exploitation for some, while displacing its harshest
aspects to those on the economic margin. The stability of
the system, then, is based on its ability to allocate
rewards, and the degree to which technocratic consciousness
can suppress questions of value.
Jurgen Habermas argues that the "new ideology is
distinguished from its predecessor in that it severs
criteria for justifying the organization of social life
from any normative regulation of interaction, thus
depoliticizing them. "34- We should, instead, read this
comment to mean "attempts to sever normative criteria"
resulting in a suppression of ethical categories in the
consideration of public policy and the proper way to
organize society itself.
At the most fundamental level, technological rational-
ity cannot eliminate the existential question of why we
should do what we do, although it can help tell us how,
when, and where to do it and, at times, what to do. The
answer to the question "why?" can be unreflective and
assumed, but it cannot be eliminated. If it is an impor-
tant question, it must ultimately be based on some human
interest believed to be worth pursuing. In fact, the often
unstated ethical dimension of technological rationality
seems grounded in utilitarian ethics, so that the produc-
tivity for its own sake Marcuse identifies is really
productivity for the sake of creating the greatest amount
of pleasure for the greatest number. In today's world, as
government proves unable to successfully manage even for
this narrow construal of human interest, the project of
apolitical administration is called into question by this
ethical ally of technological rationality. For example,
one of the appeals of the Reagan candidacy in 1980 was its
ability to call into question the right of government to
age social affairs, after the Carter administrationman
seemed unable to do so effectively. As reactionary rhetor-
ic, it harked back to older ideas of an alleged free mar-
ket, questioning the value of government intervention in
social and economic affairs, and thereby the legitimation
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of technocratic management that Habermas and Marcuse sug-
gest is necessary to protect capitalism from dysfunction
and class conflict. Moreover, it often cast its attack in
ethical terms, articulating concerns about the family, the
individual and freedom. Similarly, Daniel Bell's notion of
"public household" can be viewed as an attempt to reinsert
an explicitly ethical dimension, however repressive in its
implications, into a managed society devoid of solid
purpose . 35
These flailing attempts to seek purpose in contempor-
ary America are indicative, I think, of two weaknesses
central to technocratic rationality as ideology. First,
although it can try to hide its ethical dimension, it
cannot completely detach itself from one if it hopes to
motivate behavior. This dimension, close to philosophical
utilitarianism, can then subject technological rationality
to an "internal critique" based on the narrow range of
human interests it specifies. And this would remain true
even if the technocratic intention is self-consciously
recast negatively to now attempt to minimize dysfunction
and pain in a less hopeful world.
Secondly, as Stuart Hampshire points out, the alliance
of social engineering and utilitarianism offers a con-
stricted view of human purposes: For example, not valuing
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life for its own sake but for the limitation on happiness
that death would cause. Hampshire writes:
when the mere existence of an individual personby itself has no value, apart from the by-products and uses of the individual in producing
and enjoying desirable states of mind, there is
no theoretical barrier against social surgery of
all kinds. JD J
Yet, we can find numerous examples of vigorous opposition
based on perceptions of such "social surgery" from all
parts of the political spectrum, on matters considered
central to constituting desired ways of life, such as
sexual customs, customs of war, treatment of the aged, and
respect for life itself, to name a few. 37 Conservative
opposition to public education on birth control, opposition
by progressives to the war of attrition in Vietnam, opposi-
tion by whomever to discarding the aged simply because they
appear "unproductive," and respect for life itself dis-
played by religious and lay opposition not only to the
nuclear arms race but to the "numbers game" as a way of
thinking about it: all these may be properly understood in
part as protests against what people perceive as social
engineering and the difficulty of technological rationality
defending itself on its own terms. Indeed, even behind the
"numbers game," for example, lie various theories of
deterrence, each claiming superiority in the defense of
life and civilization itself. Behind the body counts in
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Vietnam stood the justification of the war, however
misguided, as necessary to protect freedom, democracy and
life. Body counts themselves could confuse discovery of
the real purpose of the war and debase moral sensibility,
but they provided little legitimacy for the war itself.
None of this is to argue that the moral insensibility
promoted by technological rationality will not at times
hold sway, helping legitimate advanced capitalism (or state
socialism) in the way Habermas suggests is required of it.
When it does, moral and human catastrophe can certainly
result. Rather, the argument is that it is a tenuous solu-
tion to the problem of legitimation, lacking an explicit
moral foundation (the strength of traditional society), and
tied to an implicit ethical code which is itself limited.
VThen questioned, technocrats will be under great pressure
to retreat to more explicitly political and moral arguments
which raise the questions of why we live the way we do and
what are desired ways of human life. To be forced to do
so, however, undermines the ability of the technological
project to keep such questions suppressed and opens the
door to political critique of a system ostensibly organized
by the logic of technics.
In addition to the instability of the inadequate moral
and political foundation of technological rationality,
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there are also reasons to believe that the unavoidable
situation facing a person who tries to adopt a technocratic
(or bureaucratic) role could increase the instability. In
a society that accepts the technocrat as its dominant role
model, it would be important that the individual person not
be held responsible for the virtue and the consequences of
the actions he or she carries out. The responsibility of
the technocrat is the proper use of bureaucratic, technical
or scientific rules to achieve ends thought beneficial for
the system as a whole. While at the higher level, poli-
tical decisions that set the parameters for these ends are
unavoidable (although they may not be reflected on as
such)
,
it is important that these not be questioned up and
down the line, for doing so increases the likelihood of
normative reflection on what is being attempted. The happy
technocrat derives satisfaction from knowing that if the
individual job is done properly, the system will run
efficiently. The foundation belief is, however, that the
system goals are not determined by political debate or
moral argument but by the proper use of technical rules and
procedures
.
Yet there are pressures in the roles of technocracts
that raise questions about the absence of responsibility.
For the technocrat's role to be insulated from public
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responsibility, members of the public would have to view
themselves simply as objects to be administered. The
technocrat too is asked to view his or her own contribution
to work as purely objective, yet this role of detachment is
likely to clash with more human aspirations for success and
recognition. I may talk about my contribution of an idea
for the better accomplishment of a project as "input," but
I may well resent its rejection and become indignant if my
"input" is rejected repeatedly. I may conclude that the
system is unfair to people like me and search for those
characteristics that constitute the class of "people like
me." Similarly, I may fail a test and preserve my dignity
by claiming that the test is unfair, undermining my belief
that objective tests can be designed capable of determining
who should play what functional role. Indignant at contin-
uous failure, I may question a hierarchy that now appears
to be only ostensibly organized by functional skill and
question the legitimacy of the roles of those whose status
is higher than mine. I may even begin to question the
technocratic model itself.
Of course, interpretations in line with adequate role
performance in the above situations are possible and even
likely. Bureaucrats typically fall back on the posture, "I
don't make the rules, I follow them," when confronted with
a hostile public, or even self-doubt. These examples do
indicate, however, how basic patterns of human interaction
can subject to closer scrutiny the "objective" nature of
the technocrat's role and how the language of the questions
raised can escalate from gripes to political criticism.
At a more fundamental level, moreover, there is an
important relationship between action, responsibility,
knowledge and self
-consciousness 38 that suggests techno-
cratic consciousness cannot dispense with the need for
people to ground their belief in the roles they perform,
with values not provided by technological rationality
itself. Technocrats are asked to view their role as
objective in the following sense. Their job is to cor-
rectly apply "technical" rules to achieve an intended
result, amend the rules if they prove unfruitful, and
correct any mistaken applications of the rules they may
make. The pure technocrat is, therefore, asked to adopt a
pose of a predicter of his or her own behavior, with the
prediction circumscibed by the set of rules required for a
given end.
But once a technocrat (or any person) predicts that
something will happen because he or she will follow the
rules necessary to make it happen and observes that predic-
tion, a contradiction arises: because we are simultane-
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ously the observer and the observed, once we predict we
will do something and are conscious of our prediction, this
knowledge puts our role of observer of our action in con-
tradiction with our role of actor. Our prediction is
necessary for us to know what we can achieve, but knowledge
of our prediction now, instead, constitutes a decision on
our part to try to do something. This dialectic of people
as predicters and deciders, identified by Stuart Hampshire
as a basic aspect of human action and self-consciousness , 39
can be obscured but not eliminated by technocratic roles.
It is obscured because technocrats are typically asked to
view themselves as not responsible for the human interests
affected by the ends they produce. Moreover, although they
unavoidably decide to follow each rule to bring about a
result, and these rules are formally stipulated and even
codified in a way rules pertaining to customs or norms
normally are not, the scope of the job is often narrowly
drawn, establishing distance between the rules technocrats
decide to follow and the result.
Nevertheless, if I, as a social service bureaucrat,
predict that I will take you off welfare because of newly
lowered income eligibility requirements, I have, in fact,
decided to follow the rules necessary to take you off,
whether or not it appears to me in that light. If I try to
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explain my decision to you as a prediction, I can only do
so in an ironical sense, and my "prediction" may prove to
be a quite accurate guide to my behavior precisely because
it now borders on a decision. Moreover, the more I become
aware of my decision, the more intentional my action be-
comes. If I persist in it, the more deliberate it is. The
same would obtain as much for the purest technical worker
as the bureaucrat. For although the "distancing" from the
implications of the end result is, perhaps, more easily
accomplished here, the technician decides to follow the
necessary rules to bring about some result, and is, at some
point, capable of grasping this fact.
Technocratic consciousness, therefore, cannot exempt
the individual from the potential of formulating the ques-
tion "what is it I'm really doing?" out of the purposive-
rational rules he or she is expected to apply. Because the
action can be reflected on as intentional and because the
person could decide (theoretically) not to follow any or
all of: the required rules, there is always the potential
need to justify the action undertaken. This is not to say,
of course, that people will always reflect on whether they
should follow particular rules or that there are not other
reasons, such as fear of loss of a job, that will induce
following them.
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Instead, it is to suggest that subsystems of societies
ostensibly organized only under purposive-rational rules of
behavior cannot rely on people adopting only the role of
predicters of their own behavior: because people unavoid-
ably decide as well as predict, it is, in principle, always
possible for people to become aware of their role of
deciders as well, heightening awareness of their freedom
and responsibility, and forcing into the open the need for
beliefs to justify their conduct. As we have seen, such
justification can weakly fall back on ideas like "following
the rules helps the system run efficiently"; less weakly on
ideas like "it's for the maximum pleasure for the greatest
number"; or most strongly on ideas like "it is to enhance
human life itself." However, each step taken is a step
away from a pure technocratic model, calling into question
the suppression of ethics and politics necessary for the
depoliticized ideology Marcuse argues is required to
legitimate advanced industrial society.
Conclusion
:
Political Subordination or Political Mortification?
In this chapter, I have argued both that Marcuse fails
to substantiate his case for a theory of absolute political
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mortification, and that he does offer a plausible account
of relative political mortification. Marcuse fails to
establish the conditions for his more extreme formulation
of one-dimensional society, having an inadequate under-
standing of ordinary language, an oversimplified analysis
of social structure, at best an "underspecified M subject
and a highly speculative psychology. There has been and is
an ongoing attempt to functionalize language, but language
cannot be reduced to technical terms, contradictions cannot
be eliminated without sowing mass insanity, and operation-
alization may suppress, distort and trade on the ethical
connotations of ordinary language, but it does not elimi-
nate .them. Social structure has certainly changed
measurably in the last fifty years, yet we are far from
having one commonly degraded "technical class," however
narrow job definitions have become for white-collar and
blue-collar workers alike. Tacking on an underclass does
not fully correct this deficiency. Differences in economic
positioning remain important in the explanation of politi-
cal behavior, and understanding the possibility of alli-
ances between different sectors is fundamental to the
development of political strategy.
Tnere is also little evidence to support the severity
of the eclipse of subjectivity suggested by Marcuse.
j
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This exaggerated claim rests on a quite mistaken preoccu-
pation with "immediate identification" as a primary mode of
identity development today and perhaps the only mode in the
future. All of these issues point to the extremely weak
base on which Marcuse rests his political strategy.
Marcuse*
s explanation of non-participation is marked
by a preoccupation with the "one-dimensionality" thesis,
blowing up out of all proportion with respect to what is
the actual or potential depth and range of political apa-
thy. He takes the end of ideology thesis as a negative
Utopia that is rapidly becoming reality and counters this
with an impossible image of liberation. He then develops a
caricatured portrait of the prototype of the new liberation
and compares the "average" person unfavorably with it,
insinuating into his analysis an ethnocentric and class
bias and a strategy both potentially repressive and
possibly self-defeating. Indeed, he even fails to capture
the experience of live struggling radicals as well.
"Under-rating most people as they are," Marcuse thereby
under-values perhaps the most important resource for
maintaining depoliticization : the active commitment of
human subj ects to the depoliticized roles they adopt.
At the same time, Marcuse does provide the core of a
thesis of relative political mortification, based on tech-
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nological rationality as ideology and a psychology of
harmlessly released (yet potentially political) unconscious
motives, and the personalization of grievances. Marcuse's
own focus on how technological rationality becomes, in
part, a conceptual scheme with which to (mis)uderstand the
world, implies a subject whose consciousness needs to be
actively controlled. Indeed, ideology would be superfluous
if "subjects" were seriously expected to merely reflect the
needs of the base of advanced industrial society. ^0
Moreover, Marcuse's analysis of "reason" and his under-
standing of the role of the critical theorist underpin a
richer conception of subjectivity than a strict "one-dimen-
sionality" thesis allows. If these are taken together with
his ideas on the containment of social change, the role the
"enemy" plays in this process, and a modified thesis of
functionalized language, we would now have both a subject
capable of false-consciousness and a plausible argument
about how false-consciousness is generated and maintained.
Moreover, the moral urgency with which One Dimensional
Man is written and the augmented role Marcuse sees for
young workers and women in Counterrevolution and Revolt
(1972) , indicate that he certainly does not view self-liber-
ation as a dead issue. Marcuse's continually expanded list
of potentially revolutionary agents does, however, have the
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unfortunate quality at times of theory chasing reality.
However plausible the thesis of relative political
mortification may be, I have argued that the social
cohesion it entails is likely to be a poor substitute for
authority based on norms in the stabilization of social
systems. The hidden scheme of values of technological
rationality remains open to question, and, once questioned,
can provide only a weak defense. Moreover, it is unlikely
that people can, over the long run, successfully adopt
technocratic roles in the way Marcuse requires of them.
Finally, as problems of social structure appear less
amenable to "technical" solutions, as is the case today,
purely technocratic explanations are likely to prove
unacceptable
.
There is, then, between apathy-related-to-free-choice
and extreme apathy-as -a-condition a middle ground of expla-
nation that is all-important in the study of depoliticiza-
tion today. Technological rationality is an important
legitimation, but it is not the only one, and it is under
strain. People may be conditioned through an ideology and
social psychology of adaptation, but they are also coerced,
excluded from important decisions and lied to about the
facts. 4-1 People may misperceive their interests, but they
often do so after an active although inadequate search for
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what their interest really is. Ideology and structural
pressures play a part, then, in the analysis of false-
consciousness, but so do the active subjects who incorpor-
ate and adapt the ideology and who, through their role
performance, help constitute the social structure.
There does remain, therefore, an important political
dimension within contemporary society. This dimension,
understood as the struggle to find ways to best organize
ourselves publicly, is often obscured both within society
at large and within the person. Yet, this dimension is at
odds with the needs of both corporate capitalist and state
socialist societies to present themselves as necessary and
even nature-like modes of social organization. Real poli-
tical debate and struggle are often subordinated to state
and corporate systems of administration, but they are far
from eliminated. In fact, today in the United States,
there is a sharp challenge by parts both of the left and
the right to the legitimacy of unquestioned government
management
.
Both for empirical and conceptual reasons, therefore,
I find Mills' explanation of political subordination out-
lined in Chapter III superior even to Marcuse's qualified
notion of relative political mortification. While the lat-
ter concept is a reasonable one, it has somewhat limited
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purchase in helping explain either how depoliticization may
maintain itself today or how people might break free of its
grasp
.
The critique of Marcuse is, however, an invaluable
guide in framing essential questions for inquiry, both
concerning social science explanation and politics itself.
For it demonstrates that, with the sundering of the free
market, the legitimacy of corporate capitalism is unstable,
given the limits of technological rationality as an
effective legitimation for a managed society. Politically,
it raises the momentous question of how will this "legiti-
mation crisis" resolve itself, particularly important in an
age on the nuclear brink.
In terms of social science inquiry, it raises two
fundamental problems. First, how is the study of political
consciousness, and especially of false or partial con-
sciousness, to proceed once we discard the type of unsatis-
fying answer at times offered by Marcuse. I have indicated
some preliminary directions and suggest strongly that this
problem should rank among the top concerns in the study of
depoliticization
.
Secondly, how is mainstream social science, still
committed as it is to behavioral and technocratic models of
explanation, likely to explain non-participation today; or
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in the future should a "consensus- reminiscent of the
1950 's be re-established? And what role will it play in
helping re-establish such "consensus"?
Two projections seem plausible. If apparent consensus
re-emerges, we can expect explanations based on purer
ideals of technocracy to gain increased adherence and Mar-
cuse's arguments as qualified here to become increasingly
important. Today we can expect explanations to become
modified technocratic theories, although still explaining
depoliticization largely in terms of system maintenance but
incorporating a more explicit normative dimension as well.
In the concluding chapter, I will draw out the full
conceptual map implicated in the explanation of non- .
participation and array it against the recent technocratic
theory of democracy of Samuel Huntington. This will put us
in a better position to understand both the extent and
nature of current non-participation and the parameters
within which the depoliticization of Americans is likely to
remain plausible to them. Finally, I shall conclude Mills'
paradigm of political subordination, once more fully
articulated, can prove essential in the urgent task facing
social inquiry today: to better understand the still
depoliticized, yet highly unstable, political world in
which we live.
CHAPTER VI
EXPLAINING NON-PARTICIPATION
Introduction
In this final chapter, we shall explore three areas in
order to enhance our ability to explain non-participation
in politics today and to grasp the implications of the
explanations we adopt. I shall, therefore, first review
the pluralist, reform and radical explanations and the
image of depoliticization they project, suggesting the
appropriate role of each in a comprehensive model for
explaining non-participation. In this context, I shall
explore the special role apathy plays and offer a modified
conceptual revision in our use of this term in the
explanation of non-participation.
Secondly, I will argue that Mills' incipient concept
of political subordination, once fully developed, most
enhances our ability to explain non-participation today.
Moreover, it embraces a method of inquiry that seems well
suited to grasp the complexity of both the dialectic of
human thought and action, and people and social
structure—a mode, in fact, that could be utilized by
theorists who might sharply question the accuracy of
459
460
political subordination as an explanation of contemporary
political behavior.
Finally, I will suggest that present strategies of
"^industrialization," geared to solve problems in the
political economy by shifting resources from consumption
and social welfare to investment and "defense," will
require a successful strategy of depoliticization as well.
If depoliticization continues or is advanced by strategies
of reindustrialization, how will social scientists be
likely to explain it? An examination of the work of Samuel
Huntington will reveal some initial directions. I will
conclude with some preliminary remarks on the future of
depoliticization in America and what is necessary to
include in a successful strategy to further widespread
democratic participation.
The pluralist explanation
The heart of the pluralist analysis extracted from
Bernard Berelson and Robert Dahl, it will be recalled,
centered on the assumption that America is a democratic
society par excellance
. To be sure, P.obert Dahl qualified
this assumption somewhat. Nevertheless, pluralist analysis
generally adopted the following presumptive path. Although
America democracy deviates from "classical theory," first,
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the high rates of non-participation are the best we can
hope for in an industrialized (indeed, post-industrialized)
highly complex society which covers a wide geographic area;
and secondly, those who do not participate often do not
have the proper personal requisites for democratic citi-
zenship
.
Moreover, participation is not stressed as a value in
itself but as a means to gain economic, political, or
social goals, such as legislation favoring the interest
group to which one belongs. Low rates of participation are
tolerated and even praised, therefore, because partici-
pation is not intrinsically rewarding, nor does it enhance
citizenship potential. High rates of participation, on the
other hand, are likely to bring "undesirable" citizens into
the process, straining the consensus that is the necessary
basis for a democratic polity to exist. Increasing
divisiveness would then undermine the system's ability to
manage conflict "democratically." The system would suffer
overload
.
Participation in politics, according to Robert Dahl
,
is explained as the result of a computation between the
"opportunity costs" of participating and the "opportunity
costs" of not participating. When the former are lower
than the latter, a person, seeing an advantage in partici-
462
pation, will become involved. Conversely, when the balance
is reversed, a person will find it in their rational self-
interest to become apolitical and, perhaps, apathetic out
of rational self-interest.
Robert Dahl is careful to point out that access to the
political process must be equally open to all. Political
inequality, for example, suffered by Blacks is an undemo-
cratic abridgement of American citizenship. Nevertheless,
generally in the pluralist account,! apathy, indifference
and contentment remain the primary explanations of why
people don't participate. I have criticized the pluralist
explanation of non-participation extensively in the first
chapter; I need only highlight some core issues here.
Because the pluralist account places little emphasis
on the value of participation, per se
, it is not surprising
that it tends to measure participation through the turnout
at elections. While other forms of participation are some-
times mentioned, fair elections 2 are seen as the important
measure of participation and, indeed, the only form of
participation that is really necessary for polity to be
considered "democratic."
Given pluralist commitment to the prima facie demo-
cratic character of American political institutions, it is
not surprising that they maintain a fairly strict division
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of labor between political, economic, social and other
forms of human activity. If political activity is that
which happens in the accepted political arena, either
electoral or governmental, grievances and issues at the
workplace, in the home and in the community that are not
translated into issues for government are likely to be
missed. This likelihood increases to the degree issues
remain latent or in the form of grievances or troubles. In
focusing on voting, pluralists both create a minimalist
standard of political participation and undervalue proto-
political and explicitly political activity that occurs
outside the electoral arena.
Perhaps the most striking feature of this mode of
analysis is that pluralists reverse a basic presumption of
most democratic theory: non-participation, previously
thought a symptom of an unhealthy democratic polity, is now
viewed as a sign of democratic vitality. In assuming the
American polity is the best possible form of democracy,
pluralists are led to a method that predetermines this
conclusion. The method is to draw on the characteristics
of the American polity as the operational criteria of
modern democracy itself and then, unsurprisingly, to find
that American democracy meets these requirements, in spite
of the low rate of participation. In doing so, they
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circumvent a basic tenet of democracy: the necessity not
only of the consent but also the participation of the citi-
zenry. And apathy, a word in our ordinary language that
conveys a state of indolence for which we hold the indivi-
dual responsible, is now confused with contentment with the
present order. Individuals, we are told, don't participate
in politics because they are apathetic; apathy is necessary
to maintain the consensus upon which democracy rests.
I have raised three main points of contention with
this line of reasoning. First, political involvement is
itself necessary to develop the requisites of democratic
citizenship, particularly the ability to accurately assess
what is or is not in one's interest. I may feel content in
my present situation, but this feeling itself is based on
an insecure foundation to the degree I have not explored
alternative possibilities. If I am unaware of alternatives
that do exist which would, perhaps, increase my happiness,
my contentment could be accurately described as short-
sighted. Cut off from such alternatives, the judgments
which, heretofore, were accurately described as grounded
contentment would become stale as my contentment slips into
apathy
.
Secondly, the conclusion that non-participants are
content or apathetic flies in the face of empirical
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evidence demonstrating a close correlation between non-
participation and low socio-economic status (SES) and low
educational level. According to pluralist logic, our most
content citizens are our most disadvantaged, certainly an
odd conclusion.
Thirdly, although pluralists contend that, from a
democratic point of view, apathy is no longer a blameworthy
phrase, the use of apathy as a description does trade on
ordinary usage in which- blame is assigned to the apathetic
citizens. In fact, in a society which prides itself in
being democratic, citizens who have withdrawn from politics
out of contentment or some other motive are likely to
describe themselves (or have others describe them) as
apathetic precisely for this reason. Therefore, although
pluralists claim that apathy or political withdrawal based
on contentment is harmonious with the democratic spirit, in
fact, such individuals are likely to blame themselves and
be held responsible by others for their own non-partici-
pation .
These three points combine into the following perverse
constellation. Those who do not participate due to class
and educational disadvantages are not only denied the
leverage to make political and economic gains within the
system, but they are also implicitly blamed for their own
466
depoliticization, deflecting criticism from the system as a
whole. By suggesting to us that a high level of non-parti-
cipation is something we need not worry about, pluralist
theory lulls us all into apathy, closing off one important
avenue through which to better comprehend our interests and
enhance our freedom--political participation.
There is, however, one virtue to the pluralist discus-
sion of apathy. In suggesting that apathetic citizens
withdraw from politics out of their own "free will," plu -
ralists maintain an important though exaggerated connection
between apathy and responsibility, although they implicitly
deny that there is anything wrong with being apathetic.
However perverse the political consequences of the plural-
ists' actual use of the concept of apathy, I shall later
argue that the notion of responsibility is a central ingre-
dient in the concept of apathy--one that must be maintained
in explaining non-participation.
The reform explanation
The reform explanation of non-participation is cast,
in important respects, opposite in image to that of the
pluralist. In 1960, E. E. Schattschneider set the stage
for much of the criticism of pluralism that was to follow
with the following claim: the correlation between non-
participation and low SES was evidence that non-partici-
pants were being pressured out of a political system that
was simply not meeting their needs. Those alternative
political issues and public policies that might be in the
interests of the non-participants were being suppressed;
issues that might interest the non-participants were being
displaced by those easily accomodated within the narrow
two-party system. The need, in his view, was to develop a
political means to overcome the present "bias of the
system." Instead of apathy or contentment, Schattschneider
used terms like "mobilization of bias," "abstention,"
"suppression" and "rejection" to explain why many people
didn't participate in politics.
As we have seen, the early work of Peter Bachrach
follows the basic path set by Schattschneider, while
extending and refining it in several important respects.
First, in some of his writing, 3 Bachrach suggests that
grievances may not only be excluded from the political
arena but exist as latent, unformed proto-political
discontent. Secondly, Bachrach extends the pluralist
concern for defining the political arena as that in which
"authoritative allocation of values" takes place, to
non-governmental arenas that also serve this function, in
particular corporations and worklife. Thirdly, partici-
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pation is, for Bachrach, more than a means to have one's
interests met; participation develops the individual as a
person and as a citizen and is therefore basic to the human
interest in freedom.
The elaborations of the reform paradigm, taken toge-
ther with Schattschneider's fundamental "bias of conflict-
thesis, provide the basis for the critique of pluralism we
have just reviewed. In recognizing the legitimacy only of
articulated preferences that have found their way into the
established political arena, pluralists reward those social
groups in the least need. It is these very groups which
participate the least whose policy preferences are likely
to be out of step with the prevailing "legitimate" politi-
cal conflicts or still in formation that pluralists gener-
ally dismiss as indifferent, apathetic or content.
Although the reform explanation is an important ad-
vance over the pluralist, I have argued that it needs to be
modified in several important regards. There is one issue,
for example, in which the pluralist account has the better
argument. While the emphasis on non-participants
withdrawing from a biased political process certainly has
much merit, it should be admitted that individuals can,
when appropriate, be held responsible for failure to
participate. To the reform "bias of conflict" thesis we
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need, in the first place, suggest that apathy (understood
here as related to unconstrained choices one makes) is a
necessary conceptual ingredient in the explanation of non-
participation.
The most substantial criticism of the reform analysis
is found, however, in what I have termed the "radical"
explanation. There are three central aspects of this
critique
.
First, it is assumed by Schattschneider and, at times,
Bachrach that non-participants withdraw from politics
because they rationally perceive that their needs are not
being met and that withdrawal is the rational alternative.
This presumes that non-participants fully comprehend what
is in their real interests and develop a strategy that also
serves their interests. I have argued against this, how-
ever, that it is always an open question—one not settled
simply by an appeal to evidence^--to what degree one's
understanding of one's situation is true, partial or
false. The issue of false-consciousness then should not be
eliminated as a terrain, however fraught with difficulty,
that political analysis needs to enter.
Secondly, in some sense, this is particularly true in
the explanation of non-participation. Withdrawal or exclu-
sion from the opportunities to articulate, express and
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press for one's interests can devolve into a type of apathy
distinct from that described by the pluralists. When the
pressures of social structure and inculcation of dominant
ideologies not in the interests of non-participants serve
to foster indifference or indolence with respect to the
political realm, apathy here would liken itself to a condi-
tion people suffer under. Here the responsibility for non-
participation should not be located with the non-partici-
pant but with the system and its dominant elites. A person
suffering political apathy of this type could hardly be
said to be fully conversant with his or her interests or
appropriate strategies to advance them. And this would
remain true even if apathy was the end result of a process
which, we might well be able to mutually agree, began with
withdrawal that was initially fully rational.
5
Lastly, reform analysis does not accurately perceive
the extent of the hold social structure may have over the
scope of political issue formation. Bachrach is, I
believe, correct in pointing to the workplace and corpora-
tion as institutions in need of politicization
. In his
early work, however, he does not fully consider the limits
to the issues that would likely be placed on such a process
by the constraints inherent in the social structure these
institutions help constitute. In his later work, as we
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have seen, he has crossed from the reform to the radical
paradigm, explicitly addressing issues of class, conscious-
ness, and specifically the dual nature of participatory
reform in the workplace and the corporation: as a vehicle
for further legitimation of private power or as one for
radical democratic change. This difference is all impor-
tant. Urging participation that promises power over one's
life, without comprehending and preparing for the struc-
tural and political pressures against those demands that
contravene the parameters of the present system, can lead
to defeat, depair, and increased non-participation.
The radical explanation
At the most general level, the radical explanation of
non-participation extends our analysis in two principal
ways. First, it allows us to suggest that depoliticization
may be a feature built into certain types of social
systems, constraining the level and quality of partici-
pation we would expect to find. Secondly, the political
consciousness actors bring to the understanding of the
social system in which they live may, itself, be shackled
to ideologies that harm their interests and provide only a
partial, or even false, understanding of their real
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situation. These two factors can come together, I have
argued, in a type of apathy very different from that
described by Berelson. When a profound apathy results from
severe social constraints and not from the malfeasance or
indolence of the individual, I have suggested it is better
described as a condition under which people suffer.
Conceptualizing two faces of apathy, apathy related to
individual responsibility and apathy as a condition, clari-
fies an ambiguity inherent in our usage of the term--one
with important political consequences. When people subor-
dinated in mass society become apathetic and are described
incorrectly, as Berelson and Dahl describe them, as content
or indifferent to politics, the result is to locate respon-
sibility for non-participation with the individual. The
radical explanation suggests that apathy also may be
fostered by social structure and ideology in ways that harm
the interests of the non-participants. To the degree wide-
spread apathy as a condition exists, we may suggest that a
particular social structure is inherently depoliticizing
.
The work of Mills and Marcuse indicates three poten-
tial aspects of apathy as a condition. The first, in
reverse order of significance, I have called absolute
political mortification and have found its most complete
expression in Marcuse 's One Dimensional Man . Absolute
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political mortification would exist when people have been
so thoroughly manipulated and programmed that they lose the
very capacity to think in ways that may be, at some point,
politically relevant: 6 they iose the capacity for inten _
tional action. I have left open the question of whether
absolute political mortification is, in fact, a theoretical
possibility given the potential for chemical-based human
programming and other forms of operant conditioning. How-
ever, I have decisively rejected the formulation Marcuse
offers, first as constituted by problematic constituent
concepts (e.g., "one-dimensional" language) defended with
superficial evidence and, therefore, secondly, going beyond
any reasonable conception of false-consciousness.
The essential argument against Marcuse 's extreme
thesis is this: Marcuse illicitly assumes that technolo-
gical rationality can, in fact, become human practice. I
have argued, in contrast, that Marcuse' s analysis is based
on a limited and distorted concept of subjectivity leading
to a one-dimensional characterization of the dialetic of
individual and social structure.
The application of technique and means-ends ration-
ality remains only one aspect of human practice, ultimately
relying on norms and values not reducible to technical
questions to justify particular applications of technique
es
and to motivate human action. In fact, behind any specific
application of science and technology always lie standards
for the organization of society that extend beyond that of
science and technology. Moreover, the possibility always
exists for humans to form intentions, act on them, and
reflect on their actions in terms that include but are not
circumscribed by technical considerations.
While basic questions of ethics and values can b
suppressed in modern society, they cannot be rooted out a
basic characteristics of the human experience. The positi-
vist project is not dangerous, therefore, as Marcuse
sometimes explains it, because it can turn human beings
into objects. Instead, it is pernicious because it can
encourage people to believe that a particular organiza-
tion of technology is "nature-like" thereby suppressing the
constellation of ethical considerations that stands behind
that particular organization.
In contrast to Marcuse' s extreme formulation, then,
what we really have is people "objectifying themselves" in
a technological milieu--a modern form of the alienation
Marx described a century ago. People come to appear to
themselves and others as objects needed to serve particular
functions, but they do not become objects. However strong
the technological base of society becomes, it does not
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sever its connection with the human subjects whose rules,
values, and practices help constitute both it and the
social structure in general. While false-consciousness may
become extensive, therefore, it can never be reduced to a
mere reflection of the needs of the technical base. The
relation between human subjects and the social structure
their practices constitute remains dialectical, however
unfree human action may in fact be.
As a corollary to the proposition that human subjec-
tivity is more complex than Marcuse's extreme "one-dimen-
sional" analysis allows, I have suggested that he also
offers an over-func tionalized view of language, psychology
and social structure. 7 Human language may become debased,
but it cannot be reduced only to technical terms. Human
psychology may be more adaptable (or variable) than Freud
allows, but there is little evidence that mimesis
,
as
described by Marcuse, could ever become the basic process
of cognitive and emotional development. Finally, like
human subjectivity itself, social structure is complex;
changes in social structure are not reducible to a contin-
uous process of harmonious adjustment, creating ever
greater technological hegemony.
Marcuse's extreme thesis, and the despair implicit in
it, has manifest political consequences. First, it encour-
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ages us to overlook the very real struggles for human
self-consciousness and liberation, however inadequate, that
exist in many sectors of society. Secondly, in exagger-
ating the degree and misunderstanding the character of
political quiescence, it at once fosters a sense of
hopelessness with the present situation and a search for
revolutionary heroes immune to the debasing socialization
of society. This can have the unfortunate consequence of
widening the breach between those whose struggle for self-
liberation may share more common characteristics than
Marcuse's analysis allows and whose long-term interests may
have more in common than either sees today. And perhaps of
greater significance, Marcuse's analysis of contemporary
subjectivity leaves little reason to believe that humans
are capable of any substantial freedom, let alone the
sweeping liberation his more optimistic moments suggest.
In presenting an analysis likely to unnecessarily
divide potential allies and a concept of subjectivity that
cannot sustain a serious notion a human freedom, Marcuse's
stark "one-dimensional" thesis implies a quiescent politi-
cal strategy. Divided from allies, student radicals will
revolt, fail and despair; or, overwhelmed by the utter
hopelessness of it all, without a realizable goal of free-
dom, radicals will withdraw into tight little theoretically
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pure circles and not even try to be politically relevant.
And while Marcuse's sweeping and quite impossible vision of
liberation may spur action for a while, it will also lead
inevitably to defeat, despair and withdrawal. The failure
of Marcuse's extreme formulation of apathy as a condition
to aid explanation, and his "biological foundation for
socialism" to provide a vision, is truly poignant. For the
values of human liberation, enlightenment and survival so
dear to Marcuse, as he argues, are under severe threat
today and in need of rigorous defense. Part of that
defense, however, undoubtedly is a more adequate explana-
tion of why people don't participate in politics than the
extreme concept of absolute political mortification allows.
As I have suggested, Marcuse, to his credit, does
offer a more tenable thesis of relative political mortifi-
cation. The essential elements of his thesis are as
follows: (1) a powerful apolitical ideology of technolo-
gical rationality; (2) a mass psychology that defuses
psychological discontent, both libidinally (repressive
desublimation) and aggressively (in the "enemy"); (3)
operationalized concepts that trivialize and personalize
grievances; (4) a language that undercuts the potential for
criticism in oppositional concepts (a modified "one-
dimensional language" thesis); (5) expanding privatized
.ec-
rewards; (6) pseudo-political outlets such as when el,
tions are really only ceremonial plebiscites. Relative
political mortification would not signal the end of human
intentions but rather the indefinite suspension of the con-
sciousness to form political intentions and act in their
terms
.
ime
This thesis is clearly superior to his more extre
statement because it does not reduce human subjectivity to
a mere reflection of the logic of technics. Instead, the
claim is that technological rationality has become such a
powerful ideology, abetted by other social forces, that it
successfully fools people into believing they have become
mere functional units in a technological ensemble. At the
same time, however, I have argued that technological
rationality is not likely to prove a stable legitimization
because it ultimately depends on values external to its own
system of rules to motivate behavior. The possibility of
penetrating the ideology of technological rationality
remains real, therefore, particularly if the economic
mechanism falters. The ideological protection technolo-
gical rationality affords the social system can easily
weaken under duress, whether in capitalism or state
socialism.
Finally, while the extensive apathy implied by the
concept of relative political mortification certainly has
some explanatory power, contemporary withdrawal from poli-
tics does not seem to have the full-blown mark of complete
false consciousness that even this modified "one-dimen-
sional" thesis implies.
In contrast to Marcuse's thesis on "one-dimensional
society," I have suggested that C. Wright Mills offers an
alternative and superior analytic framework for explaining
non-participation. While some of his work also shades into
extreme statements about "cheerful robots" and the like,
8
the body of his writing provides the basis for what I have
termed a concept of political subordination: a state of
affairs that exists when the scope of the political realm
is so narrowly drawn that it clearly can be said to be
severely subordinated to the dominant imperatives of the
economic and social system. Mills' concept of "mass
society" is the paradigmatic example he offers.
For Mills, political subordination occurs when people
are denied counter-ideologies, political institutions and
modes of life that would help enable them to form political
intentions and act in their terms. In a society in which
the prevailing ideology focuses on individual merit and
achievement; in which the major political parties have
programs with important similarities; and in which "poli-
tics" is considered to be contained in the speciaiized
electoral arena distinct fro* work, culture, ieisure and
family; troubles and grievances that emerge are not likely
to be translated into political issues. Instead, they are
allowed to remain personalized or possibly displaced onto
inappropriate objects, leaving untouched the source of the
malaise and deflecting the formulation of political analy-
sis and strategy.
Moreover, having reviewed Mills' early work on lan-
guage, and on social structure in The New Men of Power and
White Collar
,
I have drawn the following conclusion: in
the terms of the individual, Mills would suggest that we
cannot explain why someone does not participate politically
without grasping the language the actor would use to ex-
plain his or her own withdrawal from politics. In trying
to comprehend why people adopt depoliticized roles, there-
fore, we must not only look at the role models implicit in
the dominant ideologies but also the roles the actors be-
lieve themselves to be adopting and their explanations for
doing so. We do this not because the reasons the actors
give necessarily will be an accurate explanation of why
they have withdrawn since their self-understanding
, while
pertinent, may well be based on quite mistaken analysis of
the forces that pressured their withdrawal. 9 Indeed, they
may believe themselves to be apathetic and indolent and
hold themselves responsible, where, in fact, the political
arena rarely offers specific issues that speak to their
grievances
.
Instead, we do it to discover how the specific depoli-
ticized roles the actors have adopted have been formed and
to discover why the actors commit themselves to these.
What is characteristically different about Mills' concept
of political subordination 1 *) is that it begins to help us
see the social glue vital to depoliticized roles: the
active commitment of the actors to them . When we extend
his analysis in the directions suggested in the work of
Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb, and Frank Parkin, we see
both how people adapt dominant roles to meet their real
life situations (varying with class, ethnic or racial back-
ground, worklife, sex, etc.) and how a constellation of
such adaptations may, indeed, form a subordinate ideology.
In terms of social structure, Mills does, at times,
suggest a complexity of social types and a potential for
social change that is sometimes lacking in The Power
Elite . In his early book The New Men of Power
,
he gives
his richest description of depoliticization: a range of
citizens from those who have quit a political arena that
does not speak to their needs, to those who have been
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debased into a condition of apathy. it is also here that
he suggests there may exist openings within the vicissi-
tudes of social and economic structure for a repoliticizing
strategy to be implemented. In helping us to understand
how to analyze both why people commit themselves to
depoliticized roles, and structural openings for change,
Mills provides, at once, a guide for the analysis of
non-participation and for strategies on how to extend
democratic participation.
Explaining Non-Participation
In this thesis, I have been arguing two related but
distinct claims. The first is that there is a full range
of concepts at our disposal in the explanation of non-
participation. The second is that the concept of political
subordination is the most fruitful for inquiry today. Let
us review these in turn.
The first claim is primarily conceptual although it
does imply a certain theoretical orientation to the study
of politics. This orientation may be summarized as
follows. Humans are complex both internally and in the
relationship they have with other humans and the social
structure which they, through their beliefs, actions and
institutions help constitute. The very complexity of human
thought and action means that we must always be wary of
allowing our theoretical framework to seduce us into the
acceptance of what appears to us to be the obvious
explanation of the political act.
I have criticized each of the paradigms studied for
precisely this flaw. The pluralist focuses on
indifference, contentment and apathy; the reformist on
rational withdrawal; and the radical on apathy as a
condition. The argument here is that all of these are
conceptually pertinent to the explanation of
non-participation. Although, as we have seen, theorists
are often insensitive to this concern.
If there is a fuller range of concepts available for
the explanation of non-participation than any of the
theorists allow, this implies that the task of each is to
demonstrate why a particular concept has been emphasized.
Each does this to some degree, engaged in a particular
debate at a particular point of theoretical development.
So we find Schattschneider , for example, arguing that what
appears to be apathy is really rational withdrawal and
Marcuse that what appears to be freedom is really profound
repression. Nevertheless, with the possible exception of
Mills, none of the theorists articulate the complete range
of concepts. And all of them, including Mills, fail to
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defend the concept they choose to emphasize against this
full range.
In explaining non-participation then and successfully
defending our particular explanation, we should be aware of
the following possibilities. A person may, indeed, be con-
tent or simply uninterested in politics and become apathe-
tic; this may explain some aspects of non-participation.
The implication here, which should be drawn out and
defended, is the presumption that such people have freely
chosen to withdraw and are responsible for their decision.
If apathy is to be a prime explanation, we must also consi-
der that however free the person may intially be, apathy
can itself lead to future inability to know what is in
one's interest, cutting one off from important avenues of
political thought and action. Therefore, a theorist should
be clear whether individual apathy is to serve as an expla-
nation of non-participation with the moral approbation that
implies or whether he or she intends to reverse the normal
connotation of ordinary language and celebrate apathy as
good for the health of a political system. In the latter
case, the theorist needs to carefully explain why the
connotation in our ordinary usage should be reversed.
As the reform model explains it, people may rationally
withdraw from a biased political order. The implication
here that needs defense is that people have a relatively
clear understanding of their political situation and that
political involvement, given the constraints arrayed
against them, is self-defeating and irrational. Political
involvement is generally viewed as a worthwhile avenue of
human action, albeit one cut off from rational pursuit.
The further implication is that people are able to maintain
an accurate assessment of the political order in spite of
their withdrawal. It is the bias of limited avenues of
political action, and the elites that maintain such con-
stricted avenues, that are here held responsible for the
non-participation that exists.
Finally, I have argued that, people can devolve into a
state of political subordination or mortification that
leaves them with only a partial or a false understanding of
the constraints under which they suffer. Here the self-
awareness of the individual (or groups, classes, etc.)
becomes one of the constraining factors on the freedom of
the individual. Moreover, if such "false-consciousness" is
seen to be widespread, social structure itself, not just
the way political issues are oriented at a particular time,
is likely to be seen in contradiction with political
freedom. Given such structural arrangements, issues that
seriously advance the interests of the non-participants are
not expected to arise; the problem is to devise a strategy
to fundamentally alter these arrangements.
While I am suggesting that each of the concepts ex-
plored is pertinent to explaining non-participation, there
is nothing improper about a theorist focusing on one or
another of the concepts as the one he or she believes to
have the most explanatory power. Instead the argument is
that theorists need to entertain more self
-consciousness
about why a particular choice is made and the implied
requirement of explaining why other choices are being
passed over.
Moreover, making the choice will entail other impli-
cations. First, the choice will inform and be dependent
upon the interpretation of the available evidence the
scholar examines. Secondly, the precise meaning given the
concept will vary within certain parameters, depending on
the theoretical framework within which it is used. The
most important example of this we have studied is the way
pluralists "redefine" apathy to include a positive moral
orientation at odds with our ordinary language.
The choice of primary conceptual orientation and the
specific explanation of the concept will also be tied to
the basic theoretical orientation of the student. Plural-
ists, for example, "redefine" apathy not because they want
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to illicitly blame non-participants for their withdrawal
but rather because they see limited intrinsic value in
participation. Further, too much participation, in their
view, will destabilize a regime they presume to be as
democratic as possible.
Decisions about which explanation of non-participation
to utilize and how to develop a specific explanation will
have methodological and political implications when cast
against today's world. In stipulating one explanation (or
a particular array of them), a theorist also does the
following: (1) projects a view about what, in fact, contem-
porary American politics looks like and whether this is a
desirable state of affairs; (2) stipulates a range of what
should count as "political"; (3) suggests a view of human
nature, including anthropological assumptions about how
much and what kind of participation is desirable for the
individual and society; (4) describes and evaluates
contemporary depoliticization against this image; (5)
offers considerations about whether and when contemporary
social structure enables or inhibits free action; (6)
implies at least one contrast mode of political partici-
pation against which contemporary affairs are judged; (7)
explains non-participation in such a way that has implica-
tions for describing and evaluating future repoliticization
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and formulating strategies to advance or retard further
participation; (8) ultimately offers an interpretation of
the political world which, if it achieves serious consider-
ation, becomes part of the political reality that is its
"object" of inquiry.
That these implications should flow from any of the
potential explanations of non-participation we have identi-
fied is not, of course, a defect of the chosen explana-
tion. Rather it is an element of theorizing per se . To
the degree a theorist is aware of these, he or she is in a
better position to make these implications as explicit as
possible and offer evidence to support them as part of the
project of articulating and justifying a particular expla-
nation. The more fully articulated and defended the
assumptions undergirding an explanation, the better the
explanation is likely to be.
The theoretical task I am suggesting is, of course,
not an easy one. In fact, none of the theorists we have
studied satisfy its requirements, and their theories suffer
for it. If human behavior is complex, fully explained
neither by the stated preferences nor the apparent activity
of the participants, the danger remains: if we do not
articulate the implicit domains entailed by a particular
theory, we are more likely to succumb to the temptation of
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glibly accepting as reality those appearances that fit the
predilections of our own theory. The more successful we
are in articulating and evaluating what is implicit in our
theory, the more likely is our theory to accurately capture
reality
.
In suggesting that all of the concepts we have ex-
plored have some explanatory purchase in the study of
non-participation, I should draw out one implication of
this propostion. People today are actually capable of both
freeing themselves sufficiently from social constraints to
comprehend their real situation, perhaps deciding they are
content or perhaps that the political order is not meeting
their needs, and of being subdued under partial or false-
consciousness of their lot. Against Marcuse, then, I have
argued that people are today capable of more responsible
action than he allows, and against Berelson and Dahl that
false-consciousness must be considered as a possible entry
point to the understanding of motivation and action. H
Therefore, while my argument is in part conceptual, its
usefulness remains dependent upon an analysis of present
human potential within the parameters of contemporary
social structure. All theorists will not agree with this
analys is
.
I do believe, however, that it is an argument that
warrants a high degree of general agreement, substantiated
by powerful support in two related areas. For one thing,
the conceptual range I am suggesting conforms to our
ordinary usage of language, with which we typically try to
ascertain when we (or others) are acting freely, when our
actions advance or harm our interests and when we may be
acting or have acted under irrational impulses or delu-
sions. Secondly, we attempt to achieve this knowledge in
order to enhance our ability to act freely and ascertain
our responsibility for what we do. The desire for self-
re fleet ive action itself, particularly characteristic of
today's world, implies the full conceptual range we have
suggested, from free, responsible action to unfree action
engendered by causes outside our awareness or control. If
we desire to be more reflective, this implies there are
times when the reasons for our action are not transparent
to us .
In addition to having articulated a range of concepts
pertinent to the explanation of non-participation, I have
also suggested my choice for the one with the greatest
explanatory power today. I have called this political
subordination and chosen it for two distinct reasons.
In the first place, political subordination seems best
able to describe and evaluate the times in which we live.
This is, of course, the precise area in which political
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theory becomes explicitly politically engaged. Our cri-
tique of pluralism, reforism and "one-dimensional man"
constitutes support for this evaluation.
To review, there are certain relationships today which
an explanation of non-participation needs to be able take
into account for. Empirically, it must be able to explain
why non-participation, whether measured by the simple (and
very limited) test involving voting or by tests over an
arry of political activities, is correlated with class and
educational level. 12 It also needs to account for the
following relationship between the ideology of equal
opportunity, the ideology of sacrifice and contemporary
social structure. Americans today occupy jobs that are
marked by numerous gradations (often unnecessary from the
point of view of economic efficiency) of "function" and
rank, 13 within labor markets segmented by status, race and
sex, within a dual economy of unionized corporate jobs and
non-unionized smaller market firms. People are further
divided socially be sex, race and class; the development of
atomistic urban and suburban living arrangements; a culture
that encourages living vicariously through the television^
rather than in the community; and finding the good life in
consumer goods. Yet, there seems to be a shared orienta-
tion to their situation which is marked by a desire to see
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themselves as free and responsible agents contributing to a
tendency to hold onto a dream for advancement for oneself
or one's children, in spite of important economic and
social constraints on their freedom. One principle con-
straint, I have argued, is the fragmented nature of social
and economic ties, imposing severe obstacles to forming
common identities and organizations that could forge a
united political purpose out of vague individual discon-
tent. Indeed, perhaps the most important orientation
people have in common is that of a competitive posture with
respect to others, augmenting the disunity. Nevertheless,
people in post-traditional societies seem capable of a
relatively high degree of self
-consciousness and often
attempt to become freer by trying to comprehend the reason
for their actions.
Given a vacuum of the type of political organization
that would help people identify grievances and articulate
them as issues, the ideology of equal opportunity generates
alternate sets of self-explanations of their real situa-
tion, with the ideology of sacrifice constituting a primary
alternative. It is not surprising, therefore, that people
often are unable to grasp the political significance of
inchoate troubles. Neither should we be surprised to find
them turning them into a feeling of self-blame for failure
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that has structural roots, or displacing blame onto others
equally troubled; or lapsing into the kind of subordinate
ideology laced with cynicism that Frank Parkin describes.
It is through Mills' examination of troubles in mass
society, his early focus on the vocabulary of the actors,
and his analysis of the specific strata within society that
we were able to begin to unearth how these characteristics
bear on the explanation of non-participation. The investi-
gation was strengthened through the work of Richard Sennett
and Jonathan Cobb, particularly their emphasis on the
ideology of sacrifice and self-blame for failure and the
necessity of comprehending the self-understanding of the
agents under study in the development of an interpretive
account of behavior. I suggested, finally, that this
latter point needs to be modified to account for hidden
motives, vague discontents, partial and even false
self-interpretation on the part of the agents.
Political subordination, then, helps us account for
two essential components of contemporary political life:
first, the fact of depoliticization based on class and
education; secondly, the relation between a politically
fragmenting social structure that itself is depoliticizing
and a common attempt to see oneself as a free and respon-
sible agent in spite of important constraints on freedom.
Therefore, I have concluded that, while the other explana-
tions studied remain pertinent in explaining some aspects
of non-participation, political subordination warrants
primary consideration.
There is a second reason I have found the explanation
of political subordination extrapolated from Mills super-
ior. This is distanced from the specific conclusion that
we live in a society in which political understanding,
participation and organization is unnecessarily constrained
by contemporary social structure. Because beyond this
conclusion this mode of exploring contemporary political
relationships helps us account for the present complexity
of human thought and action. It could be applied by us at
other times to reach other conclusions about how severely
participation is constrained, or other theorists could use
it today and reach different conclusions than I have. It
is, then, a starting point for inquiry at a higher level of
generality than the specific conclusions reached here,
although itself not free of political implications.
William Connolly summarizes these when he writes:
The interpretation offered here . . . projects a
multilayered or faceted view of persons and so-
cial relations. It requires distinctions between
explicit and implicit beliefs and between con-
scious and unconscious purposes; it affirms the
possibility of deception, distortion, ambiva-
lence, and projection in relations with others
and oneself; it insists that some degree of self-
consciousness, autonomous action and moral inte-
grity are possible human achievements; it recog-
nizes an attenuated, historicized conception of
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allegiance of a populace unie s they Iremystified or specified in futuristic te?ms?15
As a general rule for social inquiry, then, I am sug-
gesting that investigation should not remain at the level
of what, at first glance, neatly conforms to the predic-
tion of a particular theory. To overcome this tendency, I
have previously argued that a theorist needs to consider a
series of implications that flow from a particular explana-
tion.^ Now the argument is that the complexity Qf human
behavior necessitates that we incorporate awareness of this
complexity in our mode of inquiry. This will also help
guard against prejudicial and superficial explanations,
ranging from the "contentment" of Berelson to the "one-di-
raensional man" of Marcuse. Interpretation, then, needs to
press beyond the presumptions of the theorist to consider
the actual self
-interpretation of the agents studied. It
should, however, push beyond this level as well to discover
what stands behind the account given by the agents and what
in that account may be misleading or untrue. There are, of
course, problems here as well. Connolly concludes:
An interpretation wishing to both respect
appearances and to reveal what they conceal can
be disciplined, but it should not pretend to be
politically neutral ... to clarify then [what
is implicit or repressed] is to give them a
distinct shape and accent previously absent; to
convince those to whom they are attributed to
accept the new formulations is partly to draw out
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what was there already and partly to change itand its role in their lives. m the sphere of
not neatly separable. And since ideas, beliefs
arid aspirations enter into political relations'that means that political reflection, once 11 isheard and heeded, or heard and repudiated, neverleaves things as they were. 1?
Nevertheless, these problems exist as part of a mode
of study best able to capture the human complexity that
shapes our thought and action. Theorists that avoid the
type of inquiry I am arguing for because they fear it leads
to biased analysis do so at great risk to their own work.
For they, at once, are likely to miss evidence that, once
considered, will render their theory more profound, while
at the same time slip into an account prone to glibly
accepting what appears to be the obvious explanation of
behavior as reality. For the sake of artificial neutral-
ity, they will avoid articulating how their particular work
is politically engaged and wind up with what we may truly
call a biased account.
Explaining non-participation and the two faces of apathy
There are, as we have seen, many concepts pertinent to
the explanation of non-participation. These include con-
tentment, cynicism, indifference, indolence, rational
withdrawal, despair, confusion, political subordination and
political mortification. Apathy, however, has played a
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central role along a range of theories, and as we shall
see, it retains an important place in explaining non-parti-
cipation, still viewed by some contemporary theorists, for
example, as desirable for a healthy democratic system.
Should more stable and apparently "consensual" times reap-
pear, it would not be surprising to see apathy resurrected
as a dominant explanation in political science literature.
Finally, apathy continues to be an important, and perhaps
the dominant, popular and journalistic explanation of
non-participation, and it is a predominant self-explanation
of non-participants. For this reason, I will try to
clarify some issues involved in the use of this term.
My departure point is the ambiguity inherent in our
ordinary usage of the term, which I have discussed in the
chapters on Berelson, Dahl and Mills. Generally speaking,
when we say someone is apathetic, we imply the agent has
some level of responsibility, although the language is open
enough to allow us to address the situation in which people
find themselves. So when we say, "John is apathetic about
nuclear war," we are at the same time holding John respon-
sible for being indifferent to something he should care
about. When we say, "The masses are apathetic about
nuclear war," an acknowledgement exists that there may be
something about being in a "mass" that renders someone
indolent. When Mills, for example, talks about apathy, he
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is suggesting that mass society creates apathy in people
who, under more appropriate circumstances, would freely
participate. Whereas when Berelson uses it, he suggests
that the individual's apathy is related to an unconstrained
choice not to participate. These distinctions are all
important both in explaining why someone does not
participate and in assigning responsibility for the
non-participation
.
Moreover, because we view participation as itself a
"good," enhancing in particular a person's ability to know
his or her and the public's interest, I have rejected
Berelson 's attempt to alter the normative import of the
term apathy. If apathy is seen, as it is in our ordinary
usage, as a term of approbation, it becomes all important
where one is locating the responsibility for the apathy.
Ludwig Wittgenstein has suggested that there are times
when we might need to revise concepts to improve our
ability to use language clearly. He writes, ".
. .a
reform of ordinary language for particular purposes, an
improvement in our terminology designed to prevent
misunderstanding in practice, is perfectly possible. "18
We should, I believe, apply this to apathy in the
following way. First, when we speak of apathy based in the
relatively free choice an individual makes, we may use the
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term while being clear in our explanation why we have
arrived at this conclusion. Secondly, when using the term
to locate responsibility outside the subject, we especially
need to be clear what we consider to be the source of
apathy, because such is not the primary use of apathy in
ordinary language. One way to do this is to use other
terms that more fully capture what we mean. Political
subordination and political mortification are two possible
substitutes I have suggested. Each expression captures
different senses of political apathy as a condition
fostered by a repressive social structure.
There are several other considerations worth noting.
First, apathy is a concept that suggests motivation and
describes quality of behavior. 19 Saying that someone is
apathetic, however, suggests nothing about whether a
certain range of acts are performed. Although unusual,
there is nothing illogical about a person being politically
apathetic and engaging in numerous political acts. The
person may not care about politics but be politically
active anyway. Berelson and Dahl commit the error of
confusing the language of motivation with that of action
whenever they describe all non-participants as apathetic.
Conversely, they err in not seeing, as Schattschneider
suggests, that people may withdraw from politics precisely
because they care greatly about the constitution of the
present political order.
Secondly, while individuals may, if appropriate, be
held responsible for their apathy, they do not simply
choose to be apathetic. Apathy relates to a constellation
of personal choices and concerns. For instance, I may
choose to focus my attention on my salvation in the
hereafter, becoming apathetic about destruction of the
environment. To the extent my choices are meaningfully
said to be free, I can be held responsible. But, even when
apathy is my responsibility, it is more like a frame of
mind or a state I have put myself in than a choice. And
when the choices leading to apathy are constrained, apathy
is akin to a condition foisted upon me.
Finally, although I have suggested that a high level
of participation is desirable, some political apathy is
necessary. I cannot, at the same time, care about every-
thing that is politically relevant. To care and work on
certain issues is to hold others in abeyance and, perhaps,
become apathetic with respect to them. In fact, trying to
care about everything I consider to be important in some
sense could lead to a personal collapse and total apathy.
Even as I suggest that participation is very desirable
therefore, I must acknowledge a distinction between neces-
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sary and unnecessary apathy.
Apathy, a central concept in the explanation of poli-
tical behavior, nevertheless is fraught with certain ambi-
guities and prone to occasional misuse in theory. I have
drawn these distinctions not to suggest what role apathy
should play in any particular explanation. Instead I am
arguing that, however it is used, the term should clearly
specify the author's intention because of the inherent
implication for assigning responsibility for non-partici-
pation .
Explaining Non-Participation in the Future
There is a central problem for political inquiry
today, prompted by the convergence of several "mini-crises"
facing the United States. First government at all levels
is facing, as James O'Connor puts it, a "fiscal crisis."
Today capitalism seems unable to generate both high levels
of private appropriation and sufficient tax dividends to
provide services necessary for social harmony and necessi-
ties that benefit private capital but which it is unwilling
to bear the cost of (such as education, roads, etc.). A
contradiction therefore begins to emerge between expanding
the socialization of the costs of production and the pri-
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vate appropriation of profit. Secondly, the economic
growth that characterized the American economy after World
War II has slackened, leading to deep recession and severe
unemployment. Even if a "recovery" occurs, it is an open
question how the rate of unemployment will respond. Third-
ly, as Jurgen Habermas suggests, the intervention of the
state to correct systems dysfunctions removes the "nature-
like" character of market relationships, politicizing and
posing a threat to the legitimacy of the system. The ques-
tion then emerges, how does advanced capitalism raise the
allocation granted private capital accumulation to generate
growth, maintain the tax base the state is dependent on,
and maintain the social harmony necessary for the austerity
this change will entail? To do so, it must defuse the
repoliticizing tendency inherent in state intervention in
the economy by making continued depoliticization plausible
to the citizenry. As we shall see, certain explanations of
non-participation can contribute to this unstated system
need
.
The present code word for the above economic project
is "^industrialization." In general, reindustrialization
implies a shift of resources toward private investment,
growth and state "defense" spending, and away from social
spending. In its more modest version, it is a retreat from
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the institution of social programs, such as those that
characterized the "New Deal" and the "Great Society." At
its most extreme, it is a call for dismantling many of the
welfare state institutions and business regulations that
exist in this country, along with an effort to rekindle the
entrepreneurial spirit of risk taking and the work ethic,
by greatly rewarding those able to succeed in the competi-
tive scramble. Allowing those who are able to accumulate
wealth, it is claimed, may even solve the problem of
poverty.
George Gilder, an extreme exponent of this position,
writes in his recent Wealth and Poverty :
Our central problem arises from a deep conflict
between the processes of material progress and
the ideals of "progressive" government and
culture. Equality, bureaucratic rationality,
predictibility
, sexual liberation, political
"populism," and the pursuit of pleasure--all the
values of advanced culture--are quite simply
inconsistent with the disciplines and investments
of economic and technical advance. The result is
that all modern governments pretend to promote
economic growth but in practice doggedly obstruct
it.
The heart of this version of the reindustrialization
solution is to reward initiative and productivity among
those positioned to generate economic growth within corpor-
ate capitalism. Reducing taxes on capital and savings,
increasing military production, dismantling business regu-
lations and even offering subsidies to promising enter-
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prises are part of this project.
On the other side, however, a set of disciplines must
be imposed on those unable to contribute to the ^industri-
alist growth plan. For the notion of growth in consumption
as the economy expands now gives way to a channeling of
resources from consumption into investment. Welfare recip-
ients must receive lower levels of support; quality of life
issues ranging from environmental concerns tc health and
safety on the job are played down; worker "productivity" in
government and business is increased; and wage levels are
kept down. All those not able to resist--that is those in
low growth industries or areas of the country, the unem-
ployed, disadvantaged, and disabled--will suffer even more
than they presently do.
For those who refuse, greater discipline may be
necessary. Social Services can be cut further, inflation
used against those unable to increase their wages or
benefits, and social service agencies utilized to keep
track of a politically troublesome underclass. And if
these fail and protests mount, more direct legal and
political repression is available, particularly if the
reindustrialization plan encounters no opposition other
than that of the now feeble welfare state liberals. 21 As
William Connolly argues, reindustrialization necessitates
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depoliticization:
If the program for the ^industrialization ofAmerica were converted into practice, it wouldmean the de-democratization of America For itwould place the most crucial economic decisionsbeyond the reach of public accountability andwould shunt constituencies and public needs thatdo not fit into the ^industrialization syndrometoward the margin of economic life and sociallegitimacy.
. . . [And] a number of cautiousjournalists and social scientists, predictably
will ignore the gap between the production of
social evils and the generation of leoitimateissues. They will continue to cultivate a
studied innocence about the historical course we
are on by equating democratic politics with
electoral competition .
"
Gilder's extreme version of. reindustrialization does
not now have the necessary political support to become
ascendant, however, if the Reagan administration's somewhat
weaker plan should succeed, this circumstance could
change. Perhaps more likely, a moderate scheme will gain
ascendancy, obtaining support from political forces in the
center, including segments of the Democratic Party.
This strategy would agree on the need for government
austerity, recognizing that, for reindustrialization to
proceed especially in a low growth economy, the new capital
for investment would not be coming from the investors.
"Defense" spending, while lower than set by President
Reagan, would continue to increase, while social programs
might increase somewhat from his austere cuts. Although
there will be acknowledgement of the inefficiency of some
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past government programs, there also will be some insis-
tence on a larger role for government in partnership with
business to help "manage" the economy than Gilder would
like. Effective management of limited revenues will be
stressed, while overtly maintaining some measure of social
compassion, although, in practice, the latter will be modi-
fied by the need to accumulate capital in private hands.
While the emphasis will be more on equitable sharing of the
burdens, the burdens will remain unfairly shared. A high
degree of depoliticization will remain essential to this
task. How will it be explained?
Both the extreme and moderate ^industrialization
plans depend, in part, on a technocratic rationale to legi-
timize themselves. Both will need to extend beyond it as
well for good reason. As I suggested in the critique of
Marcuse, technocratic legitimations are poor substitutes
for explicit norms and values. On their own, they are
incapable of helping us understand why we attempt a task,
although they can help tell us how to do it and who would
do it well. For Gilder, expertise is augmented by initia-
tive, the work ethic, and ultimately growth to provide the
greatest good for those who produce. His desire is to help
us break out of "hedonism" and think again in terms of a
bright economic future. The moderate plan will also try to
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answer the question put by Lester Thurow: how does a state
in a zero growth economy decide the best way to allocate
its limited resources? Effective management and planning
will be seen here as instrumental to the goal of "fairly"
distributing the burdens until economic growth takes off
once again. Where followers of Gilder will accuse
opponents of being hedonistic, "adolescent nay-sayers,"
"commie dupes," or "washed up welfare state liberals," the
moderates will accuse them of being "unrealistic,"
unwilling to cope with the tough choices necessary in a
"modern complex world" and temporarily limited economy.
If in both cases the depoliticized system will incor-
porate a modified technocratic rationale, how are social
scientists likely to explain the non-participation that
will be further entrenched should this project be success-
ful? Samuel Huntington gave a preliminary answer in a 1975
report he helped prepare for the "Trilateral Commission,"
one member of which was Jimmy Carter, later to be our tech-
nocratic president (and failed moderate proto-reindustri-
alist) par excellance .
The problem today, Huntington argued, is that our
political system has become "overloaded" principally by
enlarging the role of the "welfare state" beyond what it
can reasonably be expected to accomplish. By overextending
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certain functions of government, we weaken its authority,
disabling it from being able to do what is really neces-
sary. The recent democratic surge of the 1960's and 1970'
s
is partly responsible for the present crisis, dramatically
increasing what was expected of government. Today he
argues, formerly marginal groups now occupy their rightful
place in the system, and the system no longer requires
excessive participation from a democratic point of view and
can't afford it economically and politically. If partici-
pation slackens, as Huntington thinks it will and should,
what will replace the call for the extension of democracy
in the legitimation of the system? Arguing that we err
decisively in exaggerating the degree to which authority
for our political system should issue from democratic
participation, Huntington suggests new sources of legiti-
macy, in particular expertise, seniority, experience, and
special talents. Substituting expertise for participation,
we lessen system demands, increase efficiency, allow the
system to function under less duress, and thereby restore
authority to a system now more effective, legitimated with
a technocratic rationale:
Predictively , the implication of this analysis is
that in due course the democratic surge and its
resulting dual distemper in government will
moderate. Prescriptively the implication is that
those developments ought to take place in order
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to avoid the deleterious consequences of thesurge and to restore balance between vitality andgovernablility in the democratic system. 23 7
Restoring the balance is essential, Huntington argues,
because in the United States the ideals of democracy pose a
threat to democratic government. Lacking traditional and
aristocratic ideals, commitment to the ideals of democracy
and equality in periods of "creedal passion" delegitimize
existing institutions by undermining their ability to func-
tion effectively. Thus the strength of a vital, participa-
tory society is also a weakness for governing effectively
and ultimately "democratically." The threat, then, is
neither primarily external nor from internal subversion but
from the very ideals of democracy.
Although he doesn't express it this way, Huntington
suggests a revision of our ideas about democracy. It bears
more than apparent similarity to Berelson, although written
twenty years later.
.
the effective operation of a democratic
political system usually requires some measure of
apathy and non- involvement on the part of some
individuals and groups. ... In itself, this
marginality is inherently undemocratic, but it
has also been one of the factors which has
enabled democracy to function effect ively . 24
Today, Huntington reports rather casually, marginal
groups are now "becoming full participants in the political
system." There is then, the justification from a
democratic point of view, to cease overloading the poli-
tical system with "demands that extend its functions and
undermine its authority." "Less marginality on the part of
some groups then needs to be replaced by more
self-restraint on the part of all groups."
For Huntington, while democracy is undoubtedly a
worthwhile value, it is "not necessarily optimized when it
is maximized." Just as there are desirable limits to
economic growth, "there are also potentially desirable
limits to the indefinite extension of political democracy."
"Democracy," he concludes, "will have a longer life if it
has a more balanced existence." And as "creedal passion"
turns to "creedal passivity," Huntington is likely to
explain the non-participation of those shuttled to the side
of the social and political order as apathy, deflecting
attention from political constraints, in the examination of
non-participation. If internalized by non-participants, a
vague self-blame will haunt them, further supporting the
technocrat's need to be left alone to manage the society.
And both elites and marginals will accept their roles as
good for a society better run by elites capable of under-
standing and managing it in all of its "complexity." This
is the delicate "balance" Huntington hopes to fashion.
In his more recent American Politics--The Promise of
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Disharmony (1981), Huntington puts the above perspective in
the context of an analysis of cycles of American political
involvement, based on the disjuncture he suggests exists
between American ideas and institutions. He begins by
criticizing consensus, pluralist and class-conflict theo-
rists for overemphasizing the role of material factors on
political history and understating the power of values and
moral passions.
In America, there is a basic consensus on values that
is intrinsic to national identity. This "American creed,"
consisting of "liberty, equality, individualism, democracy,
and the rule of law under a constitution," has remained
remarkably stable over time and is likely to continue into
the near future. Yet, there exists a gap between American
ideals and American institutions, particularly the ideal of
equality in an inegalitarian society that creates a basic
dynamic necessary to understand American political history.
The cleavage between idea and fact creates an
"American form of cognitive dissonance" and a peculiarly
"American dilemma." In order to be themselves, Americans
must believe in the creed, but the more they believe in the
creed, the more "against themselves" they are because they
become hostile to their institutions due to the contest of
Ideal vs. Institution (IvI) : "the legitimacy of American
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government varies inversely with belief in American poli-
tical ideals. "25
s
' s
The gap between ideal and political reality stand
behind the four cycles he identifies. Moralistic reform i
the attempt to eliminate the gap, an attempt which cannot
completely succeed. Such periods of "creedal passion" are
followed by cynical times during which, incapable of inde-
finite moral indignation and having attempted reform,
people surrender to the feeling the gap can't be elimi-
nated. Yet, cynicism requires an indefinite ability to
cope with the cognitive dissonance caused by the gap, with
no prospect of doing anything about it. The resolution is
found in complacent periods during which the gap is
ignored, involving "a dulling of perceptual clarity."
People may know the gap exists, but they interest them-
selves in other matters. During these periods of "creedal
passivity": "cognitive dissonance lurks uneasily beneath
the surface of conscience but is not sufficiently command-
ing to trouble people serious ly . "26 Americans, however,
cannot remain complacent about values for long since they
are such a basic part of their identity. If still reluc-
tant to admit to the existence of the IvI gap, they may
affirm falsely that American values are fully practiced and
lapse into hypocrisy, paving the way for exposure by their
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own American ideals ushering in the next "creedal passion-
period. Intense moral indignation will follow. 27
Four periods of "creedal passion" have occurred in
American history, during which Americans have tried to
return to "first principles." The American Revolution, the
Jacksonian period, the Progressive era, and the 1960's and
1970 's were all characterized by distinctive political
cleavage, major reform efforts, political and social
realignment and intense involvement. Occurring roughly
every 60 years, the next period, Huntington expects, will
be the period from the 2010 1 s -2020
' s
.
During these periods, the disharmony characteristic of
American ideals vs. practice explodes in a "moral inten-
sity" without which the system "could not change and hence
avoid stagnation and decay." Long-term system stability,
therefore, depends on these periods of adjustment. How-
ever, the institutions whose power, Huntington argues, is
necessary for the continuation of the society and its
ideals, come under assault. Due to its dual nature, Hun-
tington concludes, a "creedal passion period is American
politics' finest--and most dangerous - -hour . "28
To this point, Huntington's argument seems to be an
interesting descriptive analysis of American political
history, committed to the ideals and institutions of Ameri-
can politics. It also appears to be a step away from his
call for "apathy" for the Trilateral Commission, now appar-
ently describing the complacency only as one stage in a
broader historical dialectic that needs to continue into
the future. 29
Yet there is a parallel argument at work as well. The
needs of "economic development" and the need for protec-
tion from "external threats" render American ideals, if not
obsolete, in need of serious revision. Once this argument
is unearthed, we are taken immediately back to his report
to the "Trilateral Commission," although in a more sophis-
ticated and elusive version. Yet, the implication to be
drawn is the same: corporate capitalism is in serious
tension with democratic aspirations -
-it is the latter that
should be tempered.
Huntington's argument is as follows. The character of
reform in the twentieth century is different, in critical
respects, from earlier periods. In the nineteenth century,
American ideals were directed at the breakdown of tradi-
tional economic and political institutions and did so
successfully. The historical development of new political
and economic institutions went together with progress in
realizing American ideals. However, in this century,
reform has been relatively less successful, perhaps most
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successful in the case of Blacks. The reason he gives is
that reform in the recent past "was directed at the elimi-
nation or modification of modern political and economic
institutions that had emerged in the course of historical
development .
"
Reform in the 20th century, therefore, involved more
"a restoration of the past" than the realization of the
future, and progress (ideals) and history (development)
work increasingly at cross purposes: 30
.
. .
an increasingly sophisticated economy and
active involvement in world affairs seem likely
to create stronger needs for hierarchy, bureau-
cracy, centralization of power, expertise, big
government specifically, big organizations
generally. In some way or another, society will
respond to these needs, while still attempting to
realize the values of the American Creed to which
they are so contradictory. If history is against
progress [ideals], for how long will progress
resist history?31
Huntington believes that the American Creed is likely
to remain intact, with the periodicity of the past prevail-
ing in the future. He fears that the system might get
stuck in the oscillation between cynicism and moralism,
further depleting the authority weakened by the 1960's and
1970' s. Weakened authority could generate demands for
authoritarian structures more capable of providing func-
tional needs than are present structures. His hope,
however, is that:
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IrL^^A CyCle ^ f r! s P°nse could stabilize to a
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§ree t
.
han lt has in the Past. Ameri-cans could acquire a greater understanding oftheir case of cognitive dissonance and throughthis understanding come to live with theirdilemma on somewhat easier terms than they havein the past, in due course evolving a more
complex but also more coherent and constant
response to this problem. 32
Huntington's argument is now clear. In order for
American institutions to function effectively, achieving
post industrial economic and political development while
protecting us from foreign enemies and allowing us to act-
forcefully in the international arena, they must regain
lost authority. This requires a swing from moralism and
cynicism. But to what? The first temptation is to suggest
his argument is a veiled call for a return to complaceny.
He writes, after all, "American political institutions are
more open, liberal and democratic than those of any other
major society, now or in the past."
But there is a deeper message. We are just coming off
a round of democratic surge. While American ideals suc-
ceeded in advancing civil rights, in other areas they were
in conflict with the imperatives of modern economic and
political development. The legacy is to weaken the author-
ity of our institutions while being unable to change their
undemocratic, massive, hierarchical, and bureaucratic char-
acter. Economic concentration will not be mitigated by the
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moral fervor inherent in the cognative dissonance of the
IvI gap, for to change significantly our major institutions
has no less than "history" against it. We can only weaken
their authority through unrealistic activism, ultimately
threatening our survival as a modern democratic polity.
If the institutions will not change without disas-
terous results, then our orientation to our ideals must.
More subtle now than in 1975, Huntington implicitly is
calling for a "realistic" attitude toward those ideals.
His analysis at once predicts the cyclical continuation of
the IvI gap and pleas for a more "complex" attitude toward
the American dilemma that would tacitly change the nature
of the gap. Behind this duality is the transparent fear
that we will get caught in an oscillation between moralism
and cynicism, thereby undermining dominant American
interests
.
Huntington's acknowledged solution is to call for
resisting extremes "in any of these responses" to the IvI
gap:
The greatest danger to the IvI gap would come
when any substantial portion of the American
population carried to an extreme any one of these
responses
. ... To maintain their ideals and
institutions, Americans have no recourse but to
temper and balance their response to the IvI
gap .33
But is it really extremes in all the responses--
s.ier
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moralism, cynicism, complacency, hypocrisy- that he'
equally worried about? In apparent contradiction, earli
in his work, he writes:
The responses of cynicism, complacency, andhypocrisy to natural problems of cognitivedissonance do not have major direct consequencestor the stability and continuity of the oolitical
system.
. .
None of these responses challengethe continuing existence of the IvI gap. 34 5
It is moralism, the cycle of reform and participation,
that threatens the gap by trying to bring reality into
accord with principles. Huntington, I believe, most fears
excess here. 35
How can such excess be mitigated? Following is
Huntington's unacknowledged solution. His whole work is a
treatise on the superiority of American democracy to
democracy elsewhere and the limits we must observe in
further attempting to democratize it in today's complex
world. By calling for a more complex attitude toward the
existence of the gap, Huntington tacitly suggests an
acceptance of the discontinuity in ways that undermine the
"creedal passion" phase and justify the "creedal passivity"
phase. If internalized, this attitude would render compla-
cency not just a cycle in America history but a character-
istic of our attitude toward the ideals themselves. Thus,
while he upholds American ideals, he also insinuates into
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them elements which reflexively would reconstitute and
narrow the IvI gap. Underneath the call for a balanced
response to the existence of the gap, then, is an attempt
to bring ideals into closer harmony with the realities of
international power. 36 impatient with prolonged moralism
and cynicism, Huntington nudges us to the next stage of the
cycle, attempting as well to make the attitudes character-
istic of that stage a more permanent feature of American
ideology and consciousness. The overt call is for a
healthy and permanent dose of moderation. The tacit call
is for more apathy.
Huntington's argument is interesting from one other
point of view pertinent to our study, for while he appears
to be a technocratic theorist, there is a difference . 37 i
have argued earlier that technocratic roles in themselves
will prove a weak legitimation for depoliticizing strat-
egies. But notice what Huntington offers--a style of
technocratic theory in which people can also feel as though
they believe in the old American Creed.
In practice, people are asked to follow the dictates
of modern economic and political development. In theory,
they are asked to hold onto their beliefs as the creative
motor of social change but to moderate their attitude to
the disharmony between ideal and institution. What is the
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basis of this attitude? We are asked to maturely recognize
that present institutions are "modern," and thereby in
their necessary form. It is the ideals about which we must
become realistic. But to temper the ideals, increasing
complacency, is to legitimize those institutions that would
manage our affairs most successfully if we would oblige by
adopting technocratic roles. To the extent we accept his
argument, Huntington succeeds in injecting into anemic
technocratic roles a healthy dose of abstract belief in--
and complacency toward the practice of -
-democratic values.
Democracy is used to legitimize future depoliticization . 38
Samuel Huntington, then, presents a sophisticated
argument to make a simple point--one made by Berelson
twenty years ago. When decoded, it is that American capi-
talism requires a healthy dose of non-participation to
prevent democratic ideals from getting out of hand.
Declaring the basic problems of justice solved, Huntington
does not adequately answer the questions posed differently
by Dahl, Schattschneider
,
Bachrach, Mills and Marcuse : are
there significant numbers of Americans illicitly shuttled
to the side of the political arena, either withdrawn from
or subordinated to a system that does not respond to their
need? Is politics itself, unnecessarily subordinated to
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other imperatives, such as capitalist development, limiting
its scope and creating a need for depoliticization?
In the end, Huntington brings into the 1980' s the type
of analysis offered by Berelson. vor the institutions of
modern society to follow their natural course of
development, they must be free from a future explosion
between nineteenth century ideals and twenty-first century
economic and political power. Because these economic and
political institutions also provide the basis for
"democracy" to be able to provide functional needs and
"defense," they need to be protected from the "excesses" of
democracy. Huntington contributes to this cause by trying
to make depoliticized technocratic roles seem attractive to
us by allowing us to believe that by adopting them we also
become realistic democrats. In doing so, he provides an
incipient explanation of non-participation particularly
suitable for the austerity of modern reindus trialization
:
moderation in participation is now seen as a sign of a
mature democratic polity. Cast in these terms, it helps
justify and, if internalized, helps foster the depoli-
ticization necessary for the reindustrialis t ' s project.
The "promise of disharmony" dissolves into the wish for
apathy
.
The Future of Depoliticization
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There is reason to believe that Samuel Huntington's
fear for the future authority of American political insti-
tutions is well founded. In 1981, the Reagan administra-
tion was able to enact profound policy changes, only
fifteen years after liberals had unleashed their "Great
Society." According to Walter Dean Burnham, such policy
shifts are almost always "crucial symptoms of critical
realignments" of the major political forces housed in each
of the dominant parties. However, over the last twenty
years, something different seems to be at work, for no
"critical realignments of a classic type" seem to have
taken place: Reagan's victory, for example, was unaccom-
panied by an ideological shift to the right.
Instead, Burnham argues, we seem to be experiencing
"further stages in a general crisis of the regime as a
whole, and hence of the socioeconomic system which under
-
girds it. "39 The crisis is profound, including in its
domain severe problems in the domestic economy, in the
corporate "empire," and at home in the cultural system and
the state. The fiscal and legitimation crises we have
reviewed seem unresponsive to any "quick fixes," raising
profound questions about the immediate political future.
As we have seen, ^industrialization strategies
address this crisis by shifting governmental priorities
from promoting consumption to accumulation, attempting to
revitalize the capitalist mode of production. Such stra-
tegies have advantages, shifting the terms of present
political debate away from discredited liberal welfare
state programs and thereby avoiding the resentment of those
whose daily reality is shaped by the ideology of sacri-
fice. Nevertheless, the Reagan economic program has
produced issues that undermine its authority, particularly
on unemployment and nuclear weapons, and its credibility is
weakened when it insists on self-reliance and makes it
impossible for many workers and members of the underclass
to work for a living.
Burnham concludes:
If the accumulation strategies of the far right
also fail--a prospect which looks increasingly
likely--then what else is left? Very probably,
one of two things: a first rate political
breakdown and regime crisis possibly requiring
some form of dictatorship to cope with the
debacle, or the rise of a socialist political
movement on the ruins of- -and extending far
beyond--the Democratic party. ^0
These problems are further accentuated because each of
the two major political parties faces severe tests in being
able to hold together coalitions necessary to push through
future programs. While more cohesive, even the Republican
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Party under Ronald Reagan is showing signs of strain. The
liberal Republicans have always been unco.fortable with
him. If his program falters> ^ w opportun . ty ^
maneuver. Richard vigeurie's new populist rhetoric indi-
cates increasing disaffection on the free-marketeer right,
opposing putting all the Republican eggs in the corporate
basket
.
The Democratic Party will face even more profound
problems, trying to coalesce some corporate sectors,
workers, women, Blacks and Hispanics, the
-Freeze movement"
and the underclass. It is caught in two related binds. If
it is to hold together as a coalition, the program it
advances to reassert economic growth will have to aid
capital accumulation, keep unemployment at "reasonable"
levels and appear to protect the disadvantaged. Specifi-
cally, the policies it has supported in defense of the
underclass are not only under increasing economic con-
straints, given the imperative of accumulation, but also
pose a threat to the identity of workers. If workers
explain their self-sacrifice in terms of their identity as
free and responsible persons, what appears to them as
"giveaways" may have the appearance of demeaning their
sacrifice and, thereby, lessening their sense of freedom.
Another New Deal coalition will be no easy task.
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The state, itself, will find its options limited,
regardless of which party prevails. On the one hand, it is
expected to be responsive to citizens through elections; on
the other, under present arrangements, it must continue to
support private accumulation. It can appear to do both
only if it succeeds in maintaining a depoliticized public.
Yet, Huntington notwithstanding, this may prove a more
difficult task than is generally assumed. For one thing,
certain legitimations have worn thin, particularly the
belief that we will all soon be getting a bigger share of a
constantly expanding pie. For another, either strategy for
reindustrialization will accentuate class and sectoral
cleavages with, at a minimum, opposition from both the free
marketeer right, and the left and the underclass. Here the
critical question will remain whether the discontent these
cleavages represent will be able to be translated into
effective political action.
The dilemma of the Democratic Party and the underclass
provide a good example of this problem. The present Demo-
cratic agenda is likely to be unable to incorporate a
serious program to speak to the needs of the underclass,
although it will certainly attempt to do so symbolically.
Without such a program, the "party of non-voters''^^- could
increase --disaffeet ion that overwhelmingly hurts the Demo-
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cratic Party more than the Republican Party. Yet, what
will happen with this disaffection? Will it translate into
effective depoliticization
,
allowing accumulation strate-
gies to proceed, while hurting Democratic electoral aspira-
tions? Will left dissidents within the party be able to
fashion a program to mobilize the disaffected as a serious
faction? Or will the disaffected be organized in extra-
party political institutions?; or will they simply engage
in proto-political or apolitical activity? This is the
particular dilemma of the Democrats and, in important
respects, American democracy in general.
If one agrees with the basic presumption of this
thesis, that from a democratic point of view there is no
alternative today to increased participation, then several
problems arise. These are pertinent whether one believes
the most effective strategy lies within or outside the
Democratic Party.
First, the strategy must demonstrate a reasonable
chance of success, which is to say, it must be one based on
serious coalition-building. If strictly moral exhortations
to participation ever had any power in American society,
they certainly will not hold sway today.
Secondly, for the strategy to be realistic, it cannot
simply fly in the face of the system imperatives we have
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identified-it must devise a program that can win short
term gains while altering the imperatives themselves. Pure
liberal welfare state policies will prove untenable if
given another try, unable to sustain growth or real justice
or to move us away from the dilemma the private accumu-
lation imPerative--with its present need for increased
depoliticization--puts democrats in. 42
Finally, for the strategy to be economically realistic
and politically accessible to a wide enough constituency to
make it credible, it must devise a program that both speaks
to present needs and overcomes those needs and beliefs that
presently divide its constituency or that disfavor programs
necessary to attack the constraints we suffer. This is a
complex problem; I can only offer a preliminary direction.
There are presently deep fears about nuclear war and
unemployment. These can be combined into an effective
program and coalition for jobs and peace. Although the
fear of nuclear war is sometimes part of a more general
fear of war, the connection between the two must be made
more explicit to develop political support for cuts in the
overall military budget. 43 How will nuclear war begin, for
example, if not in the bowels of a shooting war that gets
out of hand in unpredictable ways? Further, if we can
demonstrate that foreign intervention and aid to right wing
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regimes is used, at times, to repress workers abroad and
thereby depress wage demands that compete with American
workers, we can help heal a breach between radical
democrats and workers
.
There are also sound economic reasons to cut the mili-
tary budget. Military spending is inflationary, producing
items we cannot use in our daily life but that we expend
resources on. It also creates unemployment. For every one
billion dollars put into the military economy instead of
the consumer economy, 10,000 jobs disappear .44- Partly due
to its capital intensive nature, military spending, in
fact, produces fewer jobs than virtually any other sector
of the economy. If one can successfully make the argument
that true national security depends on a healthy economy
and that America has more than sufficient military capabi-
lity, a broad coalition for jobs and peace might prove
feasible
.
Other advantages emerge, as well. Funds would become
available to create productive jobs in industry and
technology and to help restore the infrastructure. We
could create jobs by creatively restoring social services
for those in need, thereby aiding in both respects women,
3lacks and Hispanics and the underclass. Moreover, there
is evidence that the above general strategy has appeal.
"Jobs with Peace" referenda have passed in over eighty
cities and towns in this country over the last several
years. If successful, such a coalition could be used to
create the political space for an even more difficult task.
The gap Huntington describes between ideals and
institutions underplays a disharmony inherent within
American ideals themselves^ that is insinuated into the
roles Americans adopt. There is a tension today between
the idea of democracy and that of equal opportunity to
succeed in the competitive race for advancement. For it is
the latter dream that helps legitimize both our attitude
toward growth based on private accumulation and the
ideology of sacrifice that helps divide workers from the
underclass. Both contribute to the pressure for ^indus-
trialization and depoliticization, undermining democratic
aspirations
.
The problem we face here is twofold. The political
subordination of the American public involves both a
constricted definition of politics and attitudes committing
people to roles that undermine the coalition program a
democratic thrust would require. Overcoming subordination
in the longer run involves overcoming both elements.
First, we need to speak to workers' democratic aspira-
tions. One way to do this, as Peter Bachrach argues, is to
incorporate workplace democracy into our program. 46 To the
degree experienced, education in self-rule can further
generate demands for increased responsibility and power,
helping dissolve our present commitment to roles that
reinforce depoliticization
.
For example, consumption for
its own sake might then appear less important. Or workers
might become disaffected with the imperative for private
accumulation itself, seeing how it fosters dependence on
large, impersonal organization and irrational product and
service designs, while undermining the self-reliance that
is also a vital element in their beliefs as Americans. 47 A
program incorporating worker's participation or control and
true self-reliance would, of course, at a minimum, raise
the issue of the corporation as an explicitly political
insti- tution, making vital decisions which we should have
a democratic right to participate in.
The second issue is even more difficult. For here we
are involved in fostering the development of roles that
are, in some important respects, different from the roles
people are now committed to. Creating a program with a
chance for success is the first step, especially if it
unites constituencies whose self-identities differ signifi-
cantly. The next is that, with a relevant program, parti-
cipation and struggle, in fact, can help people redefine
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for themselves and with their new allies, the roles they
now may desire to become committed to. Competition, indi-
vidualism, the ideology of sacrifice, increasing consump-
tion as a need, could give way to self-reliance with
cooperation, worker responsibility for production and the
idea of genuine participatory democracy.
As Bachrach points out and Huntington is well aware,
an important source of the subversive potential in demo-
cracy is the inability of America to fulfill the democratic
promise. In the past, American capitalism has, at times,
benefitted from the unfulfilled promise by creating reforms
that served to further legitimate the system, while
deflecting attention from deeper structural concerns. 48
However, this course may prove more difficult in the
future, given the deepening legitimation problems and
structural constraints American capitalism now faces.
Reindustrialization strategies increase these tensions and
ultimately depend on fostering even greater depolitici-
zation than we witness today.
To promote the kind of counter-strategy for radical
democratic participation I have suggested, is to promote a
kind of class struggle49__one that certainly entails
risks. Worker-corporate confrontation poses a threat to
the present "pseudodemocratic system," chancing repression
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and/or cynicism and further withdrawal if this strategy
falters. Yet, as Bachrach asks, "Given the magnitude of
the democratic crisis, which we now face, does any
alternative exist?" He answers:
Lh
' • Tocqueville was probably right when he saidt at the great advantage" of America lays in thefact that it did not have to "endure a democratic
revolution." Over a hundred and fifty yearslater it is doubtful whether the nation can now
attord not to endure a democratic revolution . 50
Whatever one's opinion on these issues, they are part
of a general problematic that will face American citizens
over the coming era, ranking second in importance only to
the threat of nuclear war. Political theorists cannot
exempt themselves from these concerns, try as some may. As
we have seen:
Class struggle is seldom regarded by mainstream
social scientists as a vital ingredient to the
health of a democratic polity. On the contrary,
it is usually perceived as a threat to the
stability, if not the survival of democracy. 51
Yet, if some of the crisis tendencies we have dis-
cussed are real, the middle ground inhabited by liberal
theorists between stark strategies of depoliticization and
radical democracy may be eroding. If analysis has implica-
tions for political action, theorists of democracy will be
under greater pressure than before to line up, explicitly
or tacitly, with free-marketeers, corporatists , or radical
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democrats. Whether they do so forthrightly will depend on
their degree of self-consciousness as theorists.
The analysis of non-participation, in turn, will
specifically have implications-riot only for our evaluation
of the present character of democracy--but for our study
of, and the development of strategies to advance or retard,
further democratic participation, as well. If there is,
indeed, a crisis brewing for American democracy, these
explanations may prove significant for immediate political
practice, as well as longer term political theory.
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reason to increase participation is to undermine ^author-ity. But his concession to Merelman on "anticipated
response pushes him to stress the "observability" of the
nondecision in the first place. Thus, his article "Two
Faces of Power" retains the subtlety of Schattschneider
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and his later discussions of participation also push him in
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as Lukes points out, to try to incorporate too much in the
paradigm of nondecision-making
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Poverty, p. 46.
42. The implication is that if people were free, they
would pursue their real interests. If they are unable to
do so, there must exist constraints on their freedom. If
these constraints emanate from structural sources rather
than personal ones, we may say, what appeared to be a
relation of authority, between individual and society, is
really a relation of power.
43. In some respects, Bachrach's view of interests has
some of the problems of "need" theorists, generally. See
William E. Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse,
45-83.
44. Bachrach, "Interests," p. 2. My emphasis.
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, p. 6. My emphasis.
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, pp. 8-9.
48 Bachrach writes: "A particularly potent form ofcoaptation is 'participatory democracy';: in PhilipSelzmck's words, it gives 'the oppositon the illusion Q f avoice without the voice itself, and so stifles oppositionwithout having to alter policy in the least"' (Power andPoverty, pp. 44-45). See alsopp. 129-130 this manuscript
.
49. In his recent article "Class Struggle and
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50. In this dissertation, see pp. 105-106 for Bachrach
on tnis issue and my comments on pp. 110-111.
51. There are three general points worth notinp as an
aside to the conclusion: First, Bachrach concedes that
workers are uninterested in national politics arguing thatthey are more likely to be interested in work-life issues.
The result may be to mispercieve the present interests of
workers, forgetting a main point in both his and Schatt-
schneider s analysis: people may reject politics because
the issues don t meet their present concerns. Both
everyday issues and national issues may become organized
into politics if they speak to people's interests.
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the^ extent to which non-elites can unconsciously work
against their own. In studying a "power struggle," for
example, he argues that the necessary and sufficient
condition for its existence is if non-elites are aware of a
conflict: "For purposes of analysis, a power struggle
exists, overtly or covertly, either when both sets of
contestants are aware of its existence or when only the
less powerful party is aware of it" (Power and Poverty
, p.
50) . Are we to infer that if only elites are aware of a
power contest, using their awareness to manipulate
acquiescence and unconscious mass support, that a "power
struggle" has not taken place?
Thirdly, Bachrach argues that modern workers
undoubtedly suffer alienation and that there is "no basis
to presume that alienation significantly impairs their
ability to make rational political choices." Yet, these
547
articulated preferences actually refUct their 1deep-seated concerns." It is hard to see how the worker
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LnS 7tl0nal P,olitical Voices when his or Sirrticulated preferences do not reflect what really shouldbe implant to him or her. This reflects the deepertension in Bachrach between his acknowledgment that many(including, at least workers and the underclass) are notfully conversant with their interests, and his desire toavoid elitism. At this stage of his work he failstherefore, to directly incorporate a conception of'false-consciousness into his analysis. (See "Interests,"
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note 48 above. J
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The shift in ownership, Mills argued, and
exaggerations of the degree of competition among business-
men before the height of business concentration, continued
to be obscured by the rhetoric of competition still pervad-ing American ideology. For big business "competition"
provided an ideological cover, behind which they could
legitimize "rationalization" of the market. For small
business, it became the rally-cry behind which their
political leaders could mobilize and exploit anxieties.
For^ both, the "rhetoric of competition" retained a
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the economic position of the business world in terms of
merit
.
Yet, as a public belief this "rhetoric of competition"
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determining economic advantage. As a private dream, it
blurred the difference between democratic and class
property
.
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See chart below:
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THE MIDDLE CLASSES
1870 1940
Old Middle Class 357
Farmers ~
Businessmen
Free Professionals
44%
521 231
21% 19%
2% 2%
New Middle Class I57 567Managers
^
-jf
14%
14%
2% 22%
Salaried Professionals 4%
Salespeople 77Office Workers
TOTAL MIDDLE CLASSES 100% 100%
Based on Mills, White Collar
, p. 65.
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lies about one's feelings until one is emptied of such
feelings." Fraternity, courtesy and altruism become
"impersonal cermonials" "having little to do psycholo-
gically with old-fashioned 'feeling for another'";
directness, deference, deliberateness or frankness also
become a choice of tack.
How should the salesperson maintain him or herself?
Quoting an anonymous source from the 1920' s, Mills
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achieve success?"
What is the practice necessary?: the practice of
MUls ?ecou^ts "
S Lnt
° ^ mind : A1 su88e^ed technique
rZttl
r n
-
• • .
when one is alone amid quiet andrestful surroundings.
. . preferably just before
1
going tosleep.
. .
the doorway
. . . into the subconscious seems tobe more nearly ajar than at any other time. If at that
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ne
-
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.
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t
°
Ver and
°Ver a§ain an affirmation ofealt vigor, vital energy, and success, the idea will
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appropriate machine technology, such as electronic
calculators, sophisticated typewriters, mechanical
collators, that required central control, facilitated the
cost-effectiveness of centralization and helped "make
bigness workable."
However, it had not yet, he reports, reached the level
in industry, especially in regard to capital investment,
although it was clearly the wave of the future.
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The old bookkeeper became no match for the high school
"girl" with three or four months machine training: "It is
like a pick and shovel against a power scoop. As a result,
the older bookkeepers are reduced to the level of the
clerical mass." Yet, even the new machine operative is not
safe: just as the machine operating high school "girl"
replaces the bookkeepers, "so the big new machines promise,
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.
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Fry writes, Freudian later metapsychology and instinct
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1. Peter Clecak, "Herbert Marcuse," in Radical
Paradoxes (New York: Harper and Row, 1953), pp. 175-229.
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570
simple desublimated release. See The Imag inary Witness,
pp. 102-108.
34. Habermas
,
"Technology and Science," p. 112.
35. Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of
Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1976), pp. 220-282.
36. Stuart Hampshire, Morality and Pessimism
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972)
,
p . 31
.
37. Ibid.
,
p. 12.
38. Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action (New York:
Viking Press, 1959), Chapter 3: "Action and Self-
Consciousness." pp. 169-222.
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CHAPTER VI
1. See Chapter I. Cynicism is a term likely to be
sed today. See the discussion of Samuel Huntington,
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acts and who is likely to perform them see Verba and Nie
Participation in America . '
3. See Chapter II, p. 102.
4. See Chapter V, p. 364-366 and pp. 401-407. See
also William E. Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse
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social inquiry. Thus, I include the words, "might not be
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.
20. George Gilder, Wealth and Poverty (New York: Basic
Books, 1981), p. 259.
21. See William E. Connolly, "The Politics of
Reindustrialization , " Democracy (July, 1981), pp. 15-16,
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also pp. 17-18.
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p. 114.
25. Samuel Huntington, American Politics --The Promise
of Disharmony (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1981), p. 41.
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p. 69.
27. Huntington does discuss different propensities
between strata. Although most American support the
"Creed," the better educated, those of higher socioeconomic
status,^ or those in political or social leadership, are
more likely to give stronger support. He also suggests,
"higher status people are more likely to be hypocritical or
complacent, lower-status people to be cynical or
moralistic," because of differing perceptions on how wide
the Institution vs. Ideals gap is ( ibid . , pp. 71-72).
28. Ibid.
,
p. 129.
29. He does discuss a cyclical tendency in the earlier
work. It is in American Politics that he gives it the more
systematic treatment.
30. Ibid .
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid .
34. Ibid.
p. 222.
pp. 228-229.
pp. 231-232.
p. 261. My emphasis.
p. 85.
35. This statement is consistent with his
straightforward statement on "apathy" for the Trilateral
Commission
.
36. Huntington seems most concerned with our relations
with Europe and Japan: "The impact that the state of
liberty in other states has on liberty in the United States
depends upon the power of those other societies and their
ability to exercise that power with respect to the United
States^1 ( ibid . , p. 257) .
37. The depoliticizing strategy Huntington's work
implies, often in the guise of expertise, makes him subject
to the following charge: "The technocratic theorist might
argue that state officials, trying to manage a complex
economy, should be released from the obligation to
legitimize their policies to a wider populace or, more
directly, that the conception of role-bearers appropriate
to scientific explanation and social control is incompa-
tible with the self-conception of the role-bearers them-
574
selves. Such an account, once its import is elaboratedmust appear to us today to be quite implausible and to bethoroughly contemptuous of those whose conduct is to be
thl pi!?' J0V the the ?r i st > in constructing and defendinge explanation, must claim to exercise the very capacitieshe strips from the human objects of inquiry. The
self-identity of the one is affirmed while that of the
other is repudiated; and no ground is provided fordifferentiating the one from the other" (William EConnolly, Appearance and Reality in Politics
, pp. 88-89).
38. Huntington argues that, in contrast to "end ofideology theories, he believes ideology--the consensus inthe American Creed-
-is basic to understanding American
political behavior. Yet, to the degree the general
argument of his book is accepted, the effect is to mitigate
the power of the ideas and bring them into conformity with
the institutions the end of ideology ideologists claim are
part of the normal course of political and economic
development and beyond ideological
. contestation.
39. Burnham, "The Eclipse of the Democratic Party,"
p. 7.
40. Ibid
.
,
p. 17.
41. Ibid.
42. For example, the economy of growth leads to ever
increasing strains on capital and natural resources, while
fostering a mode of living that continuously turns former
luxuries into necessities (e.g., the auto in suburban and
rural areas). This fosters the system's need for further
growth and, by putting continual pressure on the family
budget, develops political support for growth.
Yet this is precisely the dynamic that has provided
the groundwork for reindustrializat ion strategies based on
augmenting private accumulation.
See William E. Connolly, "The Politics of Reindus-
trialization," for a discussion of the relation between
economic growth, reindustrialization , and the discrediting
of the liberal welfare state political agenda.
43. Cuts beyond nuclear weapons are necessary, in
part, because nuclear weapons account for only twenty
percent of the "defense" budget.
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44. See Marion Anderson, The Empty Pork Barrel(Lansing, MI: Employment Research Associates, 1982).
45. Huntington does discuss the tension between
equality and "liberty of achievement," concluding they are
able to coexist in the United States, unlike in Europe
(American Politics--The Promise of Disharmony
, p. 17).
46. See Bachrach, "Class Struggle and Democracy," pp.30-33 and passim
.
47. William Connolly, "Civic-Disaffection and the
Democratic Party," Democracy
,
July 1982, pp. 26-27.
48. See also Bachrach, "Class Struggle and Democracy,"
p . 34
.
49. Bachrach discusses a related concept of class
struggle that seems pertinent to immediate political
practice in the United States. See his article above.
50. Ibid
.
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p. 42.
51. Ibid
.
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p. 33.
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